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INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INYESTirxATE  THE  ABMINISTKATION 

OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECUEITY  ACT  AND  OTHER 

INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 

ON 

THE  INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


PART  3 

SEPTEMBER  14,  18,  19,  20,  25,  1951 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


r^ 


Ersfem  Bnsiness  BrricS 
DEC  24  1952 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
22848  WASHINGTON  :   1951 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada,  Chwirman 

HARLBY  M.  KILGORE,  West  Virginia  ALEXANDER  WILEY,  Wisconsin 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi  WILLIAM  LANGER,  North  Dakota 

WARREN  G.  MAGNUSON,  Wasliington  HOMER  FERGUSON,  Micliisran 

HERBERT  R.  O'CONOR,  Maryland  WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana 

ESTES  KEFAUVER,  Tennessee  ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah 

WILLIS  SMITH,  North  Carolina  ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey 

J.  G.  SouRwixE,  Counsel 


Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Internal  Security 
Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

PAT  MCCARRAN,  Nevada,  Chairman 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi  HOMER  FERGUSON,  Michigan 

HERBERT  R.  O'CONOR,  Maryland  WILLIAM  B.  JENNER,  Indiana 

WILLIS  SMITH,  North  Carolina  ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah 


Subcommittee  Investigating  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,"^Mississippi,  Chairman 

PAT  MCCARRAN,  Nevada  HOMER  FERGUSON,  Michigan 

ROBERT  MORRIS,  Special  Counsel 
Benjamin  Mandel,  Director  of  Research 

II 


CONTENTS 


Testimony  of —  Page 

Carter,  Edward  C 896 

Colegrove,  Prof.  Kenneth 905 

Dooman,  Eugene  H 703 

Fortier,  Brig.  Gen.  L.  Joseph  (retired) 843 

Kornfeder,  Joseph  Zack 864 

Wedemeyer,  Lt.  Gen.  Albert  C.  (retired) 775 

Widener,  Mrs.  William  Harry 755 

in 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


miDAY,   SEPTEMBER   14,   1951 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  to  Investigate  the 
Administration  of  the  Internal  Security 
Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

OF  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met  at  10  a.m.,  pursuant  to  call,  in  room  424, 
Senate  Office  Buildino;,  Senator  Pat  McCarran  (chairman)  presiding. 
Present :  Senators  McCarran,  Eastland,  and  Smith  of  North  Caro- 
lina. 

Also  present :  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel ;  Robert  Morris, 
subcommittee  counsel ;  and  Benjamin  Mandel,  director  of  research. 
The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
The  chair  regrets  that,  due  to  the  absence  of  the  chairman  from 
the  Senate  for  2  weeks,  the  matter  of  these  hearings  has  been  delayed. 
They  will  proceed  more  expeditiously  from  now  on. 
Wlio  is  our  witness  today,  Mr.  Morris  ? 
Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Eugene  Dooman. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  are 
about  to  give  before  this  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judi- 
ciary of  the  United  States  Senate  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth, 
and  notliing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 
Mr.  Dooman.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  EUGENE  H.  DOOMAN,  LITCHFIELD,  CONN. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  give  your  name  and  address  to  the  reporter, 
please,  Mr.  Dooman? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Eugene  H.  Dooman,  and  my  home  is  at  Litchfield, 
Conn. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  present  occupation,  Mr.  Dooman? 

Mr.  Dooman.  I  am  retired. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  will  you  tell  us  what  positions  you  have 
held  in  the  United  States  State  Department? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Well,  from  the  beginning,  in  1912,  when  I  entered  the 
Foreign  Service,  I  was  first  assigned  to  the  Embassy  at  Tokyo  to  study 
the  Japanese  language. 

After  several  years'  tour  of  duty  in  several  of  the  consulates  in 
Japan,  I  was  assigned  to  the  American  Embassy  at  Tokyo  as  third 
secretary  in  1921. 

I  remained  there  until  1931,  when  I  was  transferred  as  first  secre- 
tary of  the  Embassy  at  London. 

703 


704  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

From  1933  to  1937  I  had  the  Japanese  desk  in  the  Far  Eastern 
Division  of  the  State  Department,  and  in  that  last  year  I  was  trans- 
ferred to  Tokyo  as  counselor  of  the  American  Embassy. 

In  1942  after  my  return  from  Japan  I  was  assigned  to  the  Embassy 
in  Russia  as  minister  consular.  I  returned  to  the  State  Department 
in  1942  and  after  doing  various  things  I  was  assigned  in  February 
1945  as  Chairman  of  the  Far  East  Subcommittee  of  the  State,  War, 
and  Navy  Coordinating  Committee. 

And  I  retired  on  the  31st  of  August  1945. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  explain  the  importance  of  that  Far  Eastern 
Committee  mentioned  as  your  last  position  held  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  had  previously  been  found  that  discussions  be- 
tween the  various  departments — that  is,  primarily  the  State  Depart- 
ment, the  War  Department,  and  the  Navy  Department — in  connec- 
tion with  problems  that  arose  out  of  the  war  through  negotiations 
were  unsatisfactory. 

And  in  1944,  I  believe  it  was,  a  committee  was  formed,  known  as 
the  State,  War,  and  Navy  Coordinating  Committee.  The  members 
of  that  committee  were  the  Assistant  Secretaries  of  those  repective 
Departments,  the  Chairman  being  James  Dunn,  who  was  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State. 

Under  the  Coordinating  Committee  there  were  two  subcommittees, 
one  for  Germany  and  one  for  Japan,  and  it  was  the  function  of  those 
committees  to  formulate  a  joint  agreement  or  meeting  of  the  minds 
of  the  three  Departments  on  various  problems  that  had  both  political 
and  military  content. 

Tlie  Subcommittee  on  the  Far  East,  of  which  I  was  Chairman,  then 
had  the  function  of  developing  and  formulating  policies  with  respect 
to  Japan  primarily,  which  had  both  military  and  political  content. 

I  would  therefore  say  that  it  was  the  original  source  of  all  of  the 
ultimate  decisions  that  were  made  in  the  field  of  policy  respecting 
Japan. 

Mr.  Morris.  Well,  Mr.  Dooman,  can  you  recall  that  Owen  Lattimore 
was  proposed  at  one  time  as  a  consultant  to  the  chief  of  the  China  desk 
of  the  Department  of  State? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  can;  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  tell  us  your  recollection  with  respect  to  that 
particular  incident,  Mr.  Dooman? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  At  that  time,  which  must  have  been  early  in  1945, 
I  was,  as  I  have  just  said,  acting  as  Chairman  of  this  Far  Eastern  Sub- 
committee of  S  WINK,  and  I  was  therefore  not  primarily  interested 
in  the  functions  and  operations  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division,  or  the 
Far  Eastern  Office,  as  it  was  then  called. 

But  one  of  the  men  in  the  office  told  me  that  papers  were  going 
through  the  State  Department  calling  for  the  appointment  of  Dr. 
Lattimore  as  adviser  to  the  China  Division,  the  papers  having  been 
initiated  by  the  Chief  of  the  China  Division. 

Mr.  Morris.  Who  was  that  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  That  was  Mr.  John  Carter  Vincent. 

I  discussed  the  matter  with  Mr.  Ballantine,  wiio  was  then  Director 
of  the  Far  Eastern  Division,  and  pointed  out  that  Lattimore  at  that 
time,  and  for  several  months  previously,  had  been  using  every  oppor- 
tunity to  discredit  the  then  Acting  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Grew. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  705 

And  I  pointed  out  that  it  would  be  incongruous  for  a  man  who  had 
expressed  himself  so  freely  on  Mr.  Grew  to  be  occupying  a  position 
under  Mr.  Grew. 

With  that  I  reported  the  matter  to  Mr.  Grew,  and  he  then  called  up 
the  administrative  people  who  had  charge  of  appointments  and  or- 
dered that  the  papers  be  quashed. 

Senator  Eastland.  Wliat  did  Mr.  Lattimore  have  to  say  against 
Mr.  Grew  ?    What  was  the  complaint  against  him  ? 

Mr.  Doom  AN.  That  would  take  a  long  time. 

Senator  Eastland.  Was  it  because  he  had  been  opposing  com- 
munism in  the  Far  East  and  because  he  wanted  a  peace  treaty  that 
would  prevent  the  Communists  from  getting  Japan? 

The  Chairman.  By  "he,"  you  refer  to  Mr.  Grew  ? 

Senator  Eastland.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  The  principal  cause  of  complaint  Avas  that  Mr.  Grew 
had  advocated  an  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  of  nonin- 
terference with  the  Japanese  themselves  in  the  form  of  government 
which  they  wanted  to  institute. 

In  other  words,  if  they  wanted  to  keep  the  Emperor,  by  all  means 
let  them  keep  it.  If  they  wanted  to  disestablish  the  monarchy,  by 
all  means  let  them  disestablish  it. 

Senator  Eastland.  Why  would  the  Communists  want  the  Emperor 
overthrown  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  The  point  which  you  have  mentioned.  Senator,  was 
one  of  the  cardinal  points  of  the  Communists  not  only  in  the  United 
States  but  also  throughout  the  world.  They  knew  perfectly  well,  of 
course,  that  communism  and  a  monarchial  system  were  incongruous. 

Therefore,  the  first  thing  was  to  get  rid  of  the  monarchial  system. 

They  knew  also  that  the  communalistic  type  of  society  which  has 
existed  in  Japan  for  2,000  years  existed  largely  because  of  the  Em- 
peror being  a  sort  of  an  element  which  brought  the  Nation  together. 

Now,  this  is  the  type  of  thing  which  I  do  not  understand  myself, 
and  I  do  not  believe  any  occidental  can,  but  nevertheless,  it  is  a  fact. 

Senator  Eastland.  Lattimore  understood  that  fact? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Lattimore  understood  the  fact  that  it  was  the  Em- 
peror who  did  bring  it  together. 

Senator  Eastland.  His  opposition  to  Grew  was  that  Mr.  Grew  was 
favoring  a  policy  after  the  war  was  won  that  would  prevent  the  Com- 
munists from  getting  Japan.     That  is  it  in  a  nutshell,  is  it  not? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  That  would  be — if  I  were  to  answer  your  question, 
Senator,  it  would  be  largely  question  of  opinion. 

Senator  Eastland.  That  is  your  judgment? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  That  is  my  judgment. 

Senator  Eastland.  And  Mr.  John  Carter  Vincent  was  urging  the 
appointment  of  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  that  a  question  ? 

Senator  Eastland.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Senator  Eastland's  proposed  question  was:  Was  Mr. 
John  Carter  Vincent  urging  the  appointment  of  Owen  Lattimore  at 
that  time? 

Mr.  Doom  AN.  Yes. 

As  I  mentioned  in  my  testimony,  the  papers  calling  for  the  assign- 
ment of  Lattimore  as  adviser  to  the  China  Division  were  initiated 
by  Vincent. 


706  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris,  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  point,  since  we  have  gotten  into 
the  subject,  I  think  it  is  appropriate  that  we  should  introduce  into 
the  record  a  resohition  of  the  Communist  Party  at  this  juncture  with 
respect  to  the  policy  toward  Japan. 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  authenticate  the  resolution  that  has  been  dis- 
cussed so  far  today  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  mimeographed  copy  of  excerpts  from  a 
magazine  called  Political  Affairs  for  July  1945,  the  official  organ  at 
that  time  of  the  Communist  Political  Association. 

It  is  headed  "The  present  situation  and  the  next  tasks." 

The  Chairman.  That  is  published  where? 

Mr.  Mandel.  In  Political  Affairs,  July  1945,  published  in  New 
York  City. 

These  excerpts  are  taken  from  a  draft  resolution  of  the  national 
board  of  the  CPA,  which  is  the  abbreviation  for  the  Communist 
Political  Association,  as  amended  and  approved  by  the  national  com- 
mittee on  June  20. 

This  draft  is  now  submitted  for  the  further  consideration  of  the  member- 
ship and  for  final  action  by  tlie  emergency  national  convention  of  the  CPA  on 
July  26-28. 

The  following  excerpts  are  quoted  [reading] : 

This  growing  reactionary  opposition  to  a  truly  democratic  and  anti-Fascist 
Europe  in  which  the  people  will  have  the  right  to  freely  choose  their  own  forms 
of  government  and  social  system  has  been  reflected  in  many  of  the  recent  actions 
of  the  State  Department. 

This  explains  wliy,  at  San  Francisco,  Stettinius  and  Connally  joined  hands 
with  Vandenberg — the  spolvesman  for  Hoover  and  the  most  predatory  sections  of 
American  finance  capital.     *     *     * 

It  is  this  reactionary  position  of  the  American  big  business  which  explains 
why  Washington,  along  with  London,  are  pursuing  the  dangerous  policy  of 
preventing  a  strong,  united  and  democratic  China  ;  and  why  they  bolster  up  the 
reactionary,  incompetent  Chiang  Kai-shelv  regime  and  why  they  harbor  the  idea 
of  coming  to  terms  with  the  Mikado  in  the  hope  of  maintaining  Japan  as  a 
reactionary  bulwark  in  the  Far  East. 

In  the  vital  struggle  to  crush  feudal-Fascist-militarist  Japan,  it  is  necessary 
that  American  labor  collaborate  in  the  prosecution  of  the  anti-Japanese  war  with 
all  democratic  forces  who  favor  and  support  victory  over  Japanese  imperialism. 

However,  labor  and  other  anti-Fascists  must  take  cognizance  of  the  fact  that, 
amongst  those  big-business  circles  who  desire  military  victory  over  Japan,  tiiere 
are  influential  forces,  including  some  in  the  State  Department,  who  are  seeking 
a  compromise  peace  which  will  preserve  the  power  of  the  Mikado  after  the  war, 
at  tlie  expense  of  Cliina  and  the  other  Far  East  peoples,  and  directed  against 
the  Soviet  Union.  Similarly,  there  are  powerful  capitalist  groupings,  including 
many  in  administration  circles,  who  plan  to  use  the  coming  defeat  of  Japan  for 
imperialist  aims,  for  maintaining  a  reactionary  puppet  Kuomintang  regime  in 
China,  for  obtaining  American  imperialist  domination  in  the  Far  East.     *     *     * 

In  the  opinion  of  the  Communist  Policy  Association,  such  a  program  should 
be  based  on  the  following  slogans  of  action : 

*  *  *  *  *  *         -  * 

Remove  from  the  State  Department  all  pro-Fascist  and  reactionary 
ofBcials.     *     *     * 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  have  introduced  into 
the  record  the  excerpts  of  the  extracts  from  Political  Affairs  of  July 
1945,  which  was  read  by  Mr.  INIandel.  I  would  like  to  introduce  that 
into  the  record  and  have  it  marked  as  the  next  consecutive  exhibit. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  so  marked  and  received. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  234,"  and  is 
as  follows:) 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  707 

[From.  Political  Affairs,  July  1945] 

The  Present  Situation  and  the  Next  Tasks 

Di-aft  resolution  of  the  National  Board,  CPA  (Communist  Political  Associa- 
tion), as  amended  and  approved  l)y  the  national  committee  on  June  20.  This 
draft  is  now  submitted  for  the  further  consideration  of  the  membership  and 
for  final  action  by  the  emergency  national  convention  of  the  CPA  on  July 
26-28  (p.  579)  : 

t^  *****  * 

This  growing  reactionary  opposition  to  a  truly  democratic  and  anti-Fascist 
Europe,  in  which  the  people  will  have  the  right  to  freely  choose  their  own  forms 
of  government  and  social  system,  has  been  reflected  in  many  of  the  recent 
actions  of  the  State  Department.  This  explains  why,  at  San  Francisco,  Stet- 
tinius  and  Connally  joined  hands  with  Vandenberg — the  spokesman  for  Hoover 
and  the  most  predatory  sections  of  American  linance  capital    *     *     *     (p  58O). 

It  is  this  reactionary  position  of  American  big  business  which  explains  why 
Washington,  along  with  London,  are  pursuing  the  dangerous  policy  of  prevent- 
ing a  strong,  united  and  democratic  China  ;  why  they  bolster  up  the  reactionary, 
incompetent  Chiang  Kai-shek  regime  and  why  they  harbor  the  idea  of  coming 
to  terms  with  the  Mikado  in  the  hope  of  maintaining  Japan  as  a  reactionary 
bulwark  in  the  Far  East     *     *     *      (p.  581). 

In  the  vital  struggle  to  crush  feudal-Fascist  militarist  Japan  it  is  necessary 
that  American  labor  collaborate  in  the  prosecution  of  the  anti-Japanese  war 
with  all  democratic  forces  who  favor  and  support  victory  over  Japanese  im- 
perialism. 

However,  labor  and  the  other  anti-Fascists  must  take  cognizance  of  the  fact 
that,  amongst  those  big-business  circles  who  desire  military  victory  over  Japan, 
there  are  influential  forces,  including  some  in  the  State  Department,  who  are 
seeking  a  compromise  peace  v.iiich  will  preserve  the  power  of  the  Mikado  after 
the  war,  at  the  expense  of  China  and  the  other  Far  East  peoples,  and  directed 
against  the  Soviet  Union.  Similarly,  there  are  powerful  capitalist  groupings, 
including  many  in  administration  circles,  who  plan  to  use  the  coming  defeat  of 
Japan  for  imperialist  aims,  for  maintaining  a  reactionary  puppet  Kuomintang 
regime  in  China,  for  obtaining  American  imperialist  domination  in  the  Far 
East     *     *     *     (p.  583). 

In  the  opinion  of  the  Communist  Political  Association,  such  a  program  should 
be  based  on  the  following  slogans  of  action  : 

*  *  *  *  *  *  * 

Remove  from  the  State  Department  all  pro-Fascist  and  reactionary 
officials     *     *     *     (p.  584). 

Mr.  DooMAN.  May  I  add  something  to  that  story  about  the  papers 
for  appointment  ? 

Mr.  MoRPas.  By  all  means,  Mr.  Dooman. 

Mr.  Dooman.  I  just  recall  now  that  about  2  weeks  after  this  episode 
Dr.  Isaiah  Bowman,  president  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  University,  came 
to  see  the  President.  That  mnst  have  been  then,  I  think  it  was,  along 
about  February  of  1945.  He  came  to  see  the  President  and  asked  the 
President  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  Dr.  Lattimore  with  the  State 
Department.  And  the  matter  was  brought  to  the  attention  then  of  the 
State  Department  and  no  further  action  was  taken. 

May  I  correct  it  again?    This  must  have  been  about  April  of  1945. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  position  did  John  Carter  Vincent  hold  at  that 
time,  Mr.  Dooman,  at  the  time  these  papers  for  employing  Mr.  Latti- 
more as  consultant  were  submitted  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  He  was  Chief  of  the  China  Division. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  hold  any  other  position  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Not  at  that  time, 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  he  associated  with  one  of  the  area  committees? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Well,  yes.    The  far-eastern  area  was  an  intradepart- 


708  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

mental  committee  at  which  there  "was  an  attempt  made  to  get  a  con- 
sensus of  opinion  about  various  policies  concerning  the  Far  East. 
And  the  coni]iosition  of  that  committee  varied  with  the  problems  that 
were  discussed. 

But,  generally  speaking,  the  standing  members  of  that  were  Dr. 
Blakeslee,  who  was  chairman.  Dr.  Hugh  Borton,  who  was  secretary,, 
and  then  the  Chief  of  the  Japan  Division,  Mr.  Earl  Dickover;  INIr. 
Ballantine,  Director  of  the  Far  Eastern  Office,  and  myself  as  chair- 
man of  this  far  eastern  subcommittee. 

And  then,  depending  on  the  problems  to  be  discussed,  there  was 
representation  from  other  divisions  of  the  Department  who  were 
interested  in  that  particular  problem. 

For  example,  if  we  were  discussing  the  question  of  the  mandated 
islands,  we  would  have  representatives  from  the  Legal  Section  and 
from,  we  will  say,  the  European  Section,  and  so  on. 

Mr.  Morris.  Could  you  say  this  was  a  policy-making  committee,. 
Mr.  Dooman? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  was  a  policy-developing  committee. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  John  Carter  Vincent  a  member  of  that  com- 
mittee ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes;  he  could  come  in  whenever  he  wanted  to.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  he  chose  not  to  come  very  often.  He  was  usually 
represented  by  a  man  from  his  office  called  Julian  Friedman. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  asked  the  question:  Was  John  Carter 
Vincent  a  member  of  that  committee. 

I  would  like  to  have  an  answer  to :  Was  he  a  member  of  that  com- 
mittee? 

Mr.  DooNAN.  Well,  as  I  tried  to  explain,  the  membership  in  that 
committee  was  a  fairly  loose  thing,  because  it  varied  with  the  subjects 
to  be  discussed.  There  were  no  officially  appointed  members  of  the 
committee.  There  were  certain  standing  members,  those  primarily 
concerned  with  Japan. 

And  then  the  composition  of  the  committee  was  extended,  depend- 
ing upon  the  character  of  the  subject  to  be  discussed.  Naturally^ 
China  would  be  very  much  influenced  by  whatever  policies  we  set 
up  for  Japan,  and,  therefore,  it  was  quite  right  and  proper  that  the 
China  Division  should  be  fully  familiar  with  whatever  was  going  on 
in  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  "When  John  Carter  Vincent  did  attend,  did  he  have 
full  authorit}'  the  same  as  any  other  member  of  the  committee  both 
to  speak,  act,  and  vote? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes,  sir. 
.     The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  testify,  Mr.  Dooman,  that  when  Mr.  John 
Carter  Vincent  did  not  attend  he  sent  a  representative? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Sometimes  they  both  came. 

Mr.  Morris.  Sometimes  both  Julian  Friedman  and  John  Carter 
Vincent  came? 

JNIr.  Dooman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  Julian  Friedman  take  a  position  and  express  him- 
self at  these  meetings? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Not  very  often. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  709 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  make  any  charges  against  Julian  Fried- 
man at  that  time  in  connection  with  his  attendance  at  the  area  meet- 
ings ? 

Mr.  DooMAisr.  No;  I  did  not  make  any  charges  because  that  implies 
that  I  complained  to  somebody  else,  some  higher  authority. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  interrupt  again.  I  may  have  lost  track  of 
this. 

Who  was  Julian  Friedman  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Julian  Friedman  was  a  member  of  the  China  Divi- 
sion of  the  State  Department. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

]Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  introduce  into  the  rec- 
ord at  this  time  a  letter  which  indicates  Julian  Friedman's  associa- 
tion with  the  State  Department,  and  at  the  same  time  his  connection 
with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Kelations,  which  composition  is  being 
considered  by  this  committee. 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  authenticate  both  of  those  documents  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  first  is  a  letter  from  the  State  Department  to  the 
Honorable  Pat  McCarran,  dated  April  23,  1951,  signed  by  Eldridge 
Durbrow,  Chief,  Division  of  Foreign  Service  Personnel. 

The  letter  reads  as  follows : 

My  Dear  Senator  McCarran  :  Your  letter  of  April  10,  1951,  addressed  to  the 
Secretary,  concerning  Julian  R.  Friedman,  has  been  referred  to  me  for  reply. 

A  review  of  Mr.  Friedman's  record  indicates  that  he  had  served  as  a  junior 
economic  analyst  in  the  Foreign  Service  Auxiliary  from  October  5,  1945,  until  the 
termination  of  his  employment  on  November  12, 1946. 

As  you  may  recall,  the  Foreign  Service  Act  of  1946,  approved  August  13,  was 
effective  November  13,  1946.  Consequently,  it  had  been  decided  to  abolish  the 
Auxiliary,  a  temporary  wartime  branch  of  the  Foreign  Service,  as  of  November 
12,  1946.  In  proceeding  with  the  liquidation  of  the  Auxiliary,  it  was  necessary 
to  order  back  to  the  United  States  for  termination  a  number  of  temporary  or 
Auxiliary  officers,  including  Mr.  Friedman.  Mr.  Friedman's  record  shows  that 
his  services  were  terminated  without  prejudice. 

I  trust  that  the  foregoing  information  will  meet  your  needs. 
Sincerely  yours. 

The  Biographical  Register  of  the  State  Department,  dated  October 
1, 194.5,  on  page  106,  lists  the  positions  held  by  Julian  Friedman,  which 
I  would  like  to  put  into  the  record. 

I  can  read  them,  if  you  desire. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  do  not  think  it  is  necessary,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  also  submit  Security  in  the  Pacific,  a  preliminary 
report  of  the  ninth  conference  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 
held  at  Hot  Springs,  Va.,  January  6  to  17,  1945,  on  page  1061,  which 
shows  that  Julian  Friedman  was  a  member  of  the  conference  secre- 
tariat. 

And  further  I  submit  a  circular  distributed  by  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations  showing  a  meeting  held  announcing  a  new  IPR 
study,^  Notes  on  Labor  Problems  in  Nationalist  China,  by  Israel 
Epstein,  with  a  supplement  called  Labor  in  Nationalist  China, 
1945^8,  by  Julian  R.  Friedman. 

Introduce  that  circular  into  the  record. 

Mr,  Morris.  I  would  like  to  introduce  into  the  record,  to  have 
marked  as  the  next  consecutive  exhibits,  the  four  documents  just 
described  and  read  by  Mr.  Mandel. 


710  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  first  is  a  letter  from  the  State  Department  to  the  chairman  on 
Julian  Friedman's  position  in  the  State  Department. 

The  second  is  the  Biographical  Register  excerpt. 

The  third  is  the  record  from  Security  in  the  Pacific,  the  Institute 
of  Pacific  Relations  publication,  showing  that  Julian  Friedman  was 
a  member  of  the  conference  secretariat,  and  the  fourth  being  a  throw- 
away  indicating  that  Julian  Friedman  had  written  the  publication 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

The  Chairman.  They  may  be  inserted  in  the  record  and  properly 
identified. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibits  Nos.  235,  236, 
237,  and  238,"  and  are  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  235 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  April  23,  1951. 
The  Honorable  Pat  McCarran, 

United  States  Senate. 
My  Dear  Senator  RIcCarran  :  Your  letter  of  April  10,  1951,  addressed  to  the 
Secretary,  concerning  Julian  R.  Friedman  has  been  referred  to  me  for  reply. 

A  review  of  Mr.  Friedman's  record  indicates  that  he  had  served  as  a  junior 
economic  analyst  in  the  Foreign  Service  Auxiliary  from  October  5,  1945,  until 
the  termination  of  his  employment  on  November  12,  1946. 

As  you  may  recall,  the  Foreign  Service  Act  of  1946,  approved  August  13,  was 
effective  November  13,  1946.  Consequently  it  had  been  decided  to  abolish  the 
Auxiliary,  a  temporary  wartime  branch  of  the  Foreign  Service,  as  of  November 
12,  1946.  In  i)roceeding  with  the  liquidation  of  the  Auxiliary,  it  was  necessary 
to  order  back  to  the  United  States  for  termination  a  number  of  temporary  or 
auxiliary  oflScers  including  Mr.  Friedman.  Mr.  Friedman's  record  shows  that 
his  services  were  terminated  without  prejudice. 

I  trust  that  the  foregoing  information  will  meet  your  needs. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Eleridge  Durbrow, 
Chief,  Division  of  Foreign  Service  Personnel. 


Exhibit  No.  286 

Julian  R.  Friedman  :  App.  div.  asst.  in  the  Dept.  of  State,  Sept.  2,  1943 ;  asst. 
to  chief  Div.  of  Labor  Relations,  Sept.  1,  1944;  divisional  asst.,  Nov.  20,  1944; 
asst.  sec.  of  comm.,  United  Nations  Conf.  on  Int.  Org.,  San  Francisco,  1945;  re- 
search and  analysis  asst.,  May  17,  1945.  (Biographic  Register,  Dept.  of  State, 
Oct.  1,  1945,  p.  106.) 

Exhibit  No.  237 

Julian  R.  Friedman 

conference  membership 

Conference  Secretariat : 

*  «     * 

Julian  Friedman 

*  *     * 

(Security  in  the  Pacific,  a  preliminary  report  of  the  Ninth  Conference  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  Hot  Springs,  Va.,  Jan.  6-17,  1945,  p.  161.) 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  711 

Exhibit  No.  238 

Announcing  a  new  IPR  study,  Notes  on  Labor  Problems  in  Nationalist  China, 
by  Israel  Epstein  (159  pp.  mimeographed),  $2.25. 

With  a  supplement :  Labor  in  Nationalist  China,  1945^8,  by  Julian  R.  Fried- 
man. Chapters:  The  War  and  Industry;  Hours  and  Wa,i,'es ;  Migrant  Skilled 
Workers;  New  (Local)  Workers;  Women  and  Children  in  Industry;  "Coolie" 
Labor;  Conscript,  Contract,  and  Slave;  Kuomintang  Labor  Law  and  Decrees; 
Labor  Organizations  and  the  Labor  Movement  *  *  *  with  a  documentary  ap- 
pendix with  the  text  of  important  Natioi.cilist  and  Communist  labor  laws  and 
policy  statements. 

International  Secretariat,  iNSTifUTE  of  Pacific  Relations 

1  East  Fifty-fourth  Street,  New  York  22,  N.  T. 

[Attached] 

Please  send  me copies  of  "Labor  Notes  on  Nationalist  China." 

$2.25  enclosed Bill  me  (Postage  added). 

I  am  an  IPR  member  entitled  to  $1.80  price. 

Name 


Address 


Mr.  Morris.  I  think  we  have  shown  in  past  hearings  the  connec- 
tion between  Mr.  Owen  Lattimore  and  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Ke- 
lations  to  a  great  extent,  and  John  Carter  Vincent. 

I  think  we  may  as  well  at  this  point  show  the  connection  of  John 
Carter  Vincent  with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

INIr.  Mandel.  I  have  a  letter  dated  November  12,  1945,  addressed 
to  E.  C.  Carter,  that  was  taken  from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations.     I  read  the  first  paragraph : 

In  answer  to  your  letter  of  November  1,  there  is  attached  hereto  a  list  of 
the  present  board  of  trustees  of  the  American  Council,  listing  the  dates  of 
their  election,  the  amounts  of  their  current  contribution,  and  the  largest  amount 
they  have  ever  contributed. 

On  this  list  we  have  the  name  of  John  Carter  Vincent. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  other  words,  this  shows  that  John  Carter  Vincent 
was  in  1945  a  member  of  the  board  of  trustees  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations.  I  would  like  that  introduced  into  the  record  and 
marked  as  the  next  consecutive  exhibit. 

The  Chairman.  From  what  source  does  this  come  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  It  comes  from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.  It  may  be  marked  and  filed  with  the 
committee. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  239"  and  is  as 

follows:) 

November  12,  1945. 
Dear  Mr.  Carter  :  In  answer  to  your  letter  of  November  1,  there  is  attached 
hereto  a  list  of  the  present  board  of  trustees  of  the  American  Council,  listing  the 
dates  of  their  election,  tlie  amount  of  their  current  contribution,  and  the  largest 
amount  they  have  ever  contributed. 


712  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  answers  to  your  other  questions  can  be  summarized  as  follows : 
The  most  active  trustees  in  the  New  Yorli  area  are  those  on  the  executive 
committee.  Of  these,  Callj;ins,  Barnett,  Huggins,  Jessup,  and  McConaughy  have 
been  the  most  active.  Morris  has  regularly  attended  meetings,  made  a  special 
gift  to  the  library  of  some  books  in  his  father's  collection,  is  available  for 
advice,  but  is  neither  a  large  contributor  nor  will  he  assume  any  responsibility 
for  fund  raising.  Seymour  regularly  attended  meetings  the  first  6  months 
after  my  arrival  but  has  been  reorganizing  a  new  company  and  so  has  been  un- 
available for  anything  more  than  telephone  comment  for  some  months.  He  is 
more  allergic  to  Kohlberg's  charges  than  most  members  of  the  committee,  but 
is  unquestionably  of  value  in  money  raising,  as  he  is  well  known  downtown 
and  generally  well  liked.  The  most  important  person  to  rely  upon  Seymour's 
judgment  currently  is  E.  B.  Kilner  of  the  Associated  Telephone  Services,  who 
has  repeatedly  told  me  that  his  company  is  on  the  verge  of  supporting  us  bv 
a  contribution  of  $1,000  to  $5,000  or  withdrawing  their  current  $250  support 
entirely. 

In  Seattle,  the  most  active  members  of  the  board  are  Martin  and  Allen.  Other 
active  people  in  Seattle  are  Greenwood,  Baillargeon,  and  Fuller,  although  Reg- 
inald Parsons  has  renewed  a  good  deal  of  his  old  interest.  Allen  is  a  potential 
troublemaker  but  I  find  he  can  be  handled  by  talking  as  tough  to  him  as  he  talks 
to  you.  If  the  current  plans  for  a  National  Conference  of  Amco  go  through 
and  Allen  is  completely  sold  on  our  bona  fides,  he  will  be  of  considerable  use 
in  money  raising  in  the  Northwest.  It  would  be  unwise  to  rely  on  Ben  Kizer 
in  that  area  as  many  of  the  Seattle  businessmen,  although  close  friends  of  Ben, 
regard  him  as  an  outsider  by  virtue  of  his  Spokane  connections. 

The  most  active  members  of  the  board  in  San  Francisco  are  Greenslade,  Allen, 
-Hmma  McLaughlin,  Hunter  Galen  Fisher,  Brayton  Wilbur,  and  Wickett.  Of 
these,  Brayton  Wilbur  and  Wickett  are  the  most  important  in  money  raising. 
<Jalen  Fisher  has  contributed  articles  to  the  Far  Eastern  Survey.  Mrs.  Mc- 
i,aughlin,  Mrs.  Dorothy  Rogers  (not  a  national  board  member),  and  Lynn  White, 
Jr.,  president  of  Mills  (not  a  national  board  member)  have  been  most  active  in 
the  school  program  and  in  general  membership  activities. 

In  Los  Angeles,  Rosecrans,  although  technically  chairman  of  the  now  defunct 
Los  Angeles  committee,  has  done  little  more  than  make  his  annual  contribiition, 
Arthur  Coons  is  the  spearhead  in  that  neighborhood  and,  if  Rosecrans  can  be 
persuaded  to  give  Coons  a  go-ahead  signal,  a  Los  Angeles  committee  can  very 
easily  be  reconstituted.  Harvey  Mudd  is  interested — almost  entirely  in  re- 
search— but  would  probably  be  available  for  financial  support  if  a  research 
program  centered  at  the  Huntington  Library  were  undertaken.  Dr.  Millikan  is 
interested  in  such  a  program  and  would  put  on  a  meeting  in  Huntington  Library 
for  discussion  of  such  activities. 

In  Chicago,  an  entire  new  slate  of  trustees  is  required  with  the  exception 
of  the  Quincy  Wrights.  Edward  Embree  freely  admits  that  he  has  only  a  small 
portion  of  his  time  available  for  the  IPR  and  would  like  to  be  relieved  of  re- 
sponsibility. The  same  is  true  of  McNair;  and,  Colegrove,  although  willing  to 
talk,  is  carrying  a  torch  against  us  because  of  our  handling  of  India  and  the  use 
of  people  like  Kate  Mitchell  and  Kumar  Goshal. 

In  other  sections  of  the  country,  the  most  interested  trustees,  as  shown  by 
correspondence,  are  Jerome  Green  and  Mortimer  Graves,  both  of  whom  have 
written  cements  on  articles  in  the  Survey  and  are  interested  in  activities  gen- 
erally. 

Apart  from  the  executive  committee,  Fisher,  Ned  Allen,  Mortimer  Graves, 
Arthur  Coons,  Brayton  Wilbur,  and  Morison  represent  the  only  individuals  on 
the  naticmal  board  of  trustees  with  whom  there  has  been  correspondence  on 
anything  other  than  renewing  their  contributions. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 


713 


Exhibit  No.  239 
AMCO  board  of  trustees 


Greene,  Jerome  D 

Wild,  Payson 

Chapman.  Mrs.  Ralph.. 
Embree,  Edwin  R 

Wright,  Mrs.  Louise 

Allen,  Riley  H 

At.'ierton,  Frank  C 

Dillinsham,  W.  F 

Looniis,  Ciiarles  F__ 

Morison,  George  Abbot. 

Bamett,  Eusrene  E 

Calkins.  Robert  D 

Chamberlain.  Joseph  P_ 

Field,  Frederick  V 

Gilchript,  Huntington.-. 
Hoggins,  G.  Ellsworth.. 

Jessup,  Piiilip  C 

LTice,  Henry  R 

McConaushv,  James  L.. 

McCoy,  Frank  R 

Morris,  Lawrence 


Parker,  Philo  W 

Seymour,  Lawrence  D_ 
Kizer,  Benjamin  H 


Martin.  Charles  E. 

Allen,  Captain 

Charles,  Allan  E... 

Davis,  Joseph  S 

Fisher,  Galen  M... 


Do. 


Orady,  Henry  F 

Greenslade,  Admiral 

Do 

McLaughlin,  Mrs.  A 

Rowell,  Chester 

Sproul,  Robert  G 

Wickett,  F.  A 

Do 

Do 

Wilbur,  Brayton 

Wilbiu',  Ray  Lyman 

Rosecrans,  W.  S 

DeCaux,  Len 

Fairbank,  John 

Graves,  Mortimer 

Lattimore,  Owen 

Thomas,  Elbert  D 

Vincent,  John  Carter 

Btick,  Pearl  S 

Emeny,  Brooks 

Emeny,  Brooks  and  Mrs. 

Hoffman 

Notestein,  Mrs.  A 

Trippe,  Juan 

Yarnell,  Admiral  H.  E... 


Year 
elected 


1928. 


1943.. 
1924-3; 


1943. 
1929. 
1932. 


1937. 
1933. 


1943. 
1943. 


1937... 
1943... 
1935-.. 

1927... 


1927. 


1927- 
1927. 


1934- 
1943- 
1943' 


1943. 
1927. 


Present  contribution 


Date 


Nov.  15,  1944- 
Aug.  7,  1945.- 
Nov.  2,  1944.- 
Mar.  19,  1945. 
June  18,  1945. 

1943 

1913 

1043 

Dec.  16,  1944. 
June  5,  1945.- 
ucc.  21,  1944. 
Mar.  12,  1945. 
Aug.  4,  1944.. 

1944 

Dec.  29,  1944. 

1944 

Julv  20,  1945-. 
Dec.  16.  1944- 
Jan.  12,  1945.. 
Oft.  13,  1944.- 
Oct.  20,  1944.. 


Aug.  7,  1945- . 
Julv  13,  1945. 
Dec.  15,  1944. 


Jan.  30,  1945 

Feb.  12,  1945 

Jan.  20,  1945 

Dec.  1,  1944.- 

Julv  3,  1945,  New 

York. 
Mar.  6,  1945 


Oct.  31,  1944. 
Feb.  7,  1944.. 
Dec.  6,  1944.. 
Dec.  6,  1944 -. 
Feb.  8,  1945.. 
Apr.  6,  1945 -. 
Jan.  26,  1945. 
Jan.  26,  1945. 


Mar.  14,  1945.... 

May  2,  1944 

Jan.  5,  1945 

Feb.  26,  1945 

Mar.  8,  1937 

Nov.  20,  1944--. 

Mar.  C,  1945 

Complimentary- 
Dec.  26,  1944 

Oct.  25,  1943 

WPF 

Mar.  28,  1945.... 

July  18,  1945 

i:>ec.  30,  1944 

Nov.  0,  1944 


Amount 


$10 

5 

10 

10 

10 

25 

650 

100 

250 

10 

10 

10 

500 

760 

25 

650 

10 

2.500 

10 

25 

25 

25 
25 
50 

10 
10 
15 
5 
25 

50 

100 
10 
50 
75 
10 
10 
40 


150 

100 

10 

5 

5 

10 

10 

"""'25 
500 

2,  500 
100 
100 

2,500 


Highest  contribution 


Date 


19.30 

Jan.  2.3,"  1943."!!-] 

i94U--!".---] 
Dec"  "21",  "1943 .". .  - '. 
19.38 

Oct.  "23",""r9'43, 

WPF,  3  vears. 
Feb.  24,  1942 

a"u?"""'i"7,  " "1943, 
WPF. 

1940,"  'N"e"w"Y"o"rk ." '. 

1940,    San    Fran- 
cisco. 

i946-""'"""I""' 
December  1929..., 

June  30,  1941 

Mar.  29,  1944 

Sept.  21,  1944 

Dec.  14,  1944 

1942 

1940 

June8","f938"."--!. 


Amount 


$10,  000 
25 

250 


25 

1,000 
12,  600 


300 
50 
10 


275 
315 


450 
500 
25 
5 
100 
350 
100 
300 


20 


714  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  could  you  describe  for  us  Owen  Latti- 
more's  position  with  respect  to  Japan  at  the  time  of  the  episode  we 
have  just  had  testimony  concerning? 

Mv.  DooMAN.  Mr.  Morris,  may  I  remind  you  that  I  have  not  an- 
swered the  last  question  that  you  put  to  me? 

Ivlr.  Morris.  I  am  sorry. 

The  Chairman.  I  was  going  to  draw  that  to  your  attention.  I  did 
not  think  the  last  question  had  been  answered.  You  interrupted 
him  with  the  insertion  of  some  material. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  You  asked  me  whether  I  had  made  any  charges  against 
Julian  Friedman,  and  I  said  I  had  not  made  any  charges  because  that 
implied  that  I  had  complained  to  some  higher  authority. 

The  fact  was  that  a  very  short  time  after  statements  had  been  made 
in  secret  meetings  of  this  Far  East  Area  Committee,  the  proceedings 
and  the  statements  made  by  various  individuals  immediately  were 
quoted  in  various  left-wing  periodicals  and  newspapers  There  were 
literally  dozens  of  such  occasions 

Senator  Eastman.    Such  at  P]\I  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  That  would  include  PM. 

It  so  happens  that  among  all  these  instances  that  actually  occurred, 
I  happened  to  keep  one,  and  that  was  in  the  Nation  of  February  3, 
1945,  where  there  appears  an  article  by  one  Pacificus,  entitled  "Danger- 
ous Experts." 

Amoncr  other  things  here  is  the  following  paragi\aph  which  I  would 
like  to  read,  if  I  may.  I  might  say  that  Dangerous  Experts  refers 
among  others  to  myself. 

Mr.  Doornail  not  only  believes  in  retaining  the  emperorist  system  minns  some 
of  tlie  more  militaristic  forms  of  emperor  worship,  but  also  thinks  that  the  only 
elements  we  can  rely  on  in  Japan  are  tlie  business  leaders,  court  circle  aristo- 
crats, and  bureaucrats. 

It  SO  happened  that  at  one  of  the  meetings  of  the  Far  Eastern  Area 
Committee,  a  few  days  before  this  article  was  published,  we  were  dis- 
cussing the  question  of  education,  and  I  pointed  out  that  the  big  busi- 
ness leaders,  members  of  the  aristocracy,  the  people  in  the  professions 
in  the  higher  levels,  included  by  far  the  largest  majority  of  those  who 
had  been  educated  at  Yale  and  Harvard  and  Cambridge  and  Oxford, 
and  other  universities,  both  in  England  and  the  United  States. 

If  there  was  any  value  whatsoever  in  reeducation  along  our  lines  it 
was  obvious,  then,  that  either  these  people  had  enjoyed  the  benefits  of 
our  educational  facilities  and  were,  therefore,  the  most  progressive  ele- 
ments, or  there  was  no  value  whatever  in  reeducation.  You  could  not 
have  both. 

Now,  I  did  make  that  statement.  This  is  a  garbled  version  of  what 
I  said.  But  the  important  thing  is  that  it  appeared  a  few  days  later 
in  The  Nation. 

"Well,  by  a  process  of  elimination  in  a  number  of  instances  of  this 
kind,  I  found  that  outside  of  those  who  were  more  or  less  standing 
members  of  the  committee  who  appeared  every  time  and  who  were 
completely  reliable,  that  Friedman  was  the  constant  element. 

I  therefore  went  to  Friedman  and  I  taxed  him  with  being  the  source 
of  information  for  these  articles  that  appeared  in  Amerasia,  in  PM, 
The  Nation,  New  Republic,  and  so  on.  He  denied  that  he  had  given 
any  of  this  information  to  unauthorized  persons. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  715 

He  said  that  he  reported  only  to  his  chief,  who  was  then  Mr. 
Vincent. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  who? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Mr.  Vincent. 

Mr.  INIoRRis,  That  being  Jolni  Carter  Vincent'? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  John  Carter  Vincent. 

Mr.  MoKRis.  Mr.  Doonian,  woukl  you  tell  us  to  the  best  of  your 
ability  the  position  that  Owen  Lattimore  took  at  that  time  with  respect 
to  Japan  '(    This  is  in  1945. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  there  is  a  wliole  library  that  could  be  made  up 
of  statements  made  by  Mr.  Lattimore  diu'ing  that  period.  I  suppose 
the  best  known,  the  one  most  frequently  quoted,  is  a  book  called 
Solution  in  Asia,  which  was  published,  I  think,  in  about  February 
1945,  and  was  very  widely  circulated  during  the  spring  and  early 
summer,  in  fact  until  the  surrender  of  Japan. 

In  general,  he  took  the  position  that  the  Japanese  people,  when 
they  were  defeated,  would  rise  in  rebellion  against  the  system  and 
overthrow  the  monarchy;  that  there  were  elements  in  the  State  De- 
partment, the  so-called  reactionary  Fascist  elements,  who  knew  noth- 
ing whatever  about  Japan  except  what  they  had  picked  up  from  people 
in  high  social  levels  in  Japan,  and  that  these  elements  were  intended  to 
use  the  prestige  and  the  force  of  the  influence  of  the  United  States 
to  keep  the  Emperor  in  power  against  the  will  of  the  Japanese  people. 

Another  point  which*  he  made  was  that  the  chief  militarists  were 
not  the  war  lords.  General  Tojo  and  others,  but  the  big  industrial 
leaders.  That  these,  the  army  and  the  navy,  were  merely  puppets  and 
instruments  of  the  big  industrialists. 

Therefore,  his  position  was  that  we  should  allow  the  Japanese  people 
to  have  their  revolt  and  disestablish  the  monarchy  and  that  we  should 
then  try  these  industrialists  as  war  criminals  and  put  them  out  of 
the  way  so  that  they  would  never  be  in  a  position  of  influence. 

And,  third,  that  the  Japanese  system,  economic  system,  should  be 
completely  broken  u])  and  a  highly  developed  competitive  economic 
system  should  be  instituted. 

Now,  as  I  say,  these  statements  can  be  found  in  a  great  many  places. 

Mr.  Morris.' Will  you  give  us  whatever  documentation  you  can? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  have  here,  for  example,  a  radio  discussion,  a  round- 
table  discussion  that  was  carried  out,  I  believe,  under  the  auspices  of 
the  University  of  Chicago.     It  was  along  about  July  8,  1945. 

Now,  I  notice  that  the  press  recently  quoted  Dr.  Lattimore  as  hav- 
ing said  that  his  position  had  been  consistently  one  of  urging  that 
we  do  not  interfere  in  the  event  that  the  Japanese  wanted  to  disestab- 
lish the  monai\  hy.     That  is  not  the  whole  story. 

In  Solution  in  Asia,  he  makes  this  statement,  which  I  cannot  quote 
textually,  but  it  runs  somewhat  along  these  lines.     He  says : 

I  will  venture  the  political  prophecy  that  the  Japanese  people  will  themselves 
revolt  and  disestablish  the  monarch. 

Now,  the  suggestion  at  the  same  time,  at  that  time — that  is,  before 
the  surrender — that  people  like  Mr.  Grew  and  myself  were  intending 
to  keep  the  Emperor  in  power  implied,  then,  that  we  proposed  to  use 
the  influence  and  the  position  of  the  United  States  to  prevent  the  exer- 
cise by  the  Japanese  people  of  their  own  will. 

'22848— 52— pt.  3 2 


716  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Well,  let  me  say  at  this  point  that  this  whole  discussion  about  the 
Emperor  carried  on  by  the  leftist  press  at  that  time  was  a  piece  of 
sheer  lunacy.  If  the  Japanese  people  wanted  to  get  rid  of  the  Em- 
peror there  was  obviously  notliing  we  could  do  to  keep  him  in ;  if,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Japanese  people  wanted  to  keep  the  Emperor  it 
would  have  been  a  piece  of  folly  on  our  part  to  have  disestablished 
a  monarchy. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  John  Carter  Vincent  endorse  those  views 
of  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  never  heard  him  express  that  opinion,  except  prob- 
ably indirectly  through — and  this  is  only  an  assumption — no,  Sena- 
tor ;  if  I  may  correct  my  statement,  I  will  say  no,  I  have  never  heard 
him  express  it. 

Senator  Eastland.  When  Mr.  Grew  resigned,  what  place  in  the 
Department  did  Mr.  Vincent  get  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN,  ]\Ir.  Grew  retired,  or  at  least  presented  his  resignation 
on  or  about  the  14th  of  August.  I  may  be  off  a  matter  of  a  few  days  or 
so.  But  the  day  he  retired,  or  presented  his  resignation,  it  was  an- 
nounced in  the  papers  that  Mr.  Dean  Acheson  has  been  appointed  as 
Under  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Dean  Acheson  having  previously  re- 
tired as  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  with  the  announcement  that  he 
was  going  to  resume  private  practice. 

Mr.  Acheson  then  returned  to  the  State  Department  somewhere 
around  the  25th  of  August  1945.  And  the  day  after  he  returned  there 
he  announced  that  I  would  be  replaced  as  chairman  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Subcommittee  of  Swink  by  Mr.  Vincent. 

Senator  Eastland.  I  would  like  also  to  know,  if  I  am  not  getting  too 
far  afield 

Mr.  JMoRRis.  That  is  all  right. 

Senator  Eastland.  The  difference  in  what  was  advocated  by  John 
Carter  Vincent  for  Japan  and  the  policies  that  the  Communists  put 
over  in  Eastern  Europe.  I  would  like  to  know  the  difference  between 
the  policies  that  he  advocated  f oi;^  Japan'  and  the  policies  that  the 
Communists  put  over  in  Eastern  Europe. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  sir,  I  am  not  competent  to  discuss  authoritative- 
ly what  the  Communists  put  over  in  Eastern  Europe,  but  I  can  tell 
you  what  was  done  in  Japan. 

And  it  may,  perhaps,  occur  to  you  that  there  are  certain  very  dis- 
tinct analogies  between  what  was  done  there  and  what  was  done  in 
Eastern  Europe. 

Senator  Eastland.  They  were  practically  the  same ;  were  they  not  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  would  prefer,  if  I  may.  Senator,  to  describe 

Senator  Eastland.  Wliat  is  it  ?  You  have  discussed  it,  in  executive 
session.  Is  it  not  your  judgment,  now,  that  the  policies  that  Mr. 
Vincent  attempted  to  put  over  in  Japan  were  the  same  as  the  policies 
that  Russia  dictated  for  the  satellite  countries? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  I  am  trying  to  be  as  accurate 

Senator  Eastland.  What  is  your  judgment? 

Mr.  Doom  an.  My  judgment  is  it  is  the  same. 

Senator  Eastland.  They  were  the  same  ? 

Mr.  DouMAN.  Obviously  the  same.  But  I  would  like  to  amplify 
that,  if  I  may. 

Senator  Eastland.  I  want  you  to.  I  want  you  to  explain  what  our 
State  Department  attempted  to  do  in  Japan,  and  the  similarity  with 
what  Russia  did  in  the  satellite  countries. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  717 

Mr.  DooMAN.  On  Sepember  22,  1945,  the  White  House  released 
a  paper,  which  was  entitled,  "The  United  States  Initial  Post-Surren- 
der Policy  for  Japan."  That  paper  was  the  work  of  our  committee, 
the  Far  Eastern  Subcommittee  of  SWINK,  for  a  period  of  about  7  or 
8  months,  except  for  certain  important  changes  which  I  will  refer  to. 

As  I  was  to  retire  from  the  State  Department  on  the  31st  of  August 
I  asked  Mr.  Dunn,  as  chairman  of  SWINK,  to  call  a  meeting  for  the 
express  purpose  of  adopting  this  paper  that  we  had  been  working 
on  for  a  long  time;  namely,  the  United  States  Initial  Post-Surrender 
Policy  for  Japan. 

That  paper  was  adopted  by  SWINK  on  the  29th  of  August,  and  on 
the  29th  of  August  that  was  telegraphed  out  to  General  MacArthur  as 
a  firm  United  States  policy  for  Japan. 

However,  in  this  release  that  was  issued  on  the  22d  of  September, 
it  was  pointed  out,  or  it  was  clear,  that  the  paper  had  been  reopened. 

On  September  6 — mind  you,  on  September  6 — by  September  6,  JSIr. 
Grew  had  retired  as  Under  Secretary,  and  had  been  replaced  by  Mr. 
Acheson.  I  had  retired  and  had  been  replaced  as  chairman  of  the  far 
eastern  subcommittee  by  Mr.  Vincent. 

Well,  I  was  very  much  interested  in  seeing  whether  there  had  been 
any  changes.  And  I  found  these,  which  I  will  quote.  These  were 
among  the  changes  that  had  been  made  in  the  paper  after  it  had 
been  adopted  on  the  29th  of  August  [reading] : 

Policies  shall  be  favored  which  permit  the  wide  distribution  of  income  and  of 
the  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  trade.  To  this  end  it  shall  be  the 
policy  of  the  Supreme  Commander — 

(a)  To  prohibit  the  retention  in  or  selection  for  places  of  importance  in  the 
economic  field  of  individuals  who  do  not  direct  future  Japanese  economic  effort 
solely  toward  peaceful  ends. 

Please  do  not  ask  me  to  explain  what  that  means. 

(&)  To  favor  a  program  for  the  dissolution  of  the  large  industrial  and  bank- 
ing combinations  which  have  exei'cised  control  of  a  large  part  of  Japan's  trade 
and  industry. 

It  is  on  the  basis  of  these  two  clauses  that  work  was  undertaken  to 
destroy,  first  of  all,  to  eliminate  the  capitalist  class  in  Japan. 

Senator  Eastland  (presiding).  Who  attempted  to  eliminate  the 
capitalist  class  in  Japan? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  Who  attempted  to  eliminate  it? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  These  were  the  instructions  sent  from  Washington. 

Senator  Eastland.  That  was  the  American  State  Department? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  W^ith  the  concurrence  of  the  Navy  Department  and 
the  War  Department. 

These  were  the  instructions  sent  to  General  MacArthur  through  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 

Senator  Eastland.  That  was  the  work  of  John  Carter  Vincent,  was 
it  not? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  He  was  chairman  at  that  time  of  this  Far  East  sub- 
committee. 

Senator  Eastland.  Go  ahead.    Excuse  me. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  I  just  keep  the  record  straight.  It  may  be  unneces- 
sary, but  may  I  point  out  that  Mr.  Dooman  is  testifying  that  this  is 
the  promulgation  of  American  policy,  and  it  represents  a  document 
that  Mr.  Dooman  worked  upon  while  he  was  officially  connected  with 
the  State  Department. 


718  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

And  lie  noticed  that  when  the  program  was  finally  promnlgated 
these  were  the  changes  that  had  been  made  by  his  successors  from  the 
program  that  had  been  adopted  by  Mr.  Dooman  and  Mr.  Grew  prior 
to  that  time. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  That  is  so. 

Senator  Eastland.  That  was  the  Acheson- Vincent  program  there  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  What  did  they  attempt  to  put  over  under  that 
program  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  The  first  thing  that  was  done,  and  this  was  in  1946, 
was  to  levy  a  capital  tax  of  from  60  to  90  percent  on  all  property  in 
excess  of  $1,000. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  Russia  do  that  in  the  countries  of  Eastern 
Europe? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Well,  that  is  why  I  hesitate  to  answer  your  questions 
directly,  Senator,  because  I  do  not  know  whether  they  did,  or  not. 
1  know  that  the  end  means  was  achieved  by  perhaps  the  same  means, 
or  by  other  means ;  I  don't  know. 

Senator  Eastland.  All  riffht.    Go  ahead. 


o 


Mr.  DooMAN.  You  can  imagine  what  that  meant.  That  is,  a  capital 
tax  of  from  60  to  90  percent  of  all  property  above  $1,000.  That  almost 
at  one  stroke  wiped  out  the  capitalist  class. 

The  excuse  for  that  was  that  it  was  necessary  to  prevent  an  inflation. 

At  that  time,  if  I  am  correct,  in  my  recollection,  the  Japanese  yen 
was  pegged  to  the  dollar  at  15  yen  to  the  dollar.  And  this  was  a 
measure  purportedly  to  prevent  any  further  inflation. 

It  was  not  more  than  a  month  or  two  after  this  thing  was  carried  out 
that  the  yen  then  was  pegged  at  50  to  1.  In  other  words,  it  had  de- 
clined by  more  than  a  third.    That  was  the  ostensible  reason  given. 

Of  course,  as  anybody  could  see,  it  would  not  have  been  an  effective 
one.    But  it  did  have  the  effect 

Senator  Eastland.  Go  ahead.  What  were  the  other  things  that 
were  proposed  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  The  next  thing  was,- and  this  is  somewhat  contro- 
versial, but  perhaps  a  good  case  might  be  made  out  for  it,  but  as 
everybody  has  seen  today,  after  this  thing  has  been  in  effect  for  some 
years,  the  thing  is  not  working. 

The  next  thmg  was  to  expropriate  ail  land  in  excess  of  5  acres 
held  by  any  one  owner. 

Senator  Eas'ixand.  That  was  a  Communist  system,  was  it  not? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Well,  Senator,  in  Poland  I  think  they  put  the  limit 
at  200  acres  at  that  time.  But  in  Japan,  where  85  million  people  are 
trying  to  make  a  living  off  an  area 

Senator  Eastland.  I  understand,  but  they  were  following  now 
the  Communist  system,  were  they  not? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Yes. 

Senator  Eastland.  Go  ahead. 

Senator  Smith.  May  I  ask  him  one  question? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Smith. 

Senator  Smith.  I  understood  you  to  say  just  now  the  yen  was  first 
pegged  at  15  to  1. 

Mr.  Dooman.  Yes. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  719 

Senator  Smith.  Later  on  at  50  to  1.  And  then  you  made  the  obser- 
vation that  that  was  a  decline  of  one-third.  It  would  decline  300  i)er- 
cent,  would  it  not  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes ;  that  is  right. 

Senator  Smith.  You  were  in  error  about  the  one-third? 

Mr.  DooMAN,  Yes. 

Well,  all  land  was  expropriated  in  excess  of  5  acres.  There  was 
an  ostensible  effort  to  pay  them  compensation  for  this  land,  but  by 
this  time  they  were  paying  for  land  in  yen  which  had  depreciated  to 
one  one-hundred-and-eightieth  of  the  nominal  value  of  the  land. 

For  example,  if  the  land  had  been  valued  in  1920,  as  it  was — that 
was  wlien  the  financial  panic  was  taking  place — if  the  land  was  valued 
at  $1,000  an  acre,  they  paid  the  owners  of  the  land  at  $1,000,  but  in 
currency  that  had  depreciated  to  one  one-hundred-and-eightieth  of  the 
value. 

In  other  words,  if  a  man  had  $1,000  in  land,  he  was  paid  one-one- 
hundred-and-eightieth. 

There  was  virtually  confiscation  of  all  land  above  5  acres. 

Senator  Eastland.  Go  ahead  and  describe  what  else  there  was. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Then  all  holdings  by  any  one  individual  in  any  large 
corporation  in  excess  of  3  percent  were  confiscated.  There  were  more 
polite  terms  used.  That  is,  they  were  transferred  to  a  go  t^ernment 
pool. 

And  then  the  Japanese  Government  was  ordered  to  sell  those  shares 
in  a  certain  order  of  priority  to  farmers'  cooperatives,  labor  unions, 
and  shopkeepers,  at  whatever  price  might  be  offered. 

And,  furthermore,  the  Japanese  Government  was  ordered  to  dis- 
regard any  relationship  between  the  price  offered  and  the  real  value ; 
and,  furthermore,  the  Japanese  Government  was  ordered  to  finance 
any  bids  for  the  shares  by  farmers'  cooperatives  and  labor  unions. 

So  that  the  net  result  was  then  to  destroy  the  previously  existing 
capitalist  class.  As  a  capitalist  class  they  no  longer  exist.  Their 
places  have  been  taken  by  hordes  of  black  marketeers  and  Chinese  and 
Formosan  thugs  of  various  kinds  who  have  been  engaged  in  illicit 
trade  of  various  kinds  and  have  then  amassed  this  enormous  fortune. 

The  net  result  was  then  to  replace  people  who  had  traditionally  had 
property  with  these  black  marketeers  and  thugs  and  blackguards  of 
various  kinds. 

Senator  Eastland.  Were  those  recommendations  favored  by  Gen- 
eral MacArthur  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Let  me  cite  in  reply  to  that  the  statement  made  by 
INIr.  Acheson  in  reply  to  General  MacArthur's  pronouncement  to  the 
Japanese  people.  I  think  it  was  on  the  first  anniversary  of  the  occu- 
pation where  General  MacArthur  had  indicated  that  he  looked  for- 
ward to  the  time  when  the  American  occupation  in  Japan  could  be 
reduced  to  some  figure  below  200,000  soldiers. 

■That  aroused  great  resentment  in  the  State  Department,  and  at 
that  time  Mr.  Acheson  issued  the  statement  that  General  MaciVrthur 
or  the  military  occupation  were  there  merely  to  carry  out  the  orders 
of  the  executive  in  Washington ;  that  they  were  not  the  f ormulators 
of  policy. 

By  implication  policy  was  formulated  in  Washington. 


720  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Therefore,  in  general,  one  would  say  that  it  didn't  really  make — 
I  don't  know  whether  General  MacArthur  approved  or  disapproved. 

Senator  Eastland.  What  other  policies  were  there  ? 

]SIr.  DooMAN.  Well,  in  the  draft  of  this  initial  policy  paper,  which 
had  been  prepared  under  my  chairmanship,  with  regard  to  people  who 
were  suspected  of  being  war  criminals  or  being  militarists,  it  was 
provided  that  they  should  be  purged;  that  is,  removed  from  any  posi- 
tion of  authority,  in  the  light  of  their  own  personal  record,  as  brought 
out  by  some  form  of  judicial  investigation. 

In  other  words,  a  man  would  stand  or  fall  on  his  own  personal 
record. 

As  you  will  see  from  that  statement  that  I  just  read  out,  people 
were  removed  from  office  on  the  basis  of  their  occupation.  Practically 
the  whole  executive  branch  of  Japanese  business,  from  chairmen  of 
boards  down  to  section  chiefs,  practically  the  whole  white-collar  ele- 
ment in  Japanese  big  business  was  removed  at  one  stroke.  Not  because 
there  was  any  record  against  them,  but  because  they  occupied  certain 
positions.     They  destroyed  it. 

Senator  Eastland.  Was  it  not  an  attempt  to  destroy  Japanese 
capitalism? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  was  an  attempt  to  destroy  and  eliminate  the  brains 
of  Japanese  business. 

Senator  Eastland.  If  you  destroy  the  brains,  you  destroy 

_  The  Chairman.  Wait  a  minute.  Let  us  see  if  we  can  get  the  ques- 
tion and  answer  together.  The  question  was :  Was  this  not  an  effort 
to  destroy  Japanese  capitalism,  and  you  converted  that  into  saying 
Japanese  brains.     Let  us  get  them  together. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  I  am  saying 

The  Chairman.  Answer  the  Senator's  question. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  In  my  opinion  it  was.  I  would  like  to  stress  that 
in  my  opinion  it  was. 

Senator  Eastland.  All  right. 

What  else  did  they  attempt  to  put  over? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Just  following  thaf  question,  following  that  point, 
I  want  to  quote  from  this  round-table  discussion  of  the  University  of 
Chicago  on  July  8,  this  statement  attributed  to  Mr.  Lattimore 
[reading]  : 

That  includes  a  lot  of  economic  and  political  action  as  well  because  we  can- 
not forget  that  the  civilian  warmakers,  that  is  the  big  industrialists  and 
financiers  of  Japan,  are  really  primarily  even  more  responsible  for  Japan's 
going  to  war  than  the  military  and  the  navy,  since  the  army  and  navy  are  only 
the  striking  instruments  and  the  tools. 

Now,  after  the  occupation  about  12  of  the  leading  Japanese  indus- 
trialists were  put  in  prison,  and  they  were  held  m  prison  for  18 
months  while  every  effort  was  made  to  dig  up  evidence  which  would 
warrant  their  being  put  on  trial,  just  as  the  military  and  political 
people  were  put  on  trial  and  later  condemned. 

They  were  held,  as  I  say,  for  18  months,  and  released  because  there 
was  no  evidence. 

Now,  if  we  are  then  to  follow  Mr.  Lattimore,  we  obviously  did  a 
great  injustice  to  General  Tojo  in  hanging  him,  because  according  to 
Mr.  Lattimore,  we  released  his  lords  and  masters  and  hung  the  tool 
and  the  instrument. 

Senator  Eastland.  Wliat  other  things  were  in  the  policy  for  Japan  ? 


IXSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  721 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  have  with  me  a  copy  of  a  paper  known  as  Far  East 
Commission  230.  This  is  a  paper  of  considerable  length,  Senator, 
in  which  all  of  the  principles  are  laid  out  for  the  atomizing  of  Japa- 
nese industry. 

Senator  Eastland.  The  what?     I  did  not  understand. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  The  atomizing,  the  fragmentation  of  Japanese  in- 
dustry.    It  is  a  very  long  paper. 

The  general  purport  was  to  see  to  it  that  the  Japanese  economy,  not 
only  in  industry  but  in  banking  and  in  every  other  field,  should  be 
reduced  to  the  smallest  possible  element. 

The  Chairman.  How  is  that  tied  in  here?     Who  is  the  article  by? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  it  was  a  paper.  It  Avas  introduced  as  follows : 
To  the  Far  Eastern  Commission  by  the  Secretary  General,  Mr.  Nel- 
son T.  Jonathan,  under  a  paper  which  reads  as  follows  [reading]  : 

The  enclosure,  a  statement  of  proposed  policy  with  respect  to  excessive  con- 
centrations of  economic  power  in  Japan,  submitted  by  the  United  States,  is  cir- 
culated herewith  for  the  consideration  of  the  Far  East  Commission  and  is  refer- 
red to  Committee  No.  2,  economic  and  financial  affairs. 

Who  prepared  this  paper,  I  have  no  means  of  knowing. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  an  official  publication  of  the  State  Department? 

Mr.  Doom  AN.  This  has  been  released 

The  Chairman.  You  can  answer  that  yes  or  no. 

Mr.  Dooman.  I  don't  know. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  an  official  publication  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  do  not  know. 

This  is  a  privately  printed  paper  I  have  before  me. 

Mr.  Morris.  Where  did  you  obtain  that,  Mr.  Dooman  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  This  was  obtained,  and  given  to  me  by  a  friend  of 
mine,  Mr.  James  Lee  Kaufman,  an  American  lawyer  in  New  York, 
who  went  out  to  Japan  and  discovered  the  existence  of  this  paper, 
and  he  had  it  privately  printed  and  distributed  among  his  friends, 
and  he  also  had  a  copy  of  it  reproduced,  or  summarized  in  an  issue  for 
News  Week  2  years  ago. 

Senator  Eastland.  Where  did  he  get  the  paper  in  Japan? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  He  was  told  of  the  existence  of  this  paper,  and  was 
told  if  he  went  to  a  certain  office  he  could  find  it.  So  he  went  to 
this — I  don't  know  where — some  repository  of  documents  and  asked 
a  young  lady 

Senator  Eastland.  It  was  there  to  guide  the  occupation  forces,  was 
it  not  ?    It  Avas  a  policy  to  guide  our  occupation,  was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  was  getting  around  to  that  in  just  a  second,  Senator, 
if  I  may.    I  am  answering  the  question. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  has  been  propounded  to  you.  Was 
it  or  was  it  not  there  to  guide  our  occupation  forces? 

Mr.  D(^OMAN.  This  paper  was  submitted  through  the  Far  Eastern 
Commission  for  consideration,  and  it  was  never  adopted  by  the  Far 
Eastern  Commission. 

However,  in  draft  form,  it  w^as  sent  out  to  Tokyo  to  the  occupa- 
tion authorities  in  the  economic  section  and  they  acted  on  it. 

Senator  Eastland.  It  was  sent  by  our  State  Department  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Sent  by  whom,  I  do  not  know.  But  it  was  sent  to 
the  occupation  authorities  and  they  acted  on  it. 


722  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

And  when  the  disclosure  was  made  by  my  friend,  Kaufman,  that 
this  paper  had  been  acted  on,  it  was  then  disavowed  as  merely  being 
a  draft  and  merely  presented  to  the  Far  Eastern  Commission  for 
consideration. 

But  the  point  I  want  to  emphasize  was  that  it  was,  for  all  practical 
purposes,  an  official  document,  because  it  was  on  the  basis  of  this 
that  various  instructions  were  sent  to  the  Japanese  Government. 

Senator  Eastland.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  to  put  it  very  mildly,  there 
is  a  striking  similarity  between  the  American  policy  toward  Japan 
and  the  policies  laid  clown  by  Russia  to  the  satellite  states  in  Eastern 
Europe,  is  there  not  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  think  that  would  be  a  fair  statement  to  state. 

Let  me  amplify  that,  if  I  may.  You  may  remember  that  there  had 
been,  before  this  establishment  of  this  Far  Eastern  Commission,  in 
existence  in  London,  the  so-called  European  Commission  of  which 
the  members  were  representatives  of  the  United  States,  England, 
Eussia,  and,  I  believe,  France.  And  it  was  pretty  well  known  in  the 
discussions  before  the  Far  Eastern  Commission  what  the  ideas  of  the 
Russians  were  with  regard  to  Germany,  with  regard  to  the  treatment 
of  Japan. 

Therefore,  when  it  came  to  the  question  of  Japan,  there  were  those 
elements  who,  knowing  what  the  Russians  wanted  in  Germany, 
assumed  that  they  would  be  satisfied  with  parallel  policies  in  Japan. 

Senator  Eastland.  Of  course,  what  Russia  wanted  was  to  set  up 
a  chaos  and  a  system  by  which  they  could  move  in;- was  that  not  it? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  think  so. 

Senator  Smith.  May  I  ask  a  question? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Smith. 

Senator  Smith.  Are  there  now  in  positions  of  power  and  trust  in 
the  American  Government  any  of  the  men  who  were  responsible  for 
the  enunciation  of  this  policy  you  have  described  to  us  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Oh,  yes. 

Senator  Smith.  Who  are  they  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Some,  I  say  are  resi5onsible,  from  the  chain  of  com- 
mand. 

Senator  Eastland.  Name  them,  please. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  In  1945  when  this  initial  post  surrender  policy  was 
promulgated,  the  responsible  people  were,  from  the  top,  Mr.  Byrnes, 
Secretary  of  State. 

Senator  Smith.  Mr.  Byrnes. 

Mr.  Dooman,  Mr.  Byrnes,  Secretary  of  State;  Mr.  Acheson,  Under 
Secretary  of  State;  John  Carter  Vincent,  as  chairman  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Subcommittee  of  SWINK,  and  also  Director  of  the  Far  East- 
ern Division;  Mr.  Edward  Barton,  who  is  still  an  economist,  I  be- 
lieve ;  he  is  the  economist  in  charge  of  economic  affairs  for  the  occupa- 
tion of  this  area ;  James  Pennfield,  and  then 

Senator  Smith.  What  position  is  he  in  now  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  I  believe  he  is  in  Yugoslavia  as  counselor  of  the  Em- 
bassy, I  believe. 

Mr.  Morris.  "Wliat  was  his  position  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Dooman.  He  had  just  returned  from  the  Far  East  and  was 
assigned  as  deputy  to  Mr,  Vincent  in  the  Far  East  Subcommittee  of 
SWINK. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  723 

Now,  subsequently — and  this  is  hearsay — the  people  who  have  been 
busy  on  Japanese  affairs,  Japanese  policies,  in  addition  to  those  I 
have  named,  would  include  Mr.  John  Allison,  and — what  is  his  nar^e 
now — an  economist,  Barnett.  I  don't  know  what  his  first  name  is. 
Barnett. 

I  think  those  are  the  principal  ones. 

Senator  Smith.  Well,  now,  is  there  any  indication  of  any  activity 
by  the  top  two  men  you  mentioned  in  the  furtherance  of  this  policy, 
Mr.  Byrnes  or  Mr.  Acheson  ?  Is  there  any  evidence  at  all,  indication 
of  activity  on  their  part  toward  favoring  the  carrying  out  of  that 
policy  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  in  m}^  personal  knowledge,  and  this  requires — 
well,  my  personal  knowledge,  I  can  recite  one  case. 

In  the  spring  of  1945  there  was  a  meeting  of  the  full  Committee  of 
SWINK,  the  chairman  at  that  time  for  that  day  being  Mr.  McCloy, 
John  McCloy,  wdio  was  then  Assistant  Secretary  of  War.  And  the 
committee  as  a  whole  had  been  discussing  some  European  matter  with 
which  I  was  not  concerned,  and,  therefore,  I  came  into  the  room  when 
they  had  completed  their  discussion  of  this  European  problem. 

And  I  noticed  among  the  people  present  was  Mr.  Dean  Acheson. 
Now,  he  had  been  called  in,  apparently,  for  consultation  on  the  Euro- 
pean problem,  and  he  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  problem 
that  I  w^as  to  discuss,  wdiich  w^as  the  question  of  the  Japanese  political 
system. 

However,  he  staved  on.  He  was  then  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  Congressional  Kelations.     He  had  nothing  to  do  with  this  officially. 

And  I  made  my  report  to  the  committee,  and  at  the  end  of  that 
report  Mr.  McCloy  said,  turning  to  Mr.  Acheson : 

Dean,  yon  are  a  great  authority  on  far  eastern  matters.  What  do  you  think 
of  what  we  have  just  heard? 

And  the  reply  was : 

I  have  discovered  that  far  eastern  experts  are  a  penny  a  dozen.  And  you 
can  find  some  experts  which  will  support  any  point  of  view  that  you  care  to  have. 
And  I,  myself,  do  not  go  along  with  what  we  have  .Inst  heard.  I  prefer  to  be 
guided  by  experts  who  think  more  along  my  point  of  view. 

From  then  on  he  quoted  virtually  textually  from  this  Solution  in 
Asia  by  Dr.  Lattimore. 

Senator  Smith.  Do  you  mean  he  quoted  from  this  paper  that  you 
mentioned  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Where  Dr.  Lattimore  had  said  that  the  Japanese 
people,  he  predicted  that  the  Japanese  people  would  rebel  and  dis- 
establish the  monarchy,  and  that  if  the  monarchy  existed  it  would 
be  only  because  there  are  certain  Fascist  groups  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment who  used  the  prestige  of  the  United  States. 

Senator  Smith.  Did  he  approve  of  this  policy  that  was  enunciated 
about  practically  confiscation  of  property? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Oh,  yes;  he  was  Under  Secretary  of  State. 

And,  as  I  say,  I  don't  know,  except  from  the  fact  that  he  would 
have  been  in  the  chain  of  command.  That  paper  could  never  have 
gone  through. 

Senator  Eastland.  Who  appointed  Vincent? 

Mr.  Dooman.  I  think  I  testified  that  the  day  after  Mr.  Acheson 
returned  as  Under  Secretary  of  State 


724  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Eastland.  Just  name  him.  Who  appointed  Vincent  ?  Jast 
name  the  man. 

JNIr.  DooMAN.  Mr.  Acheson. 

Senator  Smith.  Is  there  any  indication  that  Mr.  Byrnes,  the  Sec- 
retary of  State,  knew  about  this  at  all  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  No ;  there  is  no  indication. 

Senator  Smith.  That  surprises  me  that  that  had  developed,  and 
I  ask  you  specifically  was  there  any  evidence  that  Mr.  Byrnes  him- 
self knew  about  this  promulgation  or  enunciation  of  policy? 

Mr.  DooMAN,  No;  there  is  no  indication  to  my  knowledize. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  I  get  back  to  the  episode  you  have  just  testified 
to.    When  did  that  take  place  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  was  in  the  spring  of  1945. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  you  thoroughly  conversant  with  Owen  Latti- 
more's  Solution  in  Asia  at  that  time? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Thoroughly. 

Mr.  Morris.  When  you  heard  INIr.  Acheson  enunciate  his  views  on 
Japan,  is  it  your  testimony  that  they  coincided  with  the  views  ex- 
pressed by  Owen  Lattimore  in  Solution  in  Asia  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Exactly. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  his  view  on  experts  being  a  dime  a  dozen  coincide 
with  the  views  of  Owen  Lattimore  at  that  time? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes;  his  opinions  about  certain  types  of  experts; 
yes.    He  had  a  very  dim  view  of  experts  who  did  not  agree  with  him. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  said,  in  effect,  in  his  book.  Solution  in  Asia, 
that  people  like  myself  had  spent  a  long  time  in  Japan,  but  we  were 
spending  all  of  our  time  with  very  polite  people,  ^nd  we  really  didn't 
know  very  much  about  what  was  going  on. 

Mr.  ]\IoRRis.  May  I  get  back  to  some  previous  testimony  that  we 
have  not  completely  finished. 

I  asked  you  earlier  if  you  would  document  as  much  as  possible  your 
expression  of  Owen  Lattimore's  views  at  that  time.  You  had  given 
a  rather  precise  summary  of  what  his  views  were,  and  then  I  asked  you 
if  you  had  any  documentation  to  support  that. 

I  also  offer  you  just  by  way  of  assistance  in  connection  with  that 
extracts  from  Mr.  Lattimore's  Solution  in  Asia  that  may  aid  you  in 
answering  the  question  I  have  just  put  to  you. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Here  is  a  very  reminiscent  phrase. 

The  Chairman.  W.ait  a  minute.    What  are  you  testifying  from? 

Mr.  Morris.  These  are  extracts  from  Owen  Lattimore's  book, 
Solution  in  Asia. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.  • 

Mr.  DooMAN  (reading)  : 

Washington  is  full  of  experts  who  will  tell  you  that  the  Japanese  are  mysteri- 
ous, fanatical,  and  not  to  be  understood  by  any  ordinary  use  of  the  intellect.  The 
same  experts  are  also  addicted  to  citing  bits  of  lore  which,  they  tell  you  con- 
descendingly, explain  why  the  Japanese  always  do  this  or  never  do  that. 

Here  is  an  example  of  the  attempts  on  the  part  of  Dr.  Lattimore  to 
put  into  ridicule  people  who  did  not  agree  with  his  point  of  view. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  725 

Tliere  is  missing  from  this  that  quotation  to  which  I  have  just  re- 
ferred, and  I  think  it  runs : 

As  a  political  prophecy — 

whatever  that  may  mean — 

As  a  political  prophecy,  the  Japanese  people  will  disestablish  the  monarchy 
unless  there  is  interference  on  the  part  of  people  in  the  State  Department. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  attempting  to  quote  now  from  Latti- 
more's 

]\rr.  DooMAN.  From  memory,  yes.    I  do  not  have  a  copy  of  the  book. 

Mr.  MoRKis.  "VVe  have  a  copy  here,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  think  we 
might  ask  Mr.  Dooman  if  he  would  put  the  precise  quotation  in  if 
possible. 

Is  it  page  189,  Mr.  Dooman  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Well,  this  is  not  the  quotation  I  have  in  mind : 

I  assume  that  the  Japan  of  the  future  will  be  a  republic. 

That  follows  another  reference  where  he  says,  as  a  matter  of  politi- 
cal— will  you  give  me  just  a  minute? 
Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  Mr.  Dooman. 
Mr.  Dooman.  Here  it  is.     It  is  on  page  187  [reading]  : 

As  a  matter  of  political  prophecy,  I  agree  that  the  Japanese  people  are  likely 
to  overturn  the  throne  unless  we  prevent  them. 

Mr.  Morris.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Dooman.  Will  you  proceed  with  your 
documentation  of  views  of  Owen  Lattimore  which  you  have  testified 
to  here  today  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Would  you  like  further  references  to  Mr.  Lattimore's 
opinion  about  the  Emperor? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes;  I  think  if  you  would -put  in  a  few  more  of  those, 
Mr.  Dooman ;  those  extracts  are  of  no  assistance  to  you,  are  they,  Mr. 
Dooman  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Yes ;  on  page  189, 1  quote  as  follows  [reading] : 

If  the  Japanese  themselves  decide  to  do  without  an  Emperor,  well  and  good. 
If  not,  we  should  show  that  militarism  has  been  so  catastrophically  defeated 
that  we,  the  victors,  do  not  need  to  use  the  Emperor.  He  and  all  males  eligible 
for  the  throne  by  Japanese  rules  of  succession  and  adoption  should  be  interned, 
preferably  in  China,  but  under  the  supervision  of  a  United  Nations  Commission 
to  emphasize  united  responsibility.  His  estates,  and  estates  belonging  to  mem- 
bers of  Zaibatsu  families  and  important  militarists,  should  be  made  over  to  an 
agrarian  reform  program,  conspmiously  without  his  sanction  and  by  order  of 
the  United  Nations.  Eventually,  after  his  death  and  after  a  new  civil  service 
and  a  new  management  of  finance  and  industry  have  taken  hold,  the  remaining 
members  of  the  imperial  line  can  be  allowed  to  go  where  they  like.  New 
vested  interests  will  by  that  time  be  able  to  prevent  the  restoration  of  a  monarchy. 

The  Chairman.  From  what  did  you  read  that  extract  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  I  am  reading  from  page  189  of  Solution  in  Asia, 
by  Owen  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  have  the  whole  of  the 
Solution  in  Asia  laid  in  the  record  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  mean  that  book  ? 


726  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

• 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes ;  as  well  as  the  document  referred  to  by  the  witness 
on  the  Round  Table  Conference  from  which  quotes  have  been  taken. 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  think  we  will  put  the  book  in  the  record. 
We  will  make  it  a  part  of  the  files  of  this  committee. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  meant  make  it  a  part  of  the  files  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  The  excerpts  are  from  the  book,  are  they  not  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  We  have  read  the  excerpts  from  the  record,  Mr.  Chair- 
man. 

The  Chairman.  They  are  from  this? 

Mr.  Morris.  Some  excerpts  are  from  Solution  in  Asia,  IMr.  Chair- 
man, and  others  are  from  this  publication  of  the  Round  Table  Con- 
ference. 

The  Chairman.  You  want  all  of  these  put  into  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  So  much  of  them  as  have  been  quoted  by  Mr.  Dooman. 

The  Chairman.  Veiy  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  Meanwhile,  I  would  like  both  of  these  documents  made 
a  part  of  the  file  of  the  record. 

Tlie  Chairman  It  will  be  made  part  of  the  record  so  much  as  you 
select  as  havino;  been  testified  to  by  the  witness,  but  I  may  say  that  it  all 
has  not  been  testified  to. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  filed  for  the  information  of  the 
committee.) 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  JMoRRis.  Mr.  Dooman,  we  have  not  finished  the  line  of  question- 
ing before  which  concerns  the  official  attitude  or  the  attitude  of  John 
Carter  Vincent  with  respect  to  these  particular  discussions. 

Now,  you  said,  to  your  own  knowledge  you  have  never  heard  John 
Carter  Vincent  give  expression  to  any  views  that  coincided  with  those 
of  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Dooman.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  of  any  official  publications  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Division  of  the  State  Department  that  would  show  that  the 
views  of  the  head  of  that  Department  coincided  with  the  views  ex- 
pressed by  Mr.  Lattimore  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Yes ;  I  have  already — I  thought  I  made  it  clear  that 
primarily  this  initial  post-surrender  policy  for  Japan  was  one  for 
wliich  ]\Ir.  Vincent  would  have  primary  responsibility,  and  I  have 
tried  to  show  that. 

]Mr.  Morris.  How  do  you  know  that,  Mf.  Dooman? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Because  ipso  facto  he  was  an  ex  officio.  He  was  chair- 
man of  this  committee  that  produced  that  document. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  other  words,  he  was  the  working  chairman  of  the 
committee? 

]Mr.  Dooman.  He  was  the  working  chairman  of  that  committee. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  reason  I  ask  that,  Mr.  Dooman,  is  that  awhile  ago 
you  gave  expression  to  the  view  that  Mr.  Byrnes,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  you  did  not  know  that  he  personally  shared  the  views  put  forth 
in  this  publication  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  No;  I  did  not. 

The  question  was  whether  I  knew  the  people  who  were  responsible 
and  I  mention  Mr.  Byrnes  as  being  responsible  by  reason  of  the  chain 
of  command,  he  being  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  person  ultimately 
responsible. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  727 

Mr.  JkloRRis.  But  is  it  your  testimony,  then,  that  John  Carter  Vin- 
cent, in  addition  to  being  the  nominal  head  of  tlie  Far  Eastern  Divi- 
sion of  the  State  Department  and  your  successor  in  SWINK,  that  he 
was  an  active  member,  working  member  ? 

Mr.  Doom  AN.  Yes.  May  I  say  that  he  was  more  than  the  nominal 
director  of  the  Far  Eastern  Office,  he  was  the  actual  working  director 
as  of  the  7th  of  September,  1945. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right.  It  is  your  testimony  that  Mr.  Byrnes,  as 
Secretary  of  State,  his  work  in  that  position  did  not  necessarily  coin- 
cide with  the  position  taken  by 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Mr.  Byrnes  actually  had  very  little  interest  in  the 
Far  East. 

Senator  Smith.  What  I  was  trying  to  fix,  Mr.  Dooman,  was  that 
it  was  inconceivable  to  me  that  Mr.  Byrnes  had  any  such  ideas. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  tried  to  make  it  clear.  I  mentioned  Mr.  Byrnes 
among  those  responsible  purely  on  grounds  of  chain  of  command. 

Senator  Smith.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  The  responsibility  that  you  apply  to  Mr.  Byrnes, 
if  I  understand  it,  stems  from  the  fact  that  he  was  Secretary  of  State 
and  that  all  mentioned  in  your  testimony  were  under  him;  is  that 
correct  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  are  there  any  other  promulgations  of 
policy  that  you  are  acquainted  with  either  directly  or  from  your 
reading  knowledge  of  them  that  you  care  to  put  into  the  record  at  this 
time  'I 

Mr.  Dooman.  Very  much. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  proceed,  then,  Mr.  Dooman? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Mr.  Chairman,  this  is  a  fairly  long  story,  and  I  hope 
you  will  bear  patiently  with  me  while  I  go  into  it. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  I  want  to  know  what  the  question  is  now, 
please. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  read  the  question  back,  please  ? 

(The  reporter  read  the  pending  question,  as  follows:) 

Mr.  MoEEis.  Mr.  Dooman,  are  there  any  other  promulgations  of  policy  that 
you  are  acquainted  with  either  directly  or  from  your  reading  knowledge  of 
them  that  you  care  to  put  into  the  record  at  this  time? 

The  Chairman.  Promulgation  of  policies  as  to  what  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Promulgation  of  far-eastern  policy  with  respect  to 
Japan. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Senator  Smith.  By  whom?  Anybody  connected  with  the  State 
Department  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  By  the  State  Department,  particularly  the  Far  East- 
ern Division  thereof. 

Senator  Smith.  That  is  all  right. 

Mr.  Dooman.  You  wnll  notice  that  all  through  my  testimony  I  have 
referred  constantly  to  this  question  of  the  Emperor. 

In  March  or  April  of  1945,  Colonel  Dana  Johnson,  w^ho  was  Chief 
of  Psychological  Warfare  in  Hawaii,  came  to  Washington  and  saw 
Mr.  Grew  and  myself.  His  conclusion,  drawn  from  interrogating 
high-ranking  Japanese  prisoners  of  war,  was  that  the  Japanese  weie 
ready  to  surrender  but  that  the  various  statements  and  the  trend  oi 


728  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

public  opinion  with  regard  to  the  question  of  the  monarchy  was  such 
that  so  long  as  the  Japanese  were  left  with  the  impression  that  the 
Emperor  was  personally  to  be  tried  as  a  war  criminal  and  punished, 
that  the  monardiial  system  would  be  disestablished,  so  long  as  those 
ideas  were  assumed  to  be  public  opinion  and  would  be  implemented 
as  American  policy  after  Japan's  surrender,  that  the  Japanese  would 
not  surrender. 

Shortly  thereafter  on,  I  think  it  was  the  I7th  of  April 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Did  he  tell  you  that  was  his  opinion? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  He  did,  sir. 

On  April  17,  there  was  a  change  of  government,  a  general  retired 
as  Prime  Minister  and  there  was  a  reconstitution  of  the  Government 
at  the  head  of  which  was  Admiral  Suzuki,  who  was  then  Chamberlain 
to  the  Emperor  and  who  had  been  throughout  his  career  a  moderate. 
He  took  that  as  a  very  clear  signal  that  the  Japanese  were  ready  to 
surrender,  ready  to  talk  about  this  matter. 

Furthermore,  we  had  the  advantage  of  reading  messages  between 
the  Japanese  Government  and  their  Ambassador  in  Moscow,  and  it 
was  clear  from  these  and  other  indications  that  the  Japanese  were 
ready  to  surrender  if  only  it  were  made  clear  that  this  trend  of  opin- 
ion that  had  been  developed  by  the  leftist  press  in  the  United  States, 
namely,  that  the  Emperor  would  be  tried  as  a  w^ar  criminal  and  the 
monarchial  system  disestablished,  it  was  made  clear  that  those  were 
not  policies  of  the  United  States. 

We  then  started  on  preparing  a  document.  About  the  middle  of 
May,  Mr.  Henry  Luce  came  back  from  a  visit  to  the  Pacific,  and  he 
was  very  much  aroused.  He  said  that  the  failure  of  the  American 
Government  to  persuade  the  Japanese  to  surrender  was  causing,  was 
doing,  great  damage  to  the  morale  of  the  American  forces  who  had 
fought  through  Saipan  and  Tarawa,  and  who  were  anticipating  then 
the  assault  on  Japan  and  were  fearful  of  the  losses  that  would  have 
to  be  paid  there. 

Mr.  Grew,  who  saw  Henry  Luce^  explained  to  him  that  we  were 
working  on  that  eifort,  we  were  working  on  a  plan  along  those  lines. 

It  was,  I  think,  on  the  Sltli  of  May,  if  that  happens  to  be,  if  my 
recollection  is  correct. 

Mr.  Morris.  1945  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  1945.  It  was  on  a  Saturday  that  Mr.  Grew  called  me 
in  and  instructed  me  to  have  ready  Monday  morning  a  paper  which 
he  would  then  present  to  the  President  outhning  the  policies  that  the 
United  States  would  follow  if  Japan  surrendered. 

I  then  prepared  that  paper  and  took  it  to  Mr.  Grew  on  Monday 
morning. 

So  far  as  the  portion  relating  to  the  Emperor  is  concerned,  my 
original  draft  reads  as  follows — this  was  paragraph  12  [reading] : 

The  occurying  forces  of  the  Allies  shall  be  withdrawn  from  Japan  as  soon 
as  these  objectives — 

namely,  those  previously  enumerated — 

have  been  accomplished  and  there  has  been  established  beyond  doubt  a  peace- 
fully inclined,  i'esi)ousible  government  of  a  character  representative  of  the 
Japanese  people.  This  may  include  a  constitutional  monarchy  under  the  present 
dyujisty  if  the  peace-lovinj^  nations  can  be  convinced  of  the  genuine  determination 
of  such  a  government  to  follow  policies  of  peace  which  will  render  impossible 
the  future  development  of  aggressive  militarism  in  Japan. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  729 

Mr.  Grew  approved  the  draft  and  called  a  meeting  of  the  Policy 
Committee  of  the  State  Department.  The  Policy  Committee  of  the 
State  Department  at  that  time  consisted  of  the  Assistant  Secretaries  of 
State  and  the  Legal  Adviser.  He  read  this  document  to  them,  and 
there  was  no  dissent  until  he  came  to  that  paragraph  which  1  have  just 
read.  There  was  then  a  violent  reaction  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Acheson 
and  ^Ir.  MacLeish. 

Mr.  MoKRis.  What  position  did  both  of  those  gentlemen  hold  at 
that  time? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  was  not  present  at  the  meeting  but  the  whole  idea 
of  allowing  the  monarchy  to  remain  was  distasteful. 

Mr.  Morris.  To  Messrs.  Acheson  and  MacLeish  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes, 

Mr.  SouKWiNE.  Mr.  Dooman,  if  you  were  not  present  at  the  meet- 
ing, I  think  you  ought  to  explain  how  you  knew  what  took  place. 

Mr.  Dooman.  This  was  immediately  told  to  me  by  Mr.  Grew  after 
the  meeting. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  What  you  are  describing,  then,  is  Mr.  Grew's  de- 
scription of  what  took  place  at  the  meeting  'I 

Mr.  Dooman.  That  is  correct.  Mr.  Grew  said  that  this  committee 
was,  after  all,  advisory  to  him,  and  that  he  was  ultimately  responsible, 
and  that  he  would  take  the  responsibility  for  presenting  that  docu- 
ment to  the  President  with  the  recommendation  that  he  include  that 
document  within  a  speech  which  he  was  to  deliver  at  some  appropriate 
occasion. 

On  the  28th  of  May,  with  Judge  Rosenman,  he  went  in  to  see  the 
President.  The  President  read  it  over  and  he  said  that  he  would 
approve,  accept,  the  document,  provided  that  it  was  agreeable  to  the 
armed  services. 

On  the  29th  of  May,  Mr.  Grew,  Judge  Rosenman,  and  myself 
attended  a  meeting  in  Mr.  Stimson's  office. 

The  Chairman.  Whose  office? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Mr.  Stimson,  who  was  then  Secretary  of  War. 

This  was  at  the  Pentagon.  There  were  present  Secretary  Forrestal, 
Mr.  McCloy,  Mr.  Elmer  Davis,  who  was  then  Director  of  the  Office  of 
War  Information,  Mr.  Grew,  myself.  General  Marshall,  and  I  should 
say  in  addition  about  10  to  12  of  the  highest  military  and  naval 
officers — who  they  were  I  do  not  remember  at  this  time. 

We  had  prepared  copies  of  this  paper  for  distribution  so  that  eacti 
member  present  would  have  a  copy. 

Mr.  Stimson,  who  was  in  the  chair  at  the  meeting,  said  that  he 
approved  the  document  right  along,  he  went  right  along  with  the 
paper.  In  fact,  he  thought,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  we  did  not  give 
sufficient  allowance  to  the  Japanese  for  their  capacity  to  produce  as 
they  had  in  the  past  such  progressive  men  as  Baron  Shidihara,  Hama- 
guchi,  and  Wakatsuki,  and  others.  These  are  former  Japanese  Prime 
Ministers. 

Mr.  Forrestal  read  it  over  and  he  agreed.    Mr.  McCloy  agreed  also. 

The  Chairman.  Agreed,  or  approved? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Approved.  Mr.  Elmer  Davis  reacted  very  violently 
and  would  have  none  of  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  position  did  he  hold  at  this  time? 


730  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  DooMAN.  He  was,  as  I  said,  Director  of  the  Office  of  War  Infor- 
mation. Various  other  officers  approved  of  it,  but  there  was  a  feeling 
that  the  publication  of  that  document 

Mr.  Morris.  Vincent  was  not  present? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  No.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  information  on  this  was  re- 
stricted to  a  very  small  number  of  people,  those  people  that  I  have  just 
indicated. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  You  were  present  at  this  conference  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  was  present. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  When  you  speak  of  Mr.  Davis  having  reacted  vio- 
lently, you  were  there  and  saw  the  reaction  ? 

Mr,  DooMAN.  Yes. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  How  did  Mr.  Davis  react,  what  was  the  nature  of 
his  violent  reaction  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN,  He  did  not  approve,  he  did  not  approve  of  anything 
which  might  be  construed  in  any  way  as  forming  a  basis  for  a  negoti- 
ated surrender. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Is  that  what  he  said? 

Mr.  DcOMAN.  Yes;  that  was,  in  effect,  what  he  said.  However,  the 
thing  was  pigeonholed  because  of  the  view  among  the  military  people 
that  the  publication  of  this  document  at  that  time  would  be  premature. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  military  people? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  principally,  General  Marshall. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  not  General  Marshall  express  disagreement? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  No ;  he  weiit  along  with  the  paper  but  his  statement 
was  that  the  publication  of  the  document  at  that  time  would  be,  and 
this  word  I  remember  textually,  "premature."  With  that,  the  paper 
was  set  aside  for  the  time  being.  However,  a  very  short  time  after 
that,  it  was  a  matter  of  perhaps  2  or  3  weeks 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  tell  us  the  time  again,  the  week  and  month, 
if  possible  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  The  29th  of  May  1945,  that  this  meeting  took  place 
in  Secretary  Stimson's  office.  Within  a  very  short  time,  I  should  say 
a  matter  of  a  fortnight,  information  was  available  in  the  State  De- 
partment that  Dr.  Lattimore  had  called  on  the  President  and  had  re- 
monstrated very  strongly  against  any  position  or  decision  taken  by 
this  Government  which  would  enable  the  monarchy  to  remain  in 
Japan. 

Mr.  SouRAviNE.  What  do  you  mean  "information  was  available  in 
the  State  Department,"  Mr.  Dooman  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  you  understand,  Mr.  Sourwine,  that  so  far  as 
Japan  was  concerned,  I  was  in  a  rather  key  position,  and  there  was 
information  passing  iDack  and  forth  between  the  State  Department 
and  the  White  House  which  was  very  closely  guarded. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  mean  official  information? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Official  information. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  mean  you  learned  of  Mr.  Acheson's  protest  to 
the  President  from  official^ 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Mr.  Lattimore's 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Lattimore's  protest  from  official  papers  which 
came  across  your  desk  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  No ;  word  of  mouth. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Who  told  you  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Mr.  Grew. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  731 

Mr.  Sour  WINE.  Did  anyone  else  tell  you  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  No. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  What  you  meant  by  information  becoming  avail- 
able was  that  Mr.  Grew  told  you  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  was  Mr.  Grew  who  told  me. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  go  ahead. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Now,  Mr.  Lattimore  had  been  using  every  opportu- 
nity for  a  period  of  a  year  or  more  to  propound  the  doctrine  that  the 
Japanese  people  would  overturn  the  monarchy  and  that  there  were  a 
group  of  people  in  the  State  Department,  Fascists  and  reactionaries, 
who  were  going  to  keep  the  Emperor  in  power  against  the  will  of  the 
Japanese  people. 

But,  to  me,  it  was  very  queer  that  once  a  decision — now,  mind  you, 
up  to  that  time,  there  had  been  no  decision  within  the  State  Depart- 
ment on  the  question  of  the  Emperor.  There  was  a  trend  of  thinking 
but  there  was  no  decision  until  the  recommendation  was  made  to  the 
President.  To  me,  it  was  very  queer  that  immediately,  well,  within 
a  matter  of  weeks,  2  or  3  weeks  after  that  decision  was  made,  that  Mr. 
Lattimore  went  to  the  President  and  remonstrated  with  this  decision. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  are  there  any  other  incidents  or  episodes 
or  official  reports  that  you  know  that  would  document  your  views  on 
Owen  Lattimore,  which  you  are  now  testifying  to? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  would  like  to  identify  this  document  that  I  have 
been  talking  about  if  I  may. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  think  we  should  put  that  into  this  record,  too,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  This  document,  as  I  say,  was  put  aside. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  "this  document,"  and  we  have  been  deal- 
ing with  a  number  of  documents.  Is  this  the  document  which  you 
prepared  at  the  instance  of  the  Secretary  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  As  the  Acting  Secretary  of  State. 

I  am  proceeding  now  to  identify  the  document. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  This  paper,  then,  was  taken  by  Mr.  Stimson  to  Pots- 
dam. I  arrived  myself  at  Potsdam  on  the  13th  of  July,  and  I  was 
told  by  Mr.  McCloy,  who  was  then  there,  that  Mr.  Stimson  was  in 
active  discussion  with  Mr.  Churchill  with  regard  to  that  document 
and  I  heard  later,  I  believe  also  from  Mr.  McCloy,  that  there  was  an 
agreement  between  Mr.  Stimson  and  Mr.  Churchill,  and  that  they  had 
then  gone  to  Mr.  Truman  and  Mr.  Byrnes  and  had  received  an  accept- 
ance of  the  document.  It  was  then  telegraphed  to  General  Chiang 
Kai-shek,  and  on  May  29,  it  was  promulgated  then  as  the  Potsdam 
Proclamation  to  Japan,  and  it  was  on  the  basis  of  that  document  that 
Japan  surrendered. 

May  I  also  add,  for  the  benefit  of — I  do  not  want  to  take  credit  that 
really  belongs  to  somebody  else,  but  I  would  like  to  put  on  record 
here  that  the  preamble  to  the  Potsdam  Proclamation  was  taken  from 
a  document  prepared  by  Douglas  Fairbanks,  who  was  then  in  the 
Navy  Department  in  the  Psychological  Warfare  Department. 
The  Chairman.  Douglas  Fairbanks  ? 
Mr.  DooMAN.  Douglas  Fairbanks. 
I  would  like  to  make  acknowledgment,  if  I  could,  of  his  contribution 

2284S— 52 — pt.  3 3 


•732  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

to  a  paper  which,  after  all,  is  part  of  history. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  You  are  referring  to  the  movie  actor  i 

Mr.  DooMAN.  The  movie  actor. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Father  or  son  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Son. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Douglas  Fairbanks,  Jr. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes.  .     -,     ^r    ^  » 

Mr.  Morris.  Have  you  finished  with  that  episode,  Mr.  Dooman  { 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes.  ^^    ^^     ^-s^ 

The  Chairman.  Do  I  understand  now  that  he  started  out  to  identity 
this  instrument  and  he  does  not  identify  it  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  describe  in  detail  so  that  we  might  make  that 
a  part  of  our  record  if  the  chairman  deems  it  necessary? 

Mr  DooMAN.  Yes.  This  was  entitled  when  prepared:  "Draft 
Proclamation  by  the  Heads  of  the  State,  U.  S.-U.  K.-Chma,"  and  it 
was  then  ultimately  issued  on  the  29th  of  July  at  Potsdam,  by  Prime 
Minister  Attlee,  Mr.  Truman,  and  General  Chiang  Kai-shek,  and 
when  Kussia  came  into  the  war,  the  Soviet  Union  then  adhered  to  this 

document.  ,     .     •  i  i. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  go  back  and  get  the  document  straight 

again,  please. 

Is  this  the  document  that  you  are  now  testifying  to  the  same  docu- 
ment that  you  prepared  at  the  instance  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Stale? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  the  one  that  was  rejected  at  the  instance 
of  General  Marshall  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  was  later  signed. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  what  I  mean,  but  temporarily,  at  least,  laid 
aside  ? 

Mr,  DooMAN.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  document  that  afterwards  was  adopted 
at  Potsdam? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  the  preliminary  to  that,  the  preamble  to  that 
was  prepared  by  Douglas  Fairbanks  ? 

Mr.  DoOMAN.  Yes,  sir.  I  would  like  to  mention  this  thing  that  the 
only  portion  of  my  draft  which  was  changed,  not  in  substance  but  in 
text,  was  that  paragraph  12  which  I  have  just  read ;  that  was  cut  down 
to  read  that  the  Japanese  might  have  such  form  of  Government  as 
they  desired. 

The  Chairman.  Had  your  document  set  up  or  attempted  to  set  up 
the  continuation  of  a  monarchy  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Well,  I  haven't  read  it ;  that  the  occupation  of  Japan 

should  cease — 

when  a  responsible  government  of  a  character  representative  of  the  Japanese 
people  had  been  set  up.  This  may  include  a  constitutional  monarchy  under 
the  present  dynasty  if  the  peace-loving  nations  can  be  convinced  of  the  genuine 
determination  of  such  a  government  to  follow  policies  of  peace  which  will 
render  impossible  the  future  development  of  aggressive  militarism  in  Japan. 

As  I  say,  that  particular  paragraph  was  cut  down  to  the  effect  that 
such  type  of  government  as  they  pleased,  in  accordance  with  the 
wishes  of  the  Allies,  or  something  of  that  sort. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  offer  this  now. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  733 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Excuse  me,  that  includes  some  other  papers. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  have  this  introduced 
into  the  record  in  its  entirety,  it  is  only  three  pages  and  I  would  like  to 
have  it  marked  as  the  next  consecutive  exhibit.  It  reads:  "Draft 
Proclamation  by  the  Heads  of  State,  U.  S.,  U.  K.,  USSR-phina." 

The  Chairman.  Now,  this  instrument  that  I  now  hold  in  my  hand, 
consisting  of  three  pages,  was  that  the  entire  instrument  that  you 
prepared  at  the  instance  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  That  was  prepared  at  the  direction  of  Mr.  Grew,  then 
Acting  Secretary  of  State. 

The  Chairman.  Acting  Secretary  of  State. 

Mr.  DoOMAN.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Was  this  the  entire  instrument? 

Mr.  DoOMAN.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Going  back  a  little  bit,  this  was  the  instrument 
which  was  discussed  in  the  Pentagon  at  the  time  Mr.  Marshall  was 
present,  and  it  was  at  his  instance,  laid  aside? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  This  is  the  instrument  that  was  shown  to  the  Presi- 
dent in  the  White  House  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  As  I  recall,  on  the  28th  of  May. 

The  Chairman.  This  may  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  240"  and  is  as 
follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  240 

Deatt  Proclamation  by  the  Heads  of  State  U.  S.-U.  K.-[U.  S.  S.  R.]-China 

[Delete  matters  inside  brackets  if  U.  S.  S.  R.  not  in  war] 

(Completed  in  Department  of  State  May,  1945) 

(1)  We, — The  President  of  the  United  States,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Great 
Britain,  [the  Generalissimo  of  the  Soviet  Union]  and  the  President  of  the  Republic 
of  China,  representing  the  hundreds  of  millions  of  our  countrymen,  have  conferred 
and  agree  that  the  Japanese  people  shall  be  given  an  opportunity  to  end  this 
war  on  the  terms  we  state  herein. 

(2)  The  prodigious  land,  sea  and  air  forces  of  the  United  States,  the  British 
Empire  and  of  China,  many  times  reinforced  by  their  armies  and  air  fleets  from 
the  west  [have  now  been  joined  by  the  vast  military  might  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and]  are  poised  to  strike  the  final  blows  upon  Japan.  This  military  power  is 
sustained  and  inspired  by  the  determination  of  all  the  Allied  nations  to  prosecute 
the  war  against  Japan  until  her  capitulation. 

(3)  The  result  of  the  futile  and  senseless  German  resistance  to  the  might  of 
the  aroused  free  peoples  of  the  world  stands  forth  in  awful  clarity  as  an  example 
to  the  people  of  Japan.  The  might  that  now  converges  on  Japan  is  immeasurably 
greater  than  that  which,  when  apijlied  to  the  resisting  Nazis,  necessarily  laid 
waste  to  the  lands,  the  industry  and  the  method  of  life  of  the  whole  German 
people.  The  full  application  of  our  military  power  backed  by  our  resolve  will 
mean  the  inevitable  and  complete  destruction  of  the  Japanese  armed  forces  and 
just  as  inevitably  the  utter  devastation  of  the  Japanese  homeland. 

(4)  Are  the  Japanese  so  lacking  in  reason  that  they  will  continue  blindly  to 
follow  the  leadership  of  those  self-willed  militaristic  advisers  whose  unintelligent 
calculations  have  brought  the  Empire  of  Japan  to  the  threshold  of  annihilation? 
The  time  has  come  for-  the  Japanese  people  to  decide  whether  to  continue  on  to 
destruction  or  to  follow  the  path  of  reason. 

(5)  Following  are  our  terms.  We  will  not  deviate  from  them.  There  are  no 
alternatives.    We  shall  brook  no  delay. 

(6)  There  must  be  eliminated  for  all  time  the  authority  and  influence  of 
those  who  have  deceived  and  misled  the  people  of  Japan  into  embarking  on  world 
conquest,  for  we  insist  that  a  new  order  of  peace,  security  and  justice  will  be 
impossible  until  irresponsible  militarism  is  driven  from  the  world. 


734  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

(7)  Until  such  a  new  order  is  established  and  until  there  is  convincing  proof 
that  Japan's  war-making  power  is  destroyed,  Japanese  territory  shall  be  occupied 
to  the  extent  necessary  to  secure  the  achievement  of  the  basic  objectives  we  are 
here  setting  forth. 

(8)  The  terms  of  the  Cairo  Declaration  shall  be  carried  out  and  Japanese 
sovereignty  shall  be  limited  to  the  islands  of  Honshu,  Hokliaido,  Kyushu,  Shikohu 
and  such  minor  islands  as  we  determine. 

(9)  The  Japanese  military  forces,  after  being  completely  disarmed,  shall  be 
permitted  to  return  to  their  homes,  with  the  opportunity  to  lead  peaceful  and 
productive  lives. 

(10)  We  do  not  intend  that  the  Japanese  shall  be  enslaved  as  a  race  or  de- 
stroyed as  a  nation,  but  stern  justice  shall  be  meted  out  to  all  war  criminals, 
Including  those  who  have  visited  cruelties  upon  our  prisoners.  Democratic 
tendencies  among  the  Japanese  shall  be  supported  and  strengthened.  Freedom 
of  speech,'  of  religion  and  of  thought,  as  well  as  respect  for  the  fundamental 
human  rights  shall  be  established. 

(11)  Japan  shall  be  permitted  to  maintain  such  industries  as  are  determined 
to  offer  no  potential  for  war  but  which  can  produce  a  sustaining  economy  and 
permit  the  Japanese  to  take  their  part  in  a  world  economic  system,  with  access 
to  raw  materials  and  opportuniies  for  peaceful  trade. 

(12)  The  occupying  forces  of  the  Allies  shall  be  withdrawn  from  Japan  as 
soon  as  these  objectives  have  been  accomplished  and  there  has  been  established 
beyond  a  doubt  a  peacefully  inclined,  responsible  government  of  a  character 
representative  of  the  Japanese  people.  This  may  include  a  constitutional  mon- 
archy under  the  present  dynasty  if  the  peace-loving  nations  can  be  convinced 
of  the  genuine  determination  of  such  a  government  to  follow  policies  of  peace 
which  will  render  impossible  the  future  development  of  aggressive  militarism 
in  Japan. 

(13)  We  call  upon  the  Japanese  people  and  those  in  authority  in  Japan  to 
proclaim  now  the  unconditional  surrender  of  all  the  Japanese  armed  forces  and 
to  provide  proper  and  adequate  assurances  of  their  good  faith  in  such  action. 
The  alternative  for  Japan  is  prompt  and  utter  destruction. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  go  back  again  for  a  question  or  two.  What 
part  of  that  was  prepared  by  Douglas  Fairbanks  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  was  the  preamble. 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  call  the  preamble? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  The  preamble  consists  of  those  paragraphs  preced- 
ing the  numbered  paragraphs  in  that  paper. 

The  Chairman.  Preceding? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Preceding  the  nuihbered  paragraphs. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  first  paragraph  here  is  a  numbered  paragraph. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  correct,  the  first  paragraph  is  a  numbered 
paragraph. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  My  recollection  was  faulty.  It  consists  of  para- 
graphs 1,  2,  3,  and  4.  In  other  words,  paragraphs  1  to  4,  inclusive, 
were  prepared  by,  largely  by,  Mr.  Fairbanks. 

The  Chairman.  Where  was  Mr.  Fairbanks  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Dooman.  He  was  in  the  Psychological  Warfare  Section  of 
the  Navy  Department  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  when  you  testified  in  executive  session 
on  July  11,  1951,  at  the  beginning  of  your  testimony  with  respect  to 
a  conflict  of  views  between  yourself  and  Mr.  John  Carter  Vincent, 
you  said  then : 

My  view  was  then  that  a  country  such  as  Japan  with  a  population  far  in 
excess  of  what  it  could  support  without  colonies  was  in  very  grave  danger  of 
being  communized  unless  certain  of  the  natural  resources  available  on  the  con- 
tinent could  be  made  available  to  the  Japanese.  Vincent's  position  always  was 
that  the  opportunities  for  these  70-  or  80-million  Japanese  to  make  a  liveli- 
hood should  be  restricted  as  much  as  possible  to  what  they  could  find  on  their 
own  metropolitan  area  of  Japan,  the  four  main  islands. 

Senator  Eastland.  Whose  policy  was  that? 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  735 

Mr.  DooMAN.  That  was  the  general  policy,  Vincent's. 
Senator  Eastland.  Vincent's? 
Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes. 

Now,  I  wonder,  Mr.  Dooman,  if  you  would,  either  from  your  own 
personal  experiences  or  from  your  reading  of  official  documents  pub- 
lished by  Mr.  Vincent  or  Mr.  Vincent's  division,  support  that  testi- 
mony. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  those  views  were  set  forth  in  a  broadcast  under 
the  auspices  of  the  State  Department.  I  think  it  was  carried  on  in 
D.  C.  on  the  night  of  October  6, 1945. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  recollection  of  that  broadcast  ?  Did  you 
hear  the  broadcast,  or  did  you  read  a  transcription  of  it? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  read  a  transcription  of  it  in  the  newspapers. 

The  Chairman.  By  whom  was  the  broadcast  made  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  There  were  several  people  who  participated  in  it. 
General  Hilldring,  who  was  a  member  of  SWINK  for  civil  affairs 
matters.  Captain — I  can't  remember  his  name  now,  but  he  is  now 
the  President's  naval  aide — Captain  Davidson. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  have  a  copy  of  that  transcription  with  you, 
Mr.  Dooman? 

Mr.  Dooman.  No,  sir ;  I  do  not. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  recollection  of  what  took  place  on  that 
broadcast  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Well,  it  was  substantially  along  the  lines  testified  to 
previously  by  me  in  the  executive  session. 

Mr.  Morris.  Namely,  that  Vincent's  position  always  was  that  the 
opportunity  for  these  70  or  80  million  Japanese  to  make  a  livelihood 
should  be  restricted  as  much  as  possible  to  what  they  could  find  on 
their  own  metropolitan  area,  the  four  main  islands? 

Mr.  Dooman.  That's  right.  In  other  words,  emphasis  was  to  be 
laid  on  agriculture  and  fishing  and  such  minor  industries  as  they  could 
support. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  have  that  transcription 
inserted  in  the  record  because  of  its  considered  importance. 

The  Chairman.  What  transcription  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  the  transcript. 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  identify  this  document? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  headed  "Department  of  State  Bulletin,  Our 
Occupation  Policy  for  Japan."  The  date  of  the  bulletin  is  October 
7,  1945,  and  it  gives  the  participants  in  this  broadcast  to  which  Mr. 
Dooman  has  referred. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  I  offer  you  this  and  ask  you  if  there  are 
any  particular  passages  you  would  like  to  underscore  in  that  trans- 
cript. 

Mr.  Chairman,  with  your  permission,  I  would  like  to  introduce  the 
whole  transcript  into  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  a  photostatic  copy  of  the  original? 

Mr.  Morris.  Pardon,  sir? 

The  Chairman.  This  is  a  photostatic  copy  of  the  original? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel  has  so  identified  it. 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  taken  from  the  files  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment? 


736  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Mandel.  That  photostat  was  made  at  my  direction  by  the 

Library  of  Congress. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.    It  will  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  241"  and  is  as 

follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  241 

[From  the  Department  of  State  Bulletin.  October  7,  1945] 

OiTR  Occupation  Policy  fob  Japan 
Participants 

John  Cartehj  Vincent  :  Director,  Office  of  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  and  Chairman,  Far  Eastern  Subcommittee,  State,  War,  Navy  Coordinating 
Committee. 

Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Huxdring  :  Director  of  Civil  Affairs,  War  Department. 

Capt.  R.  L.  Dennison:  U.  S.  Navy,  Representative  of  tlie  Navy  Department 
on  the  Far  Eastern  Subcommittee,  State,  War,  Navy  Coordinating  Committee. 

Sterling  Fishek  :  Director,  NBC  University  of  the  Air. 

[Released  to  the  press  October  6] 
Announcer  :  Here  are  headlines  from  Washington: 

General  Hilldring  Says  the  Zaibatsu,  or  Japanese  Big  Business,  Will  Be  Broken 
Up ;  States  We  Will  Not  Permit  Japan  To  Rebuild  Her  Big  Combines ;  Promises 
Protection  of  Japanese  Democratic  Groups  Against  Attacks  by  Military 
Fanatics. 

John  Carter  Vincent  of  State  Department  Forecasts  End  of  National  Shinto; 
Says  That  the  Institution  of  the  Emperor  Will  Have  To  Be  Radically  Modified, 
and  That  Democratic  Parties  in  Japan  Will  Be  Assured  Rights  of  Free 
Assembly  and  Free  Discussion. 

Captain  Dennison  of  Navy  Department  Says  Japan  Will  Not  Be  Allowed  Civil 
Aviation;  Predicts  That  Japanese  Will  Eventually  Accept  Democracy,  and 
Emphasizes  Naval  Responsibility  for  Future  Control  of  Japan. 

Announcer:  This  is  the  thirty-fourth  in  a  series  of  programs  entitled  "Our 
Foreign  Policy,"  featuring  authoritative  statements  on  international  affairs  by 
Government  officials  and  Members  of  Congress.  The  series  is  broadcast  to  the 
people  of  America  by  NBC's  University  of  the  Air,  and  to  our  service  men  and 
women  overseas,  wherever  they  are  stationed,  through  the  facilities  of  the  Armed 
Forces  Radio  Service.  Printed  copies  of  these  important  discussions  are  also 
available.  Listen  to  the  closing  announcement  for  instructions  on  how  to  obtain 
them. 

This  time  we  present  a  joint  State,  War,  and  Navy  Department  broadcast 
on  "Our  Occupation  Policy  for  Japan",  Participating  are  Mr.  John  Carter 
Vincent,  Director  of  the  Office  of  Far  Eastern  Affairs  in  the  State  Department ; 
Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Hilldring,  Director  of  Civil  Affairs  in  the  War  Department; 
and  Capt.  R.  L.  Dennison,  U.  S.  N.,  Navy  Department  representative  on  the  Far 
Eastern  Subcommittee  of  the  State.  War,  Navy  Coordinating  Committee.  They 
wil  be  interviewed  by  Sterling  Fisher,  Director  of  the  NBC  University  of  the 
Air.     Mr.  Fisher — 

Fisher:  No  subject  has  been  debated  more  widely  by  the  press,  radio,  and 
general  public  in  recent  weeks  than  our  occupation  policy  in  Japan.  That  debate 
has  served  a  very  useful  purpose.  It  has  made  millions  of  Americans  conscious 
of  the  dangers  and  complications  of  our  task  in  dealing  with  70  million  Japanese. 

Publication  by  the  White  House  of  our  basic  policy  for  Japan  removed  much 
of  the  confusion  surrounding  this  debate.*  But  it  also  raised  many  questions — 
questions  of  how  our  policy  will  be  applied.  To  answer  some  of  these,  we  have 
asked  representatives  of  the  Departments  directly  concerned — the  State,  War, 
and  Navy  Departments — to  interpret  further  our  Japan  policy. 

General  Hilldring,  a  great  many  people  seemed  to  think,  until  recently  at 
least,  that  General  MacArthur  was  more  or  less  a  free  agent  in  laying  down  our 
policy  for  the  Japanese.  Perhaps  you  would  start  by  telling  us  just  how  that 
policy  is  determined. 

Hilldring:  Well,  although  I  help  execute  policy  instead  of  making  it,  I  will 
try  to  explain  how  it  is  made.     The  State,  War,  Navy  Coordinating  Committee — 


1  Bulletin  of  Sept.  23,  1945.  p.  423. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  737 

"SWING",  we  call  it— formulates  policy  for  the  President's  approral,  on  ques- 
tions of  basic  importance.  On  the  military  aspects,  the  views  of  the  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff  are  obtained  and  carefully  considered.  Directives  which  carry  the 
approved  policies  are  then  drawn  up,  to  be  transmitted  by  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  to  General  MacArthur.  As  Supreme  Commander  of  our  occupation  forces 
in  Japan,  he  is  charged  with  the  responsibility  for  carrying  them  out.  And  we 
think  he  is  doing  it  very  well. 

Fisher  :  Mr.  Vincent,  the  Far  Eastern  subcommittee  of  which  you  are  chair- 
man does  most  of  the  work  of  drafting  the  policy  directives,  as  I  understand  it. 

Vincent:  That's  right,  Mr.  Fisher.  We  devote  our  entire  energies  to  Far 
Eastern  policy  and  meet  twice  a  week  to  make  decisions  on  important  matters. 
We  then  submit  our  recommendations  to  the  top  Coordinating  Committee,  with 
which  General  Hilldring  is  associated  and  with  which  Captain  Dennison  and 
I  sit  in  an  advisory  capacity. 

Hilldring:  The  key  members  of  the  Coordinating  Committee,  representing 
the  Secretaries  of  the  three  departments,  are  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  James 
Dunn,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  John  J.  McCloy,  and  the  Under  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  Artemus  Gates. 

Fisheb:  Mr.  Vincent,  I'd  like  to  kno^^  whether  there  is  a — shall  we  say — 
strained  relationship  between  General  MacArthur  and  the  State  Department. 

Vincent:  No,  tliere  is  absolutely  no  basis  for  such  reports,  Mr.  Fisher.  There 
is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  no  direct  relationship  between  General  MacArthur  and  the 
State  Department.  I  can  assure  you  that  General  INIacArthur  is  receiving  our 
support  and  assistance  in  carrying  out  a  very  difficult  assignment. 

Fisher:  There  have  been  some  reports  that  he  has  not  welcomed  civilian 
advisers. 

Vincent  :  That  also  is  untrue.  A  number  of  civilian  Far  Eastern  specialists 
have  already  been  sent  out  to  General  MacArthur's  headquarters,  and  he  has 
welcomed  them  most  cordially.  We're  trying  right  now  to  recruit  people  with 
specialized  knowledge  of  Japan's  economy,  finances,  and  so  on.  We  expect  to 
send  more  and  more  such  people  out. 

Fisher  :  As  a  Navy  representative  on  the  Far  Eastern  subcommittee,  Captain 
Dennison,  I  suppose  you've  had  a  good  opportunity  to  evaluate  the  situation. 
Some  people  don't  realize  that  the  Navy  Department  has  a  direct  interest  in, 
and  voice  in,  the  policy  for  Japan. 

Dennison  :  We  have  a  vital  interest  in  it.  The  2  million  men  and  the  5,000 
vessels  of  the  United  States  Navy  in  the  Pacific  and  the  vital  role  they  played  in 
the  defeat  of  Japan  are  a  measure  of  that  interest.  Japan  is  an  island  country 
separated  from  us  by  4,500  miles  of  ocean.  Its  continued  control  will  always 
present  a  naval  problem. 

Fisher  :  What  part  is  the  Navy  playing  now  in  that  control? 

Dennison  :  Our  ships  are  patrolling  the  coasts  of  Japan  today,  and  in  this 
duty  they  support  the  occupation  force.  Navy  officers  and  men  will  aid  General 
MacArthur  ashore,  in  censorship  (radio,  telephone,  and  cable)  and  in  civil- 
affairs  administration.  The  Navy  is  in  charge  of  military  government  in  the 
former  Japanese  mandates  in  the  Pacific  and  also  in  the  Ryukyu  Islands. 

Fisher:   Does  that  include  Okinawa? 

Dennison  :    Yes. 

Fisher:  That's  not  generally  known,  is  it? 

Dennison  :  No,  I  believe  not.  I'd  like  to  add — besides  these  immediate  duties 
the  United  States  Navy  will  have  to  exercise  potential  control  over  Japan  long 
after  our  troops  are  withdrawn. 

Fisher:  Now,  I'd  like  to  ask  you,  Mr.  Vincent,  as  chairman  of  the  subcom- 
mittee which  drafts  our  occupation  policy,  can  you  give  us  a  statement  of  our 
over-all  objectives? 

Vincent  :  Our  immediate  objective  is  to  demobilize  the  Japanese  armed  forces 
and  demilitarize  Japan.  Our  long-range  objective  is  to  democratise  Japan — to 
encourage  democratic  self-government.  We  must  make  sure  that  Japan  will 
not  again  become  a  menace  to  the  peace  and  security  of  the  world. 

Fisher:  And  how  long  do  you  think  that  will  take? 

Vincent  :  The  length  of  occupation  will  depend  upon  the  degree  to  which  the 
Japanese  cooperate  with  us.  I  can  tell  you  this :  The  occupation  will  continue 
until  demobilization  and  demilitarization  are  completed.  And  it  will  continue 
until  there  is  assurance  that  Japan  is  well  along  the  path  of  liberal  reform.  Its 
form  of  government  will  not  necessarily  be  patterned  exactly  after  American 
democracy,  but  it  must  be  responsible  self-government,  stripped  of  all  militaristic 
tendencies. 


738  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Fisher:  General  Hilldring,  how  long  do  you  think  we'll  have  to  occupy 
Japan  ? 

Hilldking:  To  answer  that  question,  Mr.  Fisher,  would  require  a  degree  of 
clairvoyance  I  don't  possess.  I  just  don't  know  how  long  it  will  take  to  accomplish 
our  aims.  We  must  stay  in  Japan,  with  whatever  forces  may  be  required,  until 
we  have  accomplished  the  objectives  Mr.  Vincent  has  mentioned. 

Fisher:  To  what  extent  will  our  Allies,  such  as  China  and  Great  Britain 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  take  part  in  formulating  occupation  policy? 

Hilldring  :  That  is  not  a  question  which  soldiers  should  decide.  It  involves 
matters  of  high  policy  on  which  tlie  Army  must  look  to  the  State  Department. 
I  believe  Mr.  Vincent  should  answer  that  question. 

Fisher:   Well,  Mr.  Vincent,  how  about  it? 

Vincent:  Immediately  following  the  Japanese  surrender,  the  United  States 
proposed  the  formation  of  a  Far  Eastern  Advisory  Commission  as  a  means  of 
regularizing  and  making  orderly  the  methods  of  consulting  with  other  countries 
interested  in  the  occupation  of  Japan.  And  Secretary  of  State  Byrnes  announced 
recently  that  a  Commission  would  be  established  for  the  formulation  of  policies 
for  tlie  control  of  Japan."  In  addition  to  the  four  principal  powers  in  the 
Far  East,  a  number  of  other  powers  ar§  to  be  invited  to  have  membership  on  the 
Commission. 

Fisher  :  Coming  back  to  our  first  objective — General  Hilldring,  what  about  the 
demobilization  of  the  Japanese  Army?     How  far  has  it  gone? 

Hilldring  :  Disarmament  of  the  Japanese  forces  in  the  four  main  islands  is 
virtually  complete,  Mr.  Fisher.  Demobilization  in  the  sense  of  returning  disarmed 
soldiers  to  their  homes  is  well  under  way,  but  bombed-out  transport  systems  and 
food  and  housing  problems  are  serious  delaying  factors. 

Fisher  :  And  what's  being  done  about  the  Japanese  troops  in  other  parts  of 
Asia  ? 

Hilldring  :  It  may  take  a  long  time  for  them  all  to  get  home.  Demands  on 
shipping  are  urgent,  and  the  return  of  our  own  troops  is  the  highest  priority. 
Relief  must  also  be  carried  to  the  countries  we  have  liberated ;  the  return  of 
Japanese  soldiers  to  their  homes  must  take  its  proper  place. 

Fisher  :  Captain  Dennison,  how  long  do  you  think  it  will  take  to  clean  up  the 
Japanese  forces  scattered  through  Asia? 

Dennison  :  It  may  take  several  years,  Mr.  Fisher.  After  all,  there  are  close  to 
three  million  Japanese  scattered  around  eastern  Asia  and  the  Pacitic,  and  for 
the  most  part  it  will  be  up  to  the  Japanese  themselves  to  ship  them  home. 

Fisher:  And  what  is  being  done  with  the  Japanese  Navy? 

Dennison  :  The  Japanese  Navy  has  been  almost  completely  erased.  There's 
nothing  left  of  it  except  a  few  battered  hulks  and  these  might  well  be  destroyed. 

Fisher:  Now,  there  are  some  other,  less  obvious  parts  of  the  military  sys- 
tem— the  police  system,  for  example.  JThe  Japanese  secret  police  have  been 
persecuting  liberal,  anti-militarist  people  for  many  years.  Mr.  Vincent,  what 
will  be  done  about  that? 

Vincent  :  That  vicious  system  will  be  abolished,  Mr.  Fisher.  Not  only  the 
top  chiefs  but  the  whole  organization  must  go.  That's  the  only  way  to  break  its 
hold  on  the  Japanese  people.  A  civilian  police  force  such  as  we  have  in  America 
will  liave  to  be  substituted  for  it. 

Dennison  :  We've  got  to  make  sure  that  what  they  have  is  a  police  force,  and 
not  an  ai'my  in  the  guise  of  police. 

Hilldring  :  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Fisher,  General  MacArthur  has  already 
abolished  the  Kempai  and  political  police. 

Fisher  :  It  seems  to  me  that  a  key  question  in  this  whole  matter,  Mr.  Vincent, 
is  the  relationship  of  our  occupation  forces  to  the  present  Japanese  Government, 
from  the  Emperor  on  down. 

Vincent:  Well,  one  of  General  MacArthur's  tasks  is  to  bring  about  changes 
in  the  Constitution  of  Japan.  Those  provisions  in  the  Constitution  which  would 
hamper  the  establishment  in  Japan  of  a  government  which  is  responsible  to  the 
people  of  Japan  must  be  removed. 

Fisher:  Isn't  the  position  of  the  Emperor  a  barrier  to  responsible  govern- 
ment? 

Vincent:  The  institution  of  the  Emperor — if  the  Japanese  do  not  choose  to 
get  rid  of  it — will  have  to  be  radically  modified,  Mr.  Fisher. 

Dennison  :  The  Emperor's  authority  is  subi'ect  to  General  MacArthur  and 
will  not  be  permitted  to  stand  as  a  barrier  to  responsible  government.  Direc- 
tives sent  to  General  MacArthur  establish  that  point. 


»  See  p.  545. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  739 

FiSHEE :  Can  you  give  us  the  substance  of  that  directive  that  covers  that  point, 
Captain  Denuison? 

Dennison  :  I  can  quote  part  of  it  to  you.  The  message  to  General  MacArthur 
said: 

"1.  The  authority  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Japanese  Government  to  rule  the 
state  is  subordinate  to  you  as  Supreme  Commander  for  the  Allied  Powers.  You 
will  exercise  your  authority  as  you  deem  proper  to  carry  out  your  mission. 
Our  relations  with  Japan  do  not  rest  on  a  contractual  basis,  but  on  an  uncon- 
ditional surrender.  Since  your  authority  is  supreme,  you  will  not  entertain 
any  question  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  as  to  its  scope. 

"2.  Control  of  Japan  shall  be  exercised  through  the  Japanese  Government  to 
the  extent  that  such  an  arrangement  produces  satisfactory  results.  This  does 
not  prejudice  your  right  to  act  directly  if  required.  You  may  enforce  the  orders 
issued  by  you  by  the  employment  of  such  measures  as  you  deem  necessary,  in- 
cluding the  use  of  force."  ^  That's  the  directive  under  which  General  MacArthur 
is  operating. 

Fisher:  That's  clear  enough.  .  .  .  Now,  General  Hilldring,  you  have  to  do 
with  our  occupation  policy  in  both  Germany  and  Japan.  What  is  the  main  differ- 
ence between  them? 

Hilldring  :  Our  purposes  in  Germany  and  Japan  are  not  very  different.  Re- 
duced to  their  simplest  terms,  they  are  to  prevent  either  nation  from  again 
breaking  the  peace  of  the  world.  The  difference  is  largely  in  the  mechanism 
of  control  to  achieve  that  purpose.  In  Japan  there  still  exists  a  national  Gov- 
ernment, which  we  are  utilizing.  In  Germany  there  is  no  central  government, 
and  our  controls  must,  in  general,  be  imposed  locally. 

Fisher:  Are  there  advantages  from  your  point  of  view  in  the  existence  of 
the  national  Government  in  Japan? 

Hilldring:  The  advantages  which  are  gained  through  the  utilization  of  the 
national  Government  of  Japan  are  enormous.  If  there  were  no  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment available  for  our  use,  we  would  have  to  operate  directly  the  whole 
complicated  machine  required  for  the  administration  of  a  country  of  70  million 
people.  These  people  differ  from  us  in  language,  customs,  and  attitudes.  By 
cleaning  up  and  using  the  Japanese  Government  machinery  as  a  tool,  we  are 
saving  our  time  and  our  manpower  and  our  resources.  In  other  words,  we  are 
requiring  the  Japanese  to  do  their  own  housecleaning,  but  we  are  providing  the 
specifications. 

Fisher:  But  some  people  argue.  General,  that  by  utilizing  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment we  are  committing  ourselves  to  support  it.  If  that's  the  case,  wouldn't 
this  interfere  with  our  policy  of  removing  from  public  office  and  from  industry 
persons  who  were  responsible  for  Japan's  aggression? 

Hilldring:  Not  at  all.  We're  not  committing  ourselves  to  support  any  Japa- 
nese groups  or  individuals,  eitlier  in  government  or  in  industry.  If  our  policy 
requires  removal  of  any  person  from  government  or  industry,  he  will  be  re- 
moved. The  desires  of  the  Japanese  Government  in  this  respect  are  immaterial. 
Removals  are  being  made  daily  by  General  MacArthur. 

Dennison  :  Our  policy  is  to  use  the  existing  form  of  government  in  Japan,  not 
to  support  it.  It's  largely  a  matter  of  timing.  General  MacArthur  has  had  to 
feel  out  the  situation. 

Fisher:  Would  you  say.  Captain  Dennison,  that  when  our  forces  first  went 
to  Japan  they  were  sitting  on  a  keg  of  dynamite? 

Dennison  :  In  a  sense,  yes.  But  our  general  policies  were  set  before  General 
MacArthur  landed  a  single  man.  As  he  has  brought  in  troops,  he  has  corre- 
spondingly tightened  his  controls  in  order  to  carry  out  those  policies. 

Fisher  :  He  certainly  has.  Captain.  But  what  about  the  Japanese  politicians, 
Mr.  Vincent?    Some  of  them  look  pretty  guilty  to  me. 

Vincent  :  Well,  the  Higashi-Kuni  cabinet  resigned  this  week.  The  report  today 
that  Shidehara  has  become  Premier  is  encouraging.  It's  too  early  to  predict 
exactly  what  the  next  one  will  be  like,  but  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  it 
will  be  an  improvement  over  the  last  one.  If  any  Japanese  official  is  found  by 
General  MacArthur  to  be  unfit  to  hold  office,  he  will  go  out. 

Fisher  :  Will  any  of  the  members  of  the  Higashi-Kuni  cabinet  be  tried  as  war 
criminals? 

Vincent  :  We  can't  talk  about  individuals  here,  for  obvious  reasons.  But  we 
can  say  this:  All  people  who  are  charged  by  appropriate  agencies  with  being 
war  criminals  will  be  arrested  and  tried.    Cabinet  status  will  be  no  protection. 


«  Bulletin  of  Sept.  30,  1945,  p.  480. 


740  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Hiixdeing:  We  are  constantly  adding  to  the  list  of  war  criminals,  and  they 
are  beins  arrested  every  day.  The  same  standards  which  Justice  Jackson  is 
applying  in  Germany  are  being  used  in  Japan. 

Dennison  :  Our  policy  is  to  catch  the  war  criminals  and  make  sure  that  they 
are  punished — not  to  talk  about  who  is  a  war  criminal  and  who  is  not. 

fisher:  All  right,  Captain  Dennison,  leaving  names  out  of  the  discussion,  let 
me  ask  you  this :  Will  we  consider  members  of  the  Zaibatsu — the  big  indus- 
trialists— who  have  cooperated  with  the  militarists  and  profited  by  the  war, 
among  the  guilty? 

Dennison  :  We'll  follow  the  same  basic  policy  as  in  Germany.  You  will  recall 
that  some  industrialists  there  have  been  listed  as  war  criminals. 

Fisher:  General  Hilldring,  what  are  we  going  to  do  about  the  big  indus- 
trialists who  have  contributed  so  much  to  Japan's  war-making  pov»-er? 

Hh-ldring:  Under  our  policy,  all  Fascists  and  jingos — militarists — will  be 
removed,  not  only  from  public  office  but  from  positions  of  trust  in  industry  and 
education  as  well.  As  a  matter  of  national  policy,  we  are  going  to  destroy  Japan's 
war-making  power.  That  means  the  big  combines  must  be  broken  up.  There's 
no  other  way  to  accomplish  it. 

Fisher:  What  do  you  say  about  the  big  industrialists,  Mr.  Vincent? 

Vincent:  Two  things.  We  have  every  intention  of  proceeding  against  those 
members  of  the  Zaibatsu  who  are  considered  as  war  criminals.  And,  as  Gen- 
eral Hilldring  has  just  said,  we  intend  to  break  the  hold  those  large  family  com- 
bines have  over  the  economy  of  Japan — combines  such  as  Mitsui,  Mitsubishi, 
and  Sumitomo,  to  name  the  most  prominent. 

Fisher:  And  the  financial  combines  as  well? 

Vincent:  Yes.  General  MacArthur,  as  you've  probably  heard,  has  already 
taken  steps  to  break  the  power  of  the  big  financial  combines  and  strip  them  of 
their  loot. 

Fisher  :  Well,  there's  no  feeling  here  of  "Don't  let's  be  beastly  to  the  Zaibatsu." 
Captain  Dennison,  do  you  want  to  make  it  unanimous? 

Dennison  :  There's  no  disagreement  on  this  point  in  our  committee,  Mr. 
Fisher.  There  has  been  a  lot  of  premature  criticism.  But  the  discovery  and 
arrest  of  all  war  criminals  cannot  be  accomplished  in  the  first  few  days  of  occu- 
pation. Our  policy  is  fixed  and  definite.  Anyone  in  Japan  who  brought  about 
this  war,  whether  he  is  of  the  Zaibatsu,  or  anyone  else,  is  going  to  be  arrested 
and  tried  as  a  war  criminal. 

Fisher  :  General  Hilldring,  one  critic  has  charged  that  our  policy  in  Germany 
has  been  to  send  Americans  over  to  help  rebuild  the  big  trusts,  like  I.  G. 
Farbenindustrie.  He  expressed  the  fear  that  a  similar  policy  would  be  followed 
in  Japan.    What  about  that? 

Hilldring:  I  can  say  flatly,  Mr.  Fisher,  that  we  are  not  rebuilding  the  big 
trusts  in  Germany,  we  have  not  rebuilt  them,  and  we  are  not  going  to  rebuild 
them  in  the  future.  The  same  policy  will -prevail  in  Japan.  Moreover,  not  only 
will  we  not  revive  these  big  trusts  but  we  do  not  propose  to  permit  the  Germans 
or  the  Japanese  to  do  so. 

Fisher:  And  that  applies  to  all  industries  that  could  be  used  for  war  pur- 
poses ? 

Hiixdring:  The  Japanese  will  be  prohibited  from  producing,  developing,  or 
maintaining  all  forms  of  arms,  ammunitions,  or  implements  of  war,  as  well  as 
naval  vessels  and  aircraft.  A  major  portion  of  this  problem  will  involve  the 
reduction  or  elimination  of  certain  Japanese  industries  which  are  keys  to  a 
modern  war  economy.  These  industries  include  production  of  iron  and  steeel, 
as  well  as  chemicals,  machine  tools,  electrical  equipment,  and  automotive  equip- 
ment. 

Vincent  :  This,  of  course,  implies  a  major  reorientation  of  the  Japanese 
economy,  which  for  years  has  been  geared  to  the  requirements  of  total  war. 
Under  our  close  supervision,  the  Japanese  will  have  to  redirect  their  human  and 
natural  resources  to  the  ends  of  peaceful  living. 

Fisher:  Mr.  Vincent,  won't  this  create  a  lot  of  unemployment?  Is  anything 
being  done  to  combat  unemployment — among  the  millions  of  demobilized  soldiers, 
for  example? 

Vincent:  Our  policy  is  to  place  responsibility  on  the  Japanese  for  solving 
their  economic  problems.  They  should  put  emphasis  on  farming  and  fishing 
and  the  production  of  consumer  goods.  They  also  have  plenty  of  reconstruc- 
tion work  to  do  in  every  city.  We  have  no  intention  of  interfering  with  any 
attempts  by  the  Japanese  to  help  themselves  along  these  lines.  In  fact,  we'll 
give  them  all  the  encouragement  we  can. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  741 

Fisher:  What  do  you  think  they'll  do  with  the  workers  who  are  thrown  out 
of  heavy  war  industry''' 

Vincent  :  They'll  have  to  find  jobs  in  the  light  industries  Japan  is  allowed  to 
retain.  The  general  objective  of  this  revamping  of  Japan's  industrial  economy 
will  be  to  turn  that  economy  in  on  itself  so  that  the  Japanese  will  produce  more 
and  more  for  their  domestic  market. 

Fisher  :  They'll  have  to  have  some  foreign  trade  of  course  to  keep  going. 
Vincent:  Of  course,  but  not  the  unhealthfnl  sort  they  had  before  the  war. 
A  large  portion  of  Japan's  pre-war  foreign  trade  assets  were  used  for  military 
preparations,  and  not  to  support  her  internal  economy ;  after  all,  scrap-iron  and 
oil  shipments  didn't  help  the  Japanese  people.  You  could  reduce  Japan's  foreign 
trade  far  below  the  pre-war  level  and  still  have  a  standard  of  living  comparable 
to  what  they  had  before  the  war. 

FisHEK.  Tliere  have  been  some  dire  predictions  about  the  food  situation  over 
there,  and  even  some  reports  of  rice  riots.  General  Hilldring,  what  will  our 
policy  be  on  food? 

HiLLDRixG :  General  MacArthur  has  notified  the  War  Department  that  he  does 
not  expect  to  provide  any  supplies  for  the  enemy  population  in  Japan  this 
winter.  This  statement  is  in  harmony  with  the  policy  we  have  followed  in  other 
occupied  enemy  areas.  That  is  to  say,  we  will  import  supplies  for  enemy  popu- 
lations only  where  essential  to  avoid  disease  epidemics  and  serious  unrest  that 
might  jeopardize  our  ability  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  the  occupation.  The 
Japanese  will  have  to  grow  their  own  food  or  provide  it  from  imports. 

FiSHEB :  They'll  need  some  ships  to  do  that.  Captain  Dennison,  are  we  going 
to  allow  Japan  to  rebuild  her  merchant  marine? 

Dennison  :  We've  got  to  allow  her  to  rebuild  a  peacetime  economy — that's 
the  price  of  disarming  her.  That  means  trade.  But  the  question  of  whose  ships 
shall  carry  this  trade  hasn't  been  decided  yet.  We  know  we  must  control  Japan's 
imports,  in  order  to  keep  her  from  rearming — and  the  best  way  to  do  that  may 
be  to  carry  a  good  part  of  her  trade  on  Allied  ships. 

Fishee:  Then,  Captain  Dennison,  what  about  Japan's  civil  aviation?  A  lot 
of  people  were  quite  surprised  recently  when  General  MacArthur  allowed  some 
Japanese  transport  planes  to  resume  operations. 

L^ENNisoN :  That  will  not  be  continued,  Mr.  Fisher.  Under  the  terms  of  Gen- 
eral MacArthur's  directive  in  this  field,  no  civil  aviation  will  be  permitted  in 
Japan. 

Vincent:  Such  aviation  as  General  MacArthur  did  allow  was  to  meet  a  spe- 
cific emergency.     It  will  not  be  continued  beyond  that  emergency. 

Fisher  :  In  this  revamping  of  Japan's  economy,  Mr.  Vincent,  will  the  hold  of 
the  big  landholders  be  broken,  as  you  have  said  the  power  of  the  big  indus- 
trialists will  be? 

Vincent:  Encouragement  will  be  given  to  any  movement  to  reorganize  agri- 
culture on  a  more  democratic  economic  basis.  Our  policy  favors  a  wider  dis- 
tribution of  land,  income,  and  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  and  trade. 
But  those  are  things  a  democratic  Japanese  government  should  do  for  itself — 
and  will,  we  expect. 

Fishee:  And  the  labor  unions?    What  about  them? 

Vincent:  We'll  encourage  the  development  of  trade-unionism,  Mr.  Fisher, 
because  that's  an  essential  part  of  democracy. 

Fisher.  I  understand  a  lot  of  the  former  union  leaders  and  political  liberals 
are  still  in  jail.     What  has  been  done  to  get  them  out? 

Vincent:  General  MacArthur  has  already  ordered  the  release  of  all  persons 
imprisoned  for  "dangerous  thoughts"  or  for  their  political  or  religious  beliefs. 

Fisher  :  That  ought  to  provide  some  new  leadership  for  the  democratic  forces 

in  Japan.    Captain  Dennison,  to  what  extent  are  we  going  to  help  those  forces? 

Dennison  :  Our   policy    is    one    of   definitely    encouraging    liberal    tendencies 

among  the  Japanese.     We'll  give  them  every  opportunity  to  draw  up  and  to 

adopt  a  constructive  reform  program. 

Vincent:  All  democratic  parties  will  be  encouraged.  They  will  be  assured 
the  rights  of  free  assembly  and  free  public  discussion.  The  occupation  author- 
ities are  to  place  no  obstruction  in  the  way  of  the  organization  of  political 
parties.  The  Japanese  Government  has  already  been  ordered  to  remove  all 
barriers  to  freedom  of  religion,  of  thought,  and  of  the  press. 

Fisher  :  I  take  all  this  to  mean  that  the  democratic  and  anti-militarist  groups 
will  be  allowed  free  rein.  But,  Mr.  Vincent,  suppose  some  nationalistic  group 
tried  to  interfere  with  them,  using  gangster  methods? 

Vincent:  It  would  be  suppressed.  One  of  General  MacArthur's  policy  guides 
calls  for  "the  encouragement  and  support  of  liberal  tendencies  in  Japan".     It 


742  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

also  says  that  "changes  in  the  direction  of  modifying  authoritarian  tendencies 
of  the  government  are  to  be  permitted  and  favored". 

Fisher:  And  if  the  democratic  parties  should  find  it  necessary  to  use  force 
to  attain  their  objectives? 

Vincent:  In  that  event,  the  Supreme  Commander  is  to  intervene  only  where 
necessary  to  protect  our  own  occupation  forces.  This  implies  that  to  achieve 
liberal  or  democratic  political  ends  the  Japanese  may  even  use  force. 

Dennison  :  We  are  not  interested  in  upholding  the  status  quo  in  Japan,  as 
such.    I  think  we  should  make  that  doubly  clear. 

Fisher:  One  of  the  most  interesting  developments  in  recent  weeks  has  been 
the  apparent  revival  of  liberal  and  radical  sentiment  in  Japan.  I  understand 
that  the  leaders  of  several  former  labor  and  socialist  political  groups  are  get- 
ting together  in  one  party — a  Socialist  party.  What  stand  will  we  take  on 
that.  General  Hilldring? 

HiLLDRiNG :  If  the  development  proves  to  be  genuine,  we  will  give  it  every 
encouragement,  in  line  with  our  policy  of  favoring  all  democratic  tendencies  in 
Japan.  And  we'll  protect  all  democratic  groups  against  attack  by  military 
fanatics. 

Fisher:  You  intend  to  do  anything  that's  necessary,  then,  to  open  the  way 
for  the  democratic  forces. 

Hilldring  :  We're  prepared  to  support  the  development  of  democratic  gov- 
ernment even  though  some  temporary  disorder  may  result — so  long  as  our  troops 
and  our  over-all  objectives  are  not  endangered. 

FisHBH :  I  have  one  more  question  of  key  importance,  Mr.  Vincent.  What  will 
be  done  about  Shintoism,  especially  that  branch  of  it  that  makes  a  religion  of 
nationalism  and  which  is  called  "National  Shinto"? 

Vincent  :  Shintoism,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  religion  of  individual  Japanese,  is  not 
to  be  interfered  with.  Shintoism,  however,  as  a  state-directed  religion  is  to  be 
done  away  with.  People  will  not  be  taxed  to  support  National  Shinto,  and  there 
will  be  no  place  for  Shintoism  in  the  schools. 

Fisher  :  That's  the  clearest  statement  I  have  heard  on  Shinto. 

Vincent  :  Our  policy  on  this  goes  beyond  Shinto,  Mr.  Fisher.  The  dissemina- 
tion of  Japanese  militaristic  and  ultra-nationalistic  ideology  in  any  form  will 
be  completely  suppressed. 

Fisher:  And  what  about  the  clean-up  of  the  Japanese  school  system?  That 
will  be  quite  a  chore,  Mr.  Vincent. 

Vincent  :  Yes,  but  the  Japanese  are  cooperating  with  us  in  cleaning  up  their 
schools.  We  will  see  to  it  that  all  teachers  with  extreme  nationalistic  learnings 
are  removed.    The  primary  schools  are  being  reopened  as  fast  as  possible. 

Dennison  :  That's  where  the  real  change  must  stem  from — the  school  system. 
The  younger  generation  must  be  taught  to  understand  democracy.  That  goes 
for  the  older  generation  as  well. 

Fisher  :  And  that  may  take  a  very  long  time.  Captain  Dennison. 

Dennison  :  How  long  depends  on  how  fast  we  are  able  to  put  our  directives 
into  effect.  It  may  take  less  time  than  you  think,  if  we  reach  the  people  through 
all  channels — school  texts,  press,  radio,  and  so  on. 

Fisher:  What's  the  basis  for  your  optimism.  Captain? 

Dennison  :  Well,  Mr.  Fisher,  I've  had  opportunity  to  observe  a  good  many 
Japanese  outside  of  Japan.  Take  for  example  the  Japanese-Americans  in 
Hawaii.  They  used  to  send  their  children  to  Japan  at  the  age  of  about  7,  I  think, 
to  spend  a  year  with  their  grandparents.  The  contrast  between  the  life  they 
found  in  Japan  and  the  life  they  had  in  Hawaii  was  so  clear  that  the  great 
majority  returned  to  Hawaii  completely  loyal  to  the  United  States.  They  proved 
their  loyalty  there  during  the  war. 

Fisher:  What  accounts  for  that  loyalty? 

Dennison  :  Simply  that  they  like  the  American  way  of  life  better.  At  seven, 
it's  the  ice  cream,  the  movies,  the  funny  papers  they  like,  but  as  they  get  older 
they  learn  to  understand  and  appreciate  the  more  important  things  as  well.  I 
believe  the  people  in  Japan  will  like  our  ways  too.  I  think  once  they  have  a 
taste  of  them — of  real  civil  liberties — they'll  never  want  to  go  back  to  their  old 
ways. 

Hiixdring:  I'm  inclined  to  agree,  Captain.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it's  quite 
possible  we  may  find  Japan  less  of  a  problem  than  Germany,  as  far  as  retraining 
the  people  for  democracy  is  concerned.  The  Nazis  are  hard  nuts  to  craek^ 
they've  been  propagandized  so  well,  trained  so  well.  The  Japanese  are  indoctri- 
nated with  one  basic  idea  :  obedience.    That  makes  it  easier  to  deal  with  them. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  743 

Vincent  :  Or  it  may  make  it  more  difficult,  General.  It  depends  on  how  you 
look  at  it.  That  trait  of  obedience  has  got  to  be  replaced  by  some  initiative,  if 
there's  to  be  a  real,  working  democracy  iu  Japan. 

HiLLDRiNG :  I  don't  mean  to  say  it  will  be  easy.  It  won't  be  done  overnight. 
And  we'll  have  to  stay  on  the  job  until  we're  sure  the  job  is  done. 

Fisher  :  Mr.  Vincent,  what  can  you  tell  us  about  the  attitudes  of  the  Japanese 
under  the  occupation? 

Vincent  :  The  press  has  told  you  a  lot,  Mr.  Fisher.  I  can  say  here  that  recent 
indications  are  that  the  Japanese  people  are  resigned  to  defeat,  but  anxious 
about  the  treatment  to  be  given  them.  There  is  good  evidence  of  a  willingness 
to  cooperate  with  the  occupying  forces.  But,  because  of  the  long  period  of  military 
domination  they've  undergone,  only  time  and  encouragement  will  bring  about 
the  emergence  of  sound  democratic  leadership.  We  shouldn't  try  to  "hustle 
the  East",  or  hustle  General  MacArthur.  Reform  in  the  social,  economic,  and 
political  structure  must  be  a  gradual  process,  wisely  initiated  and  carefully 
fostered. 

Fisher:  Well,  thank  you,  Mr.  Vincent,  and  thanks  to  you.  General  Hilldring 
and  Captain  Dennison,  for  a  clear  and  interesting  interpretation  of  our  occupa- 
tion policy  for  Japan.  You've  made  it  very  plain  that  ours  is  a  tough,  realistic 
policy — one  that's  aimed  at  giving  no  encouragement  to  the  imperialists  and 
every  possible  encouragement  to  the  pro-democratic  forces  which  are  now  begin- 
ning to  reappear  in  Japan. 

Announcer  :  That  was  Sterling  Fisher,  Director  of  the  NBC  University  of  the 
Air.  He  has  been  interviewing  Mr.  John  Carter  Vincent,  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Far  Eastern  Affairs  of  the  State  Department ;  Maj.  Gen.  John  H.  Hilldring, 
Director  of  Civil  Aff:airs,  War  Department;  and  Capt.  R.  L.  Dennison,  Navy 
representative  on  the  Far  Eastern  Subcommittee  of  the  State,  War,  Navy  Co- 
ordinating Committee.  The  discussion  was  adapted  for  radio  by  Selden  Menefee. 
This  was  the  thirty-fourth  of  a  series  of  broadcasts  on  "Our  Foreign  Policy," 
presented  as  a  public  service  by  the  NBC  University  of  the  Air.  You  can  obtain 
printed  copies  of  these  broadcasts  at  10  cents  each  in  coin.  If  you  would  like  to 
receive  copies  of  the  broadcasts,  send  $1  to  cover  the  costs  of  printing  and  mailing. 
Special  rates  are  available  for  large  orders.  Address  your  orders  to  the  NBC 
University  of  the  Air,  Radio  City,  New  York  20,  New  York.  NBC  also  invites 
your  questions  and  comments.  Next  week  we  expect  to  present  a  special  State 
Department  program  on  our  Latin  American  policy,  with  reference  to  Argentina 
and  the  postponement  of  the  inter-American  conference  at  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Our 
guests  are  to  be  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Spruille  Braden,  who  has  just  re- 
turned from  Buenos  Aires,  and  Mr.  Ellis  O.  Briggs,  Director  of  the  Office  of 
American  Republic  Affairs.  Listen  in  next  week  at  the  same  time  for  this  im- 
portant program.    .  .  .  Kennedy  Ludlam  speaking  from  Washington,  D,  C. 

INIr.  DooMAN.  Will  you  give  me  just  a  minute?  Here  is  one  quo- 
tation. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  have  the  question  now,  please. 
(The  record  was  read  by  the  reporter  as  follows :) 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  I  offer  you  this  and  ask  you  if  there  are  any  par- 
ticular passages  you  would  like  to  underscore  in  that  transcript. 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  record  show  that  the  counsel  handed  the 
witness  the  photostatic  copy  of  the  transcript  of  a  radio  speech. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  will  have  to  read  several  quotations  from  other 
people  here. 

Mr.  Morris.  Please  do. 

Mr.  Dooman.  This  is  General  Hilldring  speaking  [reading]  : 

Hilldring.  The  Japanese  will  be  prohibited  from  producing,  developing,  or 
maintaining  all  forms  of  arms,  ammunitions,  or  implements  of  war,  as  well  as 
naval  vessels  and  aircraft.  A  major  portion  of  this  problem  will  involve  the 
reduction  or  elimination  of  certain  Japanese  industries  which  are  keys  to  a 
modern  war  economy.  These  industries  include  production  of  iron  and  steel,  as 
well  as  chemicals,  machine  tools,  electrical  equipment,  and  automotive  equipment. 

Vincent.  This,  of  course,  implies  a  major  reorientation  of  the  Japanese  econ- 
omy, which  for  years  has  been  geared  to  the  requirements  of  total  war.    Under 


744  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

our  close  supervision,  the  Japanese  will  have  to  redirect  their  human  and  natural 
resources  to  the  ends  of  peaceful  living. 

Fisher.  Mr.  Vincent,  won't  this  create  a  lot  of  unemployment?  Is  anything 
being  done  to  combat  unemployment — among  the  millions  of  demobilized  soldiers, 
for  example? 

Vincent.  Our  policy  is  to  place  responsibility  on  the  Japanese  for  solving  their 
economic  problems.  They  should  put  emphasis  on  farming  and  fishinsi  and  the 
production  of  consumer  goods.  They  also  have  plenty  of  reconstruction  work 
to  do  in  every  city.  We  have  no  intention  of  interfering  with  any  attempts  by 
the  Japanese  to  help  themselves  along  these  lines.  In  fact,  we'll  give  them  all 
the  encouragement  we  can. 

That,  I  think,  is  indicative  of  the  thinking  of  Mr,  Vincent,  in  other 
words,  that  the  Japanese  would  have  to  subsist  primarily  on  the  re- 
sources that  they  found  within  their  own  islands,  main  islands,  and 
confine  their  efforts  largely  to  agriculture  and  fishing  and  the  develop- 
ment of  consumer  goods. 

As  I  remarked  previously,  here  were  today  85,000,000  people  sup- 
posed to  be  able  to  make  a  living  off  an  area  equivalent,  roughly,  to 
one-quarter  of  Pennsylvania,  and  with  no  natural  resources  in  the  way 
of  iron,  steel,  coal,  cotton,  wool,  or  any  of  the  primary  raw  materials. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  are  there  any  other  documents  that  you 
care  to  introduce  into  the  record  at  this  time  to  support  the  conclusion 
just  arrived  at,  your  conclusion? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  I  refer  to  a  statement  made  by  General  Mac- 
Arthur,  I  think  it  was  on  the  1st  of  September,  in  which 

Mr.  Morris.  What  year  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  1946,  excuse  me.  This  was  the  first  anniversary  of 
the  setting  up  of  the  occupation  in  Japan.  At  that  time,  he  issued  a 
statement  to  the  Japanese  people  warning  them  of  the  dangers  from 
the  left  as  well  as  from  the  right. 

In  other  words,  he  was  warning  them  of  the  dangers  of  communism. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  short  time  after  that,  in  February  1947,  the 
Communists  tried  to  take  over  the  country  by  means  of  a  general  strike 
which  was  prevented  only  by  General  MacArthur  preventing  it. 
However,  the  Herald  Tribune,  as  of  September  3,  1946,  publishes  a 
dispatch  from  Mr.  John  C.  Metcalfe,  its  correspondent  in  Washington, 
stating  that  there  was  in  effect,  that  there  was  considerable  unfavor- 
able reaction  in  the  State  Department  to  General  MacArthur's  pro- 
nouncement to  the  Japanese  people. 

It  quoted  at  that  time,  this  article  quoted,  as  follows ;  if  I  may  read : 

State  Department  sources  said  no  directives  had  been  sent  to  General  Mac- 
Arthur  indicating  any  desire  on  the  part  of  the  administration  here  to  raise  the 
cry  of  "communism"  in  Japan.  The  source  said  they  were  taken  completely  by 
surprise  by  comments  in  the  MacArthur  statement,  such  as  that  the  Japanese 
islands  might  become  either  "a  powerful  bulwark  for  peace  or  a  dangerous 
springboard  for  war." 

The  incident  was  considered  here  as  particularly  irritating  since  it  came  in 
the  midst  of  delicate  American-Soviet  relations  elsewhere  in  the  world. 

The  aim  of  American  foreign  policy  in  the  Far  East  is  establisJiment  of  a 
just  and  durable  peace,  the  State  Department  sources  said.  It  is  aimed  at 
"building  a  bridge  of  friendship  to  Soviet  Russia"  and  is  not  intended  to  set  up 
"a  bulwark  against  communism"  or  to  inspire  anti-Soviet  feeling,  the  sources 
added. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  what  year? 

Mr.  Dooman.  September  3,  1946. 

The  Chairman.  1946? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  published  in  what  publication? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  745 

Mr.  DooMAN.  The  New  York  Herald  Tribune. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  who  the  sources  referred  to  in  that  arti- 
cle are^ 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  do  not  know  first-hand,  I  only  know  from  rumor. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  that  writer,  byline  writer? 

Mr.  IMoRRis.  John  C.  Metcalfe? 

Mr.  Doom  AN.  No ;  I  do  not  know  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  offer  that,  introduce  it  into  the  evi- 
dence, for  whatever  probative  value  it  may  have. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  admitted. 

(The  document  marked  "Exhibit  No.  242"  is  as    follows  0 

Exhibit  No.  242 

[From  the  New  York  Herald  Tribune,  September  3,  1946] 

MacArthur  Blast  Against  Reds  Draws  State  Department's  Fike 

(By  John  C.  Metcalfe) 

Washington,  September  2. — General  Douglas  MacArthur,  Allied  Supreme  Com- 
mander in  Japan,  was  charged  by  State  Department  sources  today  with  having 
launched  on  his  own  initiative  an  anti-Coiumuuist  campaign  in  violation  of 
American  policy  directives  to  him  from  President  Truman. 

The  charge,  unofficial  in  character,  was  based  on  General  MacArthur's  pub- 
lished statement  yesterday  on  the  first  anniversary  of  Japan's  formal  surrender. 
In  the  statement,  he  suggested  that  in  certain  circumstances  the  Japanese  people 
might  fall  prey  to  those  seeking  to  impose  the  "philosophy  of  the  extreme  radical 
left." 

It  was  stated  bluntly  at  the  State  Department  today  that  General  MacArthur 
made  public  his  statement  "without  any  consultation"  in  advance  with  American 
officials  directly  responsible  for  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States. 

controversy  threatens 

The  development  threatened  to  revive  an  old  controversy  between  General  Mac- 
Arthur  and  Washington  policy  makers.  President  Truman  made  it  clear  6 
months  ago  that  he,  in  consultation  with  James  F.  Byrnes,  Secretary  of  State, 
is  responsible  for  policy  and  that  General  MacArthur's  job  is  solely  to  carry  out 
that  policy  under  White  House  directives  forwarded  to  him  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment. 

State  Department  sources  said  no  directives  had  been  sent  to  General  Mac- 
Arthur  indicating  any  desire  on  the  part  of  the  administration  here  to  raise  the 
cry  of  "communism"  in  Japan.  The  sources  said  they  were  taken  completely  by 
sui'prise  by  comments  in  the  MacArthur  statement  such  as  that  the  Japanese 
islands  might  become  either  "a  powerful  bulwark  for  peace  or  a  dangerous  spring- 
board for  war." 

The  incident  was  considered  here  as  particularly  irritating  since  it  came  in 
the  midst  of  delicate  American-Soviet  relations  elsewhere  in  the  world. 

The  aim  of  American  foreign  policy  in  the  Far  East  is  establishment  of  a  just 
and  durable  peace,  the  State  Department  sources  said.  It  is  aimed  at  "building 
a  bridge  of  friendship  to  Soviet  Russia"  and  is  not  intended  to  set  up  "a  bulwark 
against  communism"  or  to  inspire  anti-Soviet  feeling,  the  sources  added. 

statement  held  unwarranted 

"There  is  nothing  which  the  Japanese  have  done  since  their  surrender  to 
warrant  the  statement  issued  by  General  MacArthur,"  one  official  commented. 

General  MacArthur's  task  is  to  "neutralize  Japan"  and  to  get  along  with  the 
other  interested  Allied  powers,  it  was  explained.  If  the  United  States  holds  any 
fears  about  its  security,  it  will  counter  any  Soviet  threat  with  a  strong  Navy 
and  Air  Force,  it  was  said. 

Private  advices  from  Tokyo  gave  the  following  information  today : 

"The  emphasis  on  important  developments  in  Japan  has  shifted  from  General 
MacArthur  to  the  doings  of  the  Japanese.  One  is  apt  to  get  (from  headquarters) 
a  completely  false  view  of  what  is  going  on  in  this  country.     Listening  to  the 


746  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

military  authorities  one  wonders  why  the  occupation  is  not  ended  right  now. 
Actually,  however,  the  Japanese  are  no  more  ready  to  govern  themselves  on  a 
democratic  basis  than  they  were  a  year  ago.  The  Conservatives  are  firmly  in 
the  saddle  and  are  doing  all  in  their  power  to  preserve  the  status  quo. 

"Everyone  must  be  aware  by  now  that  the  Allied  Council  here  is  a  farce  and 
that  the  Far  Eastern  Commission  seems  to  us  out  here  like  something  on  an- 
other planet." 

DEMOCJRAOY  PREFEEBED 

At  the  state  Department  it  was  said  that  if  the  Japanese  have  a  tendency  to 
go  anywhere  they  will  "most  likely  turn  toward  democracy"  as  the  preferred 
type  of  government.  But  it  was  also  pointed  out  that  the  Japanese,  like  the 
Germans,  are  primarily  interested  in  extricating  themselves  from  their  unhappy 
situation  and  will  take  any  course  that  might  lead  to  a  way  out.  They  are  playing 
off  democracy  against  communism,  it  was  said,  and  statements  like  those  by 
General  MacArthur  are  extremely  helpful  to  them. 

Department  officials,  moreover,  were  particularly  annoyed  by  the  MacArthur 
statement  because  of  the  disturbing  situations  in  Korea  and  China. 

"Maybe  General  MacArthur  thinks  he  is  bolstering  Mr.  Byrnes  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference,  but  he  is  not  helping  the  situation  in  the  Far  East  with  his 
comment,"  a  State  Department  official  said.  • 

Diplomatic  observers  also  pointed  out  that  American-Soviet  relations  at  the 
Paris  Conference,  in  Yugoslavia,  Poland,  Greece,  and  at  the  United  Nations 
Security  Council  are  none  too  calm.  They  were,  therefore,  particularly  disturbed 
by  anything  resembling  a  move  to  launch  an  anticominunist  campaign  in  Japan. 

State  Department  sources  considered  the  whole  incident  as  "undoubtedly 
especially  embarrassing"  to  Maj.  Gen.  Kuzma  Derevyanko,  Soviet  representative 
on  the  Allied  Council  for  Japan,  which  meets  at  Tokyo. 

There  was  no  indication  tonight  whether  the  State  Department  would  make 
any  official  comment,  since  most  officials  were  away  for  the  Labor  Day  week  end. 

Mr.  Morris.  Are  there  any  other  incidents  or  episodes  concerning 
this  part  of  the  testimony  that  you  care  to  add  at  this  time  ?  If  there 
are,  we  ask  you  to  do  so. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  I  can't  recall  any,  offliand,  bearing  on  this  par- 
ticular point. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  do  you  know  what  the  attitude  of  the 
State  Department,  or  any  individuals  in  the  State  Department,  was 
with  respect  toward  Japanese  Communists  ? 

Mr.  DoOMAN.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  have  any  personal  experience  with  Japanese 
Communists  ? 

Mr,  DooMAN.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  explain  those  to  the  committee,  Mr.  Doo- 
man? 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  have  any  personal  experience  with  Jap- 
anese Communists,  that  is  your  question  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right. 

Did  you  experience  the  State  Department's  policy  with  respect  to 
Japanese  Communists  first  hand? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  May  I  submit  that  the  question  is  perhaps  not 
relevant  to  the  situation  as  it  existed,  because  the  State  Department 
had  no  policy  at  that  time  with  regard  to 

Mr.  Morris.  Any  individuals  in  the  State  Department,  Mr.  Doo- 
man. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  some  time  in  May  I  believe  it  was.  May  or 
June,  I  think  it  was  May,  there  returned 

Mr.  Morris.  1945? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  1945. 

There  returned  from  China  a  Foreign  Service  officer  named  John 
K.  Emerson,  who,  before  the  war,  had  been  one  of  my  subordinates 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  747 

at  the  American  Embassy  in  Tokyo.  I  understood  that  he  had  been 
sent  to  Yenan.  Yenan  in  China  then  was  the  capital  of  the  Chinese 
Communists.  There  were  present  at  that  time  in  Yenan  a  Nosaka, 
the  leading  Japanese  Communist,  and  other  leading  Communists. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  Nosaka  the  same  as  Susumo  Okano,  head  of  the 
Japanese  Communist  Party? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  believe  the  latter  is  a  pseudonym.  I  believe  that 
Emerson  had  been  sent  to  Yenan  to  study  methods  used  by  the  Japa- 
nese Communists  in  Yenan  in  indoctrinating  Japanese  prisoners  of 
war  taken  by  the  Chinese.  As  I  said,  he  returned  to  Washington  in 
about  May  of  1945. 

The  Chairman.  Who  did? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Emerson.  He  brought  back  a  report  describing  at 
considerable  length  the  method  used  by  the  Japanese  Communists 
with  respect  to  Japanese  prisoners  of  war,  and  as  I  recall,  he  recom- 
mended that  Japanese  prisoners  in  American  stockades  be  then  turned 
over  to  Japanese  Communists  in  the  United  States  for  indoctrina- 
tion along  methods  used  by  the  Japanese  Communists  in  Yenan. 

At  that  time  he  was  also  invited  to  come  over  to  OSS,  the  Office  of 
Strategic  Services,  where  I  was  helping  with  my  own  services  in 
the  field  of  psychological  warfare  to  address  a  group  on  what  he  had 
found  in  Yenan.  At  that  time  he  displayed  a  large  number  of  posters 
and  papers  of  various  kinds  and  he  also  showed  me  a  number  of  letters 
that  he  had  brought  from  Yenan.  These  letters  were  written  by 
Japanese  Communists  in  Yenan  to  certain  Japanese  Communists  who 
were  then  employed  by  OSS  in  psychological  warfare  against  Japa- 
nese. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  was  the  episode,  Mr.  Dooman  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Are  you  acquainted  with  a  publication  that  is  entitled 
"Eighteen  Years  in  Prison''  by  Tokuda  and  Yoshio  Shiga,  published 
by  the  Japanese  Communist  Party  in  1948  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes;  I  have  a  copy  of  that  book.  The  title  in 
Japanese  is  "Gokuchi  juhachi-nen"  which  means  Eighteen  Years  in 
Jail. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  publication,  which  is  in  Japanese,  which  you 
understand,  Mr.  Dooman,  indicates  that  it  was  published  by  the 
Japanese  Communist  Party?  A  translation  here  from  the  Library 
of  Congress,  Mr.  Dooman,  indicates  that  it  was  published  by  the 
Japanese  Communist  Party  in  1948. 

Mr.  Dooman.  Oh,  yes.  I  see.  It  was  published  by  the  Japanese 
Communist  Party,  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  on  page  159  to  161,  there  is  described  an 
episode  which  involves  individuals  concerned  with  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations. 

I  ask  you  if  you  have  any  supplementary  or  corroborative  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts  described  by  these  two  Japanese  Communists  in  the 
publication  that  you  have  in  your  hand. 

I  think  it  would  be  best  if  I  read  the  episode  referred  to,  Mr. 
Dooman,  and  ask  you  if  you  had  read  it  in  the  book  and  whether  you 
know  of  any  corroboration  of  it. 

Mr.  Dooman.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  describe  what  this  is,  please  ? 

2284S— 52^pt.  3 4 


748  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  translation  from  the  book  entitled  "Eighteen 
Years  in  Prison,"  the  last  chapter  written  by  Yoshio  Shiga,  pages  159 
to  161,  published  by  the  Japanese  Connnunist  Party  in  1948  and 
translated  by  Andrew  Y,  Kuroda,  Japanese  Section,  Orientalia  Divi- 
sion, the  Library  of  Congress. 

JMr.  MoRius.  Will  you  read  the  episode  to  which  we  are  referring, 
Mr.  Mandel? 

Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

THE  DOCK  OF  FREEDOM 

At  last  the  day  came  when  we  could  become  active  asain.  That  day  came  after 
those  who  called  us  traitors  had  turnod  Japan  into  a  ruined  wastoland,  had  talcen 
the  lives  of  a  million  people  and  had  destroyed  all  peace  and  happiness. 

On  August  15  (1945)  all  hands  in  the  prison,  from  the  warden  on  down,  as- 
sembled around  a  radio  speaker,  to  hear  a  transcribed  broadcast  of  the  so-called 
August  Voice.  It  was  hardly  intelligible  because  of  the  terrible  static,  but 
I  cauglit  the  passing  phrase  of  "bear  the  unbearable."  At  any  rate,  I  was  sure 
that  Japan  had  lost  the  war. 

The  prison  officials,  from  then  on,  had  become  like  men  without  spirit.  We 
had  demanded  many  times  our  immediate  release.  However,  it  was  to  no  avail. 
We  were  still  held  in  the  jail  even  at  the  end  of  September.  On  October  4,  how- 
ever, the  SCAP  directive  was  issued  ordering  the  release  of  political  prisoners, 
and  that  settled  the  situation. 

By  the  end  of  September,  a  reporter  of  the  American  Army  had  come  three 
times  to  investigate.  He  asked  tlie  warden  if  he  still  kept  political  prisoners 
in  his  jail.  The  warden's  answer  was  always  "No."  On  September  30,  however, 
Mr.  Isaac  of  Newsweek,  and  M.  iMarukyusu  and  M.  Giran  of  a  French  news 
agency  came  to  the  prison.  They  did  not  ask  altout  the  political  prisoners.  In- 
stead, they  merely  requested  to  see  the  prison.  The  prison  authorities  reluctant- 
ly si  lowed' them  lirst  the  work  shop.  Next  they  requested  to  see  the  wards.  After 
they  went  through  the  wards,  they  requested  next  to  see  the  solitary  cells.  The 
Fuchu  Prison  is  an  American  style  cross-shaped  building,  with  the  solitary  cells 
at  the  center.  As  they  can>e  to  the  section  which  contained  the  solitary  cells, 
the  three  newsmen  asked  the  prison  authorities  point-blank  :  "You  have  political 
prisoners  here,  don't  you?"  The  officials,  taken  olT  guard,  tried  to  evade  the 
question  and  replied,  "No;  we  don't."  They  told  them,  "Then  we  will  bring 
in  American  soldiers  and  see.  Is  that  all  right?"  So  tinally  the  prison  officials 
admitted  holding  such  prisoners  and  said,  "That  over  there  is  their  detention 
quarters "  The  three  newsmen  came  rushing  to  our  section,  RI.  INIarceuse 
shouting  aloud.  "Where  is  Mr.  Tokuda?  Where  is  JMr.  Shiga"?"  That  was  the 
first  voice  of  the  outside  world  we  heard  for  those  long  years. 

From  that  day  on,  until  we  came  out  of  the  jail— about  10  days — war  cor- 
respondents of  various  newspapers  came  to  see  us.  From  SCAP  also  came  Mi*. 
Emerson,  Dr.  Norman,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Davies.  They  asked,  "What 
are  you  going  to  do  after  your  release?"  They  also  told  us  about  the  policies 
of  SCAP.  "On  October  10,  at  10  o'clock  in  the  morning,  we  came  out  of  the 
prison.  It  was  raining.  The  great  iron  doors  were  swung  open  and  we  com- 
rades arm-in-arm  stepped  out  into  the  world  of  freedom  after  an  imprisonment 
of  18  years.  We  were  all  moved  very  deeply  when  we  were  met  by  those  com- 
rades who,  with  red  flags  in  their  hands,  were  waiting  for  us  in  the  rain.  Some 
of  them  had  been  there  since  the  previous  night. 

"Then  we  plunged  into  our  new  activities  with  renewed  spirit." 

Mr.  INIoKRis.  Now,  ISIr.  Dooman,  this  committee  is  interested  in  the 
episodes  that  are  reported  in  that  book. 

I  ask  you  if  you  will  supplement  the  facts  presented  in  this  book 
from  whatever  knowledge  you  have  of  the  episode. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  what  knowledge  I  have  is  derived  largely 
from — is  largely  second-hand.  I  was  not  there,  naturally,  and  I  have 
no  first-hand  information. 

Mr.  Morris.  Have  you  heard  about  these  episodes  from  State  De- 
partment officials? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  749 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  tell  us  what  you  know  about  it  from  the 
sources  that  we  reco^iize  are  second-hand  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  there  are  two  categories.  I  have  heard  from 
State  Department  people,  other  State  Department  people,  who  were 
there  at  that  time.  Also  I  have  heard  of  this  from  a  large  number  of 
Japanese  whom  I  met  in  New  York  since  the  war,  because  this  thing 
became  a  sensation  among  the  Japanese  people,  it  was  talked  about 
from  hand  to  mouth,  it  was  talked  about  from  person  to  person,  al- 
though there  was  no  reference  to  this  in  the  papers.  It  was  a  matter 
of  general  discussion  among  the  Japanese. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  it  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  among  the 
Japanese  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  was  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  among  the 
Japanese.  I  gather  so  from  the  fact  that  perhaps  a  dozen  people, 
dozen  Japanese,  with  whom  I  have  talked  of  the  matter  since  the  war 
in  New  York  were  quite  familiar  with  the  story. 

Now,  combining  these  two  sources,  that  is,  from  State  Department 
officials  wlio  were  there  and  from  what  tlie  Japanese  themselves  said, 
this  was  in  efl'ect  the  substance  of  what  I  heard;  that  Harold  Isaac 
and  a  French  correspondent  who  was  known  to  be  a  Communist  went 
to  this  prison.  Fuchu  Prison,  and  the  events  took  place  pretty  much  as 
described  by  Shiga,  in  his  book. 

The  story  then  continues  that  they  came  back,  Isaac  and  this 
Frenchman  came  back  and  reported  their  experience  to  John  Emerson 
in  SCAP  headquarters. 

A  few  days  later,  Emerson  and,  I  believe,  Herbert  Norman 

Mr.  Morris.  Who  was  Herbert  Norman  ? 

Mr.  DooMAx.  Herbert  Norman  was  a  Canadian,  member  of  the 
Canadian  Foreign  Service,  who  had  been  in  Tokyo  before  the  war, 
and  who  had  been  sent  back  by  the  Canadian  Government  to  Japan 
as  soon  as  the  occupation  started  to  undertake  the  repatriation  of 
Canadian  citizens  left  in  Japan  during  the  war.  When  he  got  through 
with  that,  he  was  assigned  to  Counter-intelligence  under  SCAP.  The 
story  goes  on  to  say  that  Emerson,  and  I  believe  they  weren't  quite 
certain  whether  Norman  went  with  Emerson  or  not,  a  few  days  later 
went  back  to  this  prison  and  demanded  to  see  Tokuda  and  Shiga  and 
the  other  Communists. 

The  story  further  continues,  and  tliis  was  a  matter  that  was  gener- 
ally talked  about  by  the  Japanese  in  Tokyo  at  that  time,  was  that  on 
the  day  they  were  released,  apparently  October  10,  following  the  or- 
der by  General  MacArthur  for  the  release  of  political  prisoners,  that 
Emerson  and  Norman  went  in  a  staff  car  to  the  prison  and  brought 
Shiga  and  Tokuda  back  to  their  homes. 

The  Chairman.  Who  are  Shiga,  and  Tokuda? 

Mr.  Doomax.  Shiga  was  one  of  the  top  leaders  of  the  Japanese 
Communist  Party. 

Mr.  Morris.  "Wliat  was  the  effect  of  that  on  the  Japanese  population 
from  what  you  know,  Mr.  Dooman  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  The  effect  of  that,  as  said  by  one  of  the  Japanese  to 
me,  was  to  add  100,000  new  members  to  the  Japanese  Communist 
Party. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  other  words,  the  prestige  accorded  by  the  Ameri- 
can and  Canadian  officials  in  transporting  Japanese  Communists  in 


750  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

an  official  limousine  afforded  the  Japanese  Communists  a  certain 
amount  of  reputation? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes,  a  substantital  increase  in  prestige  and  standing, 
of  course. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  do  you  know  from  your  own  knowledge 
anything  of  the  report  prepared  by  Ambassador  Pauley  on  Japanese 
reparations?    Are  you  acquainted  with  that  document? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  AVill  you  tell  us  what  you  know  about  that  document 
with  respect  to  the  policy  he  enunciated  therein  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Mr.  Pauley,  who  was  sent  out  as  Reparations  Com- 
missioner or  Ambassador,  made  a  survey,  was  supposed  to  make  a 
survey,  of  the  Japanese  industry  potential  and  needs  and  what  could 
be  removed  for  reparation  purposes.  He  took  with  him,  as  his  eco- 
nomic adviser,  Mr.  Lattimore,  Owen  Lattimore ;  and,  without  knowing 
first-hand,  the  belief  is  quite  general  that  Mr.  Lattimore  wrote  the 
report  which  Mr.  Pauley  submitted  when  he  returned  to  the  United 
States. 

Well,  the  report,  which  I  believe,  is  readily  accessible,  in  effect  pro- 
vided for  the  "pasteurizing"  of  Japan — that  is,  the  reduction  of  Japan 
to,  as  has  been  previously  indicated  in  that  broadcast  by  Vincent,  to  a 
very  simple  economy ;  that  is,  one  of  primarily  agriculture  and  fishing, 
plus  small  consumer  industries. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  not  going  to  press  Mr.  Dooman 
as  to  his  knowledge  that  Mr.  Lattimore  did  write  the  Pauley  repara- 
tions report  inasmuch  as  Mr.  Lattimore  has  acknowledged  in  executive 
session,  his  connection  with  that  particular  report. 

Mr.  Chairman.  Mr.  Lattimore  has  acknowledged  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  In  executive  session. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  propose  to  oiler  that  to  the  committee  in 
open  session  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes ;  I  will  do  that,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  may  add  that,  in  general,  the  report  reflects  the 
view  set  forth  by  Mr.  Lattimore  and  others  and  the  Nation,  and  so  on : 
the  general  concept  that  Japan  should  be  reduced  to  a  very  simple 
type  of  economy. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  not  my  intention  so  much  to  intro- 
duce, although  I  will  do  that  since  you  ask,  any  of  the  executive  session 
we  had  with  Mr.  Lattimore,  but  I  was  making  that  suggestion  to 
account  for  the  fact  that  I  was  not  going  to  press  Mr.  Dooman  as  to 
how  he  knew  that  Mr.  Lattimore  wrote  that  particular  report. 

The  Chairman.  I  have  no  desire  to  direct  you  as  to  how  you  present 
the  evidence,  but  I  just  thought,  if  you  had  it  available  for  the  open 
session,  it  would  probably  clarify  some  things  because  Mr.  Dooman 
testifies  largely  from  hearsay  in  that  regard. 

Mr.  Dooman.  On  that  particular  point. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  that  particular  point. 

We  have  sat  for  it,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Dooman,  did  you  have  any  dealings  with  John  K.  Fairbank? 

Mr.  Dooman.  No.    Only  periodically. 

Mr.  Morris.  Well,  you  did  encounter  John  K.  Fairbank  in  your 
official  capacity ;  did  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Dooman.  Yes. 


mSTTTUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  751 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  describe  your  connections  with  John  K. 
Fairbank,  whatever  they  were  ? 

The  Chairman.  Who  is  he  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  had  John  K.  Fairbank's  asso- 
ciation with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  set  forth  in  the  record  at 
great  detail. 

We  have  also  had  testimony  on  the  part  of  three  witnesses  in  con- 
nection with  his  association  in  connection  with  the  Communist  Party. 

I  am  asking  Mr.  Dooman  if  he  had  encountered  at  all  Mr.  John  K. 
Fairbank  in  his  associations. 

T]ie  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  understood  Mr.  Fairbank  was  in  that  section  of  the 
Office  of  War  Information  which  dealt  with  psychological  warfare 
against  Japan. 

Now,  the  practice  was  that — I  believe  it  was — once  a  month  a  group 
would  come  over  from  the  Office  of  War  Information  with  a  draft 
program  of  the  propaganda  that  was  to  be  directed  against  Japan 
for  the  ensuing  month,  and  the  various  targets  and  subjects  which 
were  to  be  dealt  with  were  set  forth  on  a  piece  of  paper,  and  the  pur- 
pose of  their  visit  to  the  State  Department  was  to  get  clearance  on 
these  targets. 

As  I  say,  my  contacts  with  Mr.  Fairbank  were  limited  primarily  to 
those  visits  to  the  State  Department  when  he  brought  over  these  pro- 
grams of  proposed  psychological  warfare. 

Mr.  Morris.  From  your  association,  what  was  his  view  toward 
these 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  don't  know  what  responsibility  or  what  part  Mr. 
Fairbank  played  in  the  formulation  of  these  programs — that  is,  the 
setting  up  of  the  targets — but  I  found  that  invariably  in  these  pro- 
grams there  would  be  found  an  item  directing  the  psychological  war- 
fare toward  creating  in  the  minds  of  the  Japanese  an  attitude  of  re- 
sentment and  opposition  to  the  Emperor  and  to  the  monarchial  system. 

At  that  time  we  had  not  come  to  any  decision  as  to  what  our  policy 
should  be  in  that  resepect,  and  I  invariably  red-penciled  these  items 
referring  to  the  Emperor.  However,  they  would  always  appear  either 
overtly  or  covertly  in  the  next  program  that  would  be  presented. 

There  was,  in  other  words,  a  persistent  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
Office  of  War  Information  to  get  our  approval  toward  phychological 
warfare  directed  at  the  relationship  between  the  Japanese  people  and 
the  Emperor. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  you  underscored  it  in  red  ? 

Mr.  Doom  an.  I  crossed  out  with  a  red  pencil. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  made  reference  to  the  executive  ses- 
sion that  we  had  with  Mr.  Owen  Lattimore  here  on  the  13th  of  July 
1951 ;  and  from  the  executive  minutes,  on  page  15, 1  would  like  to  read 
the  following  excerpt. 

The  Chairman.  Was  the  witness  testifying  under  oath  at  that 
time? 

Mr.  Morris.  The  witness,  Mr.  Owen  Lattimore,  was  testifying  under 
oath. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Morris  (reading)  : 

Mr.  Morris.  After  you  returned,  Mr.  Lattimore,  what  was  your  next  assign- 
ment as  far  as  the  Government  was  concerned? 


752  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  was  a  member  of  the  American  Mission  to  Japan  on  the 
subject  of  reparations. 

Mr.  MoREis.  In  that  assignment,  you  were  on  the  payroll  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment; were  you  not? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  understand  that  it  was  a  White  House  mission ;  that  all  or 
some  of  the  members  including  myself  were  on  the  State  Department  payroll. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  long  were  you  on  that  payroll,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Four  or  five  months,  from  about  October  1945  to  about  Febru- 
ary or  March  1946. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  part  did  you  play  in  the  preparation  of  the  report  of  that 
mission? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  I  helped  to  draft  the  report  in  Tokyo. 

Mr.  Morris.  To  what  extent  did  you  help? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Quite  largely. 

That  is  the  acknowledgement  I  referred  to. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  may  as  well  finish  the  paragraph,  however.  [Con- 
tinues reading :] 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  describe  that  for  us,  Mr.  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Lattimore.  Well,  when  we  were  in  Tokyo,  we  had  a  number  of  experts 
with  us,  economists,  engineers,  and  so  forth ;  each  expert  was  given  access 
through  General  MacArthur's  headquarters  to  figures  and  data  on  Japan.  Each 
person  assembled  his  own  material,  and  I  was  largely  responsible  for  the  con- 
tinuous writing  of  the  report.    Each  expert  was  responsible  for  his  own  figures. 

I  would  like  to  have  that  incorporated  in  the  record,  Mr.  Chair- 
man. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  in  the  record  now;  you  have  read  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  think  with  respect  to  the,  extracts  from  the  book 
Eighteen  Years  in  Prison,  inasmuch  as  it  was  read  by  Mr.  Mandel, 
nothing  more  is  necessary. 

With  respect  to  the  book  itself,  I  suggest  that  it  be  filed  with  the 
records  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

(The  book  referred  to  was  filed  for  the  information  of  the  com- 
mittee.) 

Mr.  MoKRis.  Thank  you. 

The  Chairman.  That  instrument  that  you  had  there  a  minute  ago, 
which  is  a  transcript  from  this  book,  has  not  been  admitted  in  the 
record;  it  was  read  by  Mr.  Mandel. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel  read  that.  However,  if  you  think  it  is 
necessary,  I  will  introduce  that  into  this  record. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

(The  document  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  243"  and  is  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  243 

[Translation  1] 

The  Dooe  of  Freedom  * 

At  last  the  day  came  when  we  could  become  active  again.  That  day  came 
after  those  who  called  us  traitors  had  turned  Japan  into  a  ruined  wasteland,  had 
taken  the  lives  of  a  million  peoijle,  and  had  destroyed  all  peace  and  happiness. 

On  August  15  [1945]  all  hands  in  the  prison,  from  the  warden  on  down,  assem- 
bled around  a  radio  speaker  to  hear  a  transcribed  broadcast  of  the  so-called 
august  voice.     It  was  hardly  intelligible  because  of   the  terrible  static,  but 


1  Translated  by  Andrew  Y.  Kuroda,  Japanese  Section,  Orentalia  Division,  the  Library  of 
Congress. 

2  Last  chapter,  written  by  Yoshio  Shiga,  pp.  159-161.  From  Gokuchu  juhachi-nen  (18 
years  in  prison)  by  Kyuichi  Tokuda  and  Yoshio  Shiga,  published  by  the  Japan  Communist 
Party,  1948. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  753 

I  caught  the  passing  phrase  of  "bear  the  unbearable."  At  any  rate,  I  was  sure 
that  Japan  had  lost  the  war. 

The  prison  officials,  from  then  on,  had  become  like  men  without  spirit.  We 
had  demanded  many  times  our  immediate  release.  However,  it  was  to  no  avail. 
.We  were  still  held  in  the  jail  even  at  the  end  of  September.  On  October  4,  how- 
ever, the  SCAP  directive  was  issued  ordering  the  release  of  political  prisoners, 
and  that  settled  the  situation. 

By  the  end  of  September,  a  reporter  of  the  American  Army  had  come  three 
times  to  investigate.  He  asked  the  warden  if  he  still  kept  political  prisoners  in 
his  jail.  The  warden's  answer  was  always  "No."  On  September  30,  however, 
Mr.  Isaac,  of  Newsweek,  and  M.  Marukyusu  [Marceuse?]  and  M.  Giran  [Gil- 
land?],^  of  a  French  news  agency,  came  to  the  prison.  They  did  not  ask  about 
the  political  prisoners.  Instead,  they  merely  requested  to  see  the  prison.  The 
prison  authorities  reluctantly  showed  them  first  the  workshop.  Next  they  re- 
quested to  see  the  wards.  After  they  went  through  the  wards,  they  requested 
next  to  see  the  solitary  cells.  The  Fuchu  Prison  is  an  American-style  cross- 
shaped  building,  with  the  solitary  cells  at  the  center.  As  they  came  to  the  sec- 
tion which  contained  the  solitary  cells,  the  three  newsmen  asked  tlie  prison 
authorities  point-blank:  "You  have  political  prisoners  here;  don't  you?"  The 
officials,  taken  off  guard,  tried  to  evade  the  question,  and  replied,  "No ;  we  don't." 
They  told  them,  "Then  we  will  bring  in  American  soldiers  and  see.  Is  that  all 
right?"  So,  finally  the  prison  officials  admitted  [holding  such  prisoners]  and 
said,  "That  over  there  is  their  detention  quarters."  The  three  newsmen  came 
rushing  to  our  section,  M.  Marceuse  shouting  aloud,  "Where  is  Mr.  Tokuda? 
Where  is  Mr.  Shiga?"  That  was  the  first  voice  of  the  outside  world  we  heard 
for  those  long  years. 

From  that  day  on,  until  we  came  out  of  the  jail — about  10  days — war  corre- 
spondents of  various  newspapers  came  to  see  us.  From  SCAP  also  came  Mr. 
Emerson,  Dr.  Norman,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Davies.  They  asked  "What  are 
you  going  to  do  after  your  release?"  They  also  told  us  about  the  policies  of 
SCAP. 

On  October  10,  at  10  o'clock  in  the  morning,  we  came  out  of  the  prison.  It 
was  raining.  The  great  iron  doors  were  swung  open,  and  we  comrades,  arm  in 
arm,  stepped  out  into  the  world  of  freedom  after  an  imprisonment  of  18  years. 
We  were  all  moved  very  deeply  when  we  were  met  by  those  comrades  who,  with 
Red  flags  in  their  hands,  were  waiting  for  us  in  the  rain.  Some  of  them  had  been 
•  there  since  the  previous  night. 

Then  we  plunged  into  our  new  activ-ities  with  renewed  spirit. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  volume  itself  is  in  Japanese,  which  Mr.  Dooman 
has  translated  for  ns. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  become  a  part  of  the  files  of  this  committee. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Just  to  bring  that  Pauley  report  into  proper  per- 
spective, may  I  add  that  the  following  year — I  think  it  was  1947 — 
a  mission  was  sent  out  by  Mr.  Strike,  one  of  the  leading  consulting 
engineers  in  this  country.  He  sent  to  Japan  a  large  group  of,  I  think, 
over  20  consulting  engineers  that  went  out  to  Japan,  and  they  returned 
with  a  report  generally  overruling  the  Pauley  report,  and  the  report 
of  the  Strike  committee  in  turn  was  then  upheld  by  another  mission 
consisting  of  Mr.  Johnson,  who  was  president  of  the  Chemical  Bank 
in  New  York  or  chairman  of  the  board  of  the  Chemical  Bank,  and  Mr. 
Paul  Hoffman,  who,  between  them,  submitted  a  report  which  virtually 
wiped  out  the  recommendations  of  the  Pauley  mission. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Dooman,  do  you  know  Lawrence  Salisbury,  who 
was  editor  of  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  which  was  the  publication  of  the 
American  Council  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  ever  make  any  effort  to  change  the  personnel  in 
the  State  Department,  to  your  knowledge  ? 

'  These  names  are  difficult  to  Identify  from  their  transcription  into  the  Japanese 
syllabary. 


754  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Well,  he  is  the  ringleader  of  a  group  of  men  in  the 
Far  Eastern  Division,  who  protested  against  the  assignment  of  Dr. 
Hornbeck  as  director  of  the  Office  of  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  when  Secre- 
tary of  State  Stettinius  organized,  carried  out,  his  reorganization  of 
the  State  Department  in,  I  believe,  January  1944. 

As  a  result  of  that  rebellion,  which  was  successful,  Dr.  Hornbeck 
was  then,  I  believe,  sent  to  the  Netherlands  as  Ambassador. 

JMr.  Morris.  In  other  words,  it  was  a  successful  movement  ? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  It  was  a  successful  movement. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  you  say  Mr.  Salisbury  was  the  ringleader? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  know  that  from  your  own  experience? 

Mr.  DooMAN.  I  know  that  from  personal  laiowledge. 

The  Chairman.  Anything  further,  Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  I  think  not. 

Have  we  neglected  anything  that  we  should  know,  Mr.  Dooman? 
If  you  know  of  anything  within  the  scope  of  our  inquiry,  the  chairman 
and  I  ask  that  you  present  that  knowledge  to  this  committee. 

Mr.  DooMAN.  "Well,  my  purpose,  Mr.  Morris,  has  not  been  to  give 
you  any  evidence  as  to  whether  this,  that,  or  the  other  man  was  a 
Communist  or  not,  because  I  am  in  no  position  to  give  you  any  such 
evidence. 

My  purpose  in  testifying  here  was  to  indicate  in  general  that  policies 
put  forward  by  the  left-wing  press,  from  the  Daily  Worker  right 
down  through  the  line,  were  in  effect  substantially  translated  into 
United  States  policies  and  to  indicate  from  personal  knowledge  how 
that  operation  was  carried  out. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right. 

May  the  record  show,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  at  no  time  was  Mr. 
Dooman  asked  whether  or  not  any  particular  person  was  a  Communist. 

The  Chairman.  The  record  will  speak  for  itself  in  that  regard. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  would  you  identify  for  the  record  as  much 
as  you  can,  who  Lawrence  Salisbury  was,  with  respect  to  his  con- 
nection with  the  IPE.  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Our  files  show  that  Lawrence  Salisbury  was  at  one 
time  the  editor  of  Far  Eastern  Survey,  official  organ  of  the  American 
Council  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  he  a  State  Department  officer,  according  to  your 
files? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Editor  of  Far  Eastern  Survey,  Official  Organ  of  the 
American  Council  of  IPR,  former  Foreign  Service  official,  12  years  in 
Japan,  5  years  in  China,  and  2  in  Manila,  and  5  in  the  Department  of 
State. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  know  that  from  our  records,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  That  comes  from  the  biographical  register  of  the 
State  Department. 

The  Chairman.  Was  he  serving  in  the  State  Department  while  he 
was  writing  for  that  publication  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  When  is  your  next  meeting,  Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Next  Tuesday  at  10  a.  m. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  stand  adjourned  until  that 
time. 

(Whereupon,  at  12:35  p.  m.,  Friday,  September  14,  1951,  the  hear- 
ing was  recessed  until  10  a.  m.  Tuesday,  September  17,  1951.) 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


TUESDAY,   SEPTEMBER   18,   1951 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  to  Investigate  the  Administration 
OF  THE  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 

Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  G. 

The  subcommittee  met  at  10  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room  424, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Pat  McCarran  (chairman)  presid- 
ing. 

Present:  Senators  McCarran,  Eastland,  and  Ferguson. 

Also  present:  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel;  Robert  Morris, 
subcommittee  counsel,  and  Benjamin  Mandel,  research  director. 

The  Chairman.  The  subcommittee  will  come  to  order. 

Are  you  ready  to  proceed,  Mr.  Morris'^ 

Mr,  Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  kindly  stand  and  be  sworn  ? 

You  do  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  give 
before  the  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  of  the 
United  States  Senate  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth  and  nothing 
but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OP  MRS.  WILLIAM  HARRY  WIDENER,  NEW  YORK,  N.  Y. 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  record  show  the  witness  is  here  under 
subpena. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  last  Friday  during  the  testimony  of 
Eugene  Dooman  the  name  of  Julian  Friedman  turned  up.  Accord- 
ing to  Mr.  Dooman's  testimony,  Julian  Friedman  was  John  Carter 
Vincent's  assistant.  John  Carter  Vincent  was  then  head  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Division  of  the  State  Department  and  Mr.  Dooman  would 
attend  the  Far  Eastern  area  committee  meetings  for  John  Carter 
Vincent.  Mr.  Dooman  testified  in  the  course  of  the  day  that  he  sus- 
pected that  Julian  Friedman  was  the  person  responsible  for  leaks  of 
classified  information  from  those  meetings  to  the  left  wing  press  and, 
according  to  Mr.  Dooman's  testimony,  he  made  specific  charges  against 
Julian  Friedman  to  Julian  Friedman. 

I  thought  it  would  be  appropriate  this  morning  to  have  someone 
here  who  had  encountered  Mr.  Julian  Friedman, 

Mrs,  Widener,  will  you  give  your  name  and  address  to  the  reporter, 
please. 

Mrs.  Widener.  I  am  Mrs.  William  Harry  Widener.    My  address  is 

829  Park  Avenue,  New  York  City. 

755 


756  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  occupation,  Mrs.  Widener  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENEE.  I  am  a  writer  and  a  housewife,  a  professional  writer. 

Mr.  Morris.  Are  you  qualified  in  any  way  as  a  writer  for  the  United 
States  Government,  Mrs.  Widener? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes.  I  wrote  free  lance  scripts  on  a  WAE  basis  for 
the  Voice  of  America  from  January  1,  1951,  to  the  end  of  May  1951. 
I  applied  for  classification  as  an  information  expert  and  I  received 
such  classification. 

INIr.  Morris.  Do  you  have  any  record  of  that  classification  with  you? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes ;  I  have. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  mind  letting  me  have  it  so  I  might  put  it 
in  the  record,  please  ? 

Mrs.  WiDNER.  Here  it  is. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  identify  these  papers  for  us,  Mrs.  Widener? 
What  are  these  papers  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  They  give  a  classification  for  me  as  an  information 
specialist  from  the  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission,  a  notice 
of  rating  from  the  Department  of  State. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  rating? 

Mrs.  Widener.  They  are  dated  June  this  year — radio,  GS-12,  radio, 
GS-11,  radio,  GS-11,  periodicals  and  publications,  GS-11. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  these  in  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  I  would  like  to  know  what  these  signify  and  what 
the  designations  testified  to  by  the  witness  signify.  What  does  GS-11 
mean  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  As  I  understand  it.  Senator,  when  I  was  taken  into 
the  Voice  of  America  on  a  WAE  basis,  I  filled  out  a  civil  service  appli- 
cation stating  my  qualifications. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  a  WAE  basis  and  what  does  it  mean  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  1  was  on  a  purchase  order  basis.  The  Voice  of 
America  ordered  from  me  eight  scripts  a  month.  They  paid  me  $40 
per  script.  I  was  up  for  what  they  called  classification  under  civil 
service  and  investigation  by  the  security  officers. 

"  When  I  filed  my  papers,  I  had  to-state  what  qualifications  I  would 
have  for  such  an  appointment  with  the  State  Department.  I  happen 
to  speak  several  languages.  I  had  to  give  the  entire  history  of  my  edu- 
cation, my  background  for  security  investigation  and  for  professional 
qualifications  a  list  of  my  publications  in  the  writing  field  and  my 
experience. 

I  was  told  to  start  out  to  be  classified  in  that  field ;  GS-12  was  a  very 
good  classification.    I  believe  it  was  not  in  the  lowest  category. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  would  like  to  have  those  introduced  in  the  record  by 
way  of  describing  the  witness. 

The  Chairman.  Those  instruments,  are  they  from  your  own  hand, 
or  just  what  are  they  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Those  were  sent  to  me  by  the  Department  of  State, 
Senator. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  object  of  this,  Mr.  Morris? 

Mr.  Morris.  To  establish  who  Mrs.  Widener  is.  They  are  just  for 
a  description  of  the  witness. 

The  Chairman.  A  copy  of  each  will  be  inserted  in  the  record  by 
reference  and  filed  with  the  committee. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  757 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibits  Nos.  244  and 
245"  and  filed  in  the  committee's  files  for  the  record.) 

Mr.  MoREis.  Do  you  know  a  man  named  Clark  Andrews  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  long  have  you  known  Clark  Andrews  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  first  met  Mr.  Andrews,  1  believe,  in  1946. 

Mr.  Morris.  On  how  many  occasions,  approximately,  have  you  met 
Mr.  Andrews  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  A  great  many.    He  was  a  fiance  of  a  friend  of  mine. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mrs.  Widener,  can  you  recall  an  experience  that  you 
had  regarding  Clark  Andrews  in  the  spring  of  1947  that  would  be  of 
interest  to  this  committee  ? 

The  Chairman.  Read  the  question  again,  please,  Mr.  Reporter. 

(The  question  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  not  think  that  you  could  pin  that  down 
more,  Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mrs.  Widener,  would  you  tell  us  who  Clark  Andrews  is? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Mr.  Andrews  was  a  radio  producer. 

Mr.  Morris.  Wliat  was  his  occupation  when  you  first  met  him? 

Mrs.  Widener.  He  had  returned  from  China  where  he  had  been  in 
radio,  I  believe,  in  Chungking. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  year  was  this  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  In  1946  when  I  first  met  him.  The  pertinence  would 
be  in  reference  to  Mr.  Julian  Friedman  whom  you  mentioned  to  Sen- 
ator McCarran. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Andrews  had  been  in  private  radio  work  in 
China? 

Mrs.  WroENER,  No,  sir;  with  the  Armed  Forces,  I  believe. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Working  for  the  United  States  Government  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  was  he  doing  in  the  spring  of  1947  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  He  was  a  radio  producer  for  the  American  Broad- 
casting System. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  have  testified  that  you  had  previously  met  him 
on  numerous  occasions  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  recall  an  episode  that  involved  Mr.  Friedman 
and  Mr.  Andrews  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  give  us  an  account  of  what  happened  on  that 
particular  occasion? 

Mrs.  WroENER.  One  evening  in  the  spring  of  1947  Mr.  Andrews 
telephoned  my  home 

The  Chairman.  Where  was  this  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  In  New  York  City — and  asked  if  I  would  care  to 
join  him  and  his  fiancee  after  dinner  to  meet  a  very  special  friend  that 
he  would  like  me  to  meet,  a  very  brilliant  man  and  a  man  who  had 
been  in  China. 

At  that  time  I  was  not  married  to  Mr.Widener,  but  I  was  married 
to  a  composer,  and  my  husband  was  not  really  included  in  the  invita- 
tion. He  was  busy  with  music  and  professional  duties.  I  accepted  the 
invitation  to  go  along.  When  I  reached  the  home  of  my  friend,  my 
friend  didn't  feel  well  and  retired.    I  remained  with  Mr.  Andrews. 


758  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

We  had  a  long  talk  and  discussion.  He  said  to  me  that  his  friend 
was  expected  but  might  be  a  little  late.  We  chatted  and  waited.  I 
should  say  certainly  more  than  an  hour  later  Mr.  Andrews  said  to  me, 
"Confidentially,  I  want  to  tell  you  that  the  man  you  are  going  to  meet 
is  absolutely  brilliant.  In  fact,  he  is  one  of  the  top  brains  of  the 
Communist  Party." 

At  that  moment  the  doorbell  rang  and  the  gentleman  appeared. 

Mr.  MoREis.  Did  he  account  for  the  delay  in  any  way  of  Julian 
Friedman  in  arriving  ? 

Mrs.  WroENER.  Mr.  Friedman  accounted  for  the  delay.  Mr.  Fried- 
man came  in.  I  didn't  know  his  name  at  that  moment.  Mr.  Andrews 
introduced  Mr.  Friedman  to  me  as  Mr.  Julian  Friedman.  He  said  that 
he  was  very  sorry  to  be  late  and  to  have  kept  us  waiting,  but  that  he 
had  been  occupied  with  a  case  that  was  being  heard,  a  very  important 
case,  in  arbitration  in  New  York  City  before  Mr.  James  Fly. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Is  that  James  Lawrence  Fly  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  don't  know  his  middle  name. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Is  it  the  Mr.  Fly  formerly  with  the  Federal  Com- 
munications Commission  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  believe  so. 

Mr.  Friedman  said  he  was  delighted  that  the  case  seemed  to  be  going 
very  well  and  that 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  the  case  of  which  James  Fly  was  the  arbitrator? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir.  And  he  said,  "You  see,  I  am  conducting 
the  defense  from  behind  the  scenes."  I  said,  "May  I  ask  what  you 
mean  by  'behind  the  scenes?'"  He  said  to  me,  "It  is  an  extremely 
complicated  case.  It  is  a  case  involving  a  worker" — I  think  he  said 
social  welfare  worker  or  social  service  worker — "who  was  dismissed 
from  New  York  City  employ  and  who  claimed  she  was  unjustly  dis- 
missed because  of  her  political  beliefs." 

I  said,  "Wliat  are  her  political  beliefs?"  He  said,  "Well,  of  course, 
she  is  a  Communist  but  she  is  saying  that  she  is  not  a  Communist." 
I  said  that  that  struck  me  as  very  complicated  indeed.  Mr.  Friedman 
said,  "Of  course,  since  she  is  a  member  of  our  party,  I  am  defending 
her,  but  not  out  in  the  open." 

Then  Mr.  Andrews  interrupted  the  conversation  and  talked  about 
me  and  my  professional  activities  and  what  I  had  done.  He  and  Mr. 
Friedman  began  to  discuss  China  and  international  politics.  I  lis- 
tened for  quite  a  while.  Mr.  Friedman  said  to  me,  "I  had  a  very 
interesting  time  in  China."  I  said,  "Well,  when  did  you  leave?"  I 
remember  I  asked  him  what  he  was  doing.  He  said  that  he  was  with 
the  State  Department.  Prior  to  Mr.  Friedman's  arrival  Mr.  Andrews 
had  told  me  that  Mr.  Friedman  had  graduated  with  the  highest  honors 
from  Harvard  University.  I  believe  he  graduated  either  with  magna 
or  summa  cum  laude. 

Mr.  Friedman  took  up  the  story  of  his  going  to  China.  He  said  to 
'me  that  after  he  graduated  from  Harvard  University  he  entered  the 
State  Department  and  that  eventually  he  was  sent  to  China  where  he 
was  connected,  I  believe,  with  the  Embassy  in  Shanghai,  our  Em- 
bassy there.  He  said,  "I  was  able  to  do  very  useful  work  there,  but 
eventually  I  got  in  a  very  tough  spot."  I  asked  him  what  he  meant 
by  a  "tough  spot."  He  said,  "I  really  was  on  the  spot.  I  was  doing 
very  good  work  for  our  cause,  the  Communist  cause." 

Mr.  Morris.  He  said  it  was  the  Communist  cause. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  759 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir ;  "in  China,  but  somebody  must  have  gotten 
wise  to  me."  . 

He  was  asked  to  write  a  report  on  the  Communist  Chinese  labor 

movement. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  have  that  again,  please.    "He  said 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Mr.  Friedman  said  to  me :  "I  was  asked  to  write  a 
report  on  the  Chinese  Communist  labor  movement."  He  said,  "That 
put  me  in  a  tough  spot.  Naturally  I  wouldn't  write  anything  against 
the  party.  If  I  did  write  what  I  wanted  to  write,  it  would  tip  my 
hai]d  and  destroy  my  usefulness.  So  I  wrote  a  report  that  any  14- 
year-old  boy  could  have  written  and  got  myself  dismissed  without 
prejudice." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Dismissed   from  the  State  Department,  you 

mean  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  Without  prejudice? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  asked  him  then  what  does  "dismissed  without 
prejudice"  mean  ?    He  said,  "It  means  exactly  what  it  says." 

Mr.  Morris.  Mrs.  Widener,  may  I  interrupt  at  this  time?  Mr. 
Chairman,  at  our  last  session  we  introduced  a  letter  from  the  State 
Department  official  indicating  that  Mr.  Friedman  had  been  dismissed 
without  prejudice.    That  is  a  part  of  our  record. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  letter  available  now  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  understand  that  he  was  dismissed  be- 
cause he  had  written  such  a  poor  report  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  understand  Mr.  Friedman  told  that  he  wrote  a 
report  that  any  li-year-old  child  could  have  written. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Can  you  tie  that  with  his  dismissal,  the  report? 
I  mean  what  he  said. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  He  said  to  me  that  he  got  himself  dismissed  with- 
out prejudice. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Because  of  writing  this  report? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  what  he  said  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes,  sir.    That  isn't  exactly  his  every  word. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  that  is  the  substance  of  what  he  said  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir ;  that  was  my  understanding. 

Senator  Eastland.  Was  Mr.  Andrews  in  China? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  have  no  knowledge  of  Mr.  Andrews'  activities  in 
China  whatsoever. 

Senator  Eastland.  Was  he  in  China  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  He  did  show  a  sympathy  and  friendliness  toward  the 
Communist  movement  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  He  showed  friendliness  toward  Mr.  Julian  Fried- 
man. 

Senator  Eastland.  Had  Mr.  Andrews  been  with  the  State  Depart- 
ment ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  do  not  know. 

Senator  Eastland.  Who  was  he  with  in  China  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  only  know  that  he  said  he  had  been  with  radio. 
He  was  in  the  Armed  Forces  and  had  been  with  our  United  States 
radio  in  China. 


760  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  Chairman,  Let  the  Chair  interrupt  here.  The  letter  referred 
to  is  one  dated  April  23, 1951,  over  the  signature  of  Elbridge  Dubrow, 
Chief,  Division  of  Foreign  Service  Personnel,  and  is  addressed  to  me. 
It  has  "Exhibit  No.  235"  on  it.     It  says  [reading]  : 

Your  letter  of  April  10,  1951,  addressed  to  the  Secretary  concerning  Julian  R. 
Friedman  has  been  referred  to  me  for  reply. 

A  review  of  Mr.  Friedman's  record  indicates  that  he  had  served  as  a  junior 
economic  analyst  in  the  Foreign  Service  Auxiliary  from  August  5,  1945,  until 
the  termination  of  his  employment  on  November  12,  1946. 

As  you  may  recall,  the  Foreign  Service  Act  of  1946,  approved  August  13,  was 
effective  November  13,  1946.  Consequently  it  had  been  decided  to  abolish  the 
auxiliary,  a  temporary  wartime  branch  of  the  Foreign  Service,  as  of  November 
12,  1946.  In  proceeding  with  the  liquidation  of  the  auxiliary,  it  was  necessary 
to  order  back  to  the  United  States  for  termination  a  number  of  temporary  or 
auxiliary  officers  including  Mr.  Friedman.  Mr,  Friedman's  record  shows  that 
his  services  were  terminated  without  prejudice, 

I  trust  that  the  foregoing  information  will  meet  your  needs. 
Sincerely  yours — 

That  is  now  an  exhibit  in  this  case. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Hasn't  the  State  Department  ever  made  an 
explanation  as  to  what  they  mean  "your  services  are  terminated  with- 
out prejudice"?    Prejudice  to  what? 

The  Chairman.  I  take  it  to  mean  prejudice,  but  you  may  apply 
again  and  be  reemployed.    That  is  just  a  guess  on  my  part. 

Go  ahead,  Mr,  Morris, 

Mr,  Morris.  What  happened  then,  Mrs.  Widener  ? 

Mrs,  Widener,  Up  to  that  stage  I  had  been  listening  very  carefully 
to  what  Mr,  Friedman  had  been  saying.  He  stopped  talking,  I  said, 
"Mr.  Friedman,  I  would  like  to  ask  you  a  couple  of  questions  if  I 
might,"  He  said,  "Certainly,"  I  said,  "When  you  said  to  me  before 
you  were  conducting  a  defense  in  an  arbitration  hearing  for  someone 
who  claimed  that  she  was  being  unjustly  treated  because  of  a  charge 
against  her  political  beliefs,  you  also  told  me  that  she  was  a  member 
of  the  Communist  Party,  1  can't  understand  the  need  for  'behind 
the  scenes,'  If  she  is  sincere  in  her  membership  in  the  Communist 
Party  and  it  is  a  legal  party,  why  doesn't  she  say  she  is  a  member  of 
the  Communist  Party  and  stand  on  her  rights  to  belong  to  it,  and  why 
do  you  need  to  be  'behind  the  scenes'  if  you  believe  that  she  is  right?" 

He  said  to  me,  "Those  things  are  very  complicated  and  you  have  to 
go  about  them  in  the  most  suitable  way," 

I  said,  "I  would  like  to  ask  you  another  question.  When  you  joined 
the  State  Department,  didn't  you  take  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
United  States  Government?"  He  said,  "Yes,  I  did,"  I  said,  "Well, 
you  yourself  say  to  me  you  graduated  from  Harvard  with  honors 
and  you  told  me  that  in  the  performance  of  your  duties  you  wrote  a 
report  that  any  14-year-old  child  could  have  written.  How  do  you 
reconcile  that  with  your  sworn  duties? 

He  said  to  me,  "Well,  I  believe  that  the  end  justifies  the  means." 

We  got  into  a  discussion  of  ends  and  means. 

Mr,  Morris,  Did  he  say  what  his  end  was  ? 

Mrs,  Widener,  No,  he  did  not;  not  specifically  in  that  way,  but  I 
think  it  came  out  what  at  least  I  believed  his  end  was  eventually.  I 
said  to  him  that  I  believed  the  use  of  the  wrong  means  can  preclude 
a  riglit  end.  He  went  into  further  discussion,  saying  that  to  achieve 
the  objective  you  liave  to  use  whatever  tools  were  necessary  to  that 
objective.    I  said  to  him,  "I  think  what  you  have  just  told  me  is  the 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  761 

most  immoral  story  that  I  have  ever  heard,  and  I  would  like  to  ask 
you  one  more  question:  Do  the  means  that  you  advocate  to  achieve 
an  end  include  violence?" 

The  Chairman.  Include  what? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  "Include  violence." 

He  said,  "Yes,  if  necessary." 

I  stood  up  and  I  said :  "Sir,  it  is  my  own  belief  that  what  you  have 
just  said  to  me  is  treason,  and  I  cannot  remain  here."  I  said,  "I  want 
you  to  know  that  I  don't  consider  myself  bound  by  any  confidence  as 
to  what  1  have  listened  to  here  and  I  want  you  to  know  that  I  am  going 
to  report  you  to  the  proper  authorities." 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  report  him  to  anyone? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Eventually  I  did. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  whom? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  To  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation. 

But  I  would  like  your  indulgence  to  continue,  if  I  may. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  did  not  want  to  interrupt  you,  but  I  wanted  to 
know  what  you  did  and  whether  you  did  report. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  did  eventually  as  the  result  of  more  knowledge, 
I  would  say,  of  that  particular  subject. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  interrupt  you  there. 

At  this  interview  that  took  place,  who  was  present  in  the  course 
of  this  conversation  ?  The  picture  I  have,  it  was  your  friend  who  had 
invited  you  there  and  Mr.  Friedman  and  yourself;  is  that  correct? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  There  was  Mr.  Andrews,  Mr.  Julian  Friedman,  and 
myself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  this  to  be  a  dinner  party  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  No,  sir.     I  was  invited  after  dinner. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Just  merely  to  come  to  the  home? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  it  Mr.  Andrews'  home  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  It  was  the  home  of  his  fiancee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  she  just  retire  to  another  room? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir.     She  was  not  feeling  well. 

Senator  Ferguson.  She  retired  to  another  room  in  her  home? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Which  left  you  and  Andrews  and  Friedman 
together  talking? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir,  Mr.  Andrews  and  myself.  Then  after  Mr. 
Friedman's  arrival,  Mr.  Friedman,  Mr.  Andrews  and  myself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  invitation  came  from  Andrews  and  not 
your  friend? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Let's  put  it  this  way:  Mr.  Andrews  telephoned 
me  and  I  spoke  to  him  on  the  telephone. 

Mr.  Morris,  Did  you  gather  they  were  trying  to  get  you  to  do 
something  for  them?     Was  that  the  purpose  of  this  visit? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  didn't  gather  anything.  I  was  simply — I  went 
home  alone.  It  was  2  o'clock  in  the  morning.  I  am  not  accustomed 
to  going  home  unaccompanied  at  that  hour.     I  left. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  could  you  have  done  to  help  them  in  any 
manner  ?  I  am  not  clear  as  to  the  reason  they  would  invite  you  and 
carry  on  this  conversation.  I  can  see  part  of  the  conversation,  that 
part  about  his  being  late  and  he  gave  you  that,  and  that  started  this 


762  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

conversation;  but  he  carried  it  on  into  China  and  how  he  got  dis- 
charged and  all. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  suppose,  Senator — I  don't  like  to  suppose— — 
Senator  Ferguson.  1  do  not  want  you  to  suppose.     I  am  trying  to 
get  a  reason. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  have  a  certain  record  as  a  professional  writer.  As 
a  person  during  the  war  I  had  a  radio  show  called  Women  of  the 
World.  It  won  a  citation  of  merit  from  the  Eadio  Institute  of 
America  for  the  promotion  of  international  understanding  in  the 
women's  field.  I  had  a  certain  reputation.  I  think  it  was  natural 
that  anyone  interested  in  politics  might  discuss  them  with  me,  espe- 
cially foreign  politics. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Particularly  anyone  who  was  desirous  of  carry- 
ing out  propaganda  would  have  a  source  through  you  to  get  certain 
propaganda  carried  out ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  That  would  be  a  possible  source. 
Senator  Ferguson.  If  you  took  up  their  cause  ? 
Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  they  in  any  way  ask  you  to  take  up  this 
cause  of  communism? 
Mrs.  WiDENER.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Or  the  cause  for  this  worker  that  had  been 
discharged  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  No,  sir.  Most  of  the  conversation  that  took  place 
was  between  Mr.  Friedman  and  me  after  Mr.  Friedman's  arrival. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Would  you  say  your  success  with  your  radio  show 
Women  of  tlie  World  marked  you  in  circles  familiar  with  that  produc- 
tion as  a  liberal  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  think,  Mr.  Sourwine,  perhaps  the  fairest  way  to 
answer  is  to  say  I  think  if  anyone  is  in  professional  activity  and  field 
of  public  information  they  speak  out  in  public.  They  say  what  they 
think  out  in  public  and  the  public,  the  press,  and  the  critics  judge 
them. 

I  had  had  favorable  press  notices  and  favorable  comment.  I  feel 
that  I  would  have — in  general,  people  like  to  discuss  politics  with 
you  or  any  professional  activity  if  you  are  in  that  field.  I  was  in 
that  field. 

The  Chairman.  The  query  naturally  arises,  as  has  been  evinced  by 
the  questions  of  Senator  Ferguson,  and  it  is  in  my  mind,  as  to  why 
would  one  in  Mr.  Friedman's  position  open  up  the  whole  subject  to 
you  without  first  having  known  what  your  turn  of  mind  was  on  that 
subject.  In  other  words,  he  disclosed  to  you  his  communistic  leanings 
and  his  communistic  attitude,  according  to  your  statement,  without 
having  first  determined,  so  far  as  we  know  now,  what  your  turn  of 
mind  was. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  would  like  to  say  this:  I  think  Mr,  Andrews  on 
several  occasions  had  made  very  complimentary  remarks  about  what- 
ever qualities  I  possessed.  Mr.  Friedman  knew  when  I  met  him,  or 
seemed  to  know,  that  I  was  a  professional  writer  and  commentator,  a 
speaker.  I  don't  think  my  work  was  of  national  importance  or  of  such 
prominence  that  everybody  would  know  about  me. 

Mr.  Morris.  Clark  Andrews  met  you  on  numerous  occasions? 
Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes.     He  knew  all  about  my  activity. 
Mr.  Morris.  You  had  seen  him  on  very  many  occasions? 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  763 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  were  introduced  to  Mr.  Friedman  by  Mr.  An- 
drews ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes;  I  was. 

Mr.  Morris.  Everj^tliing  he  indicated  was  that  he  had  discussed  you 
prior  to  your  meeting? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes.  Mr.  Friedman,  the  first  thing  he  did  was 
apologize  for  his  being  late,  apologize  to  me. 

Mr.  Morris.  He  knew  you  were  going  to  be  present  when  he  arrived? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  assume  if  he  apologized  to  me  for  being  late  that 
he  must  have  expected  to  meet  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Was  your  profession  discussed? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes;  oh  yes;  certainly,  in  the  course  of  normal 
conversation. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  long  did  this  conversation  take  with  Fried- 
man ?     You  say  you  left  about  2  o'clock. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  My  best  recollection  is  that  Mr.  Friedman  arrived 
about  11  o'clock  or  shortly  thereafter,  11  o'clock  at  night.  And  I 
know  that  I  left  close  to  2  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mrs.  Widener,  in  the  course  of  the  1-hour  conversation 
with  Mr.  Andrews  and  the  3-hour  conversation  with  Mr.  Friedman, 
did  Mr.  Andrews  tell  you  that  Friedman  was  a  Communist? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Mr.  Andrews  said  to  me:  "Confidentially,  I  want 
you  to  know  that  this  man  is  one  of  the  top  brains  in  the  Communist 
Party." 

Mr.  Morris.  Then  subsequently  did  Mr.  Friedman  acknowledge  he 
was  a  Communist? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  When  he  said,  "our  party"  and  said  the  social  worker 
or  social-service  worker  was  a  Communist  "in  our  party,"  and  when 
he  spoke  of  "our  cause  in  China"  and  said  "Naturally,  I  would  not 
do  anything  to  hurt  our  cause,  the  Chinese  Communist  cause,"  it  was 
obvious. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  report  this  conversation  to  the  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation,  Mrs.  Widener? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  did  after  making  an  inquiry. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  inquiry  did  you  make  ? 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment  before  she  answers. 

Some  time  back  the  witness  asked  to  be  permitted  to  continue  and 
Senator  Ferguson,  Senator  Eastland,  and  I  think  myself  broke  in  on 
what  you  wanted  to  continue  with.  Do  you  have  something  that  you 
want  to  bring  out  there  ?     There  was  an  interruption. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Excuse  me. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Thank  you. 

The  following  morning  after  that  conversation  I  received  a  tele- 
phone call  from  Mr.  Andrews  who  said  that  "Well,  we  certainly  took 
you  for  a  ride  last  night.    You  really  fell  for  a  practical  joke." 

I  said,  "Maybe  it  was  and  maybe  it  wasn't,  but  I  would  like  to  tell  you 
this :  I  am  going  to  make  every  effort  and  do  my  level  best  to  find  out  if 
it  was  or  it  wasn't."    I  did  make  that  effort. 

I  knew  a  presswoman  in  the  United  States  Mission  to  the  United 
Nation.    Her  name  is  Sarah  Hodgekinson. 

The  Chairman.  How  do  you  spell  that? 

22848— 52— pt.  3 5 


764  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  H-o-d-g — I  am  not  sure  whether  there  is  an  "e" — 
k-i-n-s-o-n. 

I  telephoned  Miss  Hodgekinson  and  said  that  I  would  like  to  come 
and  see  her.  I  went  down  to  the  United  States  Mission  to  the  U.  N.  and 
saw  her.  I  said,  "If  I  am  not  imposing  on  you,  I  would  like  to  ask 
you  if  you  can  get  some  information  for  me.  I  would  like  to  know  if 
there  was  a  Julian  Friedman  in  the  employ  of  the  State  Department 
in  China." 

She  said,  "That  is  not  hard  to  find  out  and  I  will  be  glad  to  do  so." 
So  she  excused  herself  and  came  back  and  said,  "Yes,  there  was."  I 
said,  "Well,  then,  may  I  ask  you  could  you  get  me  more  information 
about  Mr.  Friedman  ?  And  she  said,  "Well,  I  can  try.  What  would 
you  like  to  know  ?"  I  said,  "Can  you  find  out  for  me  if  he  is  a  graduate 
of  Harvard  University  and  if  he  graduated  with  honors." 

She  said,  "You  know,  we  have  a  direct  line  to  Washington  here  and 
I  will  go  in  and  ask  the  Department  if  I  can  use  it,  and  I  will  try  to 
find  out  for  you."  So  I  waited  for,  I  guess,  20  minutes  or  half  an  hour. 
She  came  back  and  said,  "I  have  checked  on  it  for  you.  Yes,  Mr.  Fried- 
man did  graduate  from  Harvard  and  he  graduated  with  high  honors." 

Then  I  said  "Could  I  ask  you  to  find  out  one  more  thing  for  me  if  I 
am  not  intruding  or  embarrassing  you  in  any  way?"  She  said,  "No; 
not  at  all.  It  is  all  a  matter  of  record."  I  said,  "Would  you  find  out 
if  Mr.  Friedman  was  dismissed  without  prejudice?" 

She  again  left  the  room  and  came  back  and  said  "Mr.  Friedman  was 
dismissed  without  prejudice."  She  said,  "Why  do  you  want  to  know 
all  this?"  I  said,  "Because  I  had  a  long  conversation  with  Mr.  Fried- 
man last  night  and  it  disturbed  me  very  nuich."  I  said,  "Do  you  know 
anything  about  an  arbitration  case  taking  place  before  James  FlyT' 
She  said,  "No ;  I  don't  know."     I  said,  "Well,  I  would  like  to  find  out." 

I  phoned  a  reporter  that  I  knew  and  he  was  out.  She  said,  "Why 
don't  call — "  I  forget  what  name,  the  name  of  a  reporter  she  knew. 
She  said,  "I  will  get  him  on  the  phone  and  find  out."  She  did  get  her 
friend  on  the  phone.  He  said,  "Yes,  there  was  a  case  before  Mr.  James 
Fly  and  it  was  being  heard  and  it  was  a  question  of  a  dismissed 
worker."  '' 

Then  I  told  Miss  Hodgekinson  about  the  conversation  I  had  with 
Mr.  Friedman.  In  the  meantime  the  newspaper  reporter  had  said 
that  the  World-Telegram  newspaper  had  been  following  this  case 
very  closely,  the  New  York  World-Telegram.  Sarah  Hodgekinson 
said  to  me,  'Well,  if  it  has  to  do  with  a  Communist  problem,  Mr. 
Frederick  Woltman  on  the  New  York  Telegram  knows  a  great  deal 
about  the  Communist  activities,  and  why  don't  you  call  him?"  I 
said  that  I  had  never  met  Mr.  Woltman  but  I  said  I  would.  She 
said,  "You  can  call  him  up  and  say  I  said  to  call  him,"  which  I  did. 

I  asked  Mr.  Woltman  was  there  such  as  case  as  had  been  described 
to  you  and  did  he  know  if  a  Mr.  Julian  Friedman  was  appearing  in 
the  case.  He  said  "Not  on  the  record  but  off  the  record  he  is;  not 
on  the  scene,  off  the  scene."  I  felt  that  verified  the  information  that 
had  been  given  to  me.  I  reported  it  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  In- 
vestigation. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mrs.  Widener,  is  it  your  testimony  that  at  the  termina- 
tion of  your  session  with  Julian  Friedman  you  told  him  you  felt 
free  to  report  the  incident  to  the  necessary  authorities. 

Mrs.  Widener.  I  did. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  765 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  the  next  day  you  corroborated 
certain  parts  of  the  story  told  to  you  by  Mr.  Friedman  in  order  to  de- 
termine whether  or  not  he  was  telling  you  those  things  in  jest? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  making  those  efforts  to  verify  details  of  the  story, 
did  you  find  that  in  fact  those  things  he  told  you  the  night  before 
were  indeed  true? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  as  a  matter  of  fact  report  the  incident  to  the 
Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes;  I  did. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  remember  how  long  after  this  incident 
you  made  the  report  to  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  approxi- 
mately ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  The  morning  I  went  down  to  the  United  States  Mis- 
sion to  the  United  Nations  and  saw  Sarah 

The  Chairman.  That  was  the  morning  after? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  That  was  the  morning  after.  In  the  afternoon  I 
spoke  to  Mr.  Woltman. 

The  Chairman.  To  whom? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Mr.  Woltman  on  the  New  York  World-Telegram. 
I  believe  it  was  that  afternoon  or  the  next  morning  I  reported  it  to 
the  authorities. 

The  Chairman.  You  reported  it  where,  to  the  Washington  office  of 
the  FBI  or  to  the  FBI  re])resentative  in  New  York? 

Mrs.  W^iDENER.  To  the  New  York  office, 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  recommend  that  we  request  of 
the  State  Department  the  report  by  Julian  Friedman  referred  to  by 
Mrs.  Widener  in  her  testimony  on  the  Communist  Chinese  labor 
movement  ? 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  kindly  write  that  out  so  that  I  can  make 
the  request  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  I  have  it  here.  It  is  in  regard  to  the  Chinese  Com- 
munist labor  movement,  and  I  will  use  the  exact  wording  in  the  testi- 
mony by  Friedman. 

Mrs.  Widener  has  testified  Friedman  told  her  he  wrote  such  a  report 
and  described  the  report. 

The  Chairman.  That  request  will  be  made  at  once. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  ask  that  you  re- 
quest also  further  information  about  his  discharge,  what  they  meant 
by  without  prejudice,  the  facts  surrounding  his  dismissal. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris,  Mrs.  Widener,  while  you  were  working  with  the  Voice 
of  America  did  you  encounter  any  publication  of  the  Institute  of  Pa- 
cific Eelations  in  any  way  ? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  describe  whatever  you  did  encounter? 

Mrs.  Widener.  I  think  I  must  have  a  record  of  the  date.  I  was 
given  an  assignment  to  write  a  script  for  the  Voice  of  America  cover- 
ing confidential  material  that  was  sent  by  our  Embassy  in  Moscow  bade* 
to  the  United  States.  The  report  was  written  by,  if  my  memory  serves, 
me  correctly,  Mr.  John  Stines.  It  covered  conditions  for  women — I 
only  wrote  about  the  women's  field,  of  course,  for  the  Voice  of  Amer- 
ica— it  covered  conditions  for  women  in  central  and  southeast  Asiatic 


766  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

parts  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Mr.  Stines'  report  covered  in  a  very  thor- 
ough way  the  deplorable  or  what  he  considered  the  deplorable  condi- 
tions for  women  there,  the  fact  they  were  being  forced  into  heavy  in- 
dustry, into  labor  in  pig  iron  production  and  heavy  production  des- 
tined for,  I  suppose,  such  things  as  armaments  and  so  on. 

The  report  was  given  to  me  to  cover  for  a  script  for  the  Voice.  I 
took  it  home.  It  was  given  to  me  to  take  home.  When  I  studied  it,  I 
felt  I  needed  a  great  deal  of  research  material  to  write  an  effective 
script  for  it.  So  I  went  back  to  the  Voice  and  I  put  in  a  request  to  the 
editor-in-chief  if  he  could  suggest  good  sources  of  research  material. 
He  said  to  me  that  the  Foreign  Affairs  Publication  section  of  the  State 
Department  had  issued  a  very  excellent  bulletin  on  these  deplorable 
conditions  in  the  Asiatic  regions  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  he  would 
give  that  to  me  to  study.  No  one  at  the  Voice  could  find  it.  I  waited 
a  long  time  and  though  all  other  copies  were  in  order  in  the  files,  this 
particular  copy  was  missing.  I  waited  quite  a  while,  while  they  looked 
it  up.  Then  the  editor-in-chief  said  he  would  send  me  over  to  the 
research  library  of  the  Voice  of  America,  which  is  about  a  block  and 
a  half  away  from  the  building  in  which  I  work.  I  did  go  over  there. 
I  was  given  a  book  issued  under  the  sponsorship  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Affairs  as  research  material  for  this  script. 

Mr.  SoTjRwiNE.  You  mean  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  ? 
Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes.     I  am  sorry.  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 
When  I  took  the  book  home  and  I  started  to  try  to  do  my  research, 
really,  I  am  sorry,  I  just  burst  out  laughing,  because  it  was  diametri- 
cally opposite  Mr.  Stines'  report.     The  research  in  this  book  was 
diametrically  opposed  to  everything  in  Mr.  Stines'  report. 
Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  name  of  it  ? 
Mrs.  WiDENER.  Let  me  see.     Either  the  Central  Southeastern  Soviet 
Russia — let  me  think — or  Middle  Eastern.     I  just  can't  quote  the  title 
to  you.     I  Iniow  the  author. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Who  was  it? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  William  Mandel.     When  I  opened  the  book  I  was 
very  much  interested  to  see  the  Office  of  War  Information  was  in  it. 
Wlien  I  noticed  that  I  thought  I  would  get  some  really  good  material 
for  my  script.     But  I  couldn't  use  it.     It  was  my  belief  and  feeling 
that  the  book  was  largely  Communist  propaganda.     At  least  if  Mr. 
Stines'  report  and  other  material  thart  I  had  studied  on  the  subject 
consistently  is  accurate,  then  this  book  is  inaccurate.     It  paints  con- 
ditions there  in  those  regions  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  kind  of  paradise. 
Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  the  record  to  show  that  we 
have  introduced  into  the  record  evidence  that  Mr.  William  Mandel 
is  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  we 
did  show  some  connection  of  his  with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Rela- 
tions.    I  mention  that  to  show  the  fact  this  is  germane  testimony. 
Was  that  the  end  of  that  episode,  Mrs.  Widener? 
Mrs.  WiDENER.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  taken,  in  executive  session, 
testimony  by  an  adviser  of  the  Free  China  Labor  League  who  spent 
•Some  time  on  Formosa  and  in  Shanghai.  This  gentleman  is  now  cur- 
rently in  Europe.  We  have  the  choice  today  of  either  taking  his 
executive  session  testimony  and  introducing  it  into  the  public  record, 
or  we  can  wait  until  he  returns  from  Europe  and  he  will  give  the 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  767 

testimony  in  person.  I  think  it  is  a  decision  that  should  be  made  by 
the  chairman  and  the  committee,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  was  sworn.  The  testimony  was  taken  in 
regular  executive  session? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  present?  What  Senators  were  present 
and  where  was  it  taken  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  It  was  taken  in  executive  session  here  in  Washington. 
I  know  Senator  Ferguson  was  present  because  it  took  place  in  the 
Senator's  room.  I  think  Senator  Eastland  was  also  present,  but  the 
transcript  will  show  it. 

The  Chairman.  The  witness  is  now  in  Europe  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes.  We  summoned  him  to  be  here  today.  His  wife 
notified  us  last  week  he  could  not  be  present  for  he  is  in  Europe  for 
a  period  of  about  2  months.  We  have  the  decision  of  deciding  whether 
or  not  we  should  use  his  executive  session  testimony  and  make  it 
public,  or  wait  until  he  returns  from  Europe. 

The  Chairman.  It  would  be  the  view  of  the  Chair  that  we  would 
defer  until  we  can  have  the  witness  present,  but  that  view  of  the 
Chair  will  be  governed  by  the  will  of  the  committee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  would  say  normally  that  should  be  the  pro- 
gram. I  do  not  think  we  should  delay  the  hearings  because  of  the 
present  condition  when  this  could  be  made  public. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  I  will  take  that  up  in  committee  in  execu- 
tive session  at  a  later  date  as  to  what  the  'decision  will  be.  If  it  is 
necessary,  we  can  use  the  executive  testimony.  I  would  prefer  to 
have  the  witness  appear  and  testify  in  open  session. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  for  security  purposes  I  feel  we  should 
not  give  his  name,  but  this  is  the  executive  session  taken  Friday, 
July  6,  1951,  Senator  Homer  Ferguson  presiding. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.  That  will  be  taken  up  by  the  com- 
mittee in  executive  session  and  we  will  come  to  a  conclusion  on  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  here  some  evidence  by  Mr. 
Mandel  which  would  corroborate  the  episode  related  by  Mrs.  Widener 
in  connection  with  Mr.  William  Mandel's  book. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Mandel. 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  have  here  a  little  pamphlet  entitled  "IPR  books, 
1950-51,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations."  It  lists  new  and  forthcom- 
ing publications  on  the  Far  East  and  the  Pacific  area.  On  page  24 
of  this  list  we  find  The  Soviet  Far  East  and  Central  Asia,  by  Wil- 
liam Mandel,  inquiry  series.    This  is  the  book  we  have. 

The  Chairman.  Does  that  title  "The  Soviet  Far  East"  refresh  your 
memory  any? 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes,  it  does.    Could  I  see  the  book? 

The  Chairman.  Certainly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Please  see  whether  you  can  identify  that  as 
the  book. 

Mrs.  Widener.  Yes;  this  is  the  book  that  was  given  to  me. 

I  would,  if  I  may,  like  to  call  attention  to  something  that  struck 
me  when  I  looked  at  the  book.  It  has  a  foreword.  I  read  the  fore- 
word. It  was  the  first  thing  I  read.  Before  I  had  read  any  of  the 
book,  it  struck  me  that  the  foreword  is,  well,  it  is  double  talk. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Will  you  read  it? 


768  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Sour  WINE.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  point  I  think  the  entire  fore- 
word should  be  made  a  part  of  the  record  and  then  the  witness  can 
comment  on  it  if  she  likes. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

(The  matter  referred  to  is  as  follows :) 

The  Soviet  Pak  East 
(By  William  Mandel) 

FOREWORD 

This  study  forms  part  of  the  documentation  of  an  inquiry  organized  by  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  into  the  problems  arising  from  the  conflict  in  the 
Far  East. 

It  has  been  prepared  by  Mr.  William  Mandel,  research  associate,  American 
Russian  Institute. 

The  study  has  been  submitted  in  draft  to  a  number  of  authorities,  many  of 
whom  made  suggestions  and  criticisms  which  were  of  great  value  in  the  process 
of  revision. 

Though  many  of  the  comments  received  have  been  incorporated  in  the  final 
text,  the  above  authorities  do  not  of  course  accept  responsibility  for  the  study. 
The  statements  of  fact  or  of  opinion  appearing  herein  do  not  represent  the 
view  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  or  of  the  Pacific  Council  or  of  any 
of  the  national  councils.  Such  statements  are  made  on  the  sole  responsibility 
of  the  author. 

During  1938  the  inquiry  was  carried  on  under  the  general  direction  of  Dr.  I. 
W.  Dafoe  as  chairman  of  the  Pacific  Council  and  since  1939  under  his  successors. 
Dr.  Philip  C.  Jessup  and  Mr.  Edgar  J.  Tarr.  Every  member  of  the  international 
secretariat  has  contributed  to  the  research  and  editorial  work  in  connection 
with  the  inquiry,  but  special  mention  should  be  made  of  Mr.  W.  L.  Holland,  Miss 
Kate  Mitchell,  and  Miss  Hilda  Austern,  who  have  carried  the  major  share  of 
this  responsibility. 

In  the  general  conduct  of  this  inquiry  into  the  problems  arising  from  the  con- 
flict in  the  Far  East  the  institute  has  benefited  by  the  counsel  of  the  following 
advisers :  Prof.  H.  F.  Angus,  of  the  University  of  British  Columbia ;  Dr.  J.  B. 
Condliffe,  of  the  University  of  California;  M.  Etienne  Dennery,  of  the  Ecole 
des  Sciences  Politiques. 

These  advisers  have  cooperated  with  the  chairman  and  the  secretary-general 
in  an  effort  to  insure  that  the  publications  issued  in  connection  with  the  inquiry 
conform  to  a  proper  standard  of  sound  anji  impartial  scholarship.  Each  manu- 
script has  been  submitted  to  at  least  two  of  the  advisers  and  although  they  do 
not  necessarily  subscribe  to  the  statements  or  views  in  this  or  any  of  the  studies, 
they  consider  this  study  to  be  a  useful  contribution  to  the  subject  of  the  inquiry. 

The  purpose  of  this  inquiry  is  to  relate  unofficial  scholarship  to  the  problems 
arising  from  the  present  situation  in  the  Far  East.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
members  of  the  institute  in  all  countries  and  the  members  of  IPR  conferences 
with  an  impartial  and  constructive  analysis  of  the  situation  in  the  Far  East 
with  a  view  to  indicating  the  major  issues,  which  must  be  considered  in  any 
future  adjustment  of  international  relations  in  that  area.  To  this  end,  the 
analysis  will  include  an  account  of  the  economic  and  political  conditions  which 
produced  the  situation  existing  in  .July  1937,  with  respect  to  China,  to  Japan, 
and  to  the  other  foreign  powers  concerned ;  an  evaluation  of  developments  dur- 
ing the  war  period  which  appear  to  indicate  important  trends  in  the  policies 
and  programs  of  all  the  powers  in  relation  to  the  far  eastern  situation ;  and 
finally,  an  estimate  of  the  principal  political,  economic,  and  social  conditions 
which  may  be  expected  in  a  postwar  period,  the  possible  forms  of  adjustment 
which  might  be  applied  under  these  conditions,  and  the  effects  of  such  adjust- 
ments upon  the  countries  concerned. 

The  Inquiry  does  not  propose  to  document  a  specific  plan  for  dealing  with  the 
far  eastern  situation.  Its  aim  Is  to  focus  available  information  on  the  present 
crisis  in  forms  which  will  be  useful  to  those  who  lack  either  the  time  or  the 
expert  knowledge  to  study  the  vast  amount  of  material  now  appearing  or  already 
published  in  a  number  of  languages. 

The  present  study,  "The  Soviet  Far  East,"  falls  within  the  framework  of  the 
first  of  the  four  general  groups  of  studies  which  it  is  proposed  to  make  as  follows : 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  769 

I.  The  political  and  economic  conditions  which  have  contributed  to  the 
present  course  of  the  policies  of  western  powers  in  the  Far  East;  their  territorial 
and  economic  interests;  the  effects  on  their  far-eastern  policies  of  internal 
economic  and  political  developments  and  of  developments  in  their  foreign  poli- 
cies vis-a-vis  other  parts  of  the  world  ;  the  probable  effects  of  the  present  conflict 
on  their  positions  in  the  Far  East;  their  changing  attitudes  and  policies  with 
respect  to  their  future  relations  in  that  area. 

II.  The  political  and  economic  conditions  which  have  contributed  to  the  present 
course  of  Japanese  foreign  policy  and  possible  important  future  developments; 
the  extent  to  which  Japan's  policy  toward  China  lias  been  influenced  by  Japan's 
geographic  conditions  and  material  resources,  by  special  features  in  the  political 
and  economic  organization  of  Japan  which  directly  or  indirectly  affect  the  formu- 
lation of  her  present  foreign  policy,  by  economic  and  political  developments  in 
China,  by  the  external  policies  of  other  powers  affecting  Japan;  the  principal 
political,  economic,  and  social  factors  which  may  be  expected  in  a  postwar 
Japan;  possible  and  probable  adjustments  on  the  part  of  other  nations  which 
could  aid  in  the  solution  of  Japan's  fundamental  problems. 

III.  The  political  and  economic  conditions  which  have  contributed  to  the 
present  course  of  Chinese  foreign  policy  and  possible  important  future  develop- 
ments; Chinese  unification  and  reconstruction,  1931-37,  and  steps  leading  toward 
the  policy  of  united  national  resistance  to  Japan;  the  present  degree  of  political 
cohesion'and  economic  strength;  effects  of  resistance  and  current  developments 
on  the  position  of  foreign  interests  in  China  and  changes  in  China's  relations  with 
foreign  powers ;  the  principal  political,  economic,  and  social  factors  which  may 
be  expected  in  a  postwar  China ;  possible  and  probable  adjustments  on  the  part 
of  other  nations  which  could  aid  in  the  solution  of  China's  fundamental  problems. 

IV.  Possible  methods  for  the  adjustment  of  specific  problems,  in  the  light  of 
information  and  suggestions  presented  in  the  three  studies  outlined  above; 
analysis  of  previous  attempts  at  bilateral  or  multilateral  adjustments  of  political 
and  economic  relations  in  the  Pacific  and  causes  of  their  success  or  failure ;  types 
of  administrative  procedures  and  controls  already  tried  out  and  their  relative 
effectiveness ;  the  major  issues  likely  to  require  international  adjustment  in  a 
postwar  period  and  the  most  helpful  methods  which  might  be  devised  to  meet 
them ;  necessary  adjustments  by  the  powers  concerned ;  the  basic  requirements 
of  a  practical  system  of  interaational  organization  which  could  promote  the 
security  and  peaceful  development  of  the  countries  of  the  Pacific  area. 

Edwakd  C.  Cakter,  Secretary  General. 

Mrs.  WiDENER  (reading)  : 

This  study  forms  part  of  the  documentation  of  an  inquiry  organized  by  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  into  the  problems  arising  from  the  conflict  in  the 
Far  East, 

I  took  tliat  to  mean  that  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Eolations  sponsors 
this  book.     I  think  anybody  would.     [Continues  reading:] 

It  has  been  prepared  by  Mr.  William  Mandel,  research  associate,  American 
Russian  Institute. 

The  study  has  been  submitted  in  draft  to  a  number  of  authorities,  many  of 
whom  made  suggestions  and  criticisms  which  were  of  great  value  in  the  process 
of  revision. 

Though  many  of  the  comments  received  have  been  incorporated  in  the  final 
text,  the  above  authorities  do  not  of  course  accept  responsibility  for  the  study. 
The  statements  of  fact  or  of  opinion  appearing  herein  do  not  represent  the  views 
of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  or  of  the  Pacific  Council  or  of  any  of  the 
national  councils.  Such  statements  are  made  on  the  sole  responsibility  of  the 
author. 

During  1938  the  inquiry  was  carried  on  under  the  genei'al  direction  of  Dr. 
J.  W.  Dafoe  as  chairman  of  the  Pacific  Council  and  since  1939  under  his  suc- 
cessors. Dr.  Philip  C.  Jessup  and  Mr.  Edgar  J.  Tarr.  Evei-y  member  of  the 
international  secretariat  has  contributed  to  the  research  and  editorial  work  in 
connection  with  the  inquiry,  but  special  mention  should  be  made  of  Mr.  W.  L. 
Holland,  Miss  Kate  Mitchell,  and  Miss  Plilda  Austern,  who  have  carried  the 
major  share  of  this  responsibility. 

In  the  general  conduct  of  this  inquiry  into  the  problems  ai'ising  from  the  con- 
flict in  the  Far  East,  the  institute  has  benefited  by  the  counsel  of  the  following 
advisers — 


770  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

May  I  say  that  I  take  the  word  "institute"  here  to  mean  the  Insti- 
tute of  Pacific  Relations,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  this  foreword — "so 
far  as  we  are  publishing  it,  but  we  are  not  responsible  for  it" — is 
double  talk.  I  mean,  to  a  professional  writer  it  is.  It  seems  to  me 
that  way,  anyway.    [Continues  reading :] 

Prof.  H.  F.  Angus,  of  the  University  of  British  Columbia ;  Dr.  J.  B.  Condliffe, 
of  the  University  of  California ;  M.  Etienne  Dennery,  of  the  Ecole  des  Sciences 
Politiques. 

These  advisers  have  cooperated  with  the  chairman  and  the  secretary-general — 

I  take  that  to  be  the  chairman  and  the  secretary-general  of  the 
institute. 

The  Chairman.  What  else  would  you  take  it? 
Mrs.  WiDENER  (continues  reading)  : 

in  an  effort  to  insure  that  the  publications  issued  in  connection  with  the  inquiry 
conform  to  a  proper  standard  of  sound  and  impartial  scholarship. 

Now,  it  seems  to  me  before  they  said  they  were  not  responsible  for 
the  opinions  expressed  in  this  book.  Here  they  are  guaranteeing  its 
impartiality. 

Each  manuscript  has  been  submitted  to  at  least  two  of  the  advisers ;  and, 
although  they  do  not  necessarily  subscribe  to  the  statements  or  views  in  this  or 
any  of  the  studies,  they  consider  this  study  to  be  a  useful  contribution  to  the 
subject  of  the  inquiry. 

The  inquiry  is  being  conducted,  I  understand,  by  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations.  The  more  I  read  this  foreword,  frankly — I  did  feel 
like  Alice  in  Wonderland. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  your  testimony  that  that  book  was  given  to  you 
as  a  guide  in  your  writing  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  Oh,  yes,  sir.  This  was  given  to  me  as  research  mate- 
rial.   It  was  the  only  material  given  to  me. 

The  Chairman.  ]3y  whom  was  it  given  to  you  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  By  the  research  library  of  the  Voice  of  America. 

Mr.  Morris.  Can  you  think  of  an  individual  in  there  ? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  don't  know  the  name  of  the  librarian  who  gave  it 
to  me,  but  I  do  know  it  was  given  to  me.    [Continues  reading :] 

Its  purpose  is  to  provide  members  of  the  institute  in  all  countries  and  the 
members  of  IPR  conferences  with  an  impartial  and  constructive  analysis  of  the 
situation  in  the  Far  East. 

Its  purpose  is  to  provide  members  of  the  institute  in  all  countries 
and  the  members  of  the  IPR  conferences,  and  then  it  goes  on.  Then 
it  says  it  does  not  propose  to  document  a  specific  plan  for  dealing  with 
the  Far  East  situation.  Then  it  goes  on  to  guarantee  that  these  are  the 
contingencies.    Anybody  can  read  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  point  out  again  we  have 
had  testimony  before  this  committee  that  Mr.  William  Mandel,  the 
author  of  that  volume,  was  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party.  This 
episode  is  brought  forth  at  this  time,  Mr.  Chairman,  simply  as  one 
episode  that  this  particular  witness  is  able  to  testify  to  and  is  offered 
for  that  purpose. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  May  I  say  something? 

Mr.  Morris.  If  it  is  pertinent ;  yes. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  If  you  will  permit  me,  I  would  like  to  make  a  sug- 
gestion here.  I  think  this  kind  of  thing  is  typical  of  the  plight  of  the 
serious  researcher  and  student  and  would-be  accurate  writer  and  re- 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  771 

porter.  I  feel  that  if  a  book  such  as  this  exists  in  a  Government 
library,  for  research  purposes,  a  book  which  is  I  do  not  believe  im- 
partial, that  somehow  or  other  that  book  should  be  labeled  so  that  the 
researcher  who  is  writing  for  the  Voice  of  America,  or  any  other 
agency  of  the  United  States  Government,  knows  when  they  are  pick- 
ing a  book  up  such  as  this  that  this  is  in  truth  not  an  impartial  fac- 
tual document,  or  at  least  it  is  not  when  compared  with  the  Govern- 
ment's own  information. 

I  have  no  way  of  judging  any  of  this  information,  except  by  what 
was  given  to  me,  but  I  do  know  what  was  given  to  me  by  the  State 
Department  on  this  subject  whicli  was  in  direct  refutation  of  what 
is  in  this  book. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  I  understand  then  you  feel,  when  the  Gov- 
ernment has  in  its  library  of  research  for  the  Voice  of  America  a  book 
and  they  present  that  book  to  a  person  to  get  out  a  script  for  the 
Voice,  they  in  a  way  sponsor  the  accuracy  of  the  information  in  the 
research  book? 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  I  should  think  that  the  book  in  the  research  library 
would  be  classified  as  Communist  propaganda  or  else  Marxian-So- 
cialist views,  or  Lenin-Stalin  views.  So,  when  you  pick  it  up  and 
read  it,  yovi  know  what  you  have.  These  are  very  complex,  difficult 
matters  covered  in  this  book.  If  I  had  not  been  given  special  informa- 
tion by  an  expert,  written  by  an  expert  in  our  own  Embassy,  how 
could  I  have  any  knowledge  of  the  existing  conditions  in  the  central 
Asiatic  part  of  the  Soviet  Union  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  could  have  accepted  it  as  being  the  truth 
and  the  facts  and  given  it  on  the  air  in  your  script. 

Mrs.  Widener.  I  could  have  accepted  this  book  if  I  had  not  had  any 
other  information.  If  I  had  received  an  assignment  and  was  given 
by  my  own  Government  this  book  to  write  about,  which  I  was,  it 
seems  to  me  I  would  have  accepted  this  as  material  suitable. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  the  Friday  session  we  introduced 
documents  showing  Mr.  Julian  Friedman  was  connected  with  the  In- 
stitute of  Pacific  Relations.  I  think  Mr.  Mandel  has  one  more  con- 
tribution to  make  to  that  list. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  have  here  an  issue  of  the  Spotlight  on  the  Far  East, 
published  monthly  by  the  Committee  for  a  Democratic  Far  Eastern 
Policy,  which  has  been  cited  as  subversive  by  the  Attorney  General. 
This  is  the  issue  of  April  1947.  On  page  5  we  find  an  article  under 
the  heading  "Guest  Column,"  by  Julian  Friedman,  entitled  "China's 
Unions  Refuse  to  be  Puppets."    Under  his  name  it  says  [reading] : 

For  the  past  2  years  the  author  was  United  States  labor  attache  in  China.  He 
became  personally  acquainted  with  all  ranks  of  trade-unionists  and  speaks  with 
authority  on  the  Chinese  labor  movement. 

I  would  like  to  put  the  article,  which  is  brief,  into  the  record  and 

just  quote  a  portion  of  it  by  way  of  example. 

The  Chiang  Kai-shek  government  is  absolutely  opposed  to  trade-unionism 
because  it  means  democracy,  a  menace  to  Chiang's  plutocracy.  Genuine  trade- 
unionists  are  certainly  opposed  to  the  present  antilabor  National  Government — 

and  so  on  in  the  same  strain. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  have  this  whole  column 
introduced  in  the  record  and  marked  as  the  next  consecutive  exhibit. 


772  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

This  is  a  column  tliat  Julian  Friedman  wrote  for  the  Committee  for  a 
Democratic  Far  Eastern  Policy,  which  has  been  termed  "a  subversive 
organization"  by  the  Attorney  General. 

Mr.  Sour  WINE.  It  is  at  least  a  column  which  appeared  in  that  pub- 
lication under  his  name. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  see  there  is  a  photograph.  Is  that  fi  photo- 
graph of  Friedman  ?  Maybe  the  witness  can  identify  it  as  being  the 
person  she  spoke  to  on  the  night  she  has  been  talking  about. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  It  resembles ;  I  wouldn't  say  positively. 

Mr.  Morris.  Let  the  record  show  it  is  a  very  small  photograph,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  The  photograph  shows  head  and  shoulders  and  the 
entire  photograph  is  less  than  an  inch  square,  and  it  is  square. 

Mrs.  WiDENER.  It  resembles  the  person,  but  I  wouldn't  say  posi- 
tively it  was  the  person. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  would  like  that  exhibit  made  part  of  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  246"  and  is 
as  follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  246 

[From,  the  Spotlight  on  the  Far  East,  vol.  II,  No.  4,  piihlished  monthly  by  the  Committee 
for  Democratic  Far  Eastern  Policy,  New  York,  N.  Y.,  April  1947] 

GUEST  COLUMN 

China's  Unions  Refuse  To  Be  Puppets 

(By  Julian  Friedman) 
[Photograph] 

For  the  past  2  years  the  author  was  United  States  labor  attach^  iu  China. 
He  became  personally  acquainted  with  all  ranks  of  trade-unionists  and  speaks 
with  authority  on  the  Chinese  labor  movement. 

Genuine  trade-unionists  are  not  easy  to  find  in  Kuomintang  China.  To 
reach  them,  you  have  to  visit  obscure,  innocent-looking  alleys  or  out-of-the-way 
fields  in  the  suburbs  of  the  cities. 

But  it  is  most  dangerous  for  them  to  be  known  as  trade-unionists  or  to  work 
openly  for  real  trade-unionism. 

The  Chiang  Kai-shek  government  is  absolutel.v-  opposed  to  trade-unionism 
because  it  means  democracy,  a  menace  to  Chiang's  plutocracy.  Genuine  trade- 
unionists  ai-e  certainly  opposed  to  the  present  anti-labor  National  Government. 

Many  were  originally  either  company-union  or  Kuomintang  headquarters 
appointees.  There  were  also  secret-society  agents  and  gangsters  in  labor  roles. 
The  latter  are  quickly  exposed  today  by  the  workers  themselves. 

As  for  the  company-union  and  bureaucratic-union  officials,  the  workers  have 
given  them  every  opportunity  to  work  for  the  real  trade-union  movement.  So, 
they  now  face  this  dilemma :  serve  as  Kuomintang  stooges  and  'finks'  and  lose 
support  among  the  workers  or  fight  with  the  workers  and  be  attacked  by  the 
Fascists. 

That  several  have  chosen  the  latter  course  has  enraged  the  National  Govern- 
ment and  Kuomintang,  which  has  retaliated  with  arrest,  threats  of  violence, 
expulsion  from  official  labor  circles,  purging  of  official  unions,  and  reorganizing 
them. 

Nothing  illustrates  the  change  in  labor  so  aptly  as  the  Shanghai  anti-civil-war 
demonstration  of  June  23,  194G.  On  the  day  before,  the  Government  had  called 
official  trade-union  representatives  to  a  meeting  and  dictated  resolusions  which 
said  that  no  workers  or  unions  would  participate  in  tlie  demonstration,  and  that 
any  persons  in  the  demonstration  could  not  be  considered  workers.  The  resolu- 
tions were  "unanimously  adopted"  because  the  Government  chairman  said  so, 
with  no  one  else  given  a  chance  to  speak.     But  more  than  100,000  workers 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  772 

turned  out  the  next  day.    And  the  representatives  who  had  "passed"  the  resolu- 
tions the  previous  day  marched  at  their  head. 

The  Chairman.  Is  there  anything  else? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  When  did  you  wish  the  committee  to  meet  again? 

Mr.  Morris.  Tomorrow  morning  at  10  o'clock,  Mr.  Chairman.  We 
will  have  General  Wedemeyer  as  a  witness. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  questions,  Senator  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  IS^o. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  stands  in  recess  until  tommorrow 
morning  at  10  o'clock. 

(Whereupon,  at  11. 15  a.  m.  Tuesday,  September  18,  1951,  the  hear- 
ing was  recessed  until  10  a.  m.  Wednesday,  September  19, 1951.) 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


wednesday,  september  19,  1951 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration 

OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 

Security  Laws,  of  the  Cominiittee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  C. 

The  subcommittee  met  at  10  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room  424, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Pat  McCarran  ( chairman)  presiding. 

Present :  Senators  McCarran,  Eastland,  Ferguson,  and  Jenner. 

Also  present:  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel;  Robert  Mor- 
ris, subcommittee  counsel,  and  Benjamin  Mandel,  research  director. 

The  Chairman.  The  subcommittee  will  come  to  order. 

General  Wedemeyer,  will  you  stand  and  be  sworn,  please? 

You  do  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  give 
before  tiie  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  will  be  the 
truth,  the  whole  trutli,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  do. 

TESTIMOITY  OF  LT.  GEN.  ALBEKT  C.  WEDEMEYER,  (RETIRED), 

AVCO,  NEW  YORK,  N.  Y. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  will  you  give  your  name  and  address  to  the 
reporter,  please? 

General  Wedemeyer.  A.  C.  Wedemeyer,  AVCO,  420  Lexington 
Avenue,  New  York  City. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  present  occupation? 

General  Wedejieyer.  I  am  vice  president  and  a  member  of  the  board 
of  directors  of  AVCO. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  tell  the  committee  what  service  commands 
you  have  held  in  the  American  Army  with  respect  to  the  China 
theater. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  was  designated  theater  commander  and 
chief  of  staff  to  the  Generalissimo  in  the  fall  of  1944  when  General 
Stilwell  was  relieved  from  those  two  posts. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  long  did  you  hold  that  position? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Approximately  2  years. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  would  be,  then,  until  the  fall  of  1946? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  was  your  next  command  then.  General? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  commanded  the  Second  Army  with  head- 
quarters in  Baltimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  was  the  end  of  your  China  command  ? 

775 


776  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

General  Wedemetee.  That  is  correct.  I  went  out  to  Qiina  again  in 
1947  for  2  months. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  was  the  purpose  of  that  trip,  General  ? 

General  Wedemetee.  I  was  sent  out  there  as  an  envoy  of  the  Pres- 
ident to  make  a  survey  of  conditions  in  China  and  Korea. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  write  a  report  as  a  result  of  that  survey  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  the  report  which  is  now  referred  to  as  the 
Wedemeyer  report  on  China? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Wedemeyer,  when  you  assumed  command  of 
the  China  theater  what  civilian  members  were  there  on  duty  at  that 
time?     This  is  now  in  the  fall  of  1944. 

General  Wedemeyer.  What  civilian  members  were  on  duty  on  my 
staff?' 

Mr.  Morris.  On  your  staff. 

Genera]  Wedemeyer.  I  had  four  political  advisers  who  had  been 
serving  is  that  capacity  on  General  Stilwell's  staff.  They  included 
Mr.  Jack  Service,  Mr.  John  Davies,  Mr.  Raymond  Ludden,  and  Mr. 
John  Emmerson. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  long  did  they  remain  as  political  advisers  to  your 
command  after  your  arrival? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Only  a  few  months. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  during  that  period  of  time  were  you  able  to 
form  an  opinion  of  the  various  political  reports  that  they  submitted 
at  that  time? 

General  Wedemeyer.  My  analysis  of  the  reports  submitted  by  those 
gentlemen  could  not  properly  be  called  an  intelligent  or  thorough- 
going analysis,  and  this  is  the  reason :  In  my  judgment,  if  I  had  it  to 
do  over  again,  I  would  have  more  carefully  analyzed  those  reports, 
but  at  that  time,  that  is,  at  the  time  I  assumed  command  of  the  theater, 
the  Japanese  were  pushing  us  around  and  it  looked  for  a  ^yhile  as  if  I 
were  going  to  have  difficulty  remaining  there  and  to  retain  China  in 
the  war.  I  had  two  areas  of  strategic  importance— Kunming  and 
Chungking.  Kunming  was  the  terminal  of  my  principal  base  of  sup- 
ply. All  of  my  supplies,  as  you  gentlemen  know,  came  over  the 
"hump"  by  air.  We  were  cut  off  from  the  outside  world  except  by  air, 
so  if  I  lost  that,  China  might  be  put  out  of  the  war. 

The  other  area  of  importance  was  the  seat  of  the  wartime  govern- 
ment in  Chungking.  If  I  lost  that,  psychologically  and  militarily 
China  again  might  be  out.  So  I  was  hard  put  to  it  to  retain  my  situa- 
tion there,  to  stabilize  the  military  situation,  with  the  result  that  I 
neglected  the  political,  diplomatic,  or  psychological  factors  which  I 
properly  should  have  taken  heed  of  and  taken  appropriate  steps. 

These  four  men  who  were  political  advisers,  two  or  three  of  them  I 
had  known  previously.  I  had  met  them  socially  over  in  India  when 
I  was  serving  there  with  Lord  Louis  Mountbatten. 

Mr.  Morris.  Who  were  they  ? 

General  Wedeinieyer.  I  met  John  Davies,  John  Emmerson,  and  Jack 
Service.  I  had  not  met,  prior  to  my  assuming  command  in  China, 
Raymond  Ludden. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  did  the  recommendations  of  these  four  po- 
litical officers  coincide  with  American  policy  at  that  time? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  777 

General  Wedemeyer.  At  that  time  the  American  policy,  as  I  inter- 
preted it,  was  to  keep  China  in  the  war  and  to  support  the  Chinese 
Nationalist  Government.  There  were  no  clear-cut  American  policies 
enunciated,  insofar  as  I  can  recall,  pertaining  to  China  or  any  other 
area  of  the  world.  Theater  commanders  in  remote  areas  had  often- 
times to  interpret  or  try  to  conjecture  what  was  desired  in  a  broad 
sense,  what  was  desired  to  accomplish  what  the  Government  wanted. 
However,  I  felt  that  my  job  in  China  was  to  continue  China  in  the 
war,  to  contain  as  many  Japanese  in  that  area  fighting  so  that  they 
could  not  be  removed  from  the  area  and  sent  over  to  oppose  General 
Mac  Arthur  and  Admiral  Nimitz  in  the  Pacific.  As  I  stated,  also  to 
support  the  Chinese  Nationalist  Government  which  our  own  Govern- 
ment recognized  as  the  sovereign  government  in  that  area. 

So  everything  that  I  did  militarily  or  otherwise  was  in  consonance 
with  that  interpretation  of  American  policy  in  China.  If  I  had  fol- 
lowed the  advice  of  these  four  advisers,  some  of  the  advice  that  they 
embodied  in  these  reports,  in  my  judgment  I  would  not  have  been 
carrying  out  my  directive,  nor  would  I  have  been  following  the  policy  • 
of  my  country  in  that  particular  area. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  you  say  "the  policy,"  are  you  speaking 
about  the  policy  as  laid  down  by  the  military  or  by  the  State  Depart- 
ment, or  was  there  a  difference? 

Gejieral  Wedemeyek.  Senator  Ferguson,  I  made  a  real  effort  back 
in  1040,  1941,  1942,  and  1943  to  determine  American  policy  or  policies 
insofar  as  our  own  country  was  concerned  which  were  not  clearly 
enunciated.  Most  of  them  were  found  in  the  Constitution,  tlie  bill  of 
rights,  and  so  forth,  but  our  policies  pertaining  to  other  areas  of  the 
world  were  never,  in  my  judgment,  clearly  enunciated.  That  goes 
right  up  to  today.  I  don't  think  many  people  in  our  country  know 
what  we  are  striving  to  do  in  the  Far  East,  in  the  Middle  East,  or  in 
Western  Europe  today.  The  objectives  established  are  too  nebulous 
and,  in  my  judgment,  until  we  do  have  clearly  enunciated  policies  by 
the  appropriate  authorities,  not  by  the  military  but  by  civilian  authori- 
ties, as  is  contemplated  in  our  Constitution,  we  are  going  to  have  a 
difficult  time  in  accomplishing  what  I  think  the  American  people  be- 
lieve to  be  our  national  objectives. 

I  said  all  of  that  because  oftentimes  as  a  theater  commander  I 
had  to  take  action  in  the  absence  of  clearly  enunciated  policy.  I  had 
to  take  action  that  inevitably  created  policy.  Then  if  that  action 
that  I  took  had  been  wrong  or  had  been  subject  to  criticism  on  the 
part  of  our  people,  I  would  have  been  to  blame.  The  military  is  as- 
suming responsibility  that  they  should  not.  But  if  the  policy  hap- 
pened to  be  in  consonance  with  the  views  of  the  American  people, 
then  the  military  would  not  be  criticized.  I  just  mention  that  because 
I  think  it  is  a  vacuum  that  must  be  filled. 

Senator  Eastland.  What  was  the  policy  that  your  political  ad- 
visers put  forth  ?     What  was  their  advice  to  you  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Sometimes  it  is  quite  implicit.  Senator.  Other 
times  it  is  veiled,  but  the  idea  was  to  give  more  support  to  the  Com- 
munist forces  in  lieu  of  the  Nationalist  forces.  These  reports  would 
play  up  the  shortcomings,  the  maladministration  and  the  unscrupu- 
lousness  of  Nationalist  leaders,  play  up  the  orderliness  or  the  poten- 
tialities of  the  Communist  forces  in  Yunan. 


778  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

I  could  not  support  the  Communists'  political  party  and  still  carry 
out  what  I  believed  to  be  the  American  policy  in  the  area. 

Senator  Eastland.  Those  policies  were  pro-Communist,  were  they 
not? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  would  not  state  that  categorically,  sir.  I 
remember  a  newspaperman  out  there  whom  I  thought  was  an  out-and- 
out  Communist.  The  reason  I  thought  so,  after  considering  it  more 
carefully,  I  was  sure  that  he  was  so  critical  of  the  Nationalists.  There 
was  much  to  be  criticized  in  the  Nationalist  set-up.  There  was  mal- 
administration and  there  were  dishonesties. 

Senator  Eastland.  That  was  true  with  regard  to  the  Communists, 
too,  was  it  not  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  sir.  It  was  a  smaller  set-up.  The  op- 
portunities w^ere  not  quite  tliere. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  Communists  were  not  in  power  and  did  not 
have  the  opportunity  ? 

General  Wedmeyer.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  If  the  Communists  had  the  opportunity 

General  Wedemeyer.  They  w^ould  act  just  the  same  way;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  Knowing  that  these  advisers  favored  the  Com- 
munists over  the  Nationalists? 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  implicit  in  these  reports,  if  you  will 
read  them  over. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  these  reports  critical  of  the  Nationalist  Govern- 
ment that  you  were  there  to  clef  end  and  uphold  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  comment  on  that  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  would  like,  if  it  is  possible,  for  the  general  to 
designate  which,  if  any,  of  the  four  people  he  has  named  rendered  the 
reports  that  he  makes  mention  of,  the  four  advisers  who  were  on  his 
staff. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Actually,  Senator,  I  do  not  recall  ever  receiv- 
ing a  written  report  from  Mr.  John  Emmerson.  The  other  three  did 
submit  written  and  oi^al  reports  to  me.  I  stated  clearly,  sir,  that  I  did 
not  give  them  the  attention  that  I  properly  should  have,  but  I  was 
involved  in  a  military  situation. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  to  whom  were  these  reports  made?  I  mean 
these  reports  that  we  are  discussing. 

General  Wedemeyer.  They  were  submitted  to  me  as  theater  com- 
mander. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  they  submitted  through  the  State  Department 
representative  in  China?  They  were  State  Department  employees, 
were  they  not  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  They  were  all  Foreign  Service  offi- 
cers, professionals. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  they  report  to  you  through  the  ranking  State  De- 
pai'tment  representative  in  China  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes.  When  I  assumed  command  of  the  thea- 
ter, Mr.  John  Davies — I  believe  he  was  the  senior  one  of  the  group — 
reported  to  me,  indicated  what  they  had  been  doing  for  General  Stil- 
well,  and  expressed  the  desire  to  cooperate  and  to  assist  me  in  every 
way  possible.  All  of  them  spoke  Chinese.  They  were  all  Chinese 
language  students.  I  think  two  of  them  were  born  out  there,  the  sons 
of  missionaries. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  779 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Wedemeyer,  may  I  refer  you  to  the  first  report 
that  is  on  that  list  of  papers  there  in  front  of  you  on  the  table  and 
that  you  will  see  is  a  report  made  by  John  S.  Service.  It  is  one  of  the 
reports  that  we  are  discussing. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  now  referring  to  Report  No.  40  from  the  United 
States  Army  Observer  Section,  APO  879.  This  is  a  report  from 
John  S.  Service  to  General  Stihvell,  conmianding  general,  USAF- 
CBI.     It  is  dated  October  10,  19M. 

Are  you  acquainted  with  that  memorandum.  General  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  It  was  not  submitted  to  me,  of 
course,  but  when  I  assumed  the  command  of  the  theater  in  order  to  get 
background  for  my  duties,  I  read  every  document  I  could  possibly  get 
hold  of  in  my  headquarters.  This  document  I  definitely  read  at  that 
time. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  there  anything  outstanding  in  that  memorandum 
that  made  an  impression  on  you  in  the  past  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  A¥hen  I  read  it  over  I  just  recalled  being 
impressed  with  the  writer's  criticism  of  the  Chinese  Nationalist  Gov- 
ernment. There  were  criticisms  emphasized  throughout  the  paper. 
When  I  took  command  of  the  theater,  I  found  the  American  military 
were  criticizing  the  Chinese  military  and  the  relations  were  not  good. 
It  was  not  a  happy  situation.  I  recall  vividly  visiting  the  Chinese 
headquarters  to  obtain  from  the  Chinese  generals  a  resume  of  the 
situation  as  it  existed  at  that  time.  I  went  over  there  with  my  chief 
of  staff,  a  general  named  Hern.  I  was  astounded  at  the  attitude  of 
the  Chinese.  They  were  correctly  polite,  but  I  did  not  get  any  infor- 
mation from  them.  I  decided  either  they  did  not  have  any  informa- 
tion or  there  was  an  intolerable  situation  that  just  couldn't  continue. 

So  I  suggested  to  the  generalissimo  that  we  set  up  a  combined  staff. 
I  would  sit  at  the  head  of  this  table  and  next  to  me  would  be  the  head 
of  the  Chinese  Army.  On  my  right  would  be  one  of  my  staff  officers, 
say  my  Intelligence  officer;  and  sitting  next  to  him  would  be  the 
Chinese  Intelligence  officer.  That  worked  beautifully.  At  first  the 
Chinese  were  not  very  cooperative.  They  were  very  quiet.  When 
the  war  was  over  they  gave  a  party  for  my  staff  officers,  indicating 
that  marvelous  relationship  had  developed.  That  just  was  a  thing 
because  it  permeated  the  field  where  we  got  better  cooperation  between 
the  military  Chinese  and  American.  * 

I  mention  that  because  when  I  got  over  there  there  was  no  coopera- 
tion and  there  was  mistrust  and  suspicion  prevailing  in  the  theater. 
These  reports  on  the  civilian  side  just  played  up  that  same  philosophy 
that  pervaded  in  the  theater. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  may  we  get  back  to  this  report?  Is  there 
anything  outstanding  in  that  particular  report  that  you  would  care  to 
comment  on  at  this  time  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  my  judgment  the  military  capabilities  of 
the  Communist  forces  in  Yunan  were  not  great,  were  invariably  over- 
emphasized in  this  and  other  reports  submitted  to  me  by  these  political 
advisers. 

I  think  I  am  qualified  to  speak  knowingly  on  that  subject,  because 
I  am  a  trained  military  man  and  those  men  were  not.  On  the  political, 
economic,  and  diplomatic  side  I  would  feel  inclined  to  yield  to  their 
views  and  opinions. 

22848— 52— i>t.  3 6 


780  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr,  Chairman,  in  this  particular  report  there  is  cer- 
tain underscoring.  I  think  it  would  be  appropriate  if  Mr.  Mandel 
were  to  read  the  underscored  portions  of  this  report  and  we  can  have 
particuhir  questions  addressed  to  General  Wedemeyer  concerning  the 
views  expressed  therein. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

With  tlie  glaring  exposure  of  the  Kuomintang's  failure,  dissatisfaction  within 
China  is  growing  raiDidly.  The  prestige  of  the  party  was  never 'lower,  and 
Chiang  is  losing  the  respect  he  once  enjoyed  as  a  leader. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  before  that  question  is  discussed  by  the 
general  you  had  better  lay  a  foundation.  Whose  report  is  this? 
From  where  does  it  emanate? 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  a  report  of  John  S.  Service  dated  October  10, 
1944,  and  it  is  submitted  to  General  Stilwell,  commanding  general, 
USAF-CBI,  on  that  date. 

As  testimony  has  brought  foi'th,  General  Stilwell  was  the  predeces- 
sor of  General  Wedemeyer.  This  letter  came  to  the  attention  of  Gen- 
eral Wedemeyer  when  he  assumed  command  in  China. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  General,  the  underscored  matter  is  drawn  to 
your  attention.    Do  you  wish  to  discuss  it? 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  have  any  comment  on  that  particular  aspect  of 
the  Service  report  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  From  the  American  viewpoint  as  expressed  to 
me  by  practically  everyone  with  whom  I  came  in  contact,  that  state- 
ment might  be  said  to  epitomize  the  entire  American  viewpoint  toward 
Chiang  Kai-shek  and  his  government  when  I  arrived  in  the  theater  in 
October  1944. 

The  Chairman.  "\Ylien  you  say  "the  entire  American  viewpoint," 
just  what  do  you  encompass  by  that  expression  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Mr.  Chairman,  practically  everyone  with 
whom  I  spoke  felt  that  there  was  nothing  that  could  be  done  construc- 
tively to  keep  China  fighting  in  the  war. 

The  Cpiairman.  That  is  those  with  whom  you  spoke  in  that  theater? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  And  Mr.  Wallace  was  out  there,  the 
then  Vice  President.  He  stated  that  nothing  but  a  miracle  could  keep 
China  fighting  in  the  war.    He  was  quoted  in  the  papers  saying  that. 

That  was  the  pessimistic  view  uniformly  expressed  to  me  when  I 
went  over  there  to  assume  command  by  military  and  by  civilians  with 
whom  I  came  in  contact. 

Senator  Ferguson.  General  Wedemeyer,  I  wonder  whether  this  was 
in  line  with  what  you  thought  to  be  the  policy  [reading]  : 

Our  dealings  with  Chiang  Kai-sheli;  apparently  continiie  on  the  basis  of  the  un- 
realistic assumption  that  he  is  China  and  that  he  is  necessary  to  our  cause.  It  is 
time,  for  the  salje  of  the  war  and  also  for  our  future  interests  in  China,  that  we 
take  a  more  realistic  line. 

He  was  the  head,  was  he  not,  at  that  time  of  the  Nationalist  Govern- 
ment ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  he  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  could  that  be  in  line  with  your  idea  of  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  in  China,  that  sentence? 

General  Wedemeyer.  It  was  not,  Senator.  I  state  categorically  these 
reports  were  not  in  consonance  with  my  interpretation  of  my  directive 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS  781 

or  of  American  policy.  That  contravenes  American  policy  as  I  under- 
stand it,  sir. 

Mr.  MoKRis.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  the  second  underscored  pas- 
sage? 

Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

In  the  present  circumstances,  the  Knoinintang  is  dependent  on  American 
support  for  survivaL    But  we  are  in  no  way  dependent  on  the  Kuomintang. 

Then,  skipping  down — 

We  need  not  fear  Kuomintang  surrender  or  opposition.  The  party  and  Chiang 
■will  stick  to  us  because  our  victory  is  certain  and  is  their  only  hope  for  continued 
power. 

General  Wedemeyer.  My  comment  on  that  is  this :  The  Communist 
Party  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  was  dependent  upon  America  for  support 
during  the  war.  We  gave  plenty  of  it  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  much  more 
than  we  ever  gave  to  China.  A  statement  like  that  is  just  inane,  in 
my  judgment. 

JNIr.  Morris.  Did  we  need  the  Chinese  Government  in  the  war, 
General  Wedemeyer? 

General  Wedemeyer.  We  needed  it  just  as  much  as  we  needed  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  Any  diversion  of  the  Japanese  effort  that  could  be  ac- 
complished, it  was  sound  to  do  so.  The  Chinese  were  containing  in 
their  fighting  with  the  Japanese  a  million  and  a  half  Japanese  that 
might  have  been  deployed  against  our  boys  coming  up  through  the 
Philippine  Archipelago  and  through  the  Ryukyus. 

So  the  fact  that  the  Chinese  fighting,  not  as  well  as  we  would  like 
them  to  have  fought,  but  doing  increasingly  better  as  the  war  went 
on,  they  contained  one  million  and  a  half  Japanese  which  I  think  was 
creditable  and  under  the  circumstances,  a  very  great  contribution. 

Mr.  Morris.  So  it  is  your  testimony  we  did  need  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment at  that  time  to  that  extent  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir;  just  as  today  we  need  Franco,  any- 
one that  will  help  us  in  this  struggle  against  communism.  We  may 
not  approve  of  everything  they  do.  We  may  not  go  along  with  their 
governmental  structure,  but  if  they  can  help  us  in  our  struggle,  I 
say  use  them.     We  needed  them  then. 

Mr.  Morris.  On  the  basis  of  your  entire  experience  in  China  would 
you  say  that  the  situation  as  described  to  you  by  the  political  officers 
was  erroneous  in  this  respect  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  my  judgment  they  were  erroneous. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  other  words,  you  were  able  to  make  use  of  the 
Chinese  Nationalist  forces? 

General  Wedemeyer.  If  I  had  followed  the  advice  I  would  not 
have  been  carrying  out  my  orders. 

Senator  Ferguson.  General  Wedemeyer,  isn't  the  w\^y  this  would 
read  and  what  you  have  said  make  it  apparent  that  if  you  had  followed 
the  political  advice  you  would  have  tried  to  take  the  Communist  Gov- 
ernment in  China  as  lining  up  with  the  United  States  and  have  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  Nationalists  ? 

General  AVedemeyer.  Yes,  sir ;  I  think  that  is  a  fair  statement. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Their  advice  was  to  recognize  in  effect  the  Com- 
munist Government  in  China ;  whereas,  you  felt  as  we  were  then  recog- 
nizing the  Nationalists  that  that. was  the  Government  that  you  were  to 


782  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

support  and  to  get  the  Nationalists'  aid  in  your  efforts  in  China ;  is 
that  correct  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  think  that  is  a  fair  statement.  The  Chi- 
nese Communists  offered  me  command  of  their  army  and  I  notified 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  back  in  America.  I,  through  the  Ambassa- 
dor, also  notified  the  President  that  I  did  not  want  command  of  the 
army.  At  that  time  I  recognized  the  implications  of  communism 
in  the  Far  East  as  I  did  in  Europe.  I  did  not  want  to  support  people 
whom  I  knew  were  operating  under  the  aegis  of  the  Kremlin. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  felt  that  the  best  interests  of  America 
would  be  served  if  the  Nationalists  were  recognized? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Not  only  for  America  but  for  the  world,  for 
the  Far  East. 

Mr,  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  further? 

Mr.  Mandel  (continues  reading)  : 

We  need  not  fear  the  collapse  of  the  Kuomintang  government.  All  the  other 
groups  in  China  want  to  defend  themselves  and  fight  Japan.  Any  new  govern- 
ment under  any  other  than  the  present  reactionary  control  will  be  more  coopera- 
tive and  better  able  to  mobilize  the  country. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  comment  on  that  paragr.aph,  please,  General 
Wedemeyer  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Here  I  am  commenting  on  China  in  regard 
to  experts'  political  views.  It  makes  me  rather  vulnerable.  But  in 
my  experience,  which  is  only  5  years  in  China,  or  over  4  years,  I 
found  that  most  of  the  Chinese  cannot  read  or  write.  They  do  not 
understand  a  thing  about  political  philosophies,  political  structures, 
and  economic  structures.  They  mean  nothing  to  them.  They  want 
shelter,  food,  and  peace. 

When  he  talks,  when  this  man  writes  about  other  parties,  there  are 
not  other  parties  over  there  worthy  of  the  name.  Tliere  was  no  other 
leadership  through  which  I  could  work,  except  Chiang  Kai-shek  on 
the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  Mao  Tse-tung,  the  Chinese  Communist 
leader.  They  were  quite  well  organized,  these  Communists,  and  very 
articulate,  much  more  so  than  Chiang  Kai-shek,  and  very  intolerant 
of  criticism  which  Chiang  was  not.  He  did  permit  people  to  criticize 
him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  the  Chinese  Communists  help  j^ou  in  your  confining 
the  Japanese  on  the  mainland  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  sir.  I  did  make  the  effort  to  coordinate 
our  military  operations  over  there.  They  were  operating  in  sporadic 
efforts  to  the  north  of  wartime  capital  up  in  the  Yunan  area  and 
Shansi  Province.  They  never  launched  a  concerted  attack  in  coordi- 
nation with  those  attacks  that  I  was  putting  on  down  below. 

Now  I  should  say  in  fairness  to  those  people  when  my  fliers  would 
be  shot  down  behind  the  Japanese  lines,  frequently  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists would  facilitate  the  return  of  those  fliers.  I  don't  want  to 
overemphasize  that  point  because  I  don't  want  it  to  be  given  dispro- 
portionate emphasis.    But  that  is  true.    At  times  they  did  do  that. 

But  their  military  operations  did  not  make  the  contribution  so  often 
one  reads  in  the  press  or  hears  about  on  the  radio.  The  military  opera- 
tions of  the  Chinese  Communists,  at  least  while  I  was  in  command  of 
the  theater,  were  not  significant. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  say  that  on  the  basis  of  fact  you  were  the  theater 
commander  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC    RELATIONS  783 

General  Wedemeter.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  I  call  particularly  your  attention  to  the  next 
sentence  in  the  paragraph  that  Mr.  Mandel  has  just  read : 

Any  new  government  under  any  other  than  the  present  reactionary  control  will 
be  more  cooperative  and  better  able  to  mobilize  the  country. 

Would  you  comment  on  that  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  As  I  stated,  there  were  only  two  broad  polit- 
ical parties,  one  the  Communists  and  one  the  Kuomintang.  The  splin- 
ter parties  were  absolutely  impotent.  There  were  not  enough  people 
involved.  If  we  threw  over  the  Kuomintang,  it  meant  we  were  going 
to  assume  support  and  cooperate  with  the  Communists. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  that  then  have  been  true,  namely,  that  under  any 
other  than  the  present  reactionary  control,  to  use  Mr.  Service's  words, 
the  Communists  would  have  been  more  cooperative  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  The  Communists,  in  my  judgment — and  I 
have  tried  to  be  objective,  I  have  tried  to  find  good  in  Marxist 
theories — the  Communists  will  cooperate  when  the  advantage  accrues 
to  them.  At  no  time  will  a  Communist  cooperate  otherwise.  That 
was  applicable  then  and  it  is  applicable  now.  We  are  naive  if  we 
think  otherwise. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  continue  reading,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel  (continues  reading)  : 

We  need  not  support  Chiang  in  the  belief  that  he  represents  pro-American  or 
democratic  China.  All  the  people  and  all  other  political  groups  of  importance 
in  China  are  friendly  to  the  United  States  and  look  to  it  for  the  salvation  of  the 
country,  now  and  after  the  war. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  comment  on  that,  General  Wedemeyer  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Again  I  do  not  know  what  other  groups  he  is 
talking  about.     You  had  the  professors 

Mr.  Morris.  Certainly  the  Communists  were  one  of  those  groups. 

General  Wedemeyer.  They  were  the  major  group.  There  were 
only  two  major  groups  there.  There  were  splinter  parties  made  up  of 
a  few  of  the  intelligentsia  and  they  were  not  significant.  _  They  had  no 
power.     They  were  not  articulate,  so  I  think  you  can  disregard  them. 

Mr.  Morris.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  General,  the  Chinese  Communists 
have  not  proved  to  be  friendly  to  the  United  States  and  they  have  not 
looked  to  us  for  the  salvation  of  their  country  then  or  after  the  war ; 
is  that  correct  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes.  The  Chinese  Communists  have  no 
friendly  attitude  toward  anyone,  in  my  judgment,  except  the  Kremlin. 
They  certainly  have  no  friendly  attitudes  or  friendly  intentions  to- 
ward countries  that  they  call  capitalistic  nations.  Their  objective  is 
to  destroy  caj^italism.  Their  avowed  intention  is  to  destroy  capital- 
ism, expressed  to  me  personally. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  their  performances,  particularly  during  the 
past  year,  would  seem  to  be  a  complete  refutation  of  that  statement, 
would  they  not,  sir? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  continue,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel  (continues  reading)  : 

The  parallel  with  Yugoslavia  has  been  drawn  before  but  is  becoming  more  and 
more  apt.  It  is  as  impractical  to  seek  Chinese  unity,  the  use  of  the  Communist 
forces,  and  the  mobilization  of  the  population  in  the  rapidly  growing  occupied 
areas  by  discussion  in  Chungking  with  the  Kuomintang  alone,  as  it  was  to  seek 


784  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

the  solution  of  these  problems  through  Mikhailovitch  and  King  Peter's  govern- 
ment in  London,  ignoring  Tito. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  comment  on  that,  General? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  think  events  that  have  transpired  since  we 
supported  Tito  have  proved  us  wrong.  I  think  the  real  patriot  over 
in  Yugoslavia,  Mikhailovitch,  we  let  down.  Personally  I  think  we 
should  have  supported  him.  The  same  would  be  true  in  China.  With 
all  his  faults,  and  he  does  have  faults,  I  think  Chiang  Kai-shek  was 
the  proper  leader  to  support  at  the  time  we  did.  I  do  not  know  of  an- 
other leader  today  whom  we  might  support  and  obtain  best  results  in 
China  from  other  than  Chiang  Kai-shek.  To  me  today  he  epitomizes 
leadership  there. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  there  anything  more  there,  Mr.  Mandel? 

Mr.  Mandel  (continues  reading)  : 

Our  policy  toward  China  should  be  guided  by  two  facts.  First,  we  cannot 
hope  to  deal  successfully  with  Chiang  without  being  hard-boiled.  Second,  we 
cannot  hope  to  solve  China's  problems  (which  are  now  our  problems)  without 
consideration  of  the  opposition  forces — Communist,  provincial,  and  liberal. 

We  should  not  be  swayed  by  pleas  of  the  danger  of  China's  collapse.  This  is 
an  old  trick  of  Chiang's. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  comment  on  that,  General  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  It  sounds  exactly  like  somebody  was  writing 
about  the  attitude  of  Stalin  when  we  were  worried.  Stalin  was 
pressurizing  the  Allies  in  World  War  II  to  establish  a  second  front. 
It  was  always  the  implicit  threat  there  "If  you  don't  establish  a 
second  front,  we  will  make  a  separate  peace  with  Germany." 

I  think  the  same  philosophy  behind  the  situation  in  Russia  applied 
out  in  China,  and  this  chap  points  out  we  should  not  support  Chiang 
Kai-shek  because  he  is  a  reactionary.  So  was  Stalin,  the  worst  kind, 
yet  we  supported  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  continue,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel  (continues  reading)  : 

Public  announcement  that  the  President's  representative  had  made  a  visit 
to  the  Communist  capital  at  Yenan  would  have  signticance  that  no  Chinese 
would  miss — least  of  all  the  generalissimo.  The  effect  would  be  great  even 
if  it  were  only  a  demonstration  with  no  real  consultation.  But  it  should  be 
more  than  a  mere  demonstration ;  we  must,  for  instance,  plan  an  eventual  use  of 
the  Communist  armies  and  this  cannot  be  purely  on  Kuomiiitang  terms. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  comment  on  that.  General  Wedemeyer? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  think  that  would  be  just  like  foreign  repre- 
sentatives coming  over  here  and  visiting  Bob  Taft  and  ignoring 
President  Truman,  The  only  difference  is  Senator  Bob  Taft  would 
not  have  an  armed  force  to  support  his  political  Republican  Party. 

The  Chairman.  You  do  not  think  that  would  disturb  Mr.  Truman, 
do  you  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  did  not  mean  to  imply  any  disparagement 
of  any  name  I  mention. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  authenticate  this  document  pre- 
paratory to  its  being  put  in  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  document,  listed  as  No.  40,  was  taken  from  the 
transcript  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Loyalty  Security  Board  meeting 
in  the  case  of  John  S.  Service  as  a  reprinting  of  a  State  Department 
employee  loyalty  investigation. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  as  such  may  that  be  introduced  in  the 
record  and  marked  with  the  next  consecutive  exhibit  number  ? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC   RELATIONS  785 

The  Chairman.  It  is  to  be  understood  and  the  record  will  show 
that  this  is  the  exhibit  from  which  Mr.  Mandel  has  been  reading  that 
the  excerpts  were  commented  on  b}^  the  witness;  it  that  correct? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  247"  and  is 

as  follows:) 

ExHiniT  No.  247 

United  States  Army  Observer  Section, 

APO  879,  October  10,  19U. 
Report  No.  40 
Secret 

Subject:     The  need  for  greater  realism  in  our  relations  with  Cliiang  Kai-shek. 
To :'   General  Stilwell,  Commanding  General,  USAF-CBI. 

1.  You  have  allowed  me,  as  a  political  officer  attached  to  your  staff,  to 
express  myself  freely  in  the  past  regarding  the  situation  in  China  as  I  have 
seen  it.  Although  in  Yenan  I  am  only  a  distant  observer  of  recent  develop- 
ments in  Chungking  and  Washington,  I  trust  that  you  will  permit  the  con- 
tinued frankness  which  I  have  assumed  in  the  attached  memorandum  regarding 
the  stronger  policy  which  I  think  it  is  now  time  for  us  to  adopt  toward  Chiang 
Kai-shek  and  the  Central  Government. 

2.  It  is  obvious,  of  course,  that  you  cannot  act  independently  along  the  lines 
suggested.  The  situation  in  China  and  the  measures  necessary  to  meet  it 
have  both  military  importance  and  far-reaching  political  significance;  the  two 
aspects  cannot  be  separated.  Because  of  this  interrelation,  and  because  of 
the  high  level  on  which  action  in  China  must  be  taken,  there  must  be  agree- 
ment and  mutual  support  between  our  political  and  military  branches.  But 
this  will  be  ineffective  without  clear  decision  and  forceful  implementation  by 
the  President. 

3.  It  is  requested  that  copies  of  this  report  be  transmitted,  as  usual,  to  the 
American  Ambassador  at  Chungking  and  Headquarters  USAF-CBI,  for  the 
information  of  Mr.  Davies. 

(Signed)     J.  S. 
(Typed)     John  S.  Service. 
Enclosure :  Memorandum,  as  stated. 

[First  endorsement] 

United  States  Army  Observer  Section, 

APO  879,  October  16,  19U- 
To:  Gen.  Joseph  W.  Stilwell,  Commanding  United  States  Army  Forces,  China, 
Burma,  and  India,  APO  879. 

Approved : 

David  D.  Barrett, 

Colonel,  GSC. 

MEMORANDUM 

Our  dealings  with  Chiang  Kai-shek  apparently  continue  on  the  basis  of  the 
unrealistic  assumption  that  he  is  China  and  that  he  is  necessary  to  our  cause. 
It  is  time,  for  the  sake  of  the  war  and  also  for  our  future  interests  in  China, 
that  we  take  a  more  realistic  line. 

The  Kuomintang  government  is  in  crisis.  Recent  defeats  have  exposed  its 
military  ineffectiveness  and  will  hasten  the  approaching  economic  disaster. 
Passive  inability  to  meet  these  crises  in  a  constructive  way,  stubborn  unwilling- 
ness to  submerge  selllsh  power  seeking  in  democratic  unity,  and  tlie  statements 
of  Chiang  himself  to  the  People's  Political  Council  and  on  October  10,  1944, 
are  sufficient  evidence  of  the  bankruptcy  of  Kuomintang  leadership. 

With  the  glaring  exposure  of  the  Kuomintang's  failure,  dissatisfaction  within 
China  is  growing  rapidly.  The  prestige  of  the  party  was  never  lower,  and 
Chiang  is  losing  the  respect  he  once  enjoyed  as  a  leader. 

In  the  present  circumstances,  the  Kuomintang  is  dependent  on  American 
support  for  survival.    But  tve  are  in  no  icaij  dependent  on  the  Kuomintang. 

We  do  not  need  it  for  military  reasons.  It  has  lost  the  southern  air  bases 
and  cannot  hold  any  section  of  the  sea  coast.    Without  drastic  reforms — which 


786  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

must  have  a  political  base — its  armies  cannot  fight  the  Japanese  effectively 
no  matter  how  many  arms  we  give  them.  But  it  will  not  permit  those  reforms 
because  its  war  against  Japan  is  secondary  to  its  desire  to  maintain  its  own 
undemocratic  power. 

On  the  other  hand,  neither  the  Kuomintang  nor  any  other  Chinese  regime, 
because  of  the  sentiment  of  the  people,  can  refuse  American  forces  the  use  of 
Chinese  territory  against  the  Japanese.  And  the  Kuomintang  attitude  prevents 
the  utilization  of  other  forces,  such  as  the  Communist  or  provincial  troops,  who 
should  be  more  useful  than  the  Kuomintang's  demoralized  armies. 

We  need  not  fear  Kuomintang  surrender  or  opposition.  The  party  and  Chiang 
will  stick  to  us  because  our  victory  is  certain  and  is  their  only  hope  for  con- 
tinued power.  But  our  support  of  the  Kuomintang  will  not  stop  its  normally 
traitorous  relations  with  the  enemy  and  will  only  encourage  it  to  continue 
sowing  the  seeds  of  future  civil  war  by  plotting  with  the  present  puppets  for 
eventual  consolidation  of  the  occupied  territories  against  the  Communist-led 
forces  of  popular  resistance. 

We  need  not  fear  the  collapse  of  the  Kuomintang  government.  All  the  other 
groups  in  China  want  to  defend  themselves  and  fight  Japan.  Any  new  gov- 
ernment under  any  other  than  the  present  reactionary  control  will  be  more 
cooperative  and  better  able  to  mobilize  the  country. 

Actually,  by  continued  and  exclusive  support  of  the  Kuomintang,  we  tend 
to  prevent  the  reforms  and  democratic  reorganization  of  the  Government  which 
are  essential  for  the  revitalization  of  China's  war  effort.  Encouraged  by  our 
support,  the  Kuomintang  will  continue  in  its  present  course,  progressively 
losing  the  confidence  of  the  people  and  becoming  more  and  more  impotent. 
Ignored  by  us,  and  excluded  from  the  Government  and  joint  prosecution  of 
the  war,  the  Communists  and  other  groups  will  be  forced  to  guard  their  own 
interests  by  more  direct  opposition. 

We  need  not  support  the  Kuomintang  for  international  political  reasons.  The 
day  when  it  was  expedient  to  inflate  Chiang's  status  to  one  of  the  Big  Four  is 
past,  because  with  the  obvious  certainty  of  defeat,  Japan's  Pan-Asia  propaganda 
loses  its  effectiveness.  We  cannot  hope  that  China  under  the  present  Kuomin- 
tang can  be  an  effective  balance  to  Soviet  Russia,  Japan,  or  the  British  Empire  in 
the  Far  East. 

On  the  contraiT,  artificial  inflation  of  Chiang's  status  only  adds  to  his  unrea- 
sonableness. The  example  of  a  democratic,  nonimperialistic  China  will  be  much 
better  counterpropaganda  in  Asia  than  the  present  regime,  which,  even  in  books 
like  China's  Destiny,  hypnotizes  itself  with  ideas  of  consolidating  minority 
nations  (such  as  Tibet  and  Mongolia),  recovering  lost  territories  (such  as  the 
southern  peninsula),  and  protecting  the  rights  and  at  the  same  time  nationalities 
of  its  numerous  emigrants  (to  such  areas  as  Thailand,  Malaya,  and  the  East 
Indies).  Finally,  the  perpetuation  in  pow«r  of  the  present  Kuomintang  can  only 
mean  a  weak  and  disunited  China — a  sure  cause  of  international  involvements 
in  the  Far  East.  The  key  to  stability  must  be  a  strong,  unified  China.  This 
can  be  accomplished  only  on  a  democratic  foundation. 

We  need  not  support  Chiang  in  the  heUcf  that  he  represents  pro- American  or 
democratic  China.  All  the  people  and  all  other  political  groups  of  importance 
in  China  are  friendly  to  the  United  States  and  look  to  it  for  the  salvation  of  the 
country,  now  and  after  the  war. 

In  fact,  Chiang  has  lost  the  confidence  and  respect  of  most  of  the  American- 
educated,  democratically  minded  liberals  and  intellectuals.  The  Chen  brothers, 
military,  and  secret  police  cliques  which  control  the  party  and  are  Chiang's  main 
supports  are  the  most  Chauvinist  elements  in  the  country.  The  present  party 
ideology,  as  shown  in  Chiang's  own  books  China's  Destiny  and  Chinese  Economic 
Theor.v,  is  fundamentally  antiforeign  and  antidemocratic,  both  politically  and 
economically. 

Finally,  we  need  feel  no  ties  of  gratitude  to  Chiang.  The  men  he  has  kept 
around  him  have  proved  selfish  and  corrupt,  incapable,  and  obstructive, 
Chiang's  own  dealings  with  us  have  been  an  opportunist  combination  of  extrava- 
gant demands  and  unfilled  promises,  wheedling  and  bargaining,  bluff,  and  black- 
mail. Chiang  did  not  resist  Japan  until  forced  by  his  own  people.  He  has 
fought  only  passively— not  daring  to  mobilize  his  own  people.  He  has  sought 
to  have  us'  save  him — so  that  he  can  continue  his  conquest  of  his  own  country. 
In  the  process,  he  has  worked  us  for  all  we  were  worth. 

We  seem  to  forget  that  Chiang  is  an  oriental;  that  his  background  and  vision 
are  limited ;  that  his  position  is  built  on  the  skill  as  an  extremely  adroit  politi- 
cal manipulator  and  a  stubborn,  shrewd  bargainer;  that  he  mistakes  kindness 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  787 

and  flattery  for  weakness ;  and  that  he  listens  to  his  own  instrument  of  force 
rather  than  reason. 

Our  policy  toward  China  should  be  guided  by  two  facts.  First,  we  cannot 
hope  to  deal  successfully  with  Chiang  without  'being  hard-toilfd.  Second,  we 
cannot  hope  to  solve  China's  prohlems  [which  are  now  our  problems]  without 
consideration  of  the  opposition  forces — Communist,  provincial,  and  liberal. 

The  parallel  with  Yugoslavia  has  been  drawn  before  but  is  becoming  more  and 
more  apt.  It  is  as  impractical  to  seek  Chinese  unity,  the  use  of  the  Communist 
forces,  and  the  mobilization  of  the  population  in  the  rapidly  growing  occupied 
areas  by  discussion  in  Chungking  with  the  Kuomintang  alone,  as  it  was  to  seek 
the  solution  of  these  problems  through  Mikhailovitch  and  King  Peter's  govern- 
ment in  Lonon,  ignoring  Tito. 

We  should  not  be  swayed  by  pleas  of  the  danger  of  China's  collapse.  This 
is  an  old  trick  of  Chiang's. 

There  may  be  a  collapse  of  the  Kuomintang  government,  but  it  will  not  be 
the  collapse  of  China's  resistance.  There  may  be  a  period  of  some  confusion 
but  the  eventual  gains  of  the  Kuomintang's  collapse  will  more  than  make  up 
for  this.  The  crisis  itself  makes  reform  more  urgent — and  at  the  same  time 
increases  the  weight  of  our  influence.  The  crisis  is  the  time  to  push—^wt  to 
relax. 

We  should  not  let  Chiang  divert  us  from  the  important  questions  by  wasting 
time  in  futile  discussions  as  to  who  is  to  be  American  commander.  This  is  an 
obvious  subterfuge. 

There  is  only  one  man  qualified  by  experience  for  the  job.  And  the  fact  is 
that  no  one  who  knows  anything  about  China  and  is  concerned  over  American 
rather  than  Chiang's  interests  will  satisfy  Chiang. 

We  should  end  the  hollow  pretense  that  China  is  unified  and  that  we  can  talk 
only  to  Chiang.     This  piits  the  trump  card  in  Chiang's  hands. 

Public  announcement  that  the  President's  representative  had  made  a  visit 
to  the  Communist  capital  at  Yenan  would  have  significance  that  no  Chinese  would 
miss — -least  of  all  the  generalissimo.  The  effect  would  be  great  even  if  it  were 
only  a  demonstration  with  no  real  consultation.  But  it  should  be  more  than 
a  mere  demonstration  ;  we  must,  for  instance,  plan  on  eventual  use  of  the  Com- 
munist armies  and  this  cannot  be  purely  on  Kuomintang  terms. 

Finally  if  these  steps  do  not  succeed,  we  should  stop  veiling  our  negotiations 
with  China  in  complete  secrecy.  This  shields  Chiang  and  is  the  voluntary 
abandonment  of  our  strongest  weapon. 

Chinese  public  opinion  would  swing  violently  against  Chiang  if  he  were  shown 
obstructive  and  noncooperative  with  the  United  States.  We  should  not  be 
misled  by  the  relatively  very  few  Kuomintang  die-hards;  they  are  not  the  peo- 
ple. The  Kuomintang  government  could  not  withstand  public  belief  that  the 
United  States  was  considering  withdrawal  of  military  support  or  recognition 
of  the  Kuomintang  as  the  leader  of  Chinese  resistance. 

More  than  ever,  we  hold  all  the  aces  in  Chiang's  poker  game.  It  is  time  we 
start  playing  them. 

(Signed)     J.  S. 

(Typed)      John  S.  Service. 

October  10,  1944. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  think  it  would  be  appropriate  at  this  time  if  we 
showed  a  connection  between  Mr.  Service  and  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations. 

Mr,  Mandel,  will  you  bring  something  forth  on  that  score,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  From  the  same  loyalty  board  meeting  transcript  of 
proceedings,  the  date  being  May  27,  1950,  I  read  the  following  testi- 
mony : 

Question.  Under  what  circumstances  did  you  give  that  otf-the-record  talk  at 
the  IPR? 

This  was  a  question  directed  to  Mr.  Service. 

Answer.  During  the  period  of  consultation  at  my  return  in  1944  I  was  much 
sought  after  because  I  was  the  first  man  to  get  back  to  Washington  after  having 
visited  in  the  Chinese  Communist  areas  since  1939.  In  addition  to  all  these 
interrogations  by  the  different  agencies,  a  number  of  newspapermen  were  sent 
to  me  by  the  press  section  of  the  Department.     I  was  asked  to  go  up  to  New 


788  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

York  to  talk  to  Mr.  Luce.     I  got  approval.     I  talked  to  Mr.  Hopkins,  Mr.  White, 
and  various  other  people.     And  the  IPR  asked 

The  Chaiuman.  Will  you  just  explain  IPR? 

Answer.  The  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.     May  we  refer  to  it  as  the  IPR? 

The  Chairman.  Afterward,  yes. 

Answer.  The  Washington  branch  of  the  IPR  asked  Mr.  Vincent,  who  I  believe 
was  then  Director  of  the  Office  of  Chinese  Affairs,  if  it  would  be  possible  for 
me  to  come  over  and  give  an  informal  off-the-record  talk  to  some  of  their  people 
in  the  Washington  office.  The  first  I  knew  of  the  matter  was  Mr.  Vincent's 
telling  me  that  he  had  received  the  invitation  and  had  accepted  and  hoped  it 
would  be  all  right  with  me. 

Question.  In  other  words,  your  talk  at  the  IPR  was  at  the  initiative  of  the 
IPR? 

Answer.  That  is  right. 

Question.  I  notice  that  in  your  statement  .vou  subscribed  at  that  time  to  a 
number  of  magazines  dealing  with  China,  one  of  which  was  the  Far  Eastern 
Survey.     What  is  the  character  of  that? 

Answer.  The  Far  Eastern  Survey  is  a  biweekly  publication  put  out  by  the 
American  Council  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  containing  articles  written 
by  a  very  large  number  of  people  on  sub.1ects  related  to  the  Far  East  generally. 

Question.  And  Pacific  Affairs? 

Answer.  Pacific  Alfairs  is  a  quarterly  published  by  the  International  Council 
of  the  International  Secretariat,  I  believe.  Perhaps — I'm  not  sure  of  the  exact 
wording  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

Question.  You  were  undoubtedly  aware  from  the  press  of  the  charges  that 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  was  seriously  infiltrated  by  Communists.  Do 
you  have  any  knowledge  as  to  how  long  that  situation  has  existed,  when  the 
IFR  first  began  to  be  influenced  in  its  publications  by  Communist  thinking? 

Answer.  No ;  I  do  not.  Outside  of  being  a  subscriber  to  some  of  its  maga- 
zines, I  have  had  no  interest  in  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.  I  have  never  ■ 
attended  its  i)eriodic  conferences  or  participated  in  its  affairs  in  any  way.  Cer- 
tainly it  was  always  thought  of  in  the  days  referred  to  here  as  a  most  respectable 
type  of  organization.  I  have  heard  from  reading  the  press  that  there  were 
some  Communists  who  did  occupy  positions  of  some  influence  in  it  at  one  period, 
but  I  can't  tell  you  with  any  definiteness  or  from  personal  knowledge  when  that 
was  or  how  influential  those  people  were. 

******* 

Question.  I  also  notice  in  your  statement  that  at  that  time  you  subscribed 
to  the  magazine  Araerasia.     How  could  you  describe  that  magazine? 
Answer.  I  subscribed  to  it  just  after  it  was  established,  I  think. 

****••• 

Trawscript  of  Proceedings — Loyalty  Security  Board  Meeting  in  the  Case 

OF  John  S.  Service 

Date :  Tuesday,  ]\Tay  30,  1950,  10  a.  m.  to  12 :  30  p.  m. 
Place :  Room  2254,  New  State. 

******* 

Mr.  Rhetts.  I  should  like  to  offer  as  an  exhibit  at  this  time  Document  327, 
which  is  a  receipt  signed  by  the  assistant  treasurer  of  the  American  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations  for  membership  dues  for  John  S.  Service  in  the  IPR  for  the 
year  ending  February  1951  in  the  amount  of  $15. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  will  be  introduced  into  the  record,  Mr.  Chair- 
man. 

The  Chairman.  I  did  not  fret  it  clear.  This  document  represents 
interrogation  and  answer  by  whom? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  Loyalty  Security  Board  in  the  case  of  John  S. 
Service,  the  Loyalty  Security  Board  of  the  State  Department. 

The  Chairman.  With  John  S.  Service  answering? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted  in  the  record. 


mSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  789 

(The  document  referred  to  and  read  in  its  entirety  by  Mr.  Mandel 
was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  248"  and  filed  for  the  committee's  informa- 
tion. ) 

Mr.  Morris.  That  bears  on  the  precise  connection  that  John  S.  Serv- 
ice had  with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  now  come  to  the  report  of  January  23,  1943. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  I  inquire  whether  that  was  sworn  testi- 
mony? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

This  document  is  marked  No.  103  and  is  taken  from  the  same  pro- 
ceeding in  the  case  of  John  S.  Service  before  the  State  Department 
Loyalty  Security  Board. 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  the  report  of  January  23,  1943  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  this  a  report  by  Mr.  John  S.  Service  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris,  General,  may  I  call  your  attention  to  the  report  of 
January  23,  1943?  I  think  that  should  be  the  second  one  in  that 
group  of  papers  before  you. 

General  Wedeimeyer.  I  have  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Are  you  acquainted  with  that  particular  report  of 
John  S.  Service? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  have  read  it  over,  yes. 

!Mr.  ISIoRRis.  It  was  not  made  at  a  time  you  were  theater  com- 
mander? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  sir ;  several  months  prior  to  my  becoming 
commander. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  did  come  to  your  attention  after  you  became  theater 
commander? 

General  Wedemeyer.  There  was  a  copy  in  the  headquarters  of  the 
China  theater. 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  You  recognize  it  is  a  report  made  by  John  S.  Service  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Frankly,  I  couldn't  say  under  oath  that  I 
could  say  that. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  do  remember  reading  it  ? 

General  Wedemp^yer.  I  remember  reading  all  these  memoranda  in 
the  headquarters  submitted  by  the  political  advisers. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  I  wonder  if  you  would  read  the  fourth 
paragraph  on  that  page? 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  is  the  instrument? 

Mr.  Morris.  This  has  been  identified  by  Mr,  Mandel  as  a  John 
Service  report  that  was  made  part  of  the  record  of  the  loyalty  pro- 
ceedings of  the  State  Department  in  the  case  of  John  S.  Service. 

Mr.  Mandel,  please  read  part  of  the  second  paragraph,  not  the 
fourth  paragraph,  beginning  with  the  third  sentence. 

Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

In  Kuomintang-controlled  Cbina  the  conntering  of  commnnism  is  a  growing  pre- 
occupation of  propaganda,  of  both  military  and  civilian  political  indoctrination, 
and  of  secret  police  and  gendarmerie  activity.  There  is  not  only  a  rigorous 
suppression  of  anything  coming  under  the  ever-widening  definition  of  "commu- 
nism" but  there  appears  to  be  a  movement  away  from  even  the  outward  fonns  of 


790  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

democracy  in  government.  It  is  now  no  longer  wondered  whether  civil  war- 
can  be  avoided,  but  rather  whether  it  can  be  delayed  at  least  until  after  a  vic- 
tory over  Japan. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  comment  on  that,  General? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Frankly,  I  do  not  know  what  to  comment. 
I  clon't  want  to  repeat  over  and  over  again  and  take  the  Senators' 
time.  I  have  tried  to  make  it  clear  that  the  Nationalist  Government 
with  which  I  dealt  was  improving  steadily,  cooperated  with  me  to 
the  best  of  its  ability,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  I  received  no  cooperation 
from  the  Communists.  I  didn't  consider  them  a  government,  of 
course,  but  there  wasn't  much  cooperation  requested.  The  little  I 
asked  them  to  do  was  not  done,  namely,  conducting  these  military 
operations  coordinated  with  my  over-all  operations. 

I  really  do  not  know  what  thoughts  I  could  give. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  there  anything  in  that  particular  report,  in  the 
entire  report,  you  would  care  to  comment  on  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  introduce  this  in  the  record  and 
have  it  marked  as  the  next  consecutive  exhibit  ? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.  It  will  be  inserted  and  properly 
identified. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  249"  and  is 
as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  249 

January  23,  1943. 
Subject :   Kuomintang-Commuuist   Situation. 

An  outstanding  impression  gained  during  the  past  18  months  spent  in  Chung- 
king and  in  travel  through  southwest  and  northwest  China  is  that  the  most  care- 
ful study  should  be  given  to  the  internal  political  situation  in  China,  particularly 
the  growing  rift  between  the  Kuomintang  and  the  Communists. 

The  united  front  is  now  definitely  a  thing  of  the  past  and  it  is  impossible  to 
find  any  optimism  regarding  the  possibility  of  its  resurrection  as  long  as  present 
tendencies  continue  and  the  present  leadership  of  the  Kuomintang,  both  civil 
and  military,  remains  in  power.  Far  from  improving,  the  situation  is  deter- 
iorating. In  Kuomintang-controlled  China  the  countering  of  communism  is  a 
growing  preoccupation  of  propaganda,  -of  both  military  and  civilian  iwlitical 
indoctrination,  and  of  secret  police  and  gendarmerie  activity.  There  is  not  only 
a  rigorous  suppression  of  anything  coming  under  the  ever  widening  definition 
of  "communism"  but  there  appears  to  be  a  movement  away  from  even  the  out- 
ward forms  of  democracy  in  government.  It  is  now  no  longer  wondered  whether 
civil  war  can  be  avoided,  but  rather  whether  it  can  be  delayed  at  least  until  after 
a  victory  over  Japan. 

The  dangers  and  implications  of  this  disunity  are  obvious  and  far  reaching. 
Militarily,  the  present  situation  is  a  great  hindrance  to  any  effective  war  effort 
by  China.  Its  deterioration  into  civil  war  would  be  disastrous.  The  situation 
therefore  has  direct  relationship  to  our  own  efforts  to  defeat  Japan.  At  the 
present  time  a  large  and  comparatively  well-trained  and  equipped  portion  of 
the  Kuomintang  army  is  diverted  from  active  combat  against  the  Japanese  to 
blockade  the  Communists.  In  the  north  (Kansu  and  Shensi)  the  lines  are  well 
established  by  multiple  lines  of  block  houses  and  those  large  forces  remain  in 
a  condition  of  armed  readiness.  Further  south  (Hupeh,  Anhwei,  North  Kiangsu) 
the  lines  are  less  clearly  demarcated  and  sporadic  hostilities,  which  have  gone 
on  for  over  2  years  and  in  which  the  Kuomintang  forces  appear  to  take  the 
initiative,  continue. 

On  the  other  side,  the  Communist  army  is  starved  of  all  supplies  and  forced 
in  turn  to  immobilize  most  of  its  strength  to  guard  against  what  it  considers 
the  Kuomintang  threat.  It  was  admitted  by  both  parties  that  there  was  extreme 
tension  in  Kuomintang-Communist  relations  in  the  spring  of  1942.  The  Com- 
munists believe  that  it  was  only  the  Japanese  invasion  of  Yunnan  that  saved 
them  from  attack  at  that  time.  The  Communists  and  their  friends  claim,  fur- 
thermore, that  the  Kuomintang  is  devoting  its  energies  to  the  strengthening  of 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  791 

its  control  over  those  parts  of  China  accessible  to  it  rather  than  to  fighting  Japan. 
This  strengthening  of  the  position  of  (he  Knomintang  will  of  course  assist  it  in  re- 
establishing its  control  over  areas  which  will  then  be  opened  to  it.  A  logical 
part  of  such  a  policy  would  be  the  taking  over,  as  soon  as  an  opportunity  is  found, 
of  the  Communist  base  area  in  Kansu-Shensi.  Success  in  this  move  would  weaken 
the  Communists  and  make  easier  the  eventual  recapture  by  the  Kuomintang  of 
the  Communist  guerrilla  zones.  To  support  this  thesis  the  Communists  point 
to  the  campaign  in  the  more  extreme  Kuomintang  publications  for  the  immediate 
abolition  of  the  border  area.  Another  factor  sometimes  suggested  as  tending  to 
provoke  an  early  Kuomintang  attack  on  the  Communists  is  the  desirability, 
from  the  Kuomintang  point  of  view,  of  disposing  of  them  before  China  finds 
itself  an  active  ally  of  Kussia  against  Japan. 

The  possible  positive  military  value  of  the  Communist  army  to  our  war  effort 
should  not  be  ignored.  These  forces  control  the  territory  through  which  access 
may  be  had  to  Inner  Mongolia,  Manchuria,  and  Japanese  North  China  bases. 
The  strategic  importance  of  their  position  would  be  enhanced  by  the  entry  of 
Kussia  into  the  war  against  Japan.  This  importance  is  largely  potential  but 
fairly  recent  reports  of  continued  bitter  fighting  in  Shan.si  indicate  that  the 
Communists  are  still  enough  of  a  force  to  provoke  periodic  Japanese  mopping  up 
campaigns.  Reflection  of  this  is  found  in  the  intensive  Japanese  anti-Commu- 
nist propaganda  campaign  in  North  China  in  the  summer  of  1941,  although  the 
fact  must  not  be  overlooked  that  Japanese  propaganda  has  emphasized  the 
anti-Communist  angle  to  appeal  to  whatever  collaborationist  elements  there  may 
be  in  occupied  China  and  to  the  more  conservative  sections  of  the  Kuomintang. 
This  activity  in  Shausi  and  the  difiiculties  of  the  Japanese  there  contrast  with 
the  inactivity  on  most  of  the  other  Kuomintang-Japanese  fronts. 

Aside  from  the  immediate  war  aspects,  the  political  implications  of  the  situa- 
tion are  also  serious.  Assuming  that  open  hostilities  are  for  the  time  being 
averted,  the  eventual  defeat  and  \Vithdrawal  of  the  Japanese  will  leave  the 
Kuomintang  still  confronted  with  the  Communists  solidly  entrenched  in  most 
of  North  China  (East  Kansu,  North  Shensi,  Shansi,  South  Chahar,  Hopei,  Shan- 
tung, North  Kiangsu,  and  North  Anhwei).  In  addition  the  Communists  will  be 
in  position  to  move  into  the  vacuum  created  by  the  Japanese  withdrawal  from 
Suiyuan,  Jehol,  and  Manchuria,  in  all  of  which  areas  there  is  already  some 
Communist  activity.  In  the  rest  of  China  they  will  have  the  sympathy  of 
elements  among  the  liberals,  intellectuals,  and  students.  These  elements  are  of 
uncertain  size  but  of  considerable  influence  in  China,  and  the  Kuomintang's  fear 
of  their  power,  and  the  power  of  whytever  underground  organization  the  Commu- 
nists have  succeeded  in  maintaining  in  the  Kuomintang  area,  is  indicated  by  the 
size  and  activity  of  its  various  secret  police  organs. 

But  possibly  the  greatest  potential  strength  of  the  Communists,  and  one  reason 
why  military  action  against  them  will  not  be  entirely  effective  at  the  present  time, 
is  their  control  of  the  rural  areas  of  North  China  in  the  rear  of  the  Japanese. 
Here  the  Kuomintang  cannot  reach  them  and  the  Communists  have  apparently 
been  able  to  carry  out  some  degree  of  popular  mobilization.  I  am  in  possession 
of  a  secret  Koumintang  publication  describing  the  Communist  control  of  Hopei. 
It  discusses  measures  of  combating  the  Communists  (by  such  means,  for  instance, 
as  the  blockade  now  being  enforced)  and  concludes  that  if  the  Communists  fail  to 
cooperate  (i.  e.  submit  to  complete  Kuomintang  domination)  they  must  be 
exterminated.  I  hope  to  make  a  translation  of  this  pamphlet  which  would 
appear  to  have  significance  as  an  official  Kuomintang  indication  of  the  policy  it 
will  pursue  in  these  areas.  It  seems  I'easouable  to  question,  as  some  thoughtful 
Chinese  do,  whether  the  people  of  these  guerrilla  zones,  after  several  years  of 
political  education  and  what  must  be  assumed  to  be  at  least  partial  sovietization, 
will  accept  peacefully  the  imposition  of  Kuomintang  control  activated  by  such 
a  spirit  and  implemented  ljy  military  force  and  the  political  repression,  and 
secret  police  and  gendarmerie  power,  which  are  already  important  adjuncts  of 
party  control  and  which  are  being  steadily  strengthened  and  expanded. 

Non-Communist  Chinese  of  my  acquaintance  (as,  for  instance,  the  nephew  of 
the  well-known  late  editor  of  the  Ta  Kung  Fao)  consider  the  likelihood  of  civil 
war  the  greatest  problem  facing  China.  They  point  out  that  the  Communists 
are  far  stronger  now  than  they  were  when  they  stood  off  Kuomintang  armies 
for  10  years  in  central  China  and  that  they  will  be  much  stronger  yet  if  it  proves 
that  they  have  succeeded  in  winning  the  support  of  the  population  in  the  guer- 
rilla zone.  They  point  to  numerous  recent  instances  of  successful  Communist 
infiltration  into  and  indoctrination  of  opposing  Chinese  armies  (such  as  those 
of  Yen  Hsi-shan)  and  wonder  whether  this  will  not  cause  a  prolongation  of  the 


792  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

struggle  and  perhaps  make  a  victory  for  the  Kiiomintang,  or  for  either  side^ 
impossible.  There  is  undoubtedly  a  strong  revulsion  in  the  mind  of  the  average, 
nonparty  Chinese  to  the  idea  of  renewed  civil  war  and  the  Kuomintang  may 
indeed  have  difficulty  with  the  loyalty  and  eflfectiveness  of  its  conscript  troops. 

Belief  in  tlie  certainty  of  eventual  civil  war  leads  these  same  Chinese  to  ques- 
tion whether  the  United  States  has  given  sufficient  realistic  consideration  to  the 
future  in  Cliina  of  democracy.  The  question  is  raised  whether  it  is  to  China's 
advantage,  or  to  America's  own  interests,  for  the  United  States  to  give  the 
Kuomintang  Government  large  quantities  of  military  supplies  which,  judging 
from  past  experience,  are  not  likely  to  be  used  effectively  against  Japan  but  will 
be  available  for  civil  war  to  enforce  unity  in  the  country  by  military  force. 
These  Chinese  also  speculate  on  the  position  of  the  American  troops  which  may 
be  in  China  (in  support  of  the  Kuomintang  army)  if  there  should  be  a  civil 
war ;  and  wonder  what  will  be  the  attitude  of  llussia,  especially  if  it  has  become 
by  that  time  a  partner  in  the  victory  over  Japan. 

But  ignoring  these  problematical  implications,  thei'e  can  be  no  denial  that 
civil  war  in  China,  or  even  the  continuation  after  the  defeat  of  Japan  of  the 
present  deadlock,  will  greatly  impede  the  return  of  peaceful  conditions.  This 
blocking  of  the  orderly  large-scale  rehabilitation  of  China  will  in  itself  seriously 
and  adversely  affect  American  interests.  Even  if  a  conflict  is  averted,  the 
continuance  or,  as  is  probable  in  such  an  event,  the  worsening  of  the  already 
serious  economic  strains  within  the  country  may  result  in  economic  collapse. 
If  there  is  a  civil  war  the  likelihood  of  such  an  economic  collapse  is  of  course 
greater. 

There  is  also  the  possibility  that  economic  difficulties  may  make  the  war-weary, 
overconscripted  and  overtaxed  farmers  fertile  ground  for  Communist  propaganda 
and  thus  bring  about  a  revolution  going  beyond  the  moderate  democracy  which 
the  Chinese  Communists  now  claim  to  be  seeking.  Such  a  Communist  govern- 
ment would  probably  not  be  democratic  in  the  American  sense.  And  it  is 
probable,  even  if  the  United  States  did  not  incur  the  enmity  of  the  Communists 
for  alleged  material  or  diplomatic  support  of  the  Kuomintang,  that  this  Commu- 
nist government  would  be  more  inclined  toward  friendship  and  cooperation  with 
Russia  than  with  Great  Britain  and  Arnerica. 

For  these  reasons  it  would  therefore  appear  to  be  in  the  interest  of  the  United 
States  to  make  efforts  to  prevent  a  deterioration  of  the  internal  political  situation 
in  China  and,  if  possible,  to  bring  about  an  improvement. 

The  Communists  themselves  ( Chou-En-lai  and  Lin  Piao  in  a  conversation  with 
John  Carter  Vincent  and  the  undersigned  aboiit  November  20,  1942)  consider  that 
foreign  influence  (obviously  American)  witli  the  Kuomintang  is  the  only  force 
that  may  be  able  to  improve  the  situation.  They  admit  the  difficulty  of  successful 
foreign  suggestions  regarding  China's  internal  affairs  no  matter  how  tactfully 
made.  But  they  believe  that  the  reflection  of  a  better-informed  foreign  opinion, 
official  and  public,  would  have  some  effect  on  the  more  far-sighted  elements  of 
leadership  in  the  Kuomintang,  such  as  the  Generalissimo. 

The  Communists  suggest  several  approaches  to  the  problem.  One  would  be 
the  enjpliasizing  in  our  dealings  with  the  Chanese  (government,  and  in  our  prop- 
aganda to  China,  of  the  political  nature  of  the  world  conflict ;  democracy  against 
fascism.  This  would  include  constant  reiteration  of  the  American  hope  of  seeing 
the  development  of  genuine  democracy  in  China.  It  should  imply  to  the  Kuomin- 
tang our  knowledge  of  and  concern  over  the  situation  in  China. 

Another  suggestion  is  some  sort  of  recognition  of  the  Chinese  Communist  army 
as  a  participant  in  the  war  against  facisin.  The  United  States  might  intervene 
to  the  end  that  the  Kuomintang  blockade  be  discontinued  and  support  he  given 
by  the  central  government  to  the  eighteenth  group  army.  The  Communists  hope 
this  nn"ght  include  a  specification  that  the  Communist  armies  receive  a  propor- 
tionate share  of  American  supplies  sent  to  China. 

Another  way  of  making  our  interest  in  the  situation  known  to  the  Kuomintang 
would  be  to  send  American  representatives  to  visit  the  Communist  area.  I  have 
not  heard  this  proposed  by  the  Communists  themselves.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that 
they  would  welcome  such  action. 

Tills  visit  would  have  the  great  additional  advantage  of  providing  us  with 
comprehensive  and  reliable  information  regarding  the  Communist  side  of  the  sit- 
uation. For  instance  we  might  be  able  to  have  better  answers  to  some  of  the  fol- 
lowing pertinent  questions :  How  faithfully  have  the  Communists  carried  out 
their  united  front  promises?  What  is  the  form  of  their  local  government?  How 
Commnnistic  is  it?  Does  it  show  any  democratic  character  or  possibilities?  Has 
it  won  any  support  of  the  people?  How  does  it  compare  witli  conditions  of  govern- 
ment in  Kuomintang  China?     How  does  the  Communist  treatment  of  the  people  iu 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  793 

such  matters  as  taxation,  grain  requisition,  military  service  and  forced  labor 
compare  with  that  in  the  Kuomintang  territory?  What  is  tlie  military  and  econ- 
omic strength  of  the  Communists  and  what  is  their  probable  value  to  the  Allied 
cause?  IIow  have  they  dealt  with  problems  such  as  intlatiou,  price  control, 
development  of  economic  resoui'ces  for  carrying  on  the  war,  and  trading  with  the 
enemy?  Have  the  people  in  the  guerrilla  area  been  mobilized  and  aroused  to  the 
degree  necessary  to  support  real  guerrilla  warfare? 

Without  such  knowledge,  it  is  difficult  to  appraise  conlllcting  reports  and  reach 
a  considered  judgment.  Due  to  the  Kuomintang  blockade,  information  regarding 
conditions  in  the  Communist  area  is  at  present  not  available.  Such  information 
as  we  do  have  is  several  years  out  of  date,  and  has  limitations  as  to  scope  and 
probable  reliability.  Carlson  was  primarily  a  military  man  and  had  a  limited 
knowledge  of  the  Chinese  language.  Most  of  the  journalists  who  have  been  able 
to  visit  the  Communist  area  appear  to  have  a  bias  favorable  to  the  Communists. 
They  also  suffered  from  language  limitations  and  were  unable  to  remain  in 
the  area  for  an  extended  period. 

I  suggest  that  the  American  representatives  best  suited  to  visit  the  Communist 
area  are  Foreign  Service  officers  of  the  China  language  service.  One  or  two  men 
might  be  sent.  They  should  combine  moderately  long-term  residence  at  Yenan  or 
its  vicinity  with  fairly  extensive  travel  in  the  guerrilla  area.  It  is  important 
that  they  not  be  required  to  base  a  report  on  a  brief  visit  iluring  which  they  would 
be  under  the  influence  of  official  guides,  but  that  they  should  have  a  sufficient  time 
to  become  familiar  with  conditions  and  make  personal  day-to-day  observations. 

There  is  mail  and  telegraphic  communicatiim  between  Yenan  and  Chungking, 
and  similar  communication  between  various  parts  of  the  Conimuuist  area.  The 
officers  would  therefore  not  be  out  of  touch  with  the  Embassy  and  could,  if  It  is 
thought  desirable,  make  periodic  reports. 

]Mr.  Morris.  General,  may  I  call  your  attention  to  the  report  of 
April  7, 1944,  that  is  before  you? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Manclel,  will  you  read  pertinent  excerpts  from 
that? 

The  Chairman.  Before  we  go  into  that,  what  is  this  instrument, 
where  does  it  stem  from  and  what  is  the  foundation  for  it? 

Mr.  IVIandel.  The  date  is  April  7,  1944  [reading]  : 

Subject:  Excerpt  from  memorandum,  April  7,  1944,  by  John  S.  Service  forwarded 
to  Department  as  enclosure  No.  1  of  dispatch  No.  24G1,  April  21,  1944,  under  title 
"Situation  in  Sinkiang;  Its  lielatiou  to  American  Policy  vis-a-vis  China  and 
the  Soviet  Union." 

This  was  also  introduced  in  the  Loyalty  Board  proceedings  before 
the  State  Department  in  the  case  of  John  S.  Service. 

Chiang's  persisting  in.  an  active  anti-Soviet  policy,  at  a  time  when  his  policies 
(or  lack  of  them)  are  accelerating  economic  collapse  and  increasing  internal 
dissension,  can  only  be  characterized  as  reckless  adventurism.  The  cynical 
desire  to  destroy  unity  among  the  United  JS'ations  is  serious. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  paragraph  is  that? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  second  paragraph.    Further : 

Finally,  Russia  will  be  led  to  believe  (if  she  does  not  already)  that  American 
aims  run  counter  to  hers,  .and  that  she  must  therefore  protect  herself  by  any 
means  available ;  in  other  words,  the  extension  of  her  direct  power  or  influence. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  can  you  comment  on  that  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  This  statement  was  made  at  a  time  when  there 
were  a  lot  of  people  in  our  country  who  were  making  similar  state- 
ments. Today  they  are  on  the  band  wagon  of  opposing  communism. 
Quite  a  few  Americans  were  making  statements  along  that  line.  In 
fact,  when  I  came  back  after  the  war,  I  found  it  rather  dangerous,  and 
I  could  only  talk  to  a  very  few  people,  found  it  very  dangerous  to 
talk  realistically  about  the  implications  of  communism  in  this  coun- 
try and  in  the  world  in  general.    I  am  very  glad  that  Chiang  Kai-shek 


794  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

even  at  that  time  epitomized  opposition  to  communism  and  thank  God 
for  General  MacArthur  out  in  Japan  for  the  same  reason  when  others 
were  playing  footsie  with  communism,  many  others.  I  think  Chiang 
showed  a  shrewdness,  a  political  shrewdness,  in  continuing  his  op- 
position. 

As  far  as  cooperation  was  concerned,  the  Soviet  Communists  did 
not  persist  in  the  China  theater.  The  contribution  they  made  in  the 
war  against  Japan  was  negligible.  The  American  people  ought  to 
understand  that  clearly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Might  I  ask  in  relation  to  this :  Is  this  not  an 
indication  that  this  was  a  warning  at  least  to  America  that  she  had 
better  see  what  Russia  wanted  in  Asia  and  go  along  with  Russia's 
desires  rather  than  w'hat  was  well  for  America  or  the  world?  That 
is,  when  he  says  "We  should  make  every  effort  to  learn  what  the 
Russian  aims  in  Asia  are,"  and  the  previous  sentence  that  was  read 
to  you  about  Russia  having  her  way.    Is  that  right  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  It  could  be  interpreted  that  way.  I  think 
that  is  a  sound  interpretation  of  the  statement. 

JNIr.  Morris.  General,  may  I  refer  you  to  a  report  now  of  Mr.  John 
P.  Davies,  one  of  the  four  political  advisers? 

The  Chairman.  Has  this  last  one  been  inserted  in  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  No,  sir.  That  may  be  introduced  in  the  record,  having 
been  identified. 

The  Chairman.  It  may. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  250"  and 

is  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  250 

April  7,  1944. 

Subject:  Excerpt  from  memorandum,  April  7,  1944,  by  John  S.  Service,  for- 
warded to  Department  as  enclosure  No.  1  of  dispatch  No.  2461,  April 
21,  1944,  under  title  "Situation  in  Sinkiang ;  Its  Relation  to  American  Policy 
Vis-a-Vis  China  and  the  Soviet  Union." 

We  must  be  concerned  with  Russian  plans  and  policies  in  Asia  because  they 
are  bound  to  affect  our  own  plans  in  the  same  area.  But  our  relations  with  Riis- 
'  sia  in  Asia  are  at  present  only  a  subordinate  part  of  our  political  and  military  re- 
lations with  Russia  in  Europe  in  the  over-all  United  Nations  war  effort  and 
postwar  settlement.  We  should  make  every  effort  to  learn  what  the  Russian 
aims  in  Asia  are.  A  good  way  of  gaining  material  relevant  to  this  will  be  a 
careful  first-hand  study  of  the  strength,  attitudes,  and  popular  support  of 
the  Chinese  Communists.  But  in  determining  our  policy  toward  Russia  in 
Asia  we  should  avoid  being  swayed  by  China.  The  initiative  must  be  kept  firmly 
in  our  hands.     To  do  otherwise  will  be  to  let  the  tail  wag  the  dog. 

As  for  the  present  Chinese  Government,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  we 
are  faced  with  a  regrettable  failure  of  statesmanship.  Chiang's  persisting  in 
an  active  anti-Soviet  policy,  at  a  time  when  liis  policies  (or  lack  of  them)  are 
accelerating  economic  collapse  and  increasing  internal  dissension,  can  only  be 
characterized  as  reckless  adventurism.  The  cynical  desire  to  destroy  unity 
among  the  United  Nations  is  serious.  But  it  would  also  appear  that  Chiang 
unwittingly  may  be  contributing  to  Russian  dominance  in  eastern  Asia  by  in- 
ternal and  external  policies  which,  if  pursued  in  their  present  form,  will 
render  China  too  weak  to  serve  as  a  possible  counterweight  to  Russia.  By  so 
doing,  Chiang  may  be  digging  his  own  grave ;  not  only  north  China  and  Man- 
churia but  also  national  groups  such  as  Korea  and  Formosa  may  be  driven 
into  the  arms  of  the  Soviets. 

Neither  now  nor  in  the  immediately  foreseeable  future  does  the  United  States 
want  to  find  itself  in  direct  opposition  to  Russia  in  Asia ;  nor  does  it  want  to  see 
ilussia  have  undisputed  dominance  over  a  part  or  all  of  China. 

The  best  way  to  cause  both  of  these  possibilities  to  become  realities  is  to  give, 
in  either  fact  or  appearance,  support  to  the  present  reactionary  Government  of 
China  beyond  carefully  regulated  and  controlled  aid  directed  solely  toward  the 


INSTITUTE   OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS  795 

military  prosecution  of  the  war  against  Japan.  To  give  diplomatic  or  other 
support  beyond  this  limit  will  encourage  the  Kuomintang  in  its  present  suicidal 
anti-Russian  policy.  It  will  convince  the  Chinese  Communists — who  probably 
hold  the  key  to  control,  not  only  of  north  China  but  of  Inner  Mongolia  and 
Manchuria  as  well — that  we  are  on  the  other  side  and  that  their  only  hope 
for  survival  lies  with  Russia.  Finally,  Russia  will  be  led  to  believe  (if  she  does 
not  already)  that  American  aims  run  counter  to  hers,  and  that  she  must  there- 
fore protect  herself  by  any  means  available:  in  other  words,  the  extension  of 
her  direct  power  or  influence. 

It  is  important,  therefore,  that  the  United  States  have  the  following  aims  in 
its  dealings  with  China : 

1.  Avoid  becoming  involved  in  any  way  in  Sino-Soviet  relations ;  avoid  all 
appearance  of  unqualified  diplomatic  support  of  China,  especially  vis-a-vis 
Russia ;  and  limit  American  aid  to  China  to  direct  prosecution  of  the  war 
against  Japan. 

This  may  involve  soft-pedaling  of  grandiose  promises  of  postwar  aid  and  eco- 
nomic rehabilitation,  unless  they  are  predicated  on  satisfactory  reforms  within 
China. 

2.  Show  a  sympathetic  interest  in  the  Communists  and  liberal  groups  in 
China.    Try  to  fit  the  Communists  into  the  war  against  Japan. 

In  so  doing,  we  may  promote  Chinese  unity  and  galvanize  the  lagging  Chinese 
war  effort.  The  liberals,  generally  speaking,  already  consider  that  their  hope 
lies  in  America.  The  Communists,  from  what  little  we  know  of  them,  also 
are  friendly  toward  Ajnerica,  believe  that  democracy  must  be  the  next  step  in 
China,  and  take  the  view  that  economic  collaboration  with  the  United  States 
is  the  only  hope  for  speedy  postwar  rehabilitation  and  development.  It  is  vital 
that  we  do  not  lose  this  good  will  and  influence. 

3.  Use  our  tremendous  and  as  yet  unexploited  influence  with  the  Kuomintang 
promote  internal  Chinese  unity  on  the  only  possible  and  lasting  foundation  of  pro- 
gressive reform. 

There  is  no  reason  for  us  to  fear  using  our  influence.  The  Kuomintang  knows 
that  it  is  dependent  on  us ;  it  cannot  turn  toward  a  Japan  approaching  annihila- 
tion ;  it  is  inconceivable  that  it  will  turn  toward  communistic  Russia ;  and  Great 
Britain  is  not  in  a  position  to  be  of  help.  American  interest  in  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists will  be  a  potent  force  in  persuading  Kuomintang  China  to  set  its  house 
in  order. 

The  Communists  would  undoubtedly  play  an  important  part  in  a  genuinely 
unified  China — one  not  unified  by  the  Kuomintang's  present  policy  in  practice  of 
military  force  and  threat.  But  it  is  most  probable  that  such  a  democratic  and 
unified  China  would  naturally  gravitate  toward  the  United  States,  and  that  the 
United  States,  by  virtue  of  sympathy,  position,  and  economic  resources,  would 
enjoy  a  greater  influence  in  China  than  any  other  foreign  power. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  have  the  Davies  report  ?  That  is  dated  June 
24,  1943. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  I  refer  to  the  second  extract  made  on  that  page, 
General,  November  7,  1944 — Davies  [reading]  : 

The  Chinese  Communists  are  so  strong  between  the  Great  Wall  and  the  Yangtze 
that  they  can  now  look  forward  to  the  postwar  control  of  at  least  north  China. 
They  may  also  continue  to  hold  not  only  those  parts  of  the  Yangtze  Valley  which 
they  now  dominate  but  also  new  areas  in  central  and  south  China.  The  Com- 
munists have  fallen  heir  to  these  new  areas  by  a  process  which  has  been  oper- 
ating for  7  years,  whereby  Chiang  Kai-shek  loses  his  cities  and  principal  lines  of 
communication  to  the  Japanese  and  the  countryside  to  the  Communists. 

The  Communists  have  survived  10  years  of  civil  war  and  7  years  of  Japanese 
offensives.  They  have  survived  not  only  more  sustained  enemy  pressure  than 
the  Chinese  Central  Government  forces  have  been  subjected  to,  but  also  a  severe 
blockade  imposed  by  Chiang. 

They  have  survived  and  they  have  grown.  Communist  growth  since  1937  has 
been  almost  geometric  in  progression.  From  control  of  some  100,000  square 
kilometers  with  a  population  of  one  million  and  a  half  they  have  expanded  to 
about  850,000  square  kilometers  with  a  population  of  approximately  90  million. 
And  they  will  continue  to  grow. 


(22848 — 52— pt.  3- 


796  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  reason  for  this  phenomenal  vitality  and  strength  is  simple  and  funda- 
mental. It  is  mass  support,  mass  participation.  The  Communist  governments 
and  armies  are  the  first  governments  and  armies  in  modern  Chinese  history  to 
have  positive  and  widespread  popular  support.  They  have  this  support  because 
the  governments  and  armies  are  genuinely  of  the  people. 

I  wonder  if  you  would  comment  on  that  extract,  General  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  As  of  that  date,  of  that  period,  I  think  the 
writer  is  incorrect  in  the  military  capabilities  of  the  Communists,  and 
the  statement  there,  the  correctness  of  which  I  question  namely,  they 
had  withstood  the  heavy  attacks  of  the  Japanese  is  not  correct  for  the 
period  I  commanded  the  theater.  I  do  not  believe  it  was  correct  prior 
to  my  assuming  command,  because  I  read  the  history  of  the  operations 
that  had  taken  place  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  1937.  At  no  time 
were  large  numbers  of  Communist  forces  involved  with  Japanese 
forces,  and  at  no  time  did  the  Chinese  Communist  military  forces 
make  a  real  contribution  to  the  over-all  China  war  effort.  Most  of 
their  operations  were  guerrilla  in  nature.  They  were  designed  to 
capture  blockhouses  established  by  the  Japanese  and  to  capture  small 
quantities  of  arms  and  equipment. 

He  goes  on  to  say  the  reason  for  the  success  that  he  alludes  to  of  the 
Chinese  Communists  is  simple  and  fundamental.  He  says  it  is  mass 
support,  mass  participation.  I  would  change  that  and  then  go  along 
with  the  statement  [reading]  : 

It  is  Soviet  support  and  police  participation,  secret-police  participation  and 
propaganda  participation. 

Those  are  the  things  that  took  over  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  say  he  was  wrong  when  he  said  that 
*'they  have  this  support  because  the  govermnents  and  armies  are  gen- 
uinely of  the  people  ?"  Were  the  Chinese  people  Communists  at  heart, 
or  were  they  dominated  by  the  Soviet  Union  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  my  judgment — and  this  man  is  an  expert 
and  I  am  not  on  China;  he  has  lived  most  of  his  life  there  and  he 
speaks  the  language — but  in  my  humble  judgment  the  Chinese  people 
per  se  are  not  communistically  inijlined.  They  are  individualistic. 
The  family  is  the  integral  unit.  We  often  accuse  them  of  nepotism 
because  they  have  these  strong  family  ties.  If  one  enjoys  economic 
success,  he  is  duty-bound  to  take  care  of  the  other  members  of  his 
family. 

I  would  go  back  to  this.  Senator :  The  Chinese  people  don't  under- 
stand political  philosophies.  I  mean  the  bulk  of  them  do  not.  There 
is  just  a  thin  veneer  of  educated  people  in  China  who  understand 
what  we  are  talking  about.  When  anyone  talks  about  any  leader, 
any  war  lord,  any  political  party  having  the  support  of  the  Chinese 
people,  you  can  see  how  nebulous  that  is. 

Mr.  Morris.  Generel,  I  draw  your  attention  to  the  same  document 
on  the  second  page. 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  that  extract,  please? 
Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

The  generalissimo  realizes  that,  if  he  accedes  to  the  Communist  terms  for  a 
coalition  government,  they  will  sooner  or  later  disposses  him  and  his  kuo- 
mintang  of  power.  He  will  therefore  not,  unless  driven  to  an  extremity,  form  a 
genuine  coalition  government.  He  will  seek  to  retain  his  present  government, 
passively  wait  out  the  war  and  conserve  his  strength,  knowing  that  the  Com- 
munist issue  must  eventually  be  joined. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  797 

It  further  says : 

The  Communists,  on  their  part,  have  no  interest  in  reaching  an  agreement 
with  the  generalissimo  short  of  a  genuine  coalition  government.  They  recognize 
that  Chiang's  positon  is  crumbling ;  that  they  may  before  long  receive  substantial 
Russian  support,  and  that  if  they  have  patience  they  will  succeed  to  authority 
in  at  least  north  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  do  you  believe,  if  the  generalissimo  had  ac- 
ceded to  the  Communist  terms  for  a  coalition  government,  that  they 
would  sooner  or  later  dispossess  him  and  his  Kuomintang  of  power? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir ;  I  do.  The  Communists  at  that  time 
had  very  little  power.  The  generalissimo  had  most  of  the  power. 
The  Communists  were  determined  to  have  all  the  power,  and  the  gen- 
eralissimo was  just  as  determined  to  retain  all  the  power.  It  just 
makes  sense  to  me.  That  is  the  way  the  situation  maintained  out  there. 
Any  other  solution  I  do  not  accept.    I  do  not  think  it  is  sound. 

Mr.  Morris.  With  respect  to  the  second  paragraph  there,  you  agree 
with  Mr,  Davies  when  he  said  that  the  Communists  had  no  intention 
of  reaching  an  agreement  with  the  generalissimo  short  of  a  genuine 
coalition  government? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  think  the  Communists  had  the  idea  of  a 
coalition  government  just  a  step  toward  acquisition  of  all  power. 
They  would  violate  any  agreement  they  made  just  as  they  have  in 
other  areas  of  the  world.  When  the  time  came  they  would  seize  all 
the  power  and  there  would  be  no  represenation  on  the  part  of  the 
Kuomintang.    The  Kuomintang  would  be  liquidated. 

Senator  Ferguson.  General,  if  this  advice  of  Mr.  Davies  of  De- 
cember 9,  1944,  was  taken,  how  could  we  hope  to  sustain  a  democratic 
government  in  China  by  the  use  of  philosophy  of  General  Marshall's 
mission  to  form  a  coalition  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  We  couldn't,  sir.  I  never  did  believe  that  a 
coalition  with  the  Communists  was  possible.  You  can  coalesce  po- 
litical parties  at  times  over  the  years.  The  Republicans  and  Demo- 
crats have  gotten  together  in  a  bipartisan  approach  to  international 
problems.  Personally  I  do  not  agree  with  that.  It  is  the  American 
way  to  make  a  man  defend  what  he  proposes  to  do.  I  think  we  should 
always  question  the  other  man's  judgment;  do  it  in  a  respectful  but 
intelligent  way,  and  continuously.  I  think  that  is  the  whole  philoso- 
phy behind  democracy. 

Now,  you  will  get  no  such  philosophy  or  get  no  such  modus  oper- 
andi in  operations  with  the  Communists.  All  you  have  to  do  is  read 
the  Communist  Manifesto  and  Karl  Marx's  Das  Kapital  and  you  will 
have  it  laid  out  for  you  just  as  Hitler  so  obligingly  told  us  what  he 
was  going  to  do  and  we  ignored  his  warnings. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  could  you  get  a  clearer  statement  than  an 
indication  of  Davies  as  to  what  the  Communists  were.  They  were 
dominated  by  Russia  and  "if  they  have  patience  they  will  succeed  to 
authority  in  at  least  north  China."  He  limited  it  to  the  north  of 
China,  but  he  indicated  that  they  would  get  the  support  to  take  over 
China.     Is  that  not  true  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  true. 

Senator  Ferguson.  If  you  were  to  back  the  Communists,  it  was  to 
back  the  idea  that  Russia  would  be  the  dominant  power  of  China. 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  true. 


798  INSTITUTE   OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 

I  have  told  you  earlier,  sir,  I  neglected  to  give  the  attention  that 
I  should  have  when  I  was  commanding  that  theater — give  attention 
to  these  reports.  As  an  alibi,  I  was  involved  in  military  operations 
and  busy  as  the  dickens.  Later,  in  analyzing  these  reports  and  going 
back  over  many  things  that  had  happened  in  tliis,  the  psychological 
or  diplomatic  field,  I  realized  I  had  been  remiss  in  my  duties  as  a 
theater  commander  in  not  analyzing  them  more  carefully.  I  did  not 
take  the  advice.  I  adhered  to  the  path  of  trying  to  contain  the  J  apa- 
nese  and  supporting  the  Nationalist  Government  in  my  personal  rela- 
tions with  the  Chinese  military  and  civilians. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  follow  this  advice,  in  other  words  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No.  I  was  fortunate  in  having  a  very  loyal 
American  out  there  as  a  diplomatic  representative,  Patrick  J.  Hurley. 
I  admired  him  a  great  deal  and  felt  he  represented  American  policies 
realistically,  courageously  and  continuously.  He  was  the  American 
Ambassador. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  may  I  draw  your  attention  to  the  next  extract 
we  have  on  this  page  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Under  date  of  November  15,  1944,  Mr.  Mandel,  and 
will  you  read  that  for  us,  please  ? 

Mr.  Mandel  (reading)  : 

We  should  not  now  abandon  Chiang  Kai-shek.  To  do  so  at  this  juncture 
would  be  to  lose  more  than  we  could  gain.  We  must  for  the  time  being  con- 
tinue recognition  of  Chiang's  Government. 

But  we  must  be  realistic.  We  must  not  indefinitely  underwrite  a  politically 
bankrupt  regime.  And,  if  the  Russians  are  going  to  enter  the  Pacific  war,  we 
must  make  a  determined  effort  to  capture  politically  the  Chinese  Communists 
rather  than  allow  them  to  go  by  default  wholly  to  the  Russians.  Furthermore, 
we  must  fully  understand  that  by  reason  of  our  recognition  of  the  Chiang  Kai- 
shek  Government  as  now  constituted  we  are  committed  to  a  steadily  decaying 
regime  and  severely  restricted  in  working  out  military  and  political  coopera- 
tion with  the  Chinese  Communists. 

A  coalition  Chinese  Government  in  which  the  Communists  find  a  satisfactory 
place  is  the  solution  of  this  impasse  most  desirable  to  us.  It  provides  our  great- 
assurance  of  a  strong,  united,  democratic,  independent  and  friendly  China — our 
basic  strategic  aim  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  If  Chiang  and  the  Communists  reach 
a  mutually  satisfactory  agreement,  there  will  have  been  achieved  from  our 
point  of  view  the  most  desirable  possible  solution.  If  Chiang  and  the  Com- 
munists are  irreconcilable,  then  we  shall  have  to  decide  which  faction  we  are 
going  to  support. 

In  seeking  to  determine  which  faction  we  should  support  we  must  keep  in 
mind  these  basic  considerations :  Power  in  China  is  on  the  verge  of  shifting  from 
Chiang  to  the  Communists. 

If  the  Russians  enter  North  China  and  Manchuria,  we  obviously  cannot  hope 
to  win  the  Communists  entirely  over  to  us,  but  we  can  through  control  of 
supplies  and  postwar  aid  expect  to  exert  considerable  influence  in  the  direction 
of  Chinese  nationalism  and  independence  from  Soviet  control. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  comment  on  that  excerpt,  General  Wede- 
meyer ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  I  think  prior  comments  on  other  ex- 
cerpts cover  that,  sir,  namely,  that  a  coalition  government  meant  a 
Communist  government,  insofar  as  I  am  concerned.  It  would  not  be 
such  a  thing  as  a  coalition  government,  the  Communists  would  have  all 
control. 
^  Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  think  that  the  Chinese  Communist  organiza- 
tion was  a  complete  auxiliary  and  part  of  the  international  Com- 
munist organization  ? 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  799 

General  Wedemeyer.  Definitely.  I  felt  they  were  operating  under 
the  aegis  of  the  Kremlin,  and  most  of  the  leaders  had  been  trained  in 
the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  over  the  years,  over  a  period  of  20  years.  And  it  is 
that  hard  core  of  fanatic  loyal  leadership  that  the  Communists  have 
generated  in  the  various  areas  of  the  world  that  has  enabled  these 
well-organized  minorities  to  take  over  unsuspecting  intimidated 
masses.  And  particularly,  where  the  masses  are  illiterate,  unem- 
ployed, improvident,  as  they  are  in  China  and  in  India ;  those  areas 
are  particularly  vulnerable  to  the  Marxian  philosophies  and  methods. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  is  there  not  implicit  in  this  statement,  General 
Wedemeyer,  an  assertion  that  the  Chinese  Communists  were  inde- 
pendent of  Moscow  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  not  obvious.  General? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  In  which  you  do  not  believe? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Definitely,  Senator.  I  think  that  all  of  these 
satellites  are  oriented  toward  the  Kremlin.  Now,  the  Soviet  leaders 
wisely  adjust  and  change  the  application  of  their  political  and  eco- 
nomic ideas  to  conform  more  or  less  to  the  customs,  the  organization, 
and  to  the  traditions  of  the  particular  area  where  they  are  applying 
these  ideas.  They  make  adjustments.  But  the  basic  idea  is  the  de- 
struction of  free  enterprise,  the  enslavement  of  mind  and  body  and 
destruction  of  any  spiritual  force  in  this  world.  Those  are  the  basic 
objectives  of  communism,  and  they  are  making  progress  toward  ac- 
complishing those  objectives. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  I  call  your  attention  to  the  first  full  paragraph  on 
page  3  in  that  statement.     It  begins  [reading] : 

In  seeking  to  determine  which  faction  we  should  support  we  must  keep  in 
mind  these  basic  considerations  :  Power  in  China  is  on  the  verge  of  shifting  from 
Chiang  to  tlie  Communists. 

Do  you  not  interpret  that,  General  Wedemeyer,  as  a  recommenda- 
tion that  we  should  support  the  Chinese  Communist  faction  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  one  interpretation,  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  interpretation.  General  Wedemeyer? 

General  Wedemeyer.  My  interpretation  is  that  this  chap  felt  that 
the  Communists  in  China  were  getting  increasing  power.  I  do  not 
go  quite  so  far  as  to  suggest  just  from  that  statement  that  this  Foreign 
Service  officer  wants  us  to  feel  that  we  should  support  the  Communists. 
I  think  there  is  always  danger  in  reading  into  a  statement 

Mr.  Morris.  We  do  not  intend  to  do  that. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  know  you  don't,  and  I  cannot  do  it. 

The  Chairman.  You  would  say  the  language  was  an  inducement 
toward  that  conclusion,  though ;  would  you  not  5 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes;  it  inclines  in  that  direction.  In  fair- 
ness to  the  writer,  however,  I  think  he  is  the  best  witness  on  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  could  be  taken  as  a  recommendation  that  if 
you  wanted  to  be  on  the  power  side  you  take  his  views ;  is  that  correct  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  introduce  all  of  these 
excerpts  into  the  record,  but  Mr.  Mandel  has  not  yet  told  us  from  what 
sources  he  has  put  these  together,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  This  document  that  we  have  in  hand  here  on  which 
General  Wedemeyer  has  been  testifying  has  not  been  offered  for  the 
record  ? 


800  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  tell  us  what  these 
are  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  These  are  taken  from  a  publication  called  United 
States  Relations  With  China,  a  Department  of  State  publication,  Far 
Eastern  Series,  released  August  1949. 

The  Chairman.  Released  by  whom  and  by  what  authority? 

Mr.  Mandel.  By  the  State  Department.  That  is  popularly  known 
as  the  white  paper. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  paper  I  have  in  my  mind. 

Mr.  Morris.  Those  are  extracts  from  that  publication.  Senator. 
Before  introducing  that  into  the  record,  I  think  Mr.  Sourwine  would 
like  to  ask  a  few  questions  of  General  Wedemeyer  on  that. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  General,  referring  to  the  excerpt  headed  November 
15,  1944,  which  has  been  previously  discussed,  the  second  paragraph 
starts  out  with  the  sentence,  "But  we  must  be  realistic."  Would  it  be 
fair,  therefore,  to  judge  the  rest  of  this  excerpt  on  the  basis  of  whether 
it  is  realistic  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  thinl?  it  would,  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Now,  the  third  sentence  is  the  one  referred  to  by 
Mr.  Morris  obliquely  when  he  asked  you  if  you  shared  the  apparent 
feeling  of  this  writer  that  the  Chinese  Communists  were  free  agents, 
were  independent,  and  that  is  the  sentence  which  reads : 

And  if  the  Russians  are  going  to  enter  tlie  Pacific  war,  we  must  make  a  deter- 
mined elfort  to  capture  politically  the  Chinese  Communists  rather  than  allow 
them  to  go  by  default  wholly  to  the  Russians. 

That  necessarily  implies,  does  it  not,  that  the  Chinese  Communists, 
at  the  time  of  this  writing,  were  not  tied  up  with  the  Russians? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes ;  that  is  implicit  in  that  statement,  but  I 
do  not  agree  with  it. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  It  is  also  implicit  in  that  statement,  is  it  not,  that 
we  could  "capture"  politically  the  Chinese  Communists? 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  agree  with  that  statement  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  don't  agree  with  it,  but  that  is  implicit  in 
the  statement  as  you  read  it  to  me,  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  In  your  opinion,  is  either  of  those  implications 
realistic  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Definitely  not.  In  my  judgment,  in  my 
humble  judgment,  definitely  not. 

I  want  to  say  one  thing  there  to  you,  sir :  In  my  relations  with  the 
Communists  they  were  not  emotional,  they  were  not  unobjective.  They 
had  illness  up  in  that  area  and  it  was  remote,  and  at  great  cost  to  my 
limited  war  effort  I  sent  15  tons  of  medical  supplies  to  help  Mao  Tse- 
tung  and  Chou  En-lai,  with  the  permission  of  the  Generalissimo. 
I  want  you  to  understand  that  my  attitude  toward  them  was  just  as 
humanitarian  as  the  record  of  our  great  country  over  many  years. 

Now,  therefore,  when  I  make  statements  they  are  not  emotional 
replies,  sir,  they  are  just  in  the  interest  of  the  country;  not  in  my 
own  personal  interest  or  not  in  the  interest  of  the  Communists  or  the 
Kuomintang. 

I  want  to  make  a  statement  to  you,  because  I  have  emphasized  that 
I  do  not  agree  with  the  implications  there.  I  accept  the  statements, 
that  the  statements  are  implicit  in  the  way  you  interpret  them,  I  accept 
that,  but  I  do  not  agree  with  them. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  801 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  General,  I  am  attempting  here  to  be  quite  coldly- 
logical  about  this  passage  and  not  emotional  at  all,  and  I  appreciate 
your  answer. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  am  not  saying  you  were  suggesting  emotion. 
I  do  not  want  emotionalism  to  enter  into  it. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  The  next  sentence  reads : 

Furthermore,  we  must  fully  understand  that  by  reason  of  our  recognition  of  the 
Chiang  Kai-shek  government  as  now  constituted  we  are  committed  to  a  steadily 
decaying  regime  and  severely  restricted  in  working  out  military  and  political 
cooperation  with  the  Chinese  Communists. 

That  phrase  "are  committed  to  a  steadily  decaying  regime"  can  only 
be  interpreted  as  a  charge  that  the  Chiang  Kai-shek  government  was 
steadily  decaying,  is  that  not  correct? 

General  Wedemeyer.  You  mean  that  the  government  was  decaying? 
Is  that  what  you  are  asking  me,  if  it  is  correct  ? 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  That  is  implicit  in  this  language  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  It  is  implicit  in  that  language,  but  again 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  It  was  not  true,  was  it  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  would  require  quite  a  lot  of  develop- 
ment. I  do  not  know  whether  the  Senators  want  me  to  develop  that, 
Mr.  Sourwine,  or  not,  but  I  would  be  happy  to  do  it.  In  other  words, 
I  am  not  going  to  answer  yes  or  no  and  establish  a  very  important  point 
that  will  militate  against  my  entire  testimony  here. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  think  that  would  take  an  explanation  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  It  would  take  an  explanation,  Senator  Fergu- 
son, in  my  judgment,  of  about  10  minutes,  indicating  the  development 
that  brought  about  the  steadily  deteriorating  situation  in  China,  eco- 
.nomic,  psychological,  and  military. 

The  Chairman.  Would  the  committee  care  to  hear  it? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  because  of  the  question  it  would  be  of 
interest  on  this  record. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed,  then.  General. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Do  you  want  to  hear  it,  Mr.  Sourwine  ? 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Yes. 

General  Wedemeyer.  You  all  are  familiar  with  the  fact  that  Chiang 
Kai-shek  took  over  the  Chinese  Nationalist  Government  upon  the  death 
of  Dr.  Sun  Yat  Sen.  At  that  time  there  were  Soviet  Russian  advisers 
in  the  area  and  they  had  agreed  that  there  would  be  no  political  prop- 
agandizing, but  they  would  assist  the  new  Chinese  Republic  in  evolv- 
ing a  stable  economy  and  building  up  their  military  forces. 

In  typical  Communist  fashion  they  violated  their  agreement  with 
reference  to  the  dissemination  of  Communist  political  propaganda 
and  just  brought  about  the  conflict  that  ended  up  with  the  Communists 
being  pushed  back  clear  up  in  Yunan,  in  a  remote  western  province 
of  China. 

The  period  1927  to  1937  was  often  alluded  to  by  Americans,  British- 
ers, and  other  foreigners  in  the  area  who  had  lived  there  many  years 
as  the  golden  decade.  From  1927  to  1937,  during  that  period,  com- 
munications were  being  improved,  the  economy  was  being  better 
stabilized,  and  schools  were  being  built  to  extend  advantages  of  edu- 
cation, and  many  improvements,  in  other  words,  were  being  instituted. 

Now,  you  all  know  that  there  are  many  dialects  in  China,  but  basic- 
ally there  are  three  areas  and  people  living  in  those  three  areas, 


802  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

respectively,  cannot  understand  each  other.    They  all  read  and  write 
the  same  hieroglyphics,  the  same  characters. 

Chiang  Kai-shek  also  was  striving  to  bring  about  an  alphabet  that 
■would  be  universally  understood  to  simplify  the  education  that  he 
envisaged  for  his  people. 

Now,  the  military  jingoists  of  Japan,  recognizing  the  develop- 
ments which  would  bring  about  a  nationalization,  a  political  conscious- 
ness in  China,  a  unity,  were  concerned,  and  they  had  ideas  of  a  co- 
prosperity  sphere  in  Asia  under  their  domination.  So  many  observers 
with  whom  I  talked  in  the  Far  East  who  had  lived  there  many  years, 
they  refer  to  this  golden  decade — mind  you  now,  under  Chiang  Kai- 
shek's  regime  and  approximately  the  same  leaders  whom  we  have 
today,  and  we  read  in  the  press  considerable  criticism  about  them, 
they  had  that  period  where  they  were  improving  conditions  in  China 
and  many  people  feel  that  the  thing  that  precipitated  the  war  in 
1937  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  was  the  fact  that  a  strongly  unified 
China  would  make  it  more  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  Japan  to 
take  over  in  that  area.    So  that  precipitated  the  attack  in  1937. 

Now,  for  8  years  China  fought  the  Japanese.  The  Japanese  were 
a  modern  military  nation.  In  the  first  year  or  so  of  the  war  we 
suffered  many  humiliating  reverses  at  the  hands  of  the  Japanese  in 
the  battles  that  we  fought  with  them  on  the  sea  and  in  the  air  and 
on  the  ground,  as  did  the  British.  Gradually  we  evolved  forces  that 
enabled  us  to  defeat  the  Japanese  militarily. 

But  the  Chinese  did  not  have  competent  or  well-organized  military 
forces,  and  they  did  not  fight  well — they  fought  well  with  what  they 
had — ^but  by  our  standards  it  was  not  a  great  contribution.  And  I 
have  never  in  any  testimony  stated  that  the  contribution  made  by  the- 
Chinese  in  the  war  was  overwhelming,  but  it  was  important  to  us  in 
that  it  did  contain  large  numbers  of  Japanese  that  might  have  been 
employed  at  crucial  places  and  critical  times  aginst  our  forces  as  they 
advanced  up  north  against  the  Japanese  Archipelgo. 

But  during  the  war,  and  immediately  subsequent  to  VJ-day,  prop- 
aganda increased  in  that  area,  propaganda  that  denounced  you  and 
me,  the  Americans,  and  distorted  our  objectives  in  that  area,  called  us 
imperialists,  Yankee  imperialists,  and  indicated  our  determination 
to  take  over  the  Far  East,  to  dominate  the  Far  East.  These  programs 
emanated  from  Yunnan,  the  Chinese  Communist  headquarters,  and 
frequently  were  reaffirmed  in  articles  appearing  in  Pravda  and  other 
Communist-inspired  newspapers  and  radio  releases. 

It  was  perfectly  obvious  to  those  Americans  who  were  out  there  with 
me  in  1945  at  the  close  of  the  war  that  this  propaganda  campaign  was 
being  intensified  against  us  to  cause  the  Chinese  people  to  suspect  our 
motives  and  to  turn  against  us. 

Now,  in  considering  any  problem  in  China,  I  think  all  of  that 
period,  the  development  in  that  period,  must  be  thought  about  objec- 
tively. And  I  also  think  about  those  things  in  relation  to  the  state- 
ments that  I  read  here  by  experts  on  the  area.  This  is  just  a  soldier's 
view,  a  practical  view  that  I  personally  experienced  and  concluded. 
These  are  conclusions  that  I  drew  as  a  result  of  serving  out  there  just 
a  few  years. 

That  is  the  background  I  wanted  to  give  you. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Thank  you.  General.  I  have  just  two  or  three  more 
questions  about  this  particular  section  of  the  report,  this  November 
15, 1944,  item. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  803 

General  Wedmeyer.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  In  the  same  sentence  which  elicited  the  answer  you 
have  just  given  us  is  a  phrase,  and  I  had  better  read  the  whole  sen- 
tence and  underline  the  phrase  vocally  [reading]  : 

Furthermore,  we  must  fully  understand  that  by  reason  of  our  recognition  of 
the  Chiang  Kai-shek  government  as  now  constituted  we  are  committed  to  a 
steadily  decaying  regime — 

and  here  is  the  phase  I  want  to  underline — 

and  severely  restricted  in  working  out  military  and  political  cooperation  with 
the  Chinese  Communists. 

Does  that  not  carry  with  it,  implicit  in  it,  the  thought  that  the  work- 
ing out  of  military  and  political  cooperation  with  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists was  one  of  our  objectives  that  it  was  important  to  us? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  it  does. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Was  that  true  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Have  you  been  here  all  morning? 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Yes,  sir,  and  I  heard  your  previous  testimony,  but  I 
am  attempting  to  get  the  answer  to  this. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  will  be  glad  again  to  say  it.  The  contribu- 
tion made  by  the  Communists  was  very  limited  militarily,  and  eco- 
nomic assistance  would  be  nil. 

Now,  if  the  theater  commander  had  been  directed  to  assist  the  Chi- 
nese Communists  hj  giving  them  equipment  and  advisers  it  would 
have  been  a  very  difficult  logistical  job  for  me  to  get  it  way  up  there  by 
air.  I  had  no  other  way  of  getting  it  up  there.  Just  sending  15  tons 
of  medical  supplies,  I  indicated  to  you,  impinged  upon  my  little  war 
effort  in  the  southeastern  part  of  China. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  But  that  difficulty  was  not  caused  by  the  fact  that 
we  were  supporting  the  Chiang  Kai-shek  government,  was  it  ?  That 
logistic  difficulty  you  speak  of  was  a  logistic  problem. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  it  was,  because  I  could  not  put  my  planes 
in  operation  in  logistical  support  in  southeast  China  and  concurrently 
up  to  the  north.  So,  in  a  way,  it  did  militate  against  supporting  the 
Communists.  If  I  had  been  directed  to  support  the  Communists  in 
lieu  of  the  Nationalists,  I  would  have  carried  out  my  orders,  and  I 
would  have  gotten  supplies  up  there,  but  at  much  greater  difficulty, 
because  of  the  distance. 

Now,  may  I  explain  to  you,  it  may  not  be  apparent  to  you  right 
away,  but  intratheater  distribution,  within  the  theater,  was  a  real 
problem,  because  I  had  to  bring  the  fuel  to  operate  the  planes  over 
the  hump.  But  when  we  captured  Bhamo  and  Mytchinya  I  had  a 
staging  area  so  my  planes  could  hop  over  the  short  hop  and  unload 
and  go  back  without  refueling  in  my  theater,  so  I  kept  the  gasoline 
they  brought.  Once  I  started  to  distribute  in  China  it  was  a  real 
problem  because  I  was  burning  up  gasoline  at  long  distances. 

Mr.  SoTJRwiNE.  What  I  was  attempting  to  get  at  is  whether  there 
was  some  outstanding  advantage  to  us  to  be  gained  through  military 
and  political  cooperation  with  the  Chinese  Communists,  which  we 
were  losing  at  that  time.   In  your  opinion  was  there  such  an  advantage  f 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  I  don't  think  there  was  an  outstanding 
advantage  to  be  gained. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  That  is  the  point. 

General  Wedemeyer.  No. 


804  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  There  was  another  item  in  which  your  own  opinion 
is  at  variance  with  the  opinion  implicit  in  this  statement  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  The  final  comment  I  want  to  ask  you  for,  sir,  is  on 
this,  and  this  says  [reading]  : 

A  coalition  Chinese  Government  in  which  the  Communists  find  a  satisfactory" 
place  is  the  solution  of  this  impass6  most  desirable  to  us.  It  provides  our  g^reatest 
assurance  of  a  strong  united,  democratic,  independent,  and  friendly  China. 

And  in  view  of  the  statements  already  made  by  Mr.  Davies,  in  one 
of  these  reports  and  in  other  testimony  here  with  regard  to  what  would 
have  happened  in  the  event  there  had  been  a  coalition  government,  I 
would  like  to  ask  you,  sir,  Would  a  coalition  Chinese  Government  in 
which  the  Communists  found  a  satisfactory  place  have  provided  us 
with  assurance  of  either  a  democratic  or  an  independent  or  a  friendly 
China? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No.  For  many  reasons,  in  my  judgment,  it 
would  not  have  provided  a  cooperative,  friendly  China.  I  indicated 
earlier,  sir,  that  in  my  judgment  the  Chinese  Communists  were  deter- 
mined to  take  over  all  the  power. 

Mr.  SouRWTNE.  Yes,  sir. 

General  Wedeiheyer.  And  that  they  were  working  under  the  aegis 
of  the  Kremlin  power  whose  avowed  purpose  is  to  destroy  your 
country  and  mine.  And  it  is  just  inconsistent ;  we  are  being  naive  if 
we  consider  for  a  moment  that  we  could  generate  a  friendly  spirit 
among  the  Chinese  as  long  as  the  Communists  are  influencing  them 
with  their  sinister  propaganda.  We  just  cannot  do  it.  And  they  are 
most  vulnerable  to  that  propaganda  because  they  are  illiterate  and 
they  are  capable  of  intimidations  that  the  Communists  so  skillfully 
handle. 

Mr.  SouRWTNE.  Does  it  not  then  become  apparent.  General,  that  not 
only  is  that  passage  not  realistic,  but  that  in  the  space  of  a  dozen 
lines  it  has  advanced  a  half  dozen  propositions,  all  of  which  are  un- 
sound and  untenable  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  For  example,  one  other  point  that 
you  could  develop  is  the  Chinese  are  not  ready  for  a  democratio 
government.  Democracy,  as  I  understand  it,  is  predicated  upon  an 
informed  electorate.  So  that  as  long  as  you  have  80  percent  of  the 
population  illiterate  it  is  impractical  to  have  a  true  democracy  there 
There  are  a  lot  of  things  that  are  just  inconsistent,  in  my  judgment. 
^  Mr.  SouRwiNE.  That  is  as  far  as  I  wanted  to  develop  that  point, 
sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  document  therefore  may  be  introduced  into  the 
record,  Mr.  Chairman? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  251"  and  is  as 
follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  251 

[From  the  Department  of  State  publication,  Far  Eastern  Series,  released  August  1949] 

United  States  Relations  With  China 

memoranda  by  foreign  service  officers  in  china,  1943-45 

June  24,  19J^S  {Davies) 

Chinese  Communist  policy  appears  to  have  followed  the  Comintern  line.  In 
its  initial  expression  the  i)olicy  adhered  to  the  program  of  world  revolution. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  805 

With  the  Comintern's  abandonment  of  this  program,  the  Chinese  Communists 
embraced  in  1935,  in  compliance  with  Moscow  directives,  the  policy  of  the  united 
front. 

The  new  line,  so  far  as  it  applied  to  Asia,  was  in  all  probability  prompted  by 
the  Kremlin's  realistic  appraisal  of  the  Soviet  Union's  position  in  the  Far  East 
Russia  was  threatened  by  Japan.  The  Japanese  Army  had  with  its  Manchurian 
adventure  apparently  decided  upon  a  policy  of  continental  expansion.  Con- 
fronted by  a  strong  Russian  Army  in  eastern  Siberia,  the  Japanese  seemed  to  be 
intent  upon  outflanking  the  Russians  through  China.  China  could  not  be  ex- 
pected to  offer  strong  resistance  to  Japanese  expansion  so  long  as  it  was  torn 
by  internal  dissension.  It  was  therefore  evident  that  China  should  become 
unified  and  actively  resist  Japanese  pressure  westward. 

As  the  Chinese  Communists  moved  away  from  world  revolution  to  nationalism 
they  also  moved  in  the  direction  of  more  moderate  internal  political  and  economic 
policy.  Whether  these  other  moves  were  in  compliance  with  Comintern  dictates 
is  less  material  than  that  they  were  historically  and   evolutionarily  sound. 

The  trend  toward  nationalism  is  believed  to  be  strongest  among  the  troops 
and  guerrillas  who  have  been  fighting  the  national  enemy.  Although  we  have 
no  accurate  information  on  the  subject,  it  is  suspected  that  the  political  leaders 
of  the  party  retain  their  pro-Russian  orientation  and  that  they  are,  notwith- 
standing the  dissolution  of  the  Comintern,  likely  to  be  susceptible  to  Moscow 
direction.  This  probable  schism  within  the  party  may  prove  at  some  later  date 
to  be  of  major  importance  (p.  565). 

November  7,  194i  (Davies) 

The  Chinese  Communists  are  so  strong  between  the  Great  Wall  and  the 
Yangtze  that  they  can  now  look  forward  to  the  postwar  control  of  at  least  north 
China.  They  may  also  continue  to  hold  not  only  those  parts  of  the  Yangtze  Valley 
which  they  now  dominate  but  also  new  areas  in  central  and  south  China.  The 
Commxinists  have  fallen  heir  to  these  new  areas  by  a  process,  which  has  been 
operating  for  7  years,  whereby  Chiang  Kai-shek  loses  his  cities  and  principal 
lines  of  communication  to  the  Japanese  and  the  countryside  to  the  Communists. 

The  Communists  have  survived  10  years  of  civil  war  and  7  years  of  Japanese 
offensives.  They  have  survived  not  only  more  sustained  enemy  pressure  than 
the  Chinese  Central  Government  forces  have  been  subjected  to,  but  also  a  severe 
blockade  imposed  by  Chiang. 

They  have  survived  and  they  have  grown.  Communist  growth  since  1937  has 
been  almost  geometric  in  progression.  From  control  of  some  100,000  square 
kilometers  with  a  population  of  one  million  and  a  half  they  have  expanded  to 
about  850,000  square  kilometers  with  a  population  of  approximately  90  million. 
And  they  will  continue  to  grow. 

The  reason  for  this  phenomenal  vitality  and  strength  is  simple  and  funda- 
mental. It  is  a  mass  support,  mass  participation.  The  Communist  governments 
and  ai'mies  are  the  first  governments  and  armies  in  modern  Chinese  history  to 
have  positive  and  widespread  popular  support.  They  have  this  support  because 
the  governments  and  armies  are  genuinely  of  the  people  (pp.  566-567). 

January  4,  i945  (Davies) 

The  current  situation  in  China  must  afford  the  Kremlin  a  certain  sardonic 
satisfaction. 

The  Russians  see  the  anti-Soviet  government  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  decaying 
militarily,  politically,  and  economically.  They  observe  the  Chinese  Communists 
consolidating  in  north  China,  expanding  southward  in  the  wake  of  Chiang's 
military  debacles  and  now  preparing  for  the  formal  establishment  of  a  separatist 
administration. 

It  is  equally  evident  to  the  Russians  that  the  Chinese  Communists  will  not  in 
the  meantime  be  idle.  The  Communists  have  amply  demonstrated  a  capacity 
for  independent,  dynamic  growth.  However  Marshal  S'talin  may  describe  the 
Chinese  Communists  to  his  American  visitors,  he  can  scarcely  be  unaware  of  the 
fact  that  the  Communists  are  a  considerably  more  stalwart  and  self-sufficient 
force  than  any  European  underground  or  partisan  movement  (p.  567). 

June  24, 19JfS  (Davies) 

Basis  for  conflict :  The  Kuomintang  and  Chiang  Kai-shek  recognize  that  the 
CJommunists,  with  the  popular  support  which  they  enjoy  and  their  reputation  for 
administrative  reform  and  honesty,  represent  a  challenge  to  the  Central  Govern- 
ment and  its  spoils  system.  The  Generalissimo  cannot  admit  the  seemingly 
innocent  demands  of  the  Communists  that  their  party  be  legalized  and  democratic 


806  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

processes  be  put  into  practice.  To  do  so  would  probably  mean  the  abdication  of 
the  Kuomintang  and  the  provincial  satraps. 

The  Communists,  on  the  other  hand,  dare  not  accept  the  Central  Government's 
invitation  that  they  disband  their  armies  and  be  absorbed  in  the  national  body 
politic.     To  do  so  would  be  to  invite  extinction. 

This  impasse  will  probably  be  resolved,  American  and  other  foreign  observers 
in  Chungking  agree,  by  an  attempt  by  the  Central  Government  to  liquidate  the 
Communists.  This  action  may  be  expected  to  precipitate  a  civil  war  from  which 
one  of  the  two  contending  factions  will  emerge  dominant.     *     *     * 

Chiang  Kai-sliek  and  his  Kuomintang  lieutenants  fully  realize  the  risks  of  an 
attack  on  the  Communists.  This  may  explain  the  reported  statements  of  high 
officials  in  Chungking  that  they  must  prepare  not  only  for  the  coming  civil  war 
but  also  for  the  coming  war  with  Russia.  Chiang  and  his  Central  Government 
recognize  that  they  cannot  defeat  the  Communists  and  the  Soviet  Union  without 
foreign  aid.  Such  aid  would  naturally  be  sought  from  the  United  States  and 
possibly  Great  Britain. 

*  *  *  We  may  anticipate  that  Chiang  Kai-shek  will  exert  everv  effort  and 
resort  to  every  stratagem  to  involve  us  in  active  support  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment. We  will  probably  be  told  that  if  fresh  American  aid  is  not  forthcoming, 
all  of  China  and  eventually  all  of  Asia  will  be  swept  by  communism.  It  will  be 
difficult  for  us  to  resist  such  appeals,  especially  in  view  of  our  moral  commitments 
to  continued  assistance  to  China  during  the  postwar  period. 

It  is  therefore  not  inconceivable  that,  should  Chiang  attempt  to  liquidate  the 
Communists,  we  would  find  ourselves  entangled  not  only  in  a  civil  war  in  China 
but  also  drawn  into  conflict  with  the  Soviet  Union  (p.  571). 

Deceniher  9,  1944  (Davies) 

*  *  *  The  Generalissimo  realizes  that  if  he  accedes  to  the  Communist  terms 
for  a  coalition  government,  they  will  sooner  or  later  dispossess  him  and  his 
Kuomintang  of  power.  He  will  therefore  not,  unless  driven  to  an  extremity, 
form  a  genuine  coalition  government.  He  will  seek  to  retain  his  present  govern- 
ment, passively  wait  out  the  war  and  conserve  his  strength,  knowing  that  the 
Communist  issue  must  eventually  be  joined. 

The  Communist,  on  their  part,  have  no  interest  in  reaching  an  agreement  with 
the  Generalissimo  short  of  a  genuine  coalition  government.  They  recognize  that 
Chiang's  position  is  crumbling,  that  they  may  before  long  receive  a  substantial 
Russian  support  and  that  if  they  have  patience  they  will  succeed  to  authority  in 
at  least  north  China     *     *     *     (p.  572). 

November  15,  1944  (Davies) 

We  should  not  now  abandon  Chiang  Kai-shek.  To  do  so  at  this  juncture  would 
be  to  lose  more  than  we  could  gain.  We  must  for  the  time  being  continue  recog- 
nition of  Chiang's  government. 

But  we  must  be  realistic.  We  must  not  indefinitely  underwrite  a  politically 
bankrupt  regime.  And,  if  the  Russians  are  going  to  enter  the  Pacific  war,  we 
must  make  a  determined  effort  to  capture  politically  the  Chinese  Communists 
rather  than  allow  them  to  go  by  default  wholly  to  the  Russians.  Furthermore, 
we  must  fully  understand  that  by  reason  of  our  recognition  of  the  Chiang  Kai- 
shek  government  as  now  constituted  we  are  committed  to  a  steadily  decaying 
regime  and  severely  restricted  in  working  out  military  and  political  cooperation 
with  the  Chinese  Communists. 

A  coalition  Chinese  Government  in  which  the  Communists  find  a  satisfactory 
place  is  the  solution  of  this  impasse  most  desirable  to  us.  It  provides  our 
greatest  assurance  of  a  strong,  united,  democratic,  independent,  and  friendly 
China — our  basic  strategic  aim  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  If  Chiang  and  the  Com- 
munists reach  a  mutually  satisfactory  agreement,  there  will  have  been  achieved 
from  our  point  of  view  the  most  desirable  possible  solution.  If  Chiang  and  the 
Communists  are  irreconcilable,  then  we  shall  have  to  decide  which  faction  we 
are  going  to  support. 

In  seeking  to  determine  which  faction  we  should  support  we  must  keep  in  mind 
these  basic  considerations :  Power  in  China  is  on  the  verge  of  shifting  fron} 
Chiang  to  the  Communists. 

If  the  Russians  enter  North  China  and  Manchuria,  we  obviously  cannot  hope  to 
win  the  Communists  entirely  over  to  us,  but  we  can  through  control  of  supplies 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  807 

and  postwar  aid  expect  to  exert  considerable  influence  in  the  direction  of  Chinese 
nationalism  and  independence  from  Soviet  control  (p.  574). 

December  12, 194^t  {Davies) 

The  negotiations  looking  to  an  agreement  between  the  Generalissimo  and  the 
Chinese  Communists  have  failed.  It  is  not  impossible,  however,  that  one  or  the 
other  side  may  in  the  near  future  revive  the  negotiations  with  a  new  proposal. 

So  long  as  the  deadlock  exists,  or  new  negotiations  drag  on,  it  is  reasonable  to 
assume  that  the  Generalissimo  will  continue  to  refuse  us  permission  to  exploit 
militarily  the  Chinese  Communist  position  extending  into  the  geographical  center 
of  Japan's  inner  zone.  With  the  war  against  Japan  proving  so  costly  to  us,  we 
can  ill  afford  to  continue  denying  ourselves  positive  assistance  and  strategically 
valuable  positions. 

It  is  time  that  we  unequivecally  told  Chiang  Kai-shek  that  we  will  work  with 
and,  within  our  discretion,  supply  whatever  Chinese  forces  we  believe  can  contri- 
bute most  to  the  war  again  Japan.  We  should  tell  him  that  we  will  not  work  with 
or  supply  any  Chinese  unit,  whether  General  Government,  Provincial  or  Commu- 
nist, which  shows  any  inclination  toward  precipitating  civil  conflict.  We  should 
tell  him  that  we  propose  to  keep  him  as  head  of  the  recognized  government,  in- 
formed of  what  supplies  we  give  to  the  various  Chinese  forces. 

It  is  time  that  we  make  it  clear  to  Chiang  Kai-shek  that  we  expect  the  Chinese 
to  settle  their  own  political  differences ;  that  we  refuse  to  become  further  involved 
in  and  party  to  Chinese  domestic  political  disputes.  We  greatly  hope  and  desire 
that  China  will  emerge  from  this  war  unified,  democratic,  independent  and  strong. 
We  feel  that  this  goal  is  to  be  achieved  most  expeditiously  and  with  the  least 
possible  expenditure  of  Chinese  and  American  blood  and  treasure  if  the  United 
States  bends  its  efforts  in  China  primarily  toward  working  with  and  assisting 
whatever  elements  can  contribute  most  to  the  speedy  defeat  of  Japan  (p.  574). 

Mr.  Morris.  We  have  some  other  reports  here  that  I  would  like  to 
get  your  advice  on  as  to  what  we  should  do  with  them,  Mr.  Chairman. 
There  are  four  reports  here,  and  I  believe  they  are  all  reports  by  Mr. 
Service,  are  they  not,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  take  those  into  the  record,  Senator  ?  They  are 
amplifications  of  the  same  theme  that  we  have  been  developing.  Do 
you  think  we  should  go  into  them  in  detail  ? 

The  Chairman.  No.  But  I  want  to  lay  the  foundation  for  them. 
The  foundation  is  the  same  as  those  that  we  have  already  inserted  in  the 
record  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  tell  us  what  they  are  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  They  deal  with  the  theme  developed  by  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  tell  us  where  they  are  from. 

Mr.  Mandel.  They  are  all  from  the  transcript  of  the  testimony  be- 
fore the  State  Department  Loyalty  Security  Board  in  the  case  of  John 
S.  Service. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Have  they  all  been  published  in  the  white  paper  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  suggest  that  they  become 
at  least  part  of  this  official  record. 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  see  any  reason,  if  they  are  taken  from  an 
official  record  made  in  the  State  Department,  that  they  should  not  be 
admissible. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  they  should  become  part  of  this  record. 

Senator  Jenner.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  They  will  be  admitted. 


808  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC  RELATIONS 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibits  Nos.  252,  253, 
254,  and  255,"  and  are  as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  252 

[From  the  Department  of  State  publication,  Far  Eastern  Series,  released  August  1949] 

United  States  Relations  With  China 

memoranda  by  foreign  service  officers  in  china,  1943-45 

October  9,  1944  (Service) 

Reports  of  two  American  officers,  several  correspondents  and  twenty-odd  for- 
eign travelers  regarding  conditions  in  the  areas  of  North  China  under  Commu- 
nist control  are  in  striking  agreement.  This  unanimity,  based  on  actual  ob- 
servation, is  significant.  It  forces  us  to  accept  certain  facts,  and  to  draw  from 
those  facts  an  important  conclusion. 

The  Japanese  are  being  actively  opposed — in  spite  of  the  constant  warfare 
and  cruel  retaliation  this  imposes  on  the  population.  This  opposition  is  gain- 
ing in  strength.  The  Japanese  can  temporarily  crush  it  in  a  limited  area  by  the 
concentration  of  overwhelming  force.  But  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  do  this 
simultaneously  over  the  huge  territory  the  Communists  now  influence. 

This  opposition  is  possible  and  successful  because  it  is  total  guerrilla  war- 
fare aggressively  waged  by  a  totally  mobilized  population.  In  this  total  mobil- 
ization the  regular  forces  of  the  Communists,  though  leaders  and  organizers, 
have  become  subordinate  to  the  vastly  more  numerous  forces  of  the  people 
themselves.  They  exist  because  the  people  permit,  support,  and  wholeheartedly 
fight  with  them.     There  is  complete  solidarity  of  army  and  people. 

This  total  mobilization  is  based  upon  and  has  been  made  possible  by  what 
amounts  to  an  economic,  political,  and  social  revolution.  This  revolution  has 
been  moderate  and  democratic.  It  has  improved  the  economic  condition  of  the 
peasants  by  rent  and  interest  reduction,  tax  reform  and  good  government.  It 
has  given  them  democratic  self-government,  political  consciousness  and  a  sense 
of  their  rights.  It  has  freed  them  from  feudalistic  bonds  and  given  them  self- 
respect,  self-reliance  and  a  strong  feeling  of  cooperative  group  interest.  The 
common  people,  for  the  first  time,  have  been  given  something  to  fight  for. 

The  Japanese  are  being  fought  now  not  merely  because  they  are  foreign  in- 
vaders but  because  they  deny  this  revolution.  The  people  vpill  continue  to 
fight  any  government  which  limits  or  deprives  them  of  these  newly  won  gains 
(p.  566). 

June  20,  1944  (Service) 

B.  The  position  of  the  Kuomintang  and  the  Generalissimo  is  weaker  than  it 
has  been  for  the  past  10  years. 

China  faces  economic  collapse.  This  is  causing  disintegration  of  the  army 
and  the  Government's  administrative  apparatus.  It  is  one  of  the  chief  causes 
of  growing  political  unrest.  The  Generalissimo  is  losing  the  support  of  a 
China  which,  by  unity  in  the  face  of  violent  aggression,  found  a  new  and  unex- 
pected strength  during  the  first  2  years  of  the  war  with  Japan.  Internal  weak- 
nesses are  becoming  accentuated  and  there  is  taking  place  a  reversal  of  the 
process  of  unification. 

1.  Morale  is  low  and  discouragement  widespread.  There  is  a  general  feeling 
of  hopelessness. 

2.  The  authority  of  the  Central  Government  is  weakening  in  the  areas  away 
from  the  larger  cities.  Government  mandates  and  measures  of  control  cannot 
be  enforced  and  remain  ineffective.  It  is  becoming  difficult  for  the  Government 
to  collect  enough  food  for  its  huge  army  and  bureaucracy. 

3.  The  governmental  and  military  structure  is  being  permeated  and  demor- 
alized from  top  to  bottom  by  corruption,  unprecedented  in  scale  and  openness. 

4.  The  intellectual  and  salaried  classes,  who  have  suffered  the  most  heavily 
from  infiation,  are  in  danger  of  liquidation.  The  academic  groups  suffer  not 
only  the  attrition  and  demoralization  of  economic  stress;  the  weight  of  years 
of  political  control  and  repression  is  robbing  them  of  the  intellectual  vigor  and 
leadership  they  once  had. 

5.  Peasant  resentment  of  the  abuses  of  conscription,  tax  collection,  and  other 
arbitrary  impositions  has  been  widespread  and  is  growing.  The  danger  is 
ever-increasing  that  past  sporadic  outbreaks  of  banditry  and  agrarian  unrest 
may  increase  in  scale  and  find  political  motivation. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  809 

6.  The  provincial  groups  are  making  common  cause  with  one  another  and 
with  other  dissident  groups,  and  are  actively  consolidating  their  position. 
Their  continuing  strength  in  the  face  of  the  growing  weakness  of  the  Central 
Government  is  forcing  new  measures  of  political  appeasement  in  their  favor. 

7.  Unrest  within  the  Kuomintang  armies  is  increasing,  as  shown  in  one  imi)or- 
tant  instance  by  the  "young  generals  conspiracy"  late  in  1943.  On  a  higher 
plane,  the  war  zone  commanders  are  building  up  their  own  spheres  of  influence 
and  are  thus  creating  a  new  warlordism. 

8.  The  break  between  the  Kuomintang  and  the  Communists  not  only  shows 
no  signs  of  being  closed,  but  grows  more  critical  with  the  passage  of  time :  the 
inevitability  of  civil  war  is  now  generally  accepted. 

9.  The  Kuomintang  is  losing  the  respect  and  support  of  the  people  by  its 
selfish  policies  and  its  refusal  to  heed  progressive  criticism.  It  seems  unable  to 
revivify  itself  with  fresh  blood,  and  its  unchanging  leadership  shows  a  growing 
ossification  and  loss  of  a  sense  of  reality.  To  combat  the  dissensions  and 
cliquism  within  the  party,  which  grows  more  rather  than  less  acute,  the  leader- 
ship is  turning  toward  the  reactionary  and  unpopular  Chen  brothers  cliques. 

10.  The  Generalissimo  shows  a  similar  loss  of  realistic  flexibility  and  a. 
hardening  of  narrowly  conservative  views.  His  growing  megalomania  and  his 
unfortunate  attempts  to  be  sage  as  well  as  leader — shown,  for  instance,  by 
China's  Destiny  and  his  book  on  economics — have  forfeited  the  respect  of  many 
intellectuals,  who  enjoy  in  China  a  position  of  unique  influence.  Criticism  of 
his  dictatorship  is  becoming  outspoken. 

In  the  face  of  the  grave  crisis  with  which  it  is  confronted,  the  Kuomintang 
is  ceasing  to  be  the  unifying  and  progressive  force  in  Chinese  society,  the  role 
in  which  it  made  its  greatest  contribution  to  modern  China. 

C.  The  Kuomintang  is  not  only  proving  itself  incapable  of  averting  a  debacle 
by  its  own  initiative:  on  the  contrary,  its  policies  ai'e  precipitating  the  crisis. 

Some  war-weariness  in  China  m.ust  be  expected.  But  the  policies  of  the 
Kuomintang  under  the  impact  of  hyperinflation  and  in  the  presence  of  obvious 
signs  of  internal  and  external  weakness  must  be  described  as  bankrupt.  This 
truth  is  emphasized  by  the  failure  of  the  Kuomintang  to  come  to  grips  with  the 
situation  during  the  recently  concluded  plenary  session  of  the  Central  Executive 
Committee. 

1.  On  the  internal  political  front  the  desire  of  the  Kuomintang  leaders  to 
perpetuate  their  own  power  overrides  all  other  considerations.  The  result  is 
the  enthronement  of  reaction. 

The  Kuomintang  continues  to  ignore  the  great  political  drive  within  the 
country  for  democratic  reform.  The  writings  of  the  Generalissimo  and  the 
party  press  show  that  they  have  no  real  understanding  of  that  term.  Constitu- 
tionalism remains  an  empty  promise  for  which  the  only  preparation  is  a  half- 
hearted attempt  to  establish  an  unpopular  and  undemocratic  system  of  local 
self-government  based  on  collective  responsibility  and  given  odium  by  Japanese 
utilization  in  Manchuria  and  other  areas  under  their  control. 

Questions  basic  to  the  future  of  democracy  such  as  the  form  of  the  consti- 
tution and  the  composition  and  election  of  the  National  Congress  remain  the 
dictation  of  the  Kuomintang.  There  is  no  progress  toward  the  fundamental 
conditions  of  freedom  of  expression  and  recognition  of  non-Kuomintang  groups. 
Even  the  educational  and  political  advantages  of  giving  power  and  democratic 
character  to  the  existing  but  impotent  Peoples  Political  Council  are  ignored. 

The  Kuomintang  shows  no  intention  of  relaxing  the  authoritarian  controls 
on  which  its  present  power  depends.  Far  from  discarding  or  reducing  the  para- 
phernalia of  a  police  state — the  multiple  and  omnipresent  secret  police  or- 
ganizations, the  gendarmerie,  and  so  forth — it  continues  to  strengthen  them 
as  its  last  resort  for  internal  security. 

2.  On  the  economic  front  the  Kuomintang  is  unwilling  to  take  any  effective 
steps  to  check  inflation  which  woiild  injure  the  landlord-capitalist  class. 

It  is  directly  responsible  for  the  increase  of  ofiicial  corruption  which  is  one 
of  the  main  obstacles  to  any  rational  attempt  to  ameliorate  the  financial  situa- 
tion. It  does  nothing  to  stop  large-scale  profiteering,  hoarding,  and  specu- 
lation— all  of  which  are  carried  on  by  people  either  powerful  in  the  party  or 
with  intimate  political  connections. 

It  fails  to  carry  out  effective  mobilization  of  resources.  Such  measures 
of  wartime  control  as  it  has  promulgated  have  remained  a  dead  letter  or  have 
intensified  the  problems  they  were  supposedly  designed  to  remedy,  as  for 
instance,  ill-advised  and  poorly  executed  attempts  at  price  regulation. 


810  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

It  passively  allows  both  industrial  and  the  more  important  handicraft  pro- 
duction to  run  down,  as  they  of  course  must  when  it  is  more  profitable  for 
speculators  to  hold  raw  materials  than  to  have  them  go  through  the  normal 
productive  process. 

It  fails  to  carry  out  rationing  except  in  a  very  limited  way,  or  to  regulate 
the  manufacture  and  trade  of  luxury  goods,  many  of  which  come  from  areas 
under  Japanese  control.  It  shows  little  concern  that  these  imports  are  largely 
paid  for  with  strategic  commodities  of  value  to  the  enemy. 

It  fails  to  malie  an  effective  attempt  to  reduce  the  budgetary  deficit  and  in- 
crease revenue  by  tapping  such  resources  as  excess  profits  and  incomes  of 
landlords  and  merchants.  It  allows  its  tax-collecting  apparatus  to  hog  down 
in  corruption  and  inefiiciency,  to  the  point  that  possibly  not  more  than  one- 
third  of  revenues  collected  reach  the  Government.  It  continues  to  spend  huge 
government  funds  on  an  idle  and  useless  party  bureaucracy. 

At  best,  it  passively  watches  inflation  gather  momentum  without  even  at- 
tempting palliative  measures  available  to  it,  such  as  the  aggressive  sale  of 
gold  and  foreign  currency. 

It  refuses  to  attack  the  fundamental  economic  problems  of  China  such  as 
the  growing  concentration  of  land  holdings,  extortionate  rents  and  ruinous  in- 
terest rates,  and  the  impact  of  inflation. 

D.  These  apparently  suicidal  policies  of  the  Kuomintang  have  their  roots 
in  the  composition  and  nature  of  the  party. 

In  view  of  the  above  it  becomes  pertinent  to  ask  why  the  Kuomintang  has 
lost  its  power  of  leadership ;  why  it  neither  wishes  actively  to  wage  war  against 
Japan  itself  nor  to  cooperate  whole-heartedly  with  the  American  Army  in 
China ;  and  why  it  has  ceased  to  be  capable  of  unifying  the  country. 

The  answer  to  all  these  question  is  to  be  found  in  the  present  composition 
and  nature  of  the  party.  Politically,  a  classical  and  definitive  American  de- 
scription becomes  ever  more  true ;  the  Kuomintang  is  a  congerie  of  conservative 
political  cliques  interested  primarily  in  the  preservation  of  their  own  power 
against  all  outsiders  and  in  jockeying  for  position  among  themselves.  Eco- 
nomically, the  Kuomintang  rests  on  the  narrow  base  of  the  rural-gentry-land- 
lords and  militarists,  the  higher  ranks  of  the  Government  bureaucracy,  and 
merchant  bankers  having  intimate  connections  with  the  Government  bureau- 
crats. This  base  has  actually  contracted  during  the  war.  The  Kuomintang 
no  longer  commands,  as  it  once  did,  the  unequivocal  support  of  China's  indus- 
trialists, who  as  a  group  have  been  much  weakened  economically,  and  hence 
politically,  by  the  Japanese  seizure  of  the  coastal  cities. 

The  relations  of  this  description  of  the  Kuomintang  to  the  questions  pro- 
pounded above  is  clear. 

The  Kuomintang  has  lost  its  leadership  because  it  has  lost  touch  with  and  is 
no  longer  representative  of  a  nation  which,  through  the  practical  experience 
of  the  war  is  becoming  both  more  politically  conscious  and  more  aware  of  the 
party's  selfish  shortcomings. 

It  cannot  fight  an  effective  war  because  this  is  impossible  without  greater 
reliance  upon  and  support  by  the  people.  There  must  be  a  release  of  the  national 
energy  such  as  occurred  during  the  early  period  of  the  war.  Under  present 
conditions,  this  can  be  brought  about  only  by  reform  of  the  party  and  greater 
political  democracy.  What  form  this  democracy  takes  is  not  as  important  as 
the  genuine  adoption  of  a  democratic  philosophy  and  attitude;  the  threat  of 
foreign  invasion  is  no  longer  enough  to  stimulate  the  Chinese  people  and  only 
real  reform  can  regain  their  enthusiasm.  But  the  growth  of  democracy,  though 
basic  to  China's  continuing  war  effort,  would,  to  the  mind  of  the  Kuomintang's 
present  leaders,  imperil  the  foundations  of  the  party's  power  because  it  would 
mean  that  the  conservative  cliques  would  have  to  give  up  their  closely  guarded 
monopoly.  Rather  than  do  this,  they  prefer  to  see  the  war  remain  in  its  present 
state  of  passive  inertia.  Thus  are  they  sacrificing  China's  national  interests  to 
their  own  selfish  ends. 

For  similar  reasons,  the  Kuomintang  is  unwilling  to  give  whole-hearted  coop- 
eration to  the  American  Army's  effort  in  China.  Full  cooperation  necessarily 
requii-es  the  broad  Chinese  military  effort  which  the  Kuomintang  is  unable  to 
carry  out  or  make  possible.  In  addition,  the  Kuomintang  fears  the  large  scale, 
widespread  and  direct  contact  by  Americans  with  the  Chinese  war  effort  will 
expose  its  own  inactivity  and,  by  example  and  personal  contacts,  be  a  liberalizing 
Influence  (pp.  567-570). 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  811 

October  9,  19 H  {Service) 

Just  as  the  "Japanese  Army  cannot  crush  these  militant  iieople  now,  so  also 
will  Kuomintang  force  fail  in  the  future.  With  their  new  arms  and  organization, 
knowledge  of  their  own  strength,  and  determination  to  keep  what  they  have  been 
fighting  for,  these  people — now  some  90  million  and  certain  to  be  many  more 
before  the  Kuomintang  can  reach  them — will  resist  oppression.  They  are  not 
Communists.  They  do  not  want  separation  or  independence.  But  at  present 
they  regard  the  Kuomintang,  from  their  own  experience,  as  oppressors ;  and  the 
Communists  as  their  leaders  and  benefactors. 

With  this  great  popular  base,  the  Communists  likewise  cannot  be  eliminated. 
Kuomintang  attempts  to  do  so  by  force  must  mean  a  complete  denial  of  democracy. 
This  will  strengthen  the  ties  of  the  Communists  with  the  people;  a  Communist 
victory  will  be  inevitable.    *    *    * 

From  the  basic  fact  that  the  Communists  have  built  up  popular  support  of  a 
magnitude  and  depth  which  makes  their  elimination  impossible,  we  must  draw 
the  conclusion  that  the  Communists  will  have  a  certain  and  important  share  in 
China's  future  *  *  *  i  suggest  the  future  conclusion  that  unless  the  Kuomin- 
tang goes  as  far  as  the  Communists  in  political  and  economic  reform,  and  other- 
wise proves  itself  able  to  contest  this  leadership  of  the  people  (none  of  which  it 
yet  shows  signs  of  being  willing  or  able  to  do),  the  Communists  will  be  the  domi- 
nant force  in  China  within  a  comparatively  few  years  (p.  572-573). 

February  14,  1945  (Ludden  and  Service) 

American  policy  in  the  Far  East  can  have  but  one  immediate  objective:  the 
defeat  of  Japan  in  the  shortest  possible  time  with  the  least  expenditure  of 
American  lives.  To  the  attainment  of  this  objective  all  other  considerations 
should  be  subordinate. 

The  attainment  of  this  objective  demands  the  eifective  mobilization  of  China 
in  the  war  against  Japan.  Operating  as  we  are  in  a  land  theater  at  the  end  of 
a  supply  line  many  thousands  of  miles  in  length,  the  human  and  economic  re- 
sources of  China  increase  in  importance  as  we  draw  closer  to  Japan's  inner  zone 
of  defense.  Denied  the  eltective  use  of  these  resources  the  attainmnt  of  our 
primary  objective  will  be  unecessarily  delayed. 

There  is  ample  evidence  to  show  that  to  the  present  Kuomintang  Government 
the  war  against  Japan  is  secondary  in  importance  to  its  own  preservation  in 
power.  China's  military  failure  is  due  in  large  part  to  internal  political  disunity 
and  the  Kuomintang's  desire  to  conserve  such  military  force  as  it  has  for  utiliza- 
tion in  the  maintenance  of  its  political  power.  The  intention  of  the  Generalis- 
simo to  eliminate  all  political  opposition,  by  force  of  arms  if  necessary,  has  not 
been  abandoned.  In  the  present  situation  in  China,  where  power  or  self-preserva- 
tion depend  upon  the  possession  of  military  force,  neither  the  Kuomintang  nor 
opposition  groups  are  willing  to  expend  their  military  resources  against  the  Jap- 
anese through  fear  that  it  will  then  vis-^-vis  other  groups. 

The  aim  of  American  policy  as  indicated  clearly  by  official  statements  in  the 
United  States  is  the  establishment  of  political  unity  in  China  as  the  indispensable 
preliminary  to  China's  effective  military  mobilization.  The  execution  of  our 
policy  has  not  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  this  publicly  stated  aim.  On 
the  contrary,  it  has  retarded  its  effect  because  our  statements  and  actions  in 
China  have  convinced  the  Kuomintang  Government  that  we  will  continue  to 
support  it  and  it  alone.  The  Kuomintang  Government  believes  that  it  will 
receive  an  increasing  flow  of  American  military  and  related  supplies  which,  if 
past  experience  is  any  guide,  it  will  commit  against  the  enemy  only  with  great 
reluctance,  if  at  all. 

We  cannot  hope  for  any  improvement  in  this  situation  unless  we  understand 
the  objectives  of  the  Kuomintang  Government  and  throw  our  considerable  in- 
fluence upon  it  in  the  direction  of  internal  unity.  We  should  be  convinced  by 
this  time  that  the  effort  to  solve  the  Kuomintang-Communist  differences  by 
diplomatic  means  has  failed ;    *    *    *. 

At  present  there  exists  in  China  a  situation  closely  paralleling  that  which 
existed  in  Yugoslavia  prior  to  Prime  Minister  Churchill's  declaration  of  support 
for  Marshal  Tito.     That  statement  was  as  follows : 

"The  sanest  and  safest  course  for  us  to  follow  is  to  judge  all  parties  and 
factions  dispassionately  by  the  test  of  their  readiness  to  fight  the  Germans  and 


22848— 52— pt.  3^ 


812  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

thus  lighten  the  burden  of  Allied  troops.      This  is  not  a  time  for  ideological 
preferences  for  one  side  or  the  other." 

A  similar  public  statement  issued  by  the  Commander  in  Chief  with  regard  to 
China  would  not  mean  the  withdrawal  of  recognition  or  the  cessation  of  military 
aid  to  the  Central  Government;  that  would  be  both  unnecessary  and  unwise. 
It  would  serve  notice,  however,  of  our  preparation  to  malie  use  of  all  availaole 
means  to  achieve  our  primary  objective.  It  would  supply  for  all  Chinese  a  firm 
rallying  point  which  has  thus  far  been  lacking.  The  internal  effect  in  China 
would  be  so  profound  that  the  generalissimo  would  be  forced  to  make  conces- 
sions of  power  and  permit  united-front  coalition.  The  present  opposition 
groups,  no  longer  under  the  prime  necessity  of  safeguarding  themselves,  would 
be  won  wholeheartedly  to  our  side  and  we  would  have  in  China,  for  the  first  time, 
a  united  ally  (pp.  575-576). 

Exhibit  No,  253 

Yenan,  May  1,  1945. 
Congress  of  Communist  Party  Meets 

Yenan,  May  1. — The  Seventh  National  Congress  of  the  Chinese  Communist 
Party  was  held  in  Yenan  in  the  latter  part  of  April.  This  is  one  of  the  most 
important  events  in  the  history  of  modern  China. 

"The  task  of  this  Congress  is  to  rally  people  throughout  China  on  the  eve  of 
the  counteroffensive  to  save  the  nation  from  the  crisis  which  is  the  consequence 
of  the  erroneous  policy  of  the  Kuomintang  Government,  and  so  thoroughly  to 
defeat  and  annihilate  the  Japanese  aggressors  and  set  up  an  independent,  free, 
democratic,  unified,  strong  and  prosperous  new  China. 

"There  are  752  delegates  representing  1,210,000  members  of  the  Chinese  Com- 
munist Party.    Of  these  544  are  delegates  and  208  are  probationary  delegates. 

"Mao  Tse-tung,  Chu  Teh,  Li  Shao-Chi,  Chou  En-lai,  Jen  Pi-shih,  Lin  Po-hu, 
Pen  Tah-huai,  Kang  Sheng,  Chen  Yun,  Chen  Yi,  Ho  Lung,  Hsu  Hsiang-chien,  Kao 
Kang,  Lo  Fu,  and  Peng  Chen  were  elected  to  the  presidium  of  the  congress.  Jen 
Pi-shih  was  elected  secretary  and  Li  Fu-chen  assistant  secretary  of  the  congress. 

"agenda  items 

"There  were  four  items  on  the  agenda :  The  political  report  by  Comrade  Chu 
Teh,  the  report  on  redrafting  of  the  party  statutes  by  Comrade  Li  Shao-chi,  and 
the  election  of  members  of  the  central  committee  of  the  Chinese  Communist 
Party. 

"Since  its  foundation  in  1921  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  held  six  national 
congresses.  These  congresses  were  held  in  July  1921,  May  1922,  June  1923, 
January  1925,  April  1927,  and  July  1928.  Because  of  the  long  period  of  war 
and  struggle,  17  years  have  elapsed  before  the  present  seventh  congress  could 
be  convened. 

"At  the  convention  of  the  present  congress,  the  power  of  the  Chinese  Commu- 
nist Party,  unity  and  solidarity  within  the  party,  and  the  party's  prestige  among 
the  people  of  China  are  higher  than  at  any  period  in  the  past. 

"total  strength 

"At  present  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  not  only  has  over  1,200,000  mem- 
bers but  also  has  under  its  leadership  the  Eighth  Route,  New  Fourth,  and  other 
anti-Japanese  regular  armies,  numbering  110,000  strong,  over  2,200,000  People's 
Volunteer  Corps,  and  19  liberated  areas  distributed  over  19  provinces  in  Man- 
churia, north,  central,  and  south  China,  with  a  total  population  of  95,500,000. 

"Because  the  war  of  resistance  in  the  liberated  areas  is  rapidly  developing, 
these  figures  are  steadily  increasing.  Therefore,  the  Chinese  Communist  Party 
and  liberated  areas  under  its  leadership  have  really  become  the  center  of  gravity 
of  the  Chinese  people  in  the  anti-Japanese  "national  salvation  movement"  and 
struggle  for  liberation.  The  present  congress  will  undoubtely  have  an  extremely 
important  influence  on  the  future  development  of  the  war  of  resistance  and 
internal  politics  of  China."  (Yenan,  in  English  Morse  to  North  America,  May 
1,  1945,  9:30  a.  m.  e.  w.  t.) 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  813 

"Coalition  Government  Needed,"  Sats  Mao 

"Tenan,  May  1. — On  the  'coalition  government'  was  the  title  of  the  political 
report  given  by  Chairman  Mao  Tze-tung,  leader  of  the  Chinese  Communist 
Party,  to  the  Seventh  Congress  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party. 

"Mao  Tze-tung  pointed  out  that  the  'unification  of  all  parties  and  groups  and 
nonparty  representatives,  to  form  a  provisional  democratic  coalition  government 
so  as  to  carry  out  democratic  reform  to  overcome  the  present  crisis,  mobilize  and 
unify  the  national  forces  of  the  vrar  or  resistance  to  effectively  collaborate  with 
the  Allies  in  fighting  and  defeating  the  Japanese  aggressor,  and  to  secure  the 
thorough  liberation  of  the  Chinese,  are  the  basic  demands  of  the  Chinese  people 
at  present.' 

"national  assemblt 

"China  needs  a  coalition  government,  said  Mao  Tze-tung,  not  only  during  the 
war  but  also  after  the  war.  'After  the  victory  of  the  war  of  resistance,  the 
National  Assembly,  based  on  a  broad,  democratic  foundation,  should  be  called 
to  form  a  regular  democratic  government  of  a  similar  coalition  nature  embracing 
more  broadly  all  parties  and  groups  and  nonparty  representatives.  This  gov- 
ernment will  lead  the  liberated  people  of  the  entire  nation  to  build  up  an  inde- 
I)endent,  free,  unified,  prosperous,  and  strong  new  country.  After  China  has  had  a 
democratic  elective  system,  the  Government  should  be  a  coalition  working  on  the 
basis  of  a  commonly  recognized  new  democratic  program,  no  matter  whether  the 
Communist  Party  is  the  majority  or  minority  party  in  the  National  Assembly.' 

"immediate  formation 

"Mao  Tze-tung  repeatedly  urged  the  necessity  of  immediate  formation  of  a 
coalition  government.  One  party,  dictatorship,  dictatorship  of  the  antipopula- 
tion  group  within  the  Kuomintang,  said  Mao  Tze-tung,  is  not  only  'a  fundamental 
obstacle  to  the  mobilization  and  unification  of  the  strength  of  the  Chinese  people 
in  the  war  of  resistance,  it  is  also  the  (colossal)  embryo  of  the  civil  war.'  " 

MAO  reveals  postwar  PLAN  FOR  CHINA 

The  following  is  Yenan's  continuation  in  English  Morse  of  the  political  report 
given  by  Chairman  Mao  Tze-tung  to  the  Seventh  Congress  of  the  Chinese  Com- 
munist Party  held  in  Tenan,  the  first  part  of  which  was  reported  under  the 
heading  "Coalition  Government  Needed,  Says  Mao." 

"In  his  report,  Mao  Tze-tung  brought  forward  a  program  for  the  defeat  of  the 
Japanese  aggressors  and  the  establishment  of  a  new  China.  This  program  is 
divided  into  two  sections — namely,  general  and  specific — and  furnishes  the 
answers  to  many  important  wartime  and  postwar  problems.  Concerning  the 
thorough  annihilation  of  the  Japanese  aggressors  and  forbidding  a  halfway 
compromise,  Mao  Tze-tung  called  the  people's  attention  to  the  secret  under- 
standings and  dealings  between  the  pro-Japanese  elements  in  the  Kuomintang 
government  and  the  Japanese  seci-et  emissaries. 

"no  compromise 

"He  said:  'The  Chinese  people  should  demand  that  the  Kuomintang  govern- 
ment must  thoroughly  annihilate  the  Japanese  aggressors  and  forbid  any  com- 
promise. At  the  same  time  the  Chinese  people  should  expand  the  Eighth  Route 
and  New  Fourth  Armies  and  other  People's  Armies.  Moreover,  wherever  the 
enemy  has  penetrated,  the  Chinese  people  should  universally  and  voluntarily 
develop  anti-Japanese  armed  forces  ready  to  cooperate  directly  with  our  allies 
in  the  fighting.' 

"To  reactionary  elements  who  want  to  steal  the  sacred  right  of  armed  resis- 
tance to  the  Japanese  aggressors  from  them,  "The  Chinese  people  should  in  self- 
defense  resolutely  deal  a  counterblow  after  remonstrances  have  proved  futile." 

people's  freedom 

"With  regard  to  the  people's  freedom,  Mao  Tze-tung  pointed  out  that  in  their 
struggle  for  freedom  at  the  present  the  first  and  main  effort  of  the  Chinese  people 
is  directed  against  the  Japanese  aggressor.     But  the  Kuomintang  government 


814  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

has  deprived  the  people  of  their  freedom  and  bound  them  hand  and  foot,  render- 
ing them  unable  to  oppose  the  Japanese  aggressors. 

"Mao  said  that  'The  people  in  China's  liberated  areas  have  gained  their  free- 
dom, and  the  people  in  other  areas  are  able  to  and  should  gain  such  freedom. 
The  more  the  Chinese  people  have  gained,  the  greater  is  the  organized  democratic 
force,  and  then  there  is  the  possibility  of  a  coalition  government.' 


"With  regard  to  the  unification  of  the  people,  Mao  pointed  out  that  'divided 
China  must  be  changed  into  unified  China.'  But  what  Chinese  people  want  is 
not  'absolutist  unification  by  dictators'  but  the  'democratic  unification  by  the 
people.  The  movement  of  the  Chinese  people  striving  for  freedom,  democracy, 
and  a  coalition  government  is  actually  a  movement  for  unification.' 

"With  regard  to  the  People's  Armies,  Mao  pointed  out  that  without  any  army 
which  stands  on  the  side  of  the  people  a  coalition  government  cannot  be  formed. 
The  Eighth  Route  and  New  Fourth  Armies  are  wholeheartedly  on  the  side  of  the 
people.  Mao  also  pointed  out  that  many  Kuomintang  troops  which  frequently 
suffered  [words  missing]  oppress  the  people  and  discriminate  against  other 
troops  should  be  reformed.  Mao  Tze-tung  declared :  'As  soon  as  the  new  demo- 
cratic coalition  government  and  the  united  high  command  is  formed  in  China, 
troops  in  the  Chinese  liberated  areas  will  at  once  be  handed  over  to  them.  But 
all  Kuomintang  troops  must  also  be  handed  over  to  them  at  the  same  time. 

"private  capitalism 

"Mao  Tze-tung  declared  that  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  in  the  entire  period 
[words  missing].  The  new  democracy  approves  the  development  of  private 
capitalism  and  ownership  of  private  property,  but  this  must  follow  the  theory 
propounded  by  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen;  namely,  to  carry  out  the  principle  of  'tillers 
own  their  land'  and  to  guarantee  that  private  capitalism  'cannot  control  the  life 
of  the  people  in  the  country.' 

"With  regard  to  the  land  problem,  Mao  pointed  out  that  in  the  liberated  areas 
the  reduction  of  rent  and  interest  has  been  carried  out  so  that  the  landlords  and 
peasants  jointly  take  part  in  the  war  of  resistance. 

"Mao  also  declared :  'If  there  is  no  particular  hindrance,  we  shall  continue  to 
carry  out  this  policy  after  the  war.  First  of  all,  the  reduction  of  rent  and  in- 
terest will  be  carried  out  throughout  the  country  and  then  [words  missing]. 
Then  appropriate  means  will  be  found  to  arrive  systematically  at  the  [words 
missing]  "tillers  own  their  land." '  [Next  paragraph  garbled  in  transmis- 
sion— Ed.] 

"On  the  one  hand  'workers'  interest  will  be  'protected',  while  on  the  other 
band  'guaranties  are  given  to  [words  missing]  profits  from  proper  commercial 
[enterprise — Ed.].'  He  declared  that  in  this  new  democratic  state  'facilities 
will  certainly  be  [words  missing]  widespread  [development — Ed.]  of  a  private 
capitalistic  economy'  apart  from  the  economy  of  state-owned  business  and  co- 
operatives. 

"Mao  Tze-tung  welcomes  foreign  investments  in  China.  He  said  that  the 
industrialization  of  China  'will  [afford — Ed.]  a  very  great  amount  of  foreign 
Investments.' 

"culture  and  education 

"'With  regard  to  culture  and  education,  Mao  Tze-tung  pointed  out  [words 
missing]  respecting  the  intelligentsia  who  serve  the  people  and  have  made  [words 
missing].  He  also  pointed  out  the  various  tasks  such  as  the  liquidation  of  illit- 
eracy, and  the  popularization  of  public  hygiene.  He  further  pointed  out  that  the 
ancient  Chinese  and  foreign  culture  should  be  'absorbed  critically.' 


"Concerning  the  national  minorities  problem,  Mao  Tze-tung  pointed  out  that 
'national  minorities  should  be  helped  [asterisks  supplied  by  Tenan — Eld.]  to  at- 
tain liberation  and  development,  politically,  economically,  and  culturally.  Their 
language,  literature,  customs,  habits,  and  religious  faith  should  be  respected.' 

"With  regard  to  the  problem  of  religion,  Mao  Tze-tung  pointed  out  that  'accord- 
ing to  the  principle  of  freedom  of  belief,  China's  liberated  areas  will  allow  evey 
school  of  religion  to  exist.     Protestants,  Catholics,  Mohammedans,  Buddhists, 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  815 

and  other  religious  beliefs,  provided  they  obey  the  Government  laws  and  decrees, 
will  be  protected  by  the  Government.' 

"Mao  Tze-tung  in  his  report  dwelt  in  detail  on  'diplomatic  problems'  [words 
missing]  principle  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  in  diplomatic  policy,  de- 
clared Mao  Tze-tung,  'is  the  establishment  and  consolidation  of  the  diplomatic 
relations  with  other  countries,  the  solution  of  mutually  related  wartime  and 
postwar  problems,  such  as  the  cooperation  in  fighting,  peace  conference,  com- 
mercial intercourse,  investments,  [words  missing]  of  thorough  extermination  of 
the  Japanese  aggressors,  upholding  of  world  peace  [words  missing]  for  equal 
and  independent  status  of  tiie  nation  [words  missing]  interests  and  friendship  of 
nations  and  peoples.' 

"international  conferences 

"Also  the  Atlantic  Charter  and  resolutions  was  [words  missing]  Moscow, 
Cairo,  Tehran,  and  Crimea  international  conferences,  Mao  Tze-tung  said,  that  the 
Chinese  Communist  Party  [words  missing]  the  Crimea  Conference  on  this  ques- 
tion. The  Chinese  Communist  Party  'welcomes  the  San  Francisco  United  Na- 
tions Conference  and  has  sent  its  representative  to  join  the  Chinese  delegation  in 
order  to  express  the  will  of  the  Chinese  people.' 

"Mao  Tze-tung  opined  that  the  Crimea  line  accords  [words  missing]  with  the 
policy  held  by  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  in  the  settlement  of  the  Chinese 
and  oriental  question.  He  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  policy  similar  to  that  of  [words 
missing]  be  adopted  in  the  Orient  and  Cliina." 

4-POINT  PROGRAM 

"He  said  that  '(1)  The  Japanese  aggressors  must  be  ultimately  defeated  and 
the  Japanese  Fascist  military  and  the  causes  producing  them  thoroughly  extermi- 
nated. There  should  be  on  halfway  compromise:  (2)  [words  missing]  the  ves- 
tige of  fascism  in  China  must  be  exterminated  without  allowing  the  least  trace  to 
remain;  (3)  domestic  peace  must  be  established  in  China  and  civil  war  not  al- 
lowed to  recur;  (4)  the  Kuomintang  dictatorship  [words  missing]  must  be  abol- 
ished [words  missing.]  After  its  abolition  it  should  at  first  be  supplanted  by 
a  provisional  democratic  coalition  government  fully  supported  by  the  whole  na- 
tion. [Words  missing]  territories  having  been  recovered,  the  i-egular  coalition 
government  executing  the  popular  will  should  be  set  up  through  free  and  unre- 
stricted elections." 

SOVIET  UNION 

"Speaking  of  the  Sino-Soviet  diplomatic  relations,  '[We  are  of  the  opinion — 
Ed.]  that  the  Kuomintang  Government  must  stop  its  attitude  of  enmity  toward 
the  Soviet  Union  and  swiftly  improve  [Sino — Ed.]  Soviet  diplomatic  relations.' 
'On  behalf  of  the  Chinese  people,  Mao  Tze-tung  expressed  [words  missing]  which 
has  always  been  rendered  to  China  by  the  Soviet  Government  and  people  in 
China's  war  [words  missing]  liberated  and  expressed  welcome  of  Marshal  Sta- 
lin's speech  [words  missing]  and  recent  denouncement  of  the  Soviet-Japanese 
neutrality  pact  by  the  Soviet  Union.' 

"Mao  Tze-tung  added :  'We  believe  that  without  the  participation  of  the 
Soviet  Union  it  is  not  possible  to  reach  a  final  and  thorough  settlement  of  the 
Pacific  question.' " 

.  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS 

"Regarding  Sino-Anglo  and  Sino-American  diplomatic  relations,  Mao  Tze-tung 
said :  'The  great  efforts  made  by  the  Great  Powers,  American  and  Great  Brit- 
ain, especially  the  former,  in  the  common  cause  of  fighting  the  Japanese  aggres- 
sors and  the  sympathy  and  aid  rendered  by  their  governments  and  peoples  to 
China,  deserve  our  thanks.  [Words  missing]  will  or  Chinese  people  and  thereby 
injure  and  lose  the  friendship  of  the  Chinese  people.  If  any  foreign  government 
helps  China's  reactionary  group  to  oppose  the  democratic  cause  of  the  Chinese 
people,  a  gross  mistake  will  have  been  committed.' 

"Speaking  of  the  abrogation  of  the  unequal  treaties  with  China  [words 
missing],  Mao  Tze-tung  said  that  the  Chinese  people  welcome  [words  missing] 
Chinese  people  on  a  footing  of  equality.  But  he  pointed  out,  China  'definitely 
cannot  rely  on  an  [words  missing]  equality  [words  missing]  being  given  by  the 
good  will  of  foreign  governments  and  peoples.  [Words  missing]  and  actual 
footing  of  equality  must  in  the  main  rely  oji  the  efforts  of  the  Chinese  people 


816  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

to  build  up  politically,  economically,  and  culturally  a  new  democratic  country^ 
which  is  independent,  free,  democratic,  unified,  prosperous,  and  strong.  China 
assuredly  cannot  gain  real  independence  and  equality  according  to  the  policy 
of  the  Kuomintang  government  at  present  in  force?" 

FAE  EASTERN  COUNTRIES 

"Mao  Tze-tung  advocated  the  following  policies  to  be  adopted  with  regard  to 
the  countries  in  the  Far  East:  After  the  [words  missing]  unconditional  sur- 
render of  the  Japanese  aggressors,  all  democratic  [words  missing]  of  the  Japa- 
nese people  should  be  aided  to  establish  a  democratic  regime  of  the  Japanese 
people.  Without  such  a  democratic  regime  of  the  Japanese  people,  thorough  ex- 
termination of  the  Japanese  [words  missing]  would  not  be  possible  to  guarantee 
peace  in  the  Pacific  [asterisks  supplied  by  Yenan — Ed.]  'The  decision  of  the 
Cairo  Conference  to  grant  independence  to  Korea  is  correct,  and  the  Chinese 
people  should  so  help  the  Korean  people  to  attain  liberation  [words  missing].* 
With  regard  to  Thailand,  she  'should  be  dealt  with  according  to  the  measures  of 
dealing  with  a  Fascist  turncoat'."  (Yenan,  in  English  Morse  to  North  America, 
May  2, 1^5.) 

Exhibit  No.  254 

Junes  1944. 

The  Situation  in  China  and  Suggestions  Rexjarding  Ameeioan  Pomct 

/.  The  situation  in  China  is  rapidly  becominff  critical 

A.  The  Japanese  strategy  in  China,  which  has  been  as  much  political  as  mili- 
tary, has  so  far  been  eminently  successful. 

Japan  has  had  the  choice  of  two  alternatives. 

1.  It  could  beat  China  to  its  knees.  But  this  would  have  required  large-scale 
military  operations  and  a  large  and  continuing  army  occupation.  And  there 
was  the  danger  that  it  might  have  driven  the  Kuomintang  to  carry  out  a  real 
mobilization  of  the  people,  thus  making  possible  effective  resistance  and  perhaps 
rendering  the  Japanese  task  as  long  and  costly  as  it  has  been  in  north  China. 

2.  Or  Japan  could  maintain  just  enough  pressure  on  China  to  cause  slow 
strangulation.  Based  on  the  astute  use  of  puppets,  the  understanding  of  the 
continuing  struggle  for  power  within  China  (including  the  Kuomintang-Com- 
munist  conflict),  and  the  knowledge  that  Chiang  expects  to  have  the  war  won 
for  him  outside  of  China  by  his  allies,  this  policy  had  the  advantage  that  as  long 
as  the  Kuomintang  leaders  saw  a  chance  for  survival  they  would  not  take  the 
steps  necessary  to  energize  an  effective  war.  It  would  thus  remove  any  active 
or  immediate  threat  to  Japan's  flank,  and  permit  consolidation  and  gradual  exten- 
sion of  the  important  Japanese-held  bases  in  China.  Finally,  it  would  permit 
the  accomplishment  of  these  aims  at  a  relatively  small  cost. 

Japan  chose  the  second  alternative,  accepting  the  gamble  that  the  Kuomintang 
would  behave  exactly  as  it  has.  Like  many  other  Japanese  gambles,  it  has  so 
far  proved  to  have  been  nicely  calculated.  China  is  dying  a  lingering  death  by 
slow  strangulation.  China  does  not  now  constitute  any  threat  to  Japan.  And 
China  cannot,  if  the  present  situation  continues,  successfully  resist  a  determined 
Japanese  drive  to  seize  our  offensive  bases  in  east  China. 

B.  The  position  of  the  Kuomintang  and  the  Generalissimo  is  weaker  than  it 
has  been  for  the  past  10  years. 

China  faces  economic  collapse.  This  is  causing  disintegration  of  the  army  and 
the  Government's  administrative  apparatus.  It  is  one  of  the  chief  causes  of 
growing  political  unrest.  The  Generalissimo  is  losing  the  support  of  a  China 
which,  by  unity  in  the  face  of  violent  aggression,  found  a  new  and  unexpected 
strength  during  the  first  2  years  of  the  war  with  Japan.  Internal  weaknesses 
are  becoming  accentuated,  and  there  is  taking  place  a  reversal  of  the  process  of 
unification. 

1.  Morale  is  low  and  discouragement  widespread.  There  is  general  feeling  of 
hopelessness. 

2.  The  authority  of  the  Central  Government  is  weakening  in  the  areas  away 
from  the  larger  cities,  and  Government  mandates  and  measures  of  control  cannot 
be  enforced  and  remain  ineffective.  It  is  becoming  difficult  for  the  Government 
to  collect  enough  food  for  its  huge  army  and  bureaucracy. 

3.  The  governmental  and  military  structure  is  being  permeated  and  demoral- 
ized from  top  to  bottom  by  corruption,  unprecedented  in  scale  and  openness. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  817 

4.  The  intellectual  and  salaried  classes,  who  have  suffered  the  most  heavily 
from  inflation,  are  in  danger  of  liquidation.  The  academic  groups  suffer  not 
only  the  attrition  and  demoralization  of  economic  stress ;  the  vs^eight  of  years  of 
political  control  and  repression  is  robbing  them  of  the  intellectual  vigor  and 
leadership  they  once  had. 

5.  Peasant  resentment  of  the  abuses  of  conscription,  tax  collection,  and  other 
arbitrary  impositions  has  been  widespread  and  is  growing.  The  danger  is  ever 
increasing  that  past  sporadic  outbreaks  of  banditry  and  agrarian  unrest  may  in- 
crease in  scale  and  find  political  motivation. 

6.  The  Provincial  groups,  are  making  common  cause  with  one  another  and 
with  other  dissident  groups  ,and  are  actively  consolidating  their  positions.  Their 
continuing  strength  in  the  face  of  the  growing  weakness  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment is  forcing  new  measures  of  political  appeasement  in  their  favor. 

7.  Unrest  within  the  Kuomintang  Armies  is  increasing,  as  shown  in  one  impor- 
tant instance  by  the  "young  generals'  conspiracy"  late  in  1943.  On  a  higher 
plane  the  war-zone  commanders  are  building  up  their  own  spheres  of  influence 
and  are  thus  creating  a  "new  warlordism." 

8.  The  break  between  the  Kuomintang  and  the  Communists  not  only  shows 
no  signs  of  being  closed  but  grows  more  critical  with  the  passage  of  time ;  the 
inevitability  of  civil  war  is  now  generally  accepted. 

9.  The  Kuomintang  is  losing  the  respect  and  support  of  the  people  by  its 
selfish  policies  and  its  refusal  to  heed  progressive  criticism.  It  seems  unable 
to  revivify  itself  with  fresh  blood,  and  its  unchanging  leadership  shows  a 
growing  ossification  and  loss  of  a  sense  of  reality.  To  combat  the  dissension  and 
cliquism  within  the  party,  which  grow  more  rather  than  less  acute,  the  leadership 
is  turning  toward  the  reactionary  and  unpopular  Chen  brothers'  clique. 

10.  llie  Generalissimo  shows  a  similar  loss  of  realistic  flexibility  and  a  hard- 
ening of  narrowly  conservative  views.  His  growing  megalomania  and  his  un- 
fortunate attempts  to  be  "sage"  as  well  as  leader — shown,  for  instance,  by 
"China's  Destiny"  and  his  book  on  economics — have  forfeited  the  respect  of  many 
intellectuals,  who  enjoy  in  China  a  position  of  unique  influence.  Criticism  of  his 
dictatorship  is  becoming  more  outspoken. 

These  symptoms  of  deterioration  and  internal  stress  have  been  increased 
by  the  defeat  in  Honan  and  will  be  further  accelerated  if,  as  seems  likely,  the 
Japanese  succeed  in  partially  or  wholly  depriving  the  Central  Government  of 
east  China  south  of  the  Yangtze. 

In  the  face  of  the  grave  crisis  with  which  it  is  confronted,  the  Kuomintang  is 
ceasing  to  be  the  unifying  and  progressive  force  in  Chinese  security,  the  role 
in  which  it  made  its  greatest  contribution  to  modern  China. 

C.  The  Kuomintang  is  not  only  proving  itself  incapable  of  averting  a  debacle 
by  its  own  initiatives  :  on  the  contrary,  its  policies  are  precipitating  the  crisis. 

Some  war-weariness  in  China  must  be  expected.  But  the  policies  of  the 
Kuomintang  under  the  impact  of  hyperinflation  and  to  the  presence  of  obvious 
signs  of  internal  and  external  weakness  must  be  described  as  bankrupt.  This 
truth  is  emphasized  by  the  failure  of  the  Kuomintang  to  come  to  grips  with 
the  situation  during  the  recently  concluded  plenary  session  of  the  central  execu- 
tive committee. 

1.  On  the  internal  political  front  the  desire  of  the  Kuomintang  leaders  to  per- 
petuate their  own  power  overrides  all  other  considerations. 

The  result  is  the  enthronement  of  reaction. 

The  Kuomintang  continues  to  ignore  the  great  political  drive  within  the 
country  for  democratic  reform.  The  writings  of  the  Generalissimo  and  the 
party  press  show  that  they  have  no  real  understanding  of  that  term.  Constitu- 
tionalism remains  an  empty  promise  for  which  the  only  "preparation"  is  a  half- 
hearted attempt  to  establish  an  unpopular  and  undemocratic  system  of  local 
self-government  based  on  collective  responsibility  and  given  odium  by  Japanese 
utilization  in  Manchuria  and  other  areas  under  their  control. 

Questions  basic  to  the  future  of  democracy  such  as  the  form  of  the  Constitution 
and  the  composition  and  election  of  the  National  Congress  remain  the  dictation 
of  the  Kuomintang.  There  is  no  progress  toward  the  fundamental  conditions  of 
freedom  of  expression  and  recognition  of  non-Kuomintang  groups.  Even  the 
educational  and  political  advantages  of  giving  power  and  democratic  character 
to  the  existing  but  important  People's  Political  Council  are  ignored. 

On  the  contrary,  the  trend  is  still  in  the  other  direction.  Through  such  means 
as  compulsory  political  training  for  Government  posts,  emphasis  on  the  political 
nature  of  the  army,  through  control,  and  increasing  identification  of  the  party 
and  Government,  the  Kuomintang  intensifies  its  drive  for  "Ein  Volk,  ein  Reich, 


818  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

ein  Fiihrer,"  even  though  such  a  policy  in  China  is  inevitably  doomed  to  failure. 

The  Kuomintang  shows  no  intention  of  relaxing  the  autoritarian  controls  on 
which  its  present  power  depends.  Far  from  discarding  or  reducing  the  para- 
phernalia of  a  police  state — the  multiple  and  omnipresent  secret-police  organi- 
zations, the  gendarmerie,  and  so  forth — it  continues  to  strengthen  them  as  its 
last  resort  for  internal  security.  (For  the  reenforcement  of  the  most  impor- 
tant of  these  German-inspired  and  Gestapo-like  organizations  we  must,  unfortu- 
nately, bear  some  responsibility.) 

Obsessed  by  the  growing  and  potential  threat  of  the  Communists,  who  it  fears 
may  attract  the  popular  support  its  own  nature  makes  impossible,  the  Kuomin- 
tang, despite  the  pretext — to  meet  foreign  and  Chinese  criticism — of  conducting 
negotiations  with  the  Communists,  continues  to  adhere  to  policies  and  plans 
which  can  only  result  in  civil  war.  In  so  doing,  it  shows  itself  blind  to  the 
facts:  that  its  internal  political  and  military  situation  is  so  weak  that  success- 
without  outside  assistance  is  most  problematic,  that  such  a  civil  war  would 
hasten  the  process  of  distintegration  and  the  spread  of  chaos ;  that  it  would 
prevent  the  prosecution  of  any  effective  war  against  Japan ;  and  that  the  only 
parties  to  benefit  would  be  Japan  immediately  and  Russia  eventually.  Prepara- 
tions for  this  civil  war  include  an  alliance  with  the  present  Chinese  puppets 
■which  augur  ill  for  future  unity  and  democracy, 

2.  On  the  economic  front  the  Kuomintang  is  unwilling  to  take  any  effective 
steps  to  check  inflation  which  would  injure  the  landlord-capitalist  class. 

It  is  directly  responsible  for  the  increase  of  official  corruption,  which  is  one 
of  the  main  obstacles  to  any  rational  attempt  to  ameliorate  the  financial  situa- 
tion. It  does  nothing  to  stop  large-scale  profiteering,  hoarding,  and  speculation, 
all  of  which  are  carried  on  by  people  either  powerful  in  the  party  or  with  inti- 
mate political  connections. 

It  fails  to  carry  out  effective  mobilization  of  resources.  Such  measures  of 
■wartime  control  as  it  has  promulgated  have  remained  a  dead  letter  or  have 
intensified  the  problems  they  were  supposedly  designed  to  remedy,  as,  for 
instance,  ill-advised  and  poorly  executed  attempts  at  price  regulations. 

It  passively  allows  both  industrial  and  the  more  important  handicraft  pro- 
duction to  run  down,  as  they,  of  course,  must  when  it  is  more  profitable  for 
speculators  to  hold  raw  materials  than  to  have  them  go  through  the  normal 
productive  process. 

It  fails  to  carry  out  rationing  except  in  a  very  limited  way,  or  to  regulate  the 
manufacture  and  trade  in  luxury  goods,  many  of  which  come  from  areas  under 
Japanese  control.  It  shows  little  concern  that  these  imports  are  largely  paid 
for  with  strategic  commodities  of  value  to  the  enemy. 

It  fails  to  make  an  effective  attempt  to  reduce  the  budgetary  deficit  and 
increases  revenue  by  tapping  such  resources  as  excess  profits  and  incomes  of 
landlords  and  merchants.  It  allows  its  tax-collecting  apparatus  to  bog  down 
in  corruption  and  ineflacieney  to  the  point  that  possibly  not  more  than  one-third 
of  revenues  collected  reach  the  Government.  It  continues  to  spend  huge  Gov- 
ernment funds  on  an  idle  and  useless  party  bureaucracy. 

At  best,  it  passively  watches  inflation  gather  momentum  without  even  attempt- 
ing palliative  measures  available  to  it,  such  as  the  aggressive  sale  of  gold  and 
foreign  currency. 

It  refuses  to  attack  the  fundamental  economic  problems  of  China,  such  as  the 
growing  concentration  of  landholdings,  extortionate  rents,  and  ruinous  interest 
rates,  and  the  impact  of  inflation. 

3.  On  the  external  front  the  Kuomintang  is  showing  itself  inept  and  selfishly 
short-sighted  by  progresive  estrangement  of  its  allies. 

By  persistence  in  tactics  of  bargaining,  bluff,  and  blackmail,  most  inappro- 
priate to  its  circumstances,  and  its  continuing  failure  to  deal  openly  and  frankly, 
and  to  extend  whole-hearted  cooperation,  which  its  own  interests  demand,  the 
Kuomintang  is  alienating  China's  most  important  ally,  the  United  States.  It 
has  already  alienated  its  other  major  jwtential  ally,  Soviet  Russia,  toward  which 
its  attitude  is  as  irrational  and  short-sighted  as  it  is  toward  the  Communists. 
The  latest  example  of  this  is  the  irresponsible  circulation  of  the  report  that 
Soviet  Russia  and  Japan  have  signed  a  secret  military  agreement  permitting 
Japanese  troop  withdrawals  from  Manchuria. 

It  is  allowing  this  situation  to  develop  at  a  time  when  its  survival  is  de- 
pendent as  never  before  upon  foreign  support.  But  the  Kuomintang  is  en- 
dangering not  only  itself  by  its  rash  foreign  policy :  There  are  indications  that  it 
is  anxious  to  create  friction  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  and 
Russia.    When  speedy  victory,  and  any  victory  at  all,  demands  maximizing  of 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  819 

agreements  and  the  minimizing  of  frictions,  such  maneuvers  amount  to  sabotage 
of  the  war  effort  of  the  United  Nations. 

4.  On  the  military  front  the  Kuomintang  appears  to  have  decided  to  let 
America  win  the  war  and  to  have  withdrawn  for  all  practical  purposes  from 
active  participation. 

Its  most  important  present  contribution  is  to  allow  us,  at  our  own  and 
fantastic  cost,  to  build  and  use  air  bases  in  China. 

It  delayed,  perhaps  too  long  for  success,  to  allow  forces  designated  for  the 
purpose  and  trained  and  equipped  by  us  to  take  the  offensive  in  west  Yunnan, 
even  though  needed  to  support  the  American-Chinese  campaign  in  north  Burma, 
the  purpose  of  which  is  to  open  a  life  line  into  China  and  facilitate  the  eventual 
landing  on  the  China  coast.  It  agreed  to  this  action  only  after  long  months  of 
obstruction. 

It  fails  to  make  effective  use  of  American  equipment  given  to  it,  as  it  also  failed 
with  earlier  Russian  supplies.  Equipment  brought  into  China  has  often  not  been 
transported  to  the  fighting  fronts.  In  other  cases  it  has  been  known  to  have 
been  hoarded  or  diverted  to  nonmilitary  purpose.  China  has  displayed  a  dog  in 
the  manger  attitude  in  regard  to  equipment  consigned  to  China  and  deteriorat- 
ing in  India  for  lack  of  transportation.  It  has  concealed  and  refused  to  make 
available  to  our  forces  hoards  of  supplies  such  as  gasoline  known  to  exist  in 
China,  even  when  the  emergency  was  great  and  China's  own  interest  directly 
served. 

It  has  consistently  refused  to  consolidate  and  efficiently  administer  transiwrta- 
tion.  In  the  past  this  resulted  in  great  losses  of  supplies  in  the  Japanese  capture 
of  Burma  and  west  Yunnan ;  now  it  is  crippling  Chinese  internal  transportation 
on  which  military  activity  must  depend. 

It  has  allowed  military  cooperation  to  be  tied  up  with  irrelevant  financial 
demands  which  can  only  be  described  as  a  form  of  blackmail.  It  has  made  these 
excessive  demands  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  American  expenditures  in  China 
(against  which  there  are  almost  no  balancing  Chinese  payments)  continually  add 
to  the  large  Chinese  nest  egg  of  foreign  exchange,  which  cannot  be  used  in  China 
at  present  and  thus  constitutes  in  effect  a  "kitty"  being  hoarded  for  postwar  use 

It  has  failed  to  implement  military  requisitioning  laws  to  assist  us  in  obtain- 
ing supplies  in  China  and  has  left  us  at  the  mercy  of  conscienceless  profiteers, 
some  of  whom  have  been  known  to  have  oflicial  connections.  It  has  permitted 
the  imposition  on  us  of  fantastic  prices,  made  more  so  by  a  wholly  unrealistic 
exchange  rate,  for  articles  in  some  cases  originally  supplied  to  China  through 
American  credits.  It  seemingly  has  ignored  the  fact  that  the  more  supplies  that 
can  be  obtained  in  China,  the  greater  the  tonnage  from  India  that  can  be  devoted 
to  other  essential  military  items. 

It  remains  uncooperative  and  at  times  obstructive  in  American  efforts  to  col- 
lect vital  intelligence  regarding  the  enemy  in  China.  This  attitude  is  exem- 
plified by  the  disapi)ointing  fruits  of  promised  cooi)eration  by  Chinese  espionage 
organizations  (toward  which  we  have  expended  great  effort  and  large  sums)  ; 
by  the  continued  obstruction,  in  the  face  of  agreement,  to  visits  by  American 
observers  to  the  actual  fighting  fronts,  and  by  the  steadfast  refusal  to  permit  any 
contact  with  the  Communist  areas.  It  apparently  remains  oblivious  to  the 
urgent  military  need,  both  in  China  and  in  other  related  theaters,  for  this  in- 
telligence regarding  our  common  enemy,  and  it  seemingly  cares  little  for  the  fact 
that  exclusion  from  Communist-controlled  territory  hampers  our  long-range 
bombing  of  Japan  and  may  cost  needless  loss  of  American  lives. 

In  its  own  war  effort  a  pernicious  and  corrupt  conscription  system  which 
works  to  insure  the  selection  and  retention  of  the  unfit,  since  the  ablest  and  the 
strongest  can  either  evade  conscription,  buy  their  way  out,  or  desert.  It  starves 
and  maltreats  most  of  its  troops  to  the  degree  that  their  military  effectiveness  is 
greatly  impaired  and  military  service  is  regarded  in  the  minds  of  the  people 
as  a  sentence  of  death.  At  the  same  time  it  refuses  to  follow  the  suggestion  that 
the  army  should  be  reduced  to  the  size  that  could  be  adequately  fed,  medically 
cared  for,  trained  and  armed.  It  bases  this  refusal  on  mercenary  political  con- 
siderations— the  concentration  on  the  continuing  struggle  for  power  in  China, 
and  the  ultimate  measurement  of  power  in  terms  of  armies. 

For  the  same  reason  it  refuses  to  mobilize  its  soldiers  and  people  for  the  only 
kind  of  war  which  China  is  in  a  position  to  wage  effectively — a  i)eople's  guerrilla 
war.  Perhaps  our  entry  into  the  war  has  simplified  the  problems  of  the  Kuomin- 
tang. As  afraid  of  the  forces  within  the  country,  its  own  people,  as  it  is  of  the 
Japanese,  it  now  seeks  to  avoid  conflict  with  the  Japanese  in  order  to  concentrate 
on  the  perpetuation  of  its  own  power. 


820  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  condition  to  which  it  has  permitted  its  armies  to  deteriorate  is  shown 
most  recently  by  the  defeat  in  Honan,  which  is  due  not  only  to  lack  of  heavy 
armament  but  also  to  poor  morale  and  miserable  condition  of  the  soldiers, 
absence  of  support  by  the  people,  who  have  been  consistently  mistreated,  lack 
of  leadership,  and  prevalent  corruption  among  the  ofBcers  through  such  prac- 
tices as  trade  with  the  occupied  areas. 

If  we  accept  the  obvious  indications  that  the  present  Kuomintang  leadership 
does  not  want  to  tight  the  Japanese  any  more  than  it  can  help,  we  must  go  further 
and  recognize  that  it  may  even  seek  to  prevent  China  from  becoming  the  battle- 
ground for  large-scale  campaigns  against  the  Japanese  land  forces.  This  helps  to 
explain  the  Kuomintang's  continued  dealings  with  the  Japanese  and  pupi)ets. 
Thus  the  Kuomintang  may  hope  to  avert  determined  Japanese  attack,  maintain 
its  own  position  and  power,  save  the  east  China  homes  of  practically  all  of  its 
oflBcials,  and  preserve  its  old  economic-industrial  base  in  the  coastal  cities. 

If  this  analysis  is  valid  it  reveals  on  the  part  of  the  Kuomintang  leadership, 
which  means  the  generalissimo,  a  cynical  disregard  of  the  added  cost  of  the 
inevitable  prolongation  of  the  war  in  American  lives  and  resources. 

D.  These  apparently  suicidal  policies  of  the  Kuomintang  have  their  roots  in 
the  composition  and  nature  of  the  party. 

In  view  of  the  above  it  becomes  pertinent  to  ask  why  the  Kuomintang  has  lost 
its  power  of  leadership;  why  it  neither  wishes  actively  to  wage  war  against 
Japan  itself  nor  to  cooperate  wholeheartedly  with  the  American  Army  in  China, 
and  why  it  has  ceased  to  be  capable  of  unifying  the  country. 

The  answer  to  all  these  questions  is  to  be  found  in  the  present  composition  and 
nature  of  the  party.  Politically,  a  classical  and  definitive  American  description 
becomes  ever  more  true :  the  Kuomintang  is  a  congerie  of  conservative  political 
cliques  interested  primarily  in  the  preservation  of  their  own  power  against  all 
outsiders  and  in  jockeying  for  position  among  themselves.  Economically,  the 
Kuomintang  rests  on  the  narrow  base  of  the  rural  gentry  landlords,  the  militar- 
ists, the  higher  ranks  of  the  Government  bureaucracy  and  merchant  bankers 
having  intimate  connections  with  the  bureaucrats.  This  base  has  actually  con- 
tracted during  the  war.  The  Kuomintang  no  longer  commands,  as  it  once  did, 
the  unequivocal  support  of  China's  industrialists,  who  as  a  group  have  been  much 
weakened  economically,  and  hence  politically,  by  the  Japanese  seizure  of  the 
coastal  cities. 

The  relation  of  this  description  of  the  Kuomintang  to  the  questions  propounded 
above  is  clear. 

The  Kuomintang  has  lost  its  leadership  because  it  has  lost  touch  with  and  is 
no  longer  representative  of  a  nation  which,  through  the  practical  experience 
of  the  war,  is  becoming  both  more  politically  conscious  and  more  aware  of  the 
party's  selfish  shortcomings. 

It  cannot  fight  an  effective  war  becaiTse  this  is  impossible  without  greater  re- 
liance upon  and  support  by  the  people.  There  must  be  a  release  of  the  national 
energy  such  as  occurred  during  the  early  period  of  the  war.  Under  present 
conditions,  this  can  be  brought  about  only  by  reform  of  the  party  and  greater 
political  democracy.  What  form  this  democracy  takes  is  not  as  important  as  the 
genuine  adoption  of  a  democratic  philosophy  and  attitude ;  the  threat  of  foreign 
invasion  is  no  longer  enough  to  stimulate  the  Chinese  people  and  only  real  reform 
can  now  regain  their  enthusiasm.  But  the  growth  of  democracy,  though  basic 
to  China's  continuing  war  effort,  would,  to  the  mind  of  the  Kuomintang's  present 
leaders,  imperil  the  foundations  of  the  party's  power  because  it  would  mean  that 
the  conservative  cliques  would  have  to  give  up  their  closely  guarded  monopoly. 
Bather  than  do  this,  they  prefer  to  see  the  war  remain  in  its  present  state  of 
passive  inertia.  They  are  thus  sacrificing  China's  national  interests  to  their 
own  selfish  ends. 

For  similar  reasons,  the  Kuomintang  is  unwilling  to  give  wholehearted  co- 
operation to  the  American  Army's  effort  in  China.  Full  cooperation  necessarily 
requires  the  broad  Chinese  military  effort  which  the  Kuomintang  is  unable,  to 
carry  out  or  to  make  possible.  In  addition,  the  Kuomintang  fears  that  large- 
scale,  widespread,  and  direct  contact  by  Americans  with  the  Chinese  war  effort 
will  expose  its  own  inactivity  and,  by  example  and  personal  contacts,  be  a 
liberalizing  influence. 

The  Kuomintang  cannot  unify  the  country  because  it  derives  its  support  from 
the  economically  most  conservative  groups,  who  wish  the  retention  of  China's 
economically  and  socially  backward  agrarian  society.  These  groups  are  in- 
capable of  bringing  about  China's  industrialization,  although  they  pay  this 
objective  elaborate  lip  service.  They  are  also  committed  to  the  maintenance  of 
an  order  which  by  its  very  nature  fosters  particularism  and  resists  modern 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  821 

centralization.  Countless  examples  can  be  given  to  show  the  line-up  of  the  party 
with  the  groups  that  oppose  modernization  and  industrialization — such  as  con- 
nections with  Szechwan  warlords  and  militarists.  The  Kuomintang  sees  no 
objection  to  maintaining  the  economic  interests  of  some  of  its  component  groups 
in  occupied  China  or  in  preserving  trade  with  occupied  China,  the  criterion  of 
which  is  not  the  national  interest  but  its  profitability  to  the  engaging  groups. 
This  explains  why  free  China's  imports  from  occupied  China  consist  largely  of 
luxuries,  against  exports  of  food  and  strategic  raw  materials.  It  is  therefore 
not  surprising  that  there  are  many  links,  both  political  and  economic,  between 
the  Kuomintang  and  the  puppet  regime. 

E.  The  present  policies  of  the  Kuomintang  seem  certain  of  failure ;  if  that 
failure  results  in  a  collapse  of  China,  it  will  have  consequences  disastrous  both 
to  our  immediate  military  plans  and  our  long-term  interests  in  the  Far  Bast. 

The  foregoing  analysis  has  shown  that  the  Kuomintang,  under  its  present 
leadership,  has  neither  the  ability  nor  desire  to  undertake  a  program  which 
could  energize  the  war  and  check  the  process  of  internal  disintegration.  Its 
preoccupation  with  the  maintenance  and  consolidation  of  its  power  must  result, 
to  the  contrary,  in  acceleration  rather  than  retardation  of  the  rate  of  this  disin- 
tegration. Unless  it  widens  its  base  and  changes  its  character,  it  must  be 
expected  to  continue  its  present  policies.  It  will  not  of  its  own  volition  take 
steps  to  bring  about  this  broadening  and  reform.  The  opposite  will  be  the  case : 
Precisely  because  it  has  lost  popular  support,  it  is  redoubling  its  efiorts  to 
maintain  and  monopolize  control. 

The  present  policies  of  the  Kuomintang  seem  certain  to  fail  because  they  run 
counter  to  strong  forces  within  the  country  and  are  forcing  China  into  ruin. 
Since  these  policies  are  not  favorable  to  us,  nor  of  assistance  in  the  prosecution 
of  an  effective  war  by  China,  their  failure  would  not  of  itself  be  disastrous  to 
American  interests.  For  many  reasons  mentioned  above,  we  mignt  welcome  the 
fall  of  the  Kuomintang  if  it  could  immediately  be  followed  by  a  progressive 
government  able  to  unify  the  country  and  help  us  fight  Japan. 

But  the  danger  is  that  the  present  drifting  and  deterioration  under  the 
Kuomintang  may  end  in  a  collapse.  The  result  would  be  the  creation  in  China 
of  a  vacuum.  This  would  eliminate  any  possibility  in  the  near  future  of  utilizing 
China's  potential  military  strength.  Because  the  Japanese  and  their  puppets 
might  be  able  to  occupy  this  vacuum,  at  much  less  cost  than  by  a  major  military 
campaign,  it  might  also  become  impossible  for  us  to  exploit  China's  flank  posi- 
tion and  to  continue  operating  from  Chinese  bases.  The  war  would  thus  be 
prolonged  and  made  more  difl5cult. 

Such  a  collapse  would  also  initiate  a  period  of  internal  chaos  in  China,  which 
would  deter  the  emergence  of  a  strong  and  stable  government,  an  indispensable 
precondition  for  stability  and  order  in  the  Far  East. 

China,  which  might  be  a  minor  asset  to  us  now,  would  become  a  major 
liability. 

F.  There  are,  however,  active  and  constructive  forces  in  China  opposed  to  the 
present  trends  of  the  Kuomintang  leadership  which,  if  given  a  chance,  might 
avert  the  threatened  collapse. 

These  groups,  all  increasingly  dissatisfied  with  the  Government  and  the  party 
responsible  for  it,  include  the  patriotic  younger  army  oflScers ;  the  small  mer- 
chants ;  large  sections  of  the  lower  ranks  of  the  Government  bureaucracy ;  most 
of  the  foreign-returned  students ;  the  intelligentsia,  including  professors,  stu- 
dents, and  the  professional  classes ;  the  liberal  elements  of  the  Kuomintang,  who 
make  up  a  sizable  minority  under  the  leadership  of  such  men  as  Sun  Fo ;  the 
minor  parties  and  groups,  some  of  which  like  the  National  Salvationists  enjoy 
great  prestige ;  the  Chinese  Communist  Party ;  and  the  inarticulate  but  increas- 
ingly restless  rural  population. 

The  collective  numbers  and  influence  of  these  groups  could  be  tremendous. 
A  Kuomintang  oflScial  recently  admitted  that  resentment  against  the  present 
Kuomintang  Government  is  so  widespread  that  if  there  were  free,  universal 
elections  80  percent  of  the  votes  might  be  cast  against  it.  But  most  of  these 
groups  are  nebulous  and  unorganized,  feeling — like  the  farmers — perhaps  only 
a  blind  dislike  of  conditions  as  they  are.  They  represent  different  classes  and 
varying  political  beliefs,  where  they  have  any  at  all.  They  are  tending,  how- 
ever, to  draw  together  in  the  consciousness  of  their  common  interest  in  the 
change  of  the  status  quo.  This  awakening  and  fusion  is,  of  course,  opposed  by 
the  Kuomintang  with  every  means  at  its  disposal. 

The  danger,  as  conditions  grow  worse,  is  that  some  of  these  groups  may  act 
independently  and  blindly.  The  effect  may  be  to  make  confusion  worse.  Such 
might  be  the  case  in  a  military  putsch,  a  possibility  that  cannot  be  disregarded. 


822  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  result  might  be  something  analogous  to  the  Sian  incident  of  1936.  But  the 
greater  delicacy  and  precariousness  of  the  present  situation  would  lend  itself 
more  easily  to  exploitation  by  the  most  reactionary  elements  of  the  Kuomintang, 
the  Japanese,  or  the  puppets.  Another  possibility  is  the  outbreak,  on  a  much 
larger  scale  than  heretofore,  of  unorganized  and  disruptive  farmers  revolts. 
A  disturbing  phenomenon  is  the  apparent  attempt  now  being  made  by  some  of 
the  minority  parties  to  effect  a  marriage  of  convenience  with  the  provincial 
warlords,  among  the  most  reactionary  and  unscrupulous  figures  in  Chinese  poli- 
tics and  hardly  crusaders  for  a  new  democracy. 

The  hopeful  sign  is  that  all  of  these  groups  are  agreed  that  the  basic  problem 
in  China  today  is  political  reform  toward  democracy.  This  point  requires 
emphasis.  It  is  only  through  political  reform  that  the  restoration  of  the  will 
to  fight,  the  unification  of  the  country,  the  elimination  of  provincial  warlordism, 
the  solution  of  the  Communist  problem,  the  institution  of  economic  policies 
which  can  avoid  collapse,  and  the  emergence  of  a  government  actually  sup- 
ported by  the  people  can  be  achieved.  Democratic  reform  is  the  crux  of  all 
important  Chinese  problems,  military,  economic,  and  political. 

It  is  clear  beyond  doubt  that  China's  hope  for  internal  peace  and  effective 
unity — certainly  in  the  immediate  future  (which  for  the  sake  of  the  war  must 
be  our  prior  consideration)  and  probably  in  the  long  term  as  well — lies  neither 
with  the  present  Kuomintang  nor  with  the  Communists,  but  in  a  democratic 
combination  of  the  liberal  elements  within  the  country,  including  these  within 
the  Kuomintang,  and  the  probably  large  sections  of  the  Communists  who  would 
be  willing,  by  their  own  statements  and  past  actions,  to  collaborate  in  the 
resurrection  of  a  united  front. 

Given  the  known  interest  and  attitudes  of  the  Chinese  people,  we  can  be  sure 
that  measures  to  accomplish  the  solution  of  these  problems  will  be  undertaken 
in  earnest  by  a  broadly  based  government.  Such  a  government — and  only  such 
a  government — will  galvanize  China  out  of  its  military  inertia  by  restoring  na- 
tional morale  through  such  means  as  the  reduction  of  the  evils  of  conscription 
and  stopping  the  maltreatment  and  starvation  of  the  troops.  Such  a  govern- 
ment— and  only  such  a  government — will  automatically  end  the  paralyzing  in- 
ternal dissention  and  political  unrest.  Such  a  government — and  only  such  a 
government — will  undertake  the  economic  measures  necessary  to  increase  pro- 
duction, establish  effective  price  controls,  mobilize  national  resources,  and  end 
corruption,  hoarding,  speculation,  and  profiteering. 

It  is,  of  course,  unrealistic  to  assume  that  such  a  broadly  based  democratic 
government  can  be  established  at  one  stroke,  or  that  it  can  immediately  achieve 
the  accomplishment  of  these  broad  objectives.  But  progress  will  be  made  as, 
only  as,  the  government  moves  toward  democracy. 

II.  In  the  light  of  this  developing  crisis  ichat  should  be  the  American  attitude 
toicard  China  f 

It  is  impossible  to  predict  exactly  how  far  the  present  disintegration  in  China 
can  continue  without  spectacular  change  in  the  internal  situation  and  drastic 
effect  on  the  war  against  Japan.  But  we  must  face  the  question  whether  we 
can  afford  passively  to  stand  by  and  allow  the  process  to  continue  to  an  almost 
certainly  disastrous  collapse,  or  whether  we  wish  to  do  what  we  legitimately 
and  practically  can  to  arrest  it.  We  need  to  formulate  a  realistic  policy  toward 
China. 

A.  The  Kuomintang  and  Chiang  are  acutely  conscious  of  their  dei)endence  on 
us  and  will  be  forced  to  appeal  for  our  support. 

We  must  realize  that  when  the  process  of  disintegration  gets  out  of  hand 
it  will  be  to  us  that  the  Kuomintang  will  turn  for  financial,  political,  and  military 
salvation.  The  awareness  of  this  dependence  is  the  obvious  and  correct  explana- 
tion of  the  Kuomintang's  hypersensitivity  to  American  opinion  and  criticism. 
The  Kuomintang — and  particularly  the  Generalissimo — know  that  we  are  the 
only  disinterested,  yet  powerful,  ally  to  whom  China  can  turn. 

The  appeal  will  be  made  to  us  on  many  grounds  besides  the  obvious,  well- 
worn  but  still  effective  one  of  pure  sentiment.  They  have  said  in  the  past 
and  will  say  in  the  future  that  they  could  long  ago  have  made  peace  with  Japan 
on  what  are  falsely  stated  would  have  been  favorable  terms.  They  have  claimed 
and  will  claim  again  that  their  resistance  and  refusal  to  compromise  with  Japan 
saved  Russia,  Great  Britain,  and  ourselves,  ignoring  the  truth  that  our  own 
refusal  to  compromise  with  Japan  to  China's  disadvantage  brought  on  Pearl 
Harbor  and  our  involvement  before  we  were  ready.  They  have  complained  and 
will  continue  to  complain  that  they  have  received  less  support  in  the  form  of 
materials  than  any  other  major  ally,  forgetting  that  they  have  done  less  fighting. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  823 

have  not  used  the  materials  given,  and  vs^ould  not  have  had  the  ability  to  use 
what  they  asked  for.  Finally,  they  have  tried  and  will  continue  to  try  to  lay 
the  blame  on  us  for  their  difficulties,  distorting  the  effect  of  American  Army 
expenditures  in  China  and  ignoring  the  fact  that  these  expenditures  are  only 
a  minor  factor  in  the  whole  sorry  picture  of  the  mismanagement  of  the  Chinese 
economy. 

But  however  far-fetched  these  appeals,  our  flat  refusal  of  them  might  have 
several  embarrassing  effects. 

1.  We  would  probably  see  China  enter  a  period  of  internal  chaos.  Our  war 
effort  in  this  theater  would  be  disrupted,  instability  in  the  Far  East  prolonged, 
and  possible  Russian  intervention  attracted. 

2.  We  would  be  blamed  by  large  sections  of  both  Chinese  and  American  public 
opinion  for  "abandoning"  China  after  having  been  responsible  for  its  collapse. 
(In  a  measure  we  would  have  brought  such  blame  upon  ourselves  because  we 
have  tended  to  allow  ourselves  to  become  identified  not  merely  with  China  but 
also  with  the  Kuomintang  and  its  policies.  Henceforth,  it  may  be  the  better 
part  of  valor  to  avoid  too  close  identification  with  the  Kuomintang.) 

3.  By  an  apparent  abandonment  of  China  in  its  hour  of  need,  we  would  lose 
international  prestige,  especially  in  the  Far  East. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  conae  to  the  rescue  of  the  Kuomintang  on  its  own 
terms  we  would  be  buttressing,  but  only  temporarily,  a  decadent  regime  which 
by  its  existing  composition  and  program  is  incapable  of  solving  China's  problems. 
Both  China  and  ourselves  would  be  gaining  only  a  brief  respite  from  the  ultimate 
day  of  reckoning.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  it  is  to  our  advantage  to  avoid  a 
situation  arising  in  which  we  would  be  presented  with  a  Hobson's  choice  between 
two  such  unpalatable  alternatives. 

B.  The  Kuomintang's  dependence  can  give  us  great  influence. 
Circumstances  are  rapidly  developing  so  that  the  Generalissimo  will  have  to 

ask  for  the  continuance  and  increase  of  our  support.  Weak  as  he  is,  he  is  in 
no  position — and  the  weaker  he  becomes  the  less  he  will  be  able — to  turn  down  or 
render  nugatory  any  coordinated  and  positive  policy  we  may  adopt  toward 
China.  The  cards  are  all  in  our  favor.  Our  influence,  intelligently  used,  can  be 
tremendous. 

C.  There  are  three  general  alternatives  open  to  us. 

1.  We  may  give  up  China  as  hopeless  and  wash  our  hands  of  it  althogether. 

2.  We  may  continue  to  give  support  to  the  Generalissimo,  when  and  as  he 
asks  for  it. 

3.  We  may  formulate  a  coordinated  and  positive  policy  toward  China  and  take 
the  necessary  steps  for  its  implementation. 

D.  Our  choice  between  these  alternatives  must  be  determined  by  our  objectives 
in  China, 

The  United  States,  if  it  so  desired  and  if  it  had  a  coherent  policy,  could  play 
an  important  and  perhaps  decisive  role  in — 

1.  Stimulating  China  to  an  active  part  in  the  war  in  the  Far  East,  thus  hasten- 
ing the  defeat  of  Japan. 

2.  Staving  off  economic  collapse  in  China  and  bringing  about  basic  political 
and  economic  reforms,  thus  enabling  China  to  carry  on  the  war  and  enhance 
the  chances  of  its  orderly  postwar  recovery. 

3.  Enabling  China  to  emerge  from  the  war  as  a  major  and  stabilizing  factor  in 
postwar  east  Asia. 

4.  Winning  a  permanent  and  valuable  ally  in  the  progressive,  independent,  and 
democratic  China. 

E.  We  should  adopt  the  third  alternative — a  coordinated  and  positive  policy. 
This  is  clear  from  an  examination  of  the  background  of  the  present  situation 

in  China  and  the  proper  objectives  of  our  policy  there. 

The  first  alternative  must  be  rejected  on  immediate  military  grounds,  but  also 
for  obvious  long-range  considerations.  It  would  deprive  us  of  valuable  air  bases 
and  position  on  Japan's  flank.  Its  adoption  would  prolong  the  war.  We  cannot 
afford  to  wash  our  hands  of  China. 

The  results  of  the  second  alternative — which,  insofar  as  we  have  a  China 
policy,  has  been  the  one  we  have  been  and  are  pursuing — speak  for  themselves. 
The  substantial  financial  assistance  we  have  given  China  has  been  frittered 
away  with  neglibible,  if  any  effect  in  slowing  inflation  and  retarding  economic 
collapse.  The  military  help  we  have  given  has  certainly  not  been  used  to  increase 
China's  war  effort  against  Japan.  Our  political  support  has  been  used  for 
the  Kuomintang's  own  selfish  purposes  and  to  bolster  its  short-sighted  and  ruin- 
ous policies. 

The  third,  therefore,  is  the  only  real  alternative  left  to  us.  Granted  the  re- 
jection of  the  first  alternative,  there  is  no  longer  a  question  of  helping  and  advis- 


824  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC  RELATIONS 

Ing  China.  China  itself  must  request  this  help  and  advice.  The  only  question  is 
whether  we  give  this  help  within  a  framework  which  malies  sense,  or  whether 
we  continue  to  give  it  in  our  present  disjointed  and  absent-minded  manner.  lu 
the  past  it  has  sometimes  seemed  that  our  right  hand  did  not  know  what  the 
left  was  doing.  To  continue  without  a  coherent  and  coordinated  policy  will  be 
dissipating  our  effort  without  either  China  or  ourselves  deriving  any  appreciable 
benefit.  It  can  only  continue  to  create  new  problems,  in  addition  to  these  already 
troubling  us,  without  any  compensating  advantages  beyond  those  of  indolent 
short-termed  expediency.  But  most  important  is  the  possibility  that  this  hap- 
hazard giving,  this  serving  of  short-term  expediency,  may  not  be  enough  to  save 
the  situation ;  even  with  it,  China  may  continue  toward  collapse. 

F.  This  positive  policy  should  be  political. 

The  problem  confronting  us  is  whether  we  are  to  continue  as  in  the  past  ta 
ignore  politcal  considerations  of  direct  military  significance  or  whether  we  are 
to  take  a  leaf  out  of  the  Japanese  book  and  invoke  even  stronger  existing  political 
forces  in  China  to  achieve  our  military  and  long-term  political  objective. 

We  must  seek  to  contribute  toward  the  reversal  of  the  present  movement 
toward  collapse  and  to  the  rousing  of  China  from  its  military  inactivity.  This 
can  be  brought  about  only  by  an  accelerated  movement  toward  democratic  polit- 
ical reform  within  China.  Our  part  must  be  that  of  a  catalytic  agent  in  this 
process  of  China's  democratization.  It  can  be  carried  out  by  the  careful  exer- 
tion of  our  influence,  which  has  so  far  not  been  consciously  and  systematically 
used. 

///.  TJie  implementation  of  this  political  policy,  though  difficult  in  some  respects^ 
is  practical  and  can  &e  carried  out  by  many  means 

A.  Diplomatic  finesse  will  be  required  in  the  execution  of  this  policy  in  such 
a  way  as  not  to  offend  the  strong  current  of  genuine  nationalism  (as  disting- 
uished from  the  chauvinism  of  the  Kuomintang)  which  characterizes  almost 
all  sections  of  the  Chinese  people.  There  must  be  a  sensitivity  to  the  situation 
In  China  and  the  political  changes  there  so  that  there  can  be  an  appropriate 
and  immediate  stiffening  or  softening  of  the  measures  which  we  undertake. 
This  tact  and  sensitivity  wHl  be  required  not  only  of  the  top  policy-directing 
agency  but  of  all  other  agencies  actually  implementing  that  policy  and  concerned 
in  direct  relations  with  China. 

There  must  be  effective  coordination  of  the  policies  and  actions  of  all  American 
Government  agencies  concerned  in  these  dealings  with  China. 

The  present  lack  of  effective  cooperation  between  the  various  Government 
agencies — State,  War,  and  some  of  the  newer  autonomous  organizations — de- 
tracts from  the  efficient  functioning  of  each,  and  weakens  American  influence, 
when  it  is  most  needed. 

It  must  be  recognized — and  it  will  be  even  more  the  case  under  the  iwlicy 
proposed — that  all  our  dealings  with  all  our  activities  in  China  have  political 
implication.  Coordination  is  absolutely  essential  for  the  achievement  of  unity 
of  policy  and  synchronization  of  action.  It's  attainment  will  require  intelligent 
and  forceful  direction  both  in  Washington  and  in  Chunking, 

The  logical  person  to  coordinate  activities  in  Chunking  is  obviously,  because 
of  the  broad  issues  involved,  the  Ambassador.  Similarly  the  corresponding 
person  in  Wahington  might  be  the  Chief  of  the  China  Section  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment who  would  watch  the  whole  field  for  the  President  or  a  responsible  Cabinet 
member.  Positive  action,  of  course,  would  depend  on  constant  and  close  con- 
sultation, both  in  Washington  and  in  the  field,  between  the  representatives  of 
the  State,  War,  Navy,  and  Treasury  Departments  and  the  other  agencies  operat- 
ing in  China. 

C.  Since  all  measures  open  to  us  should  not  be  applied  simultaneously,  there 
should  be  careful  selection  and  timing. 

Some  measures  will  be  simple  and  immediately  useful.  Others  should  be 
deferred  until  primary  steps  have  been  taken.  Still  others  will  be  more  force- 
ful or  dii'ect  and  their  use  will  depend  on  the  Kuomintang's  recalcitrance  to 
change  its  ways.     We  must  avoid  overplaying  or  underplaying  our  hand. 

D.  Specific  measures  which  might  be  adopted  in  the  carrying  out  of  this  posi- 
tive policy  include  the  following : 

1.  Negative:  (a)  Stop  our  present  mollycoddling  of  China  by:  Resti'icting 
lend-lease,  cutting  down  training  of  Chinese  military  cadets,  discontinuing  train- 
ing of  the  Chinese  Army,  taking  a  firmer  stand  in  the  financial  negotiations, 
or  stopping  the  shipment  of  gold.  Any  or  all  of  these  restrictive  measures  can 
be  reversed  as  the  Generalissimo  and  the  Kuomintang  become  moi-e  cooperative 
in  carrying  on  military  operations,  using  equipment  and  training  supplied,  being 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  825 

reasonable  on  financial  questions,  or  allowing  ns  freedom  in  such  military  require- 
ments as  establishing  contact  with  the  Communist  areas. 

(6)  Stop  building  up  the  Generalissimo's  and  the  Kuomintang's  prestige  in- 
ternationally and  in  the  United  States.  Such  "face"  serves  only  to  bolster  the 
regime  internally  and  to  harden  it  in  its  present  policies.  Our  inclusion  of 
China  as  one  of  the  Big  Four  served  a  useful  purpose  in  the  early  stage  of  the 
war  and  as  a  counter  to  Japanese  racial  propaganda  but  has  now  lost  its  justi- 
fication. 

We  make  fools  of  ourselves  by  such  actions  as  the  attention  given  to  the 
meaningless  utterances  of  Chu  Hsueh-fen  as  a  spokesman  of  Chinese  labor  and 
the  prominence  accorded  to  China  in  the  International  Labor  Office  Conference. 
Our  tendency  toward  overlavish  praise  is  regarded  by  the  Chinese  as  a  sign 
of  either  stupdity  or  weakness. 

Abandonment  of  glib  generalities  for  hard-headed  realism  in  our  attitude 
toward  China  will  be  quickly  understood,  without  the  resentment  that  would 
probably  be  felt  against  the  British.  We  can  make  it  clear  that  praise  will  be 
given  when  praise  is  due. 

(c)  Stop  making  unconditional  and  grandiose  promises  of  help  along  such 
lines  as  UNNRA,  postwar  economic  aid,  and  political  support.  We  can  make  it 
clear  without  having  to  be  vei*y  explicit  that  we  stand  ready  to  help  China  when 
China  shows  itself  deserving.  This  ties  into  the  more  positive  phase  of  pub- 
licity and  propaganda  to  the  effect,  for  instance,  that  American  postwar  eco- 
nomic aid  will  not  be  extended  to  build  up  monopolistic  enterprise  or  support  the 
landlord-gentry  class  but  in  the  interests  of  a  democratic  people. 

(d)  Discontinue  our  present  active  collaboration  with  Chinese  secret  police 
organizations,  which  support  the  forces  of  reaction  and  stand  for  the  opposite 
of  our  American  democratic  aims  and  ideals.  This  collaboration,  which  results 
in  the  effective  strengthening  of  a  Gestapo-like  organization,  is  becoming  in- 
creasingly known  in  China.  It  confuses  and  disillusions  Chinese  liberals,  who 
look  to  us  as  their  hope,  and  it  weakens  our  position  with  the  Kuomintang  leaders 
in  pressing  for  democratic  reform. 

2.  Positive:  (o)  High  Government  officials  in  conversation  with  Chinese  lead- 
ers in  Washington  and  in  China  can  make  known  our  interest  in  democracy  and 
unity  in  China  and  our  dissatisfaction  with  present  Kuomintang  military,  finan- 
cial, and  other  policies.  Such  suggestions  will  bear  great  weight  if  they  come 
from  the  President  and  advantage  can  be  taken  of  opportunities  such  as  the 
visits  of  the  Vice  President  Wallace  to  China  and  H.  H.  Kung  to  the  United 
States.  A  progressive  stage  can  be  questions  or  statements  by  Members  of 
Congress  regarding  affairs  in  China. 

(&)  We  should  take  up  the  repeated,  but  usually  insincere  requests  of  the 
Kuomintang  for  advice.  If  advisers  are  asked  for,  we  should  see  that  they  are 
provided,  that  good  men  are  selected,  and  that  they  get  all  possible  aid  and 
support  from  us.  While  the  Kuomintang  will  be  reluctant  to  accept  the  advice 
we  may  give,  its  mere  reiteration  will  have  some  effect. 

(c)  We  should  seek  to  extend  our  influence  on  Chinese  opinion  by  every  prac- 
tical means  available. 

The  Office  of  War  Information  should  go  beyond  its  present  function  of  report- 
ing American  war  news  to  pointing  up  the  values  of  democracy  as  a  permanent 
political  system  and  as  an  aid  in  the  waging  of  war  against  totalitarianism.  We 
should  attempt  to  increase  the  dissemination  in  China,  by  radio  or  other  more 
direct  means,  of  constructive  American  criticism.  This  should  include  recogni- 
tion and  implied  encouragement  to  liberal  and  progressive  forces  within  China. 
Care  should  be  taken  to  keep  this  criticism  on  a  helpful,  constructive,  and  objec- 
tive plane  and  to  avoid  derogatory  attacks  which  may  injure  Chinese  nation- 
alistic sensitivities.  To  do  this  work,  there  may  have  to  be  some  expansion  of 
the  OWI  in  China  and  of  our  propaganda  directed  toward  this  country. 

A  second  line  is  the  active  expansion  of  our  cultural  relations  program.  The 
present  diversion,  b.v  Koumintang  wishes,  to  technical  subjects  should  be  recti- 
fied and  greater  emphasis  laid  on  social  sciences,  cultural,  and  practical  political 
subjects  such  as  American  Government  administration.  We  should  increase  our 
aid  and  support  to  intellectuals  in  China  by  the  many  means  already  explored, 
such  as  aid  to  research  in  China,  translation  of  articles,  and  opportunity  for 
study  or  lecturing  in  the  United  States. 

Other,  more  indirect  lines,  are  the  expansion  of  our  American  Foreign  Service 
representation  in  China  to  new  localities  (since  each  office  is  in  some  measure  a 
center  of  American  influence  and  contact  with  Chinese  lilierals  and  returned 
students  from  the  United  States)  and  the  careful  indoctrination  of  the  American 


826  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Army  personnel  in  China  to  create,  by  example  and  their  attitude  toward  Chi- 
oese,  favorable  impressions  of  America  and  the  things  that  America  stands  for. 
Where  contact  between  American  and  Chinese  military  personnel  has  been 
close,  as  in  Burma,  the  result  has  apparently  been  a  democratizing  influence. 

(d)  We  should  assist  the  education  of  public  opinion  in  the  United  States 
toward  a  realistic  but  constructively  sympathetic  attitude  toward  China.  The 
most  obvious  means  would  be  making  background  information  available,  in  an 
unofficial  way,  to  responsible  political  commentators,  writers,  and  research 
workers.  Without  action  on  our  part  their  writings  will  become  known  to  Chi- 
nese Government  circles  and  from  them  to  other  politically  minded  groups.  We 
should,  however,  coordinate  this  with  the  activity  described  in  the  section  above 
to  promote  dissemination  in  China. 

(e)  We  should  maintain  friendly  relations  with  the  liberal  elements  in  the 
Kuomintang,  the  minor  parties,  and  the  Communists.  This  can,  and  should  for 
its  maximum  effect,  be  done  in  an  open,  aboveboard  manner.  The  recognition 
which  it  implies  will  be  quickly  understood  by  the  Chinese. 

Further  steps  in  this  direction  could  be  publicity  to  liberals,  such  as  distin- 
guished intellectuals.  When  possible  they  may  be  included  in  consideration  for 
special  honors  or  awards,  given  recognition  by  being  asked  to  participate  in  in- 
ternational commissions  or  other  bodies,  and  invited  to  travel  or  lecture  in  the 
United  States.  A  very  effective  action  of  this  type  would  be  an  invitation  to 
Madam  Sun  Yat-sen  from  the  White  House. 

We  should  select  men  of  known  liberal  view  to  represent  us  in  OWI,  cultural 
relations,  and  other  lines  of  work  in  China. 

(/)  We  should  continue  to  show  an  interest  in  the  Chinese  Communists. 
This  includes  contact  with  the  Communist  representatives  in  Chungking,  pub- 
licity on  the  blockade  and  the  situation  between  the  two  parties,  and  continued 
pressure  for  the  dispatch  of  observers  to  north  China.  At  the  same  time  we 
should  stress  the  importance  of  north  China  militarily  for  intelligence  regarding 
Japanese  battle  order,  Japanese  air  strength,  weather  reporting,  bombing  data, 
and  damage  assessment,  and  air  crew  evacuation  and  rescue  work.  We  should 
consider  the  eventual  advance  of  active  operations  against  the  Japanese  to  north 
China  and  the  question  of  assistance  to  or  cooperation  with  Communist  and 
guerrilla  forces.  If  our  reasonable  requests  based  on  urgent  military  grounds 
do  not  receive  a  favorable  response,  we  should  send  our  military  observers  any- 
way. 

(g)  We  should  consider  the  training  and  equipping  of  provincial  and  other 
armies  in  China  in  cases  where  we  can  be  satisfied  that  they  will  fight  the  Jap- 
anese. 

ih)  We  should  continue  to  press,  and  if  necessary  insist,  on  getting  American 
observers  to  the  actual  fighting  fronts.  We  should  urge,  and  when  possible 
assist,  the  improvement  of  the  condition  of  the  Chinese  soldier,  especially  his 
treatment,  clothing,  feeding,  and  medical  care. 

(i)  We  should  publicize  statements  by  responsible  Government  ofiicials  indi- 
cating our  interest  in  Chinese  unity  and  our  attitvide  toward  such  questions  as 
the  use  of  American  lend-lease  supplies  by  the  Kuomintang  in  a  civil  war.  It  is 
interesting  for  instance,  that  Under  Secretary  Welles'  letter  to  Browder  regard- 
ing American  interest  in  Chinese  unity  was  considered  so  important  by  the  Kuo- 
mintang that  publication  in  China  was  prohibited. 

This  program  is,  of  course,  far  from  complete.  Other  measures  will  occur  to 
the  policy  agency  and  will  suggest  themselves  as  the  situation  in  China  develops. 

E.  Most  of  these  measures  can  be  applied  progressively. 

This  is  true,  for  instance,  of  the  various  negative  actions  suggested,  and  of  the 
conversations,  statements,  and  other  lines  of  endeavor  to  influence  public  opinion 
in  China.  A  planned  activity  of  encouragement  and  attention  to  liberals,  minor 
party  leaders,  and  the  Communists  can  advance. 

F.  The  program  suggested  contains  little  that  is  not  already  being  done  in  an 
uncoordinated  and  only  partially  effective  manner. 

What  is  needed  chiefly  is  an  integration,  systematic  motivation  and  planned 
expension  of  activities  in  which  we  are  already,  perhaps  in  some  cases  uncon- 
sciously, engaged.  We  do,  for  instance,  try  to  maintain  contact  with  liberal 
groups ;  we  have  expressed  the  desire  to  send  observers  to  the  Communist  area ; 
we  have  a  weak  cultural  relations  program;  and  the  OWI  has  made  some  at- 
tempts to  propagandize  American  democratic  ideals. 

G.  The  program  constitutes  only  very  modified  and  indirect  intervention  in 
Chinese  affairs. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  827 

It  must  be  admitted  that  some  of  the  measures  pi'oposed  would  involve  taking 
more  than  normal  interest  in  the  affairs  of  another  sovereign  nation.  But  they 
do  not  go  so  far  as  to  infringe  on  Chinese  sovei'eignty.  If  we  choose  to  make 
lend-lease  conditional  ou  a  better  war  effort  by  China,  it  is  also  China's  freedom 
to  refuse  to  accept  it  on  these  conditions.  We  do  not  go  nearly  as  far  as  im- 
perialistic countries  have  often  done  in  the  past.  We  obviously  do  not,  for 
instance,  suggest  active  assistance  or  subsidizing  of  rival  parties  to  the  Kuomin- 
tang,  as  the  Russians  did  in  the  case  of  the  Communists. 

Furthermore,  the  Chinese  Government  would  find  it  difficult  to  object.  The 
Chinese  have  abused  their  freedom  to  propagandize  in  the  United  States  by  the 
statements  and  writing  of  such  men  as  Lin  Yu-tang.  They  have  also,  and  through 
Lin  Yu-tang,  who  carries  an  official  passport  as  a  representative  of  the  Chinese 
Government,  engaged  in  "cultural  relations"  work.  They  have  freely  criticized 
American  policies  and  American  leaders.  And  they  have  attempted  to  dabble 
in  American  politics,  througli  Madame  Chiang,  Luce,  Willkie,  and  Republican 
Congressmen.  They  have  had,  and  will  continue  to  have,  freedom  to  try  to  influ- 
ence public  opinion  in  the  United  States  in  the  same  way  that  we  will  try  to  do 
it  in  China. 


Exhibit  No.  255 

MiLiTART  Weakness  of  Our  Fab  Eastern  Policy 

February  14,  1945. 
To  the  Commandinff  General,  USAF: 

American  policy  in  the  Far  East  can  have  but  one  immediate  objective:  the 
defeat  of  Japan  in  the  shortest  possible  time  with  the  least  expenditure  of  Ameri- 
can lives.  To  the  attainment  of  this  objective  all  other  considerations  should  be 
subordinate. 

The  attainment  of  this  objective  demands  the  effective  mobilization  of  China 
in  the  war  against  Japan.  Operating  as  we  are  in  a  land  theater  at  the  end  of 
a  supply  line  many  thousands  of  miles  in  length,  the  human  and  economic 
resources  of  China  increase  in  importance  as  we  draw  closer  to  Japan's  inner 
zone  of  defense.  Denied  the  effective  use  of  these  resources,  the  attainment  of 
our  primary  objective  will  be  unnecessarily  delayed. 

There  is  ample  evidence  to  show  that  to  the  present  Kuomintang  government 
the  war  against  Japan  is  secondary  in  importance  to  its  own  preservation  in 
power.  China's  military  failure  is  due  in  large  part  to  internal  political  disunity 
and  the  Kuomintang's  desire  to  conserve  such  military  force  as  it  has  for  utiliza- 
tion in  the  maintenance  of  its  political  power.  The  intention  of  the  generalissimo 
to  eliminate  all  political  opposition,  by  force  of  arms  if  necessary,  has  not  been 
abandoned.  In  the  present  situation  in  China,  where  power  or  self-preservation 
depend  upon  the  possession  of  military  force,  neither  the  Kuomintang  nor  opposi- 
tion groups  are  willing  to  expend  their  military  resourses  against  the  Japanese 
through  fear  that  it  will  weaken  them  vis-tl-vis  other  groups.  A  recent  instance 
is  the  lack  of  resistance  to  the  Japanese  capture  of  the  southern  section  of  the 
Hankow-Canton  Railway.  Equally,  the  Kuomintang  is  jealously  intent  on  pre- 
venting the  strengthening  of  other  groups:  Witness  the  blockade  of  the 
Communists. 

The  aim  of  American  policy,  as  indicated  clearly  by  official  statements  in  the 
United  States,  is  the  establishment  of  political  unity  in  China  as  the  indispensable 
preliminary  to  China's  effective  military  mobilization.  The  execution  of  our 
policy  has  not  contributed  to  the  achievement  of  this  publicly  stated  aim.  On 
the  contrary,  it  has  retarded  its  achievement.  It  has  had  this  undesired  and 
undesirable  effect  because  our  statements  and  actions  in  China  have  convinced 
the  Kuomintang  government  that  we  will  continue  to  support  it,  and  it  alone. 
The  Kuomintang  government  believes  that  it  will  receive  an  increasing  flow  of 
American  military  and  related  supplies  which,  if  past  experience  is  any  guide, 
it  will  commit  against  the  enemy  only  with  great  reluctance,  if  at  all. 

We  cannot  hope  for  any  improvement  in  this  situation  unless  we  understand 
the  objectives  of  the  Kuomintang  Government  and  throw  our  considerable  in- 
fluence upon  it  in  the  direction  of  internal  unity.  We  should  be  convinced  by  this 
time  that  the  effort  to  solve  the  Kuomintang-Communist  differences  by  diplo- 
matic means  has  failed ;  we  should  not  be  deceived  by  any  face-saving  formula  re- 


22848 — 52— pt.  3- 


828  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

suiting  from  the  discussions  because  neither  side  is  willing  to  bear  the  onus  of 
failure.  We  should  also  realize  that  no  goverament  can  survive  in  China  with- 
out American  support. 

There  are  in  China  important  elements  interested  in  governmental  reform  by 
which  unity  and  active  prosecution  of  the  war  may  result.  Aside  from  the 
Chinese  Communists,  however,  all  of  these  elements  are  cowed  by  a  widespread 
secret  police  system  and  lack  any  firm  rallying  point.  They  will  remain  help- 
less to  do  anything  constructive  as  long  as  statements  of  our  policy  indicate  that 
we  are  champions  of  the  status  quo. 

At  present  there  exists  in  China  a  situation  closely  paralleling  that  which 
existed  in  Yugoslavia  prior  to  Prime  Minister  Churchill's  declaration  of  support 
for  Marshal  Tito.    That  statement  was  as  follows  : 

"The  sanest  and  safest  course  for  us  to  follow  is  to  judge  all  parties  and 
factions  dispassionately  by  the  test  of  their  readiness  to  fight  the  Germans  and 
thus  lighten  the  burden  of  Allied  troops.  This  is  not  a  time  for  ideological  prefer- 
ences for  one  side  or  the  other." 

A  similar  public  statement  issued  by  the  Commander  in  Chief  with  regard  to 
China  would  not  mean  the  withdrawal  of  recognition  or  the  cessation  of  military 
aid  to  the  Central  Government;  that  would  be  both  unnecessary  and  unwise.  It 
would  serve  notice,  however,  of  our  preparation  to  malie  use  of  all  available 
means  to  achieve  our  primary  objective.  It  would  supply  for  all  Chinese  a  firm 
rallying  point  which  has  thus  far  been  lacking.  The  internal  effect  in  China 
would  be  so  profound  that  the  generalissimo  would  be  forced  to  make  conces- 
sions of  power  and  permit  united  front  coalition.  The  present  opposition  groups, 
no  longer  under  the  prime  necessity  of  safeguarding  themselves,  would  be  won 
wholeheartedly  to  our  side  and  we  would  have  in  China,  for  the  first  time,  a 
united  ally. 

Whether  we  like  it  or  not,  by  our  very  presence  here  we  have  become  a  force 
in  the  internal  politics  of  China  and  that  force  should  be  used  to  accomplish  our 
primary  mission.  In  spite  of  hero-worshipping  publicity  in  the  United  States, 
Chiang  Kai-shek  is  not  China  and  by  our  present  narrow  policy  of  outspokenly 
supporting  his  dog-in-the-manger  attitude  we  are  needlessly  cutting  ourselves 
oft'  from  millions  of  useful  allies ;  many  of  whom  are  already  organized  and  in 
position  to  engage  the  enemy.  These  allies,  let  it  be  clear,  are  not  confined  to 
Communist-controlled  areas  of  China,  but  are  to  be  found  everywhere  in  the  coun- 
try. The  Communist  movement  is  merely  the  most  prominent  manifestation  of  a 
condition  which  is  potentially  present  throughout  Chiha.  Other  important 
groups  favor  the  same  program  as  that  espoused  by  the  so-called  Communist- 
agrarian  reform,  civil  rights,  the  establishment  of  democratic  institutions — but 
the  Communists  are  the  only  group  at  present  having  the  organization  and 
strength  openly  to  foster  such  revolutionary  ideas. 

Our  objective  is  clear,  but  in  China  we  have  been  jockeyed  into  a  position  from 
which  we  have  only  one  approach  to  the  objective.  Support  of  the  generalissimo 
is  desirable  insofar  as  there  is  concrete  evidence  that  he  is  willing  and  able  to 
marshal  the  full  strength  of  China  against  Japan.  Support  of  the  generalissimo 
is  but  one  means  to  an  end ;  it  is  not  an  end  in  itself,  but  by  present  statements 
of  policy  we  show  a  tendency  to  confuse  the  means  with  the  end.  There  should 
be  an  immediate  adjustment  of  our  position  in  order  that  flexibility  of  approach 
to  our  primary  objective  may  be  restored. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  testify  that  to  the  best  of  your  recollection 
the  reports  of  these  four  political  officers  were  uniformly  derogatory 
of  the  Chinese  Nationalist  Government  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  I  could  state  that  the  reports  oral  and  writ- 
ten of  three,  Mr.  Service,  Mr.  Davies,  and  Mr.  Ludden,  were  very 
commendatory  in  references  to  the  Commiuiists,  and  frequently  de- 
rogatory in  references  to  the  Nationalist  Government. 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Wedemeyer,  can  you  recall  that  any  friction 
or  disagreement  was  openly  expressed  between  yourself  and  General 
Hurley  on  the  one  hand  and  these  political  advisers  on  the  other? 
You  have  testified  that  generally  you  were  in  support  of  General 
Hurley's  position. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  my  position  out  there  was  I  was  just 
a  military  man  and  I  looked  up  to  the  Ambassador  as  the  senior  rep- 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  829 

resentative  of  my  country  in  that  area.  And  when  I  first  reported  to 
take  over  the  command  I  paid  my  respects  to  Ambassador  Gaus.  He 
was  the  Ambassador  to  China  at  that  time.  And  shortly  thereafter,  a 
month  or  so  hater,  he  resigned,  and  Mr.  Patrick  J.  Hurley  became  the 
Ambassador.  And  I  evolved  a  system  of  working  together,  and,  as  I 
stated,  I  recognized  him  as  a  senior,  a  civilian,  and  I  deferred  to  his 
ideas  in  the  political,  diplomatic,  economic,  and  cultural  fields.  In 
the  military  field  I  felt  that  I  was  responsible  and  he  did  too. 

Senator  Ferguson.  General,  when  you  were  assigned  to  China  on 
this  mission,  was  it  to  carry  out  a  new  policy  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  sir,  1  received  no  instructions  about  a 
new  policy. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  assigned  to  carry  out  a  mission  which 
in  your  opinion  was  the  mission  previous  to  your  assignment  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  To  support  the  Nationalist  Government  of 
China  and  to  actually,  to  put  it  bluntly,  kill  as  many  Japanese  as 
possible. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  help  them  in  the  Japanese  cause. 

General  Wedemeyer.  To  assist  them  or  to  cooperate  with  them  in 
their  military  operations  against  the  Japanese,  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  you  understood  that  that  was  a  carrying 
on  of  a  policy  that  had  been  there  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  you  found  in  the  files  of  the  foreign  officers 
a  different  philosophy  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  you  kept  to  the  assignment  that  you  felt 
that  you  had  and  carried  that  out  as  nearly  as  you  could  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  that  was  the  policy  at  least  of  Hurley  who 
came  there  as  the  Ambassador  of  the  United  States  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  all  I  have. 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Wedemeyer,  there  was  a  question,  I  think,  on 
the  record :  Did  you  recall  any  expressions  of  disagreement  between 
any  of  these  Foreign  Service  officers  and  yourself  and  General  Hurley  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  I  did  not  have  any  disagreement  with 
them. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  hear  of  any  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir ;  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  tell  us  about  it.  General  Wedemeyer  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  Ambassador  Hurley  moved  over  to  my 
house  during  the  winter  of  1944-45  because  the  Japs  used  to  bomb  us 
there  and  a  big  boulder  had  rolled  into  the  Ambassador's  house,  so 
he  moved  into  my  house  for  a  few  weeks  while  his  house  was  being 
renovated.  And  he,  in  the  evening  discussions  in  my  home,  sug- 
gested that  these  four  political  advisers  that  I  had  be  placed  under 
him.  That  seemed  logical  to  me.  I  looked  to  the  Ambassador  for  my 
intructions  in  political  matters,  diplomatic  matters,  and  I  told  him 
I  would  agree  to  that. 

So  we  were  ordered  home  in  February  of  1945  by  President  Koose- 
velt.  And  when  we  got  back  to  this  country,  to  the  Capital,  Mr. 
Hurley  requested  that  those  four  men  be  returned  to  him  and  to 
operate  in  the  Embassy,  and  said  that  General  Wedemeyer  had  no 


830  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

objection;  which  was  correct.  That  was  done.  Mr.  Stimson,  as 
Secretary  of  War,  had  requested  those  four  political  advisers  for  his 
friend  General  Stilwell  when  General  Stilwell  assumed  command 
out  there  some  years  earlier. 

So,  Mr.  Stimson  was  interested  in  my  view,  and  I  had  lunch  with 
him  and  expressed  agreement  that  they  should  be  put  back  over  under 
the  Embassy.  I  did  not  express  disapproval  or  concern  about  these 
men.  I  had  none.  They  had  been  loyal  to  me.  I  did  not  agree  with 
their  reports.  I  found  them  to  be  very  bright,  keen,  and  they  cer- 
tainly knew  most  of  the  Chinese  leaders.  But,  as  I  indicated,  I  did 
not  analj^ze  their  reports  nearly  as  carefully  as  I  should  have,  and 
talk  to  them  about  it,  because  I  was  so  busily  involved  with  military 
duties.     They  were  put  over  under  the  Ambassador. 

Wlien  we  got  back,  we  were  only  home  about  a  week,  and  we 
flew  back  to  Uhina,  and  Mr.  Hurley  then  had  some  difficulties  with 
these  men.  He  felt,  as  he  expressed  it,  that  they  were  undermining 
his  efforts  to  bring  about  a  stability  in  the  China  area.  He  finally 
had  one  of  them  transferred.  And  some  had  already  left,  I  think. 
Mr.  Service  had  come  back,  and  Mr.  Emmerson  and  Ludden  and 
Davies  still  were  there.  And  finally  Davies  was  transferred  to  Mos- 
cow, and  he  came  over  to  say  good-by  to  me.  At  that  time  Hurley 
was  still  living  with  me,  and  they  had  quite  a  heated  argument  in 
my  home. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  tell  us  what  the  argument  was  about  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Of  course,  one  does  not  remember  all  of  the 
details. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  realize  that.     Just  give  us  the  substance. 

General  Wedemeyer.  This  has  not  occurred  to  me  in  the  years  inter- 
vening. But  Hurley  stated  to  Mr.  Davies  that  he,  Davies,  had  not 
supported  Mr.  Hurley  and  had  made  reports  that  contravened  Amer- 
ican policy  as  he.  Hurley,  understood  it,  and  that  he  was  going  to  ask 
the  State  Department  to  relieve  Mr.  Davies ;  that  is,  to  discharge  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  mean  discharge  him  entirely  from  the 
service  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Discharge  him  entirely  from  the  Foreign 
Service.     Mr.  Hurley  made  that  statement. 

And  Mr.  Davies  protested  very  strongly  and  became  highly  emo- 
tional, as  did  the  Ambassador,  and  there  were  exchanges.  I  do  not 
recall,  really,  in  fairness  to  either  one  of  them,  what  was  said. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  you  can  give  the  substance  of  it. 

General  Wedemei^er.  The  substance  was  that  Mr.  Davies  felt  that 
he  had  been  loyal,  and  Mr.  Hurley  that  he  had  not  been  loyal  to  him, 
Hurley,  and  finally  Mr.  Hurley  agreed  not  to  request  his  discharge 
but  definitely  that  he  should  be  transferred  and  go  to  Moscow  to  see  at 
first  hand  the  operation  of  some  of  these  ideas  that  Mr.  Davies  had 
been  espousing. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So,  it  was  Mr.  Hurley's  idea  that  he  would  not 
ask  for  his  discharge  from  the  service  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  he  recommended  that  Davies  be  sent  to 
Moscow  to  experience  things  that  he  had  been  advocating  in  China  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  That  is  my  recollection  of  the  con- 
versation that  took  place  in  my  house  in  about  February  or  March 
or  April,  right  around  in  there. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  831 

Senator  FEROusoisr.  Of  course,  you  felt,  when  their  advice  was  not 
in  line  with  wliat  you  thought  your  mission  was,  that  you,  being  a 
military  man  and  assigned  there  to  do  a  certain  mission,  did  not  have 
any  personal  feeling  against  them  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Oh,  yes;  I  did,  Senator,  but  I  was  too  busy 
with -the  military  job.  But  if  I  had  known — those  men  were  under 
me,  and  if  I  ever  have  anybody,  civilian  or  military,  under  me,  and 
he  is  doing  anything  that  I  interpret  as  disloyal,  I  will  go  after  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  interpret  these  things  as  being  dis- 
loyal 'i 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  did  not,  sir,  because  I  did  not  analyze  them 
as  I  should  have  carefully. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  will  put  it  to  j^ou  now  :  What  is  your  opinion 
now  after  you  read  these  rejDorts  in  the  light  of  all  the  circumstances? 
Were  they  disloval  to  the  Government  and  the  policy  that  we  had 
there? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  cannot  answer  that  question,  sir ;  honestly  I 
cannot  answer  it.  But  I  can  say  this :  If  I  had  followed  their  advice, 
communism  would  have  run  rampant  over  China  much  more  rapidly 
than  it  did.  And  I  would  not  have  carried  out  my  directive  or  my 
instructions  as  I  understood  them. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  that  is  an  answer  to  my  question. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  would  hesitate  to  call  any  man  categorically 
disloyal,  sir,  unless  I  had  the  proof. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  understand  your  answer. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Wedemeyer,  when  General  Marshall  went  to 
China,  did  you  ever  see  his  directive  that  he  took  with  him? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir;  I  did. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  know  who  prepared  that  directive  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  sir;  I  don't.  I  think  that  General  Hull 
and  General  Lincoln  and  General  Marshall  himself  had  something  to 
to  with  it. 

Subsequently  I  saw  a  carbon  copy  of  that  directive  in  the  Pentagon, 
and  it  had  the  initials  J.  C.  V.  in  the  lower  left-hand  corner,  as  I 
recall  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Whose  initials  could  they  be? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  the  head  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division 
was  John  Carter  Vincent  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  say  you  saw  the  initials  J.  C.  V.  on  the  draft  of  the 
directive  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  have  seen  them  on  a  carbon  copy  of  that 
directive,  sir.  Whether  it  was  the  final  directive,  I  don't  know.  I 
mean,  I  did  not  compare  the  phraseology  exactly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  General,  I  wonder  whether  you  have  an  opinion 
as  to  why  it  is  so  difficult  for  committees  to  actually  ascertain  who 
did  prepare  this  directive.  Why  should  there  be  any  argument  about 
who  prepared  this  or  any  secrecy  about  who  prepared  it  ?  Why  should 
it  not  be  an  open  book? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  Senator  Ferguson,  I  can  understand 
why  we  should  protect  sources  of  information  in  the  FBI.  I  can 
understand  that  where  the  FBI  at  times  does  not  want  you  to  have 
access,  or  anyone  to  have  access,  to  their  files. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  their  source. 


832  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  ! 

General  WedeMeyer.  Yes,  sir.     You  will  destroy  a  source. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  understand  that. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Or  jeopardize  a  source.  But  I  do  not  under- 
stand at  all  why  the  repersentatives  of  the  American  people  do  not 
have  more  information  concerning  national  and  international  develop- 
ments. 

Senator  Ferguson.  As  to  who  prepared  a  document. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  think  that  who  prepared  a  document  cer- 
tainly should  be  available  to  you  representatives  of  the  American 
peoples. 

I  could  not  understand,  for  example,  why  Wedemeyer's  name  was 
mentioned  so  frequently  in  the  MacArthur  hearings,  associated  with 
a  telegram,  and  yet  we  could  not  find  out  who  in  the  State  Department 
had  direct  contact  with  the  same  matter.  And  I  do  not  know  to  this 
day,  and  I  tried  to  find  out.     Yet  my  name  was  bandied  about  freely. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  it  was  not  a  secret  on  your  part? 

General  Wedemeyer.  And  my  permission  was  not  requested  either. 
If  I  had  some  compunction  about  it,  I  certainly  was  not  given  the  op- 
portunity to  express  it,  but  I  did  not  care. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  it  comes  to  a  State  Department  official, 
then  it  becomes  a  deep,  dark  secret  ? 

General  Whjemyer.  I  could  not  say  that  as  a  generality,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  did  in  that  case. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  is  certainly  true  as  to  who  prepared  the  docu- 
ment of  the  Marshall  situation ;  is  it  not  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  don't  know,  sir.  I  did  not  know  that  you 
people  had  made  the  request  to  get  this  information,  sir.  I  did  not 
know  that. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  the  record  should  show  that  at 
this  time  we  have  not  made  such  a  request  for  that  document. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  true,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  now  suggest 
and  ask  that  the  Chair  and  the  committee  obtain  this  information  as 
to  who  actually  did,  and  let  us  havelt  on  the  record  so  that  it  will  not 
be  in  dispute. 

The  Chairman.  You  mean  we  will  try  to  obtain  it. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Well,  that  is  all  the  committee  can  do.  It  can 
do  its  best. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  proceed  through  its  chairman 
at  once  to  try  to  secure  the  information  by  every  means  that  we  know 
of.  I  wish  to  say,  however,  that  the  Chair  has  had  some  difficulty  in 
times  past. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  appreciate  that. 

The  Chairman.  The  witness  on  the  stand  now.  General  Wedemeyer, 
rendered  a  very  valuable  report  that  would  have  been  of  great  interest 
to  the  people  of  this  country,  and  the  chairman,  then  chairman  of 
another  committee  of  the  Senate,  attempted  by  subpoena  to  get  that 
report,  and  the  subpena  was  denied,  or  the  document  was  denied  to  the 
subpena  officer.  So,  we  may  have  some  trouble  here  again,  but  we  will 
try. 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Wedemeyer,  do  you  recall  the  recommenda- 
tions made  in  the  directive  that  General  Marshall  took  with  him  to 
China? 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  833 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  I  could  give  you  substantially  what  was 
in  it.  It  required  General  Marshall,  as  a  special  envoy  of  the  Presi- 
dent, to  go  to  China  and  to  broaden  the  base  of  the  Government,  to 
bring  about  a  coalition  of  the  various  political  parties  there  and  to 
create  stability  in  that  area. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  you  say  that  was  the  substance  of  the  directive? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Now,  General  Wedemeyer,  were  you  in  China  when 
General  Marshall  first  arrived  on  his  mission  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  You  mean  on  this  mission?  Yes,  sir;  I  met 
him  at  the  airport. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  you  the  ranking  American  military  commander 
in  the  field  at  that  time  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  you  consulted  on  military  matters  by  General 
Marshall  in  the  execution  of  his  mission  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  I  gave  General  Marshall  a  resume 
of  the  situation  that  maintained  in  China  at  the  end  of  the  war  and 
indicated  my  intention,  which  was  hardly  necessary  to  do,  but  that 
every  resource  in  the  China  theater  was  at  his  disposal  to  help  him  out. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  General  Marshall  make  an  effort  to  bring  about  a 
coalition  between  the  Chinese  Nationalist  Government  and  the  Com- 
munist government  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir;  I  think  he  made  a  very  continued 
and  studied  effort  to  bring  about  a  coalition  of  the  political  factions, 
and  also  to  do  away  with  the  military  forces  of  any  particular  political 
party,  and  to  amalgamate  them  with  the  political  forces,  and  they 
would  be  tlie  army  or  the  military  force  of  the  political  entity  that 
he  ended  up  with.  Obviously,  it  would  be  impossible  to  carry  on  a 
political  entity  if  Republicans  had  an  army  and  Democrats  had  an 
army  in  our  own  country. 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Wedemeyer,  do  you  have  any  knowledge  that 
General  Marshall  imposed  an  embargo  on  the  Chines  Nationalist 
Government  at  that  time  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  The  term  "embargo,"  in  the  connotation  of 
that  term,  I  do  not  know  whether  it  had  application  to  what  I  know 
about  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  tell  us  just  what  you  know  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  There  was,  as  I  recall  it,  $500,000,000  appro- 
priated by  the  Congress  to  help  China.  I  do  not  know  whether  the 
help  was  military  or  economic  or  both,  but  I  know  that  General  Mar- 
shall was  authorized  by  the  President  to  determine  the  assistance, 
economic  and  military,  that  would  be  given  to  China.  This,  of  course, 
was  to  assist  him  in  bringing  about  this  coalition  that  he  was  ordered 
to  accomplish. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  do  you  know  that  this  money  was  withheld  from 
the  Chinese  Government  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  sir,  when  I  returned,  I  was  put  in  com- 
mand of  the  Second  Army  over  here  with  headquarters  in  Baltimore. 
But  I  did  receive  calls  from  Chinese  friends  here  telling  me  that  they 
were  desperate  for  ammunition  and  for  maintenance  parts  for  their 
vehicles,  American  vehicles  that  they  had  secured  during  the  war,  and 
they  urged  me  to  do  what  I  could.     I  was  in  no  official  status  and  could 


834  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

do  nothing  about  it,  but  it  would  indicate  that  there  were  retardations 
or  stoppages  of  the  flow  of  supplies  to  China.  That  was  my  only 
contact  with  that  situation. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  have  no  further  questions  to  ask  General  Wedemeyer 
on  this  score. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  have  a  question. 

You  did  answer  some  questions  to  the  United  States  News ;  is  that 
correct  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  I  am  asking  you  in  relation  to  the  answers 
to  questions  on  how  our  policy  was  influenced.  Do  you  recall  those 
answers  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  I  think  Mr.  David  Lawrence  asked 
me  if  in  my  judgment  there  were  influences 

The  Chairman.  I  think  the  questions  and  answers  might  be 
submitted. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  just  wanted  to  know  whether  or  not  there 
was  any  change  that  you  wanted  to  make  in  those  answers  or  whether 
that  is  your  opinion. 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  sir ;  that  is  my  considered  opinion. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  your  considered  opinion  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  All  right.  I  suggest,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  we 
insert  this. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  would  like  to  emphasize  there.  Senator 
Ferguson,  that  in  referring  to  that  I  know  of  my  own  personal  ex- 
perience that  there  are  thousands  of  loyal  Americans  in  Government 
service. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  say  that  in  here. 

General  Wedemeyer.  And  I  want  it  emphasized  here,  sir,  because 
I  do  not  want  in  any  way  to  reflect  against  the  many  of  my  own  com- 
rades in  military  service,  or  against  many  fine  people  in  the  Gov- 
ernment service  in  general. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  that  does  not  detract  from  these  answers 
in  here? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Not  one  iota,  sir.  I  believe  those  statements 
to  be  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  suggest  that 
this  excerpt  of  an  interview  of  General  Wedemeyer  appearing  in  the 
September  14,  1951,  issue  of  United  States  News  and  World  Report 
be  inserted  in  the  record.  That  is,  only  that  portion  of  it  beginning 
with  How  Policy  Was  Influenced  and  down  to  Basic  Mistakes  of  the 
United  States. 

The  Chairman.  I  believe  that  is  proper.  It  may  be  inserted  in 
the  record. 

(The  information  referred  to  is  as  follows :) 

How  Policy  Was  Influenced 

Question.  What  do  you  mean  by  "sinister  influences"? 

Answer.  Communist  influences  which  had  their  genesis  in  tlie  Kremlin,  but 
which  were  implemented  by  representatives  in  tliis  country,  both  by  Soviet 
representatives  and,  unfortunately,  by  some  of  our  own  misguided  citizens. 

Question.  Inside  the  Government? 

Answer.  Undoubtedly  to  a  limited  extent.  I  do  not  want  to  reflect  against 
the  thousands  of  loyal  Americans  in  Government  service  who  have  been  stead 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  835 

fast  in  their  devotion  to  duty  and  to  the  principles  of  democracy.  They  are 
in  the  vast  majority. 

Question.  I  suppose  you  include  the  State  Department? 

Answer.  Yes.    I  mean  in  many  departments. 

Question.  Do  you  thinlc  there  are  communistic  influences  in  the  military 
departments? 

Answer.  I  never  came  into  direct  contact  with  a  man  in  uniform  in  any  of 
the  services  of  whom  I  could  say  categorically  that  he  was  a  Communist  or 
had  Communist  connections. 

Question.  But  were  there  suspicions  as  to  that  voiced  from  time  to  time  in 
the  Far  East? 

Answer.  Yes.  Take  the  newspaper  that  we  published  and  disseminated 
widelv  in  the  China  theater  during  and  subsequent  to  the  war.  It  was  called 
The  China  Lantern.  There  were  editorials  that  appeared  in  that  paper  from 
time  to  time  that  were  inimical  to  the  best  interests  of  our  country.  The  men 
on  the  staff  of  that  paper  were  in  the  military  service. 

Question.  Going  back  to  this  matter  of  the  influences  on  our  policy,  isn't  it 
possible  that  some  of  these  influences  were  those  that  swallowed  the  com- 
munistic line  and  believed  it  to  be  the  better  line  of  the  two? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir ;  I  accept  that  explanation.  But  as  far  back  as  1933,  when 
we  recognized  Soviet  Russia,  I  perceived  in  my  small  way  the  real  implications 
of  communism.  I  had  read  Das  Kapital  and  had  studied  and  followed  as  much 
as  I  could  the  developments  in  Soviet  Russia.  During  the  2  years,  1936  to  1938, 
that  I  was  in  Germany  as  a  student  at  the  German  War  College,  the  Nazis  con- 
tributed considerably — not  intentionally — to  my  education  pertaining  to  Soviet 
objectives.  It  was  not  all  propaganda  that  the  Nazis  put  out  about  the  Soviets. 
I  warned  both  civil  and  military  leaders  with  whom  I  was  associated  in  America 
about  the  implications  of  what  I  called  "indiscriminate  assistance  to  the  Soviet 
Russians." 

From  1940  through  most  of  1943,  I  was  connected  with  strategic  planning 
in  the  then  War  Department  and  had  an  opportunity  to  express  views.  There 
were  a  number  of  American  officers  who  realized  the  real  implications  of  what 
I  term  "indiscriminate  assistance"  to  a  nation  whose  objectives  or  aims  were 
just  as  dangerous  to  America,  if  not  more  so,  than  were  those  of  Hitler  and  his 
henchmen. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  ever  express  disagreement  with  General 
Marshall  on  the  advisability  of  forming  a  coalition  government  in 
China? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  When  General  Marshall  first  came 
out  and  showed  me  his  directive  I  told  him  I  did  not  believe  it  was 
possible  of  accomplishment.  I  testified  to  that  effect  before  in  the 
MacArthur  hearings,  and  that  is  in  coincidence  with  the  view  I  ex- 
pressed earlier  today  several*  times,  namely,  you  cannot  coalesce  Com- 
munists with  people  who  desire  individual  freedom.  It  just  is  not 
going  to  work.  People  who  have  a  spiritual  belief,  people  who  respect 
the  dignity  of  the  individual,  they  are  just  antithetical  to  the  views 
or  philosophies  of  Marxism. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  no  further  questions  at  this 
time. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Jenner? 

Senator  Jenner.  I  have  no  questions. 

Senator  Fekguson.  You  would  say  then  that  the  old  proverb  of  say- 
ing you  cannot  mix  oil  and  water  would  apply  to  trying  to  mix  these 
two  philosophies,  and  that  you  would  have  domination  by  the  Com- 
munists? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  I  am  always  afraid  of  cliches,  you 
know,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  at  least  you  think  the  Communist  philos- 
ophy would  dominate? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Definitely,  yes,  sir.  They  will  dominate  if 
they  are  permitted  to. 


836  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is,  if  you  try  to  compromise  with  them. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  have  no  further  questions  at  this  particular  time  of 
General  Wedemeyer. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  have  any  questions,  Senator  Jenner? 

Senator  Jenner.  No. 

The  Chairman.  General,  we  wish  to  express  our  sincere  gratitude 
for  your  presence  here  and  for  your  splendid  testimony  and  coopera- 
tion generally. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  would  like  to  make  just  one  statement,  sir. 
I  have  been  following  the  work  of  this  committee,  and  I  commend  both 
the  Democratic  and  Republican  members  for  what  I  believe  to  be  an 
objective  investigation  in  the  interest  of  the  country.  Don't  pay  any 
attention,  please,  to  the  smear  campaigns  that  are  being  instituted  by 
those  very  same  forces  that  you  are  investigating.    I  wish  you  success. 

The  Chairman.  Gentlemen  of  the  committee,  the  chairman  of  this 
committee  has  received  a  letter  dated  September  15, 1951,  on  the  letter- 
head 450  Eiverside  Drive,  New  York  27,  N.  Y.,  purporting  to  be 
signed  by  Corliss  Lamont  and  bearing  his  signature.  The  letter  starts 
out  by  saying  (reading)  : 

I  wish  to  protest  again  to  you  and  the  Senate  Judiciary  Subcommittee  on 
Internal  Security,  of  which  you  are  chairman — 

and  so  forth.    I  will  not  detain  the  committee  to  read  the  letter. 

Senator  Jenner.  I  received  a  copy,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  The  members  of  the  committee,  I  think,  have  re- 
ceived copies. 

The  letter  from  Mr,  Lamont  will  be  inserted  in  the  record  with  the 
permission  of  the  committee. 

(The  letter  referred  to  is  as  follows :) 

New  York  27,  N.  Y.,  September  15,  1951. 
The  Honorable  Pat  McCarran, 

Chairman,  Subcommittee  on  Internal  Security,  Senate  Judiciary  Committee, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Washington^  D.  C. 

My  Dear  Senator  McCarran  :  I  wish  to  protest  again  to  you  and  the  Senate 
Judiciary  Subcommittee  on  Internal  Security,  of  which  you  are  chairman,  against 
the  repeated  actions  of  that  subcommittee  in  attemipting  to  smear  me  as  a  Com- 
munist and  to  associate  me  with  the  alleged  betrayal  of  American  foreign  policy 
in  the  Far  East.  Your  subcommitee  has  dragged  me  into  this  picture  as  part  of 
a  shabby  endeavor  to  discredit  the  American  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  and 
to  establish  it  as  a  subversive  organization. 

The  Subcommittee  on  Internal  Security  has  tried  to  give  the  totally  false  im- 
pression that  I  am  a  far-eastern  expert  and  have  been  a  prime  mover  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.  But  in  fact  I  have  never  been  par- 
ticularly interested  in  the  Far  East  and  have  only  a  few  years  been  a  member 
of  the  institute,  and  a  very  inactive  one  at  that. 

However,  my  late  father,  Thon-jas  W.  Lamont,  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.,  did  have 
considerable  knowledge  of  the  Far  East  and  visited  both  Japan  and  China.  For 
more  than  20  years  he  participated  actively  in  the  work  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relationti  and  contributed  generously  to  it.  From  1925  until  the  time  of  his 
death  in  1948  he  made  to  that  organization  14  donations  amounting  to  $14,700. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  did  not  start  contributing  to  the  institute  until  1946. 
From  that  year  until  the  present  I  made  six  donations  totaling  $800,  or  about 
one-eighteenth  of  the  total  of  my  father's  gifts.  Yet  your  subcommittee  and  its 
investigators  have  never  once  mentioned  my  Republican  father's  long  and  deep 
interest  in  the  institute.  Instead,  this  subcommittee  has  stressed  my  own  slight 
and  brief  association  with  the  institute,  obviously  as  part  of  its  effort  to  paint 
that  excellent  organization  as  red  by  concealing  the  fact  that  leading  bankers 
and  conservatives  have  been  among  its  chief  backers. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  837 

At  its  hearing  on  August  22,  1951,  your  subcommittee  read  into  its  records 
the  crudest  sort  of  dishonesty  about  me.  Your  counsel  submitted  on  that  occa- 
sion a  memorandum  headed,  "C.  L.  from  E.  C.  C,"  and  then  suggested  that  it 
had  been  written  to  Corliss  Lamont  from  E.  C.  Carter,  former  secretary  general 
of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.  Testimony  continued  for  some  time  on  this 
assumption ;  and  nobody  was  given  an  opportunity  to  refute  it  and  to  show  that 
the  memo  was  from  Mr.  Carter  to  Clayton  Lane,  at  one  tinoe  an  oflSicer  of  the 
institute. 

The  memorandum  itself  was  perfectly  innocent.  And  this  episode  well  illus- 
trates the  method  of  your  subcommittee  in  striving  to  mislead  public  opinion. 
Evidently  some  members  of  this  subcommittee  would  be  glad  to  see  me  hung  for 
the  nonexistent  crimes  of  sonieone  else  whose  initials  happen  to  be  the  same 
as  mine. 

On  August  2,  1951,  a  self-confessed  ex-spy,  Mrs.  Hede  Massing,  testified  before 
your  subcommittee  that  I  was  a  Communist.  I  wrote  your  subcommittee  August 
12  disproving  this  charge  and  saying  in  part:  "For  the  one-thousandth  time  I 
completely  and  categorically  deny  that  I  am  or  ever  have  been  a  Communist. 
My  numerous  disagreements  on  fundamental  points  with  Communist  and  Soviet 
docti-ines,  such  as  those  regarding  philosophy,  civil  liberties,  the  Tito  controversy, 
and  the  aggression  of  the  North  Koreans  in  1950,  show  clearly  that  I  rely  on  my 
own  independent  thinking  and  follow  nobody's  line.  I  am  a  radical  American 
dissenter  carrying  on  as  best  I  can  the  dissenting  tradition  of  my  ancestors  who 
came  over  on  the  Mayflower." 

I  requested  your  subcommittee  to  enter  the  above  statement  into  its  oflacial 
records.    But  I  did  not  even  receive  an  acknowledgement  of  my  letter. 

From  its  record,  Mr.  Senator,  it  seems  to  me  that  your  subcommittee  is  con- 
stantly encouraging  the  violation  of  the  Ninth  Commandment,  "Thou  shalt  not 
bear  false  witness  against  thy  neighbor."  It  is  turning  representative  govern- 
ment into  government  by  misrepresentation.  It  is  causing  the  American  people 
to  lose  faith  in  their  democratic  institutions  and  is  thereby  doing  more  to  under- 
mine the  political  system  of  the  United  States  than  all  the  Communists  who  have 
ever  existed  in  this  country. 

Other  congressional  investigating  committees,  of  both  House  and  Senate,  have 
behaved  just  as  scandalously.  The  procedures  of  such  committees  ought  to  be 
revised  by  law  in  order  to  guarantee  defendant  witnesses,  organizations,  and 
other  victims  their  legitimate  rights  and  a  fair  hearing.  The  new  rules  should 
apply  whether  bankers  or  teachers,  labor  leaders  or  Communists,  liberals  or 
independents,  Republicans  or  Democrats  are  being  investigated. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman,  let  me  earnestly  request  that  in  the  interests 
of  the  truth  you  enter  this  letter  in  the  official  records  of  the  Senate  Judiciary 
Subcommittee  on  Internal  Security  as  my  refutation  of  the  untrue  accusations 
made  against  me  at  its  hearings. 
Very  truly  yours, 

Corliss  Lamont. 

The  Chairman.  In  connection  with  Mr.  Lament's  letter  the  chair- 
man desires  to  insert  in  the  record  at  this  time  the  reply  of  the  chair- 
man of  this  committee  dated  September  19,  1951,  addressed  to  Mr. 
Corliss  Lamont  and  signed  by  the  chairman  of  this  committee.  Those 
letters  will  be  inserted  in  the  record  so  as  to  become  a  part  of  the 
record  of  this  hearing. 

(The  letter  referred  to  is  as  follows :) 

Septembeb  19,  1951. 
Mr.  Corliss  Lamont, 

New  Yorlc  27,  tf.  Y. 

Deiab  Mr.  Lamont:  I  have  your  letter  of  September  15,  1951,  which  I  notice 
you  have  released  to  the  press. 

I  take  note  of  the  fact  which  you  impart  in  your  letter  that  your  father, 
Thomas  W.  Lamont,  contributed  $14,700  to  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 
during  the  period  1925-48  and  that  he  took  an  active  interest  in  the  institute 
and  in  the  Far  East.  I  also  note  that  you  point  out  that  your  own  six  donations 
to  the  institute  totaled  only  $800  by  contrast. 

I  would  like  to  jwint  out,  however,  that  you  are  wrong  in  your  statement 
that  this  committee  has  never  once  mentioned  your  father's  name  in  its  hear- 


838  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

ings.  In  fact,  the  only  substantial  testimony  involving  either  you  or  your 
father  concerned  an  episode  which  took  place  in  1945.  As  you  must  know,  if 
you  read  the  record,  this  episode  involved  an  effort  made  by  Mr.  Owen  Latti- 
more  and  Mr.  E.  C.  Carter  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  to  induce  your 
father,  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  through  you,  to  sign  a  draft  prepared  by  Mr. 
Lattimore  in  answer  to  an  article  that  appeared  in  the  Reader's  Digest  by  J.  B. 
Powell  and  Max  Eastman.  Testimony  showed  that  Mr.  Lattimore  prepared 
a  draft  of  an  answer  after  consultation  with  Mr.  T.  A.  Bisson  and  made  arrange- 
ments to  have  it  published  in  the  name  of  some  prominent  American.  According 
to  testimony,  they  selected  your  father,  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  as  a  person  who 
might  sign  the  article.  Arrangements  for  the  carrying  out  of  this  plan,  according 
to  testimony  and  documents  introduced  into  the  record,  were  made  through 
you.  When  your  father  declined  to  have  his  name  signed  to  the  article,  this 
committee  took  especial  care  to  bring  out  his  refusal  to  do  so. 

It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  the  committee  and  the  staff  questioned  Mr.  Carter 
at  length  on  the  unusual  language  used  in  the  letter  from  Mr.  Carter  to  Mr. 
Lattimore  who  were  admittedly  good  friends.  The  letter  of  June  19,  1945,  reads 
in  part : 

"Dear  Owen  :  Here  is  a  typed  copy  of  the  draft  you  handed  me  yesterday. 
Late  last  evening  I  went  up  to  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixty-sixth  Street  and  saw 
the  son.  I  discovered  that,  alas,  his  father  left  yesterday  for  Maine  and  prob- 
ably will  be  gone  all  summer.  I  explained  the  general  situation  to  the  son 
and  said  that  I  would  like  his  advice  as  to  who  would  be  the  best  single  person 
or  group  of  three  or  four  to  sign  such  a  letter.  He  made  some  academic  sug- 
gestions and  then  finally  suggested  the  possibility  of  his  father.  He  thought 
it  would  better  for  me  to  approach  him  than  for  him  to  do  so,  though  he  said 
the  chances  weren't  very  good  because  his  father  is  fatigued  and  doesn't  usually 
like  to  take  on  extra  burdens  during  his  holiday.  He  also  confirmed  what  I 
suspected,  that  the  father  likes  to  do  his  own  writing.  I  am,  however,  prepared 
in  2  or  3  days  to  send  the  draft  to  him  with  as  strong  and  tactful  a  letter  as 
I  can  write  on  the  off-chance  that  he  might  be  will  to  do  something.     *     *     * 

"Edward  C.  Carter." 

I  believe  if  you  will  read  or,  if  you  have  already  done  so,  reread  that  testimony 
you  will  find  that  the  committee  was  simply  trying  to  bring  out  the  facts,  and 
the  incidence  of  your  name  and  your  father's  name  was  dictated  by  the  under- 
lying circumstances  and  by  nothing  else. 

With  respect  to  the  second  point  you  make  in  your  letter,  therein  you  accuse 
the  committee  of  dishonesty  to  you.    The  record  you  refer  to  is  as  follows : 

"Mr.  Mandel  :  I  have  here  a  footnote  dated  November  5,  1948,  taken  from  the 
files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.  'CL  from  ECC.  'CL'  may  be  Corliss 
Lamont,  and  'ECO'  may  be  E.  C.  Carter."  ' 

Two  letters  "OL  from  ECC"  were  introduced  into  the  record  at  this  point  and 
there  was  no  significance  whatever  attached  to  the  identity  of  the  "CL." 

As  you  must  know,  it  was  the  habit  of  the  lu'^titute  of  Pacific  Relations  to  refer 
to  individuals  in  the  various  memoranda  by  their  initials  only.  The  assumption 
that  it  may  have  been  Corliss  Lamont  was  without  significance  and  represented 
a  mere  guess  on  the  part  of  the  research  director  as  to  the  addressee  therein. 
Certainly  there  was  no  invidious  connotation  drawn  from  this  conchisiun.  How- 
ever, inasmuch  as  you  point  out  that  the  "CL"  is  Clayton  Lane  and  not  Corliss 
Lamont,  your  statement  of  this  fact  will  be  cross-indexed  to  that  testimony. 

As  for  the  fact  that  you  have  been  identified  before  this  committee  as  a  Com- 
munist, I  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  this  committee  has  made  no  findings  nor 
drawn  any  conclusions  from  the  sworn  testimony  before  it. 

As  you  request,  your  letter  is  being  put  into  the  official  record. 
Sincerely, 

Pat  McCakran,  Chairman. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  Senator  from  Michigan  has 
received  a  letter  from  Henry  A.  WalLace,  and  I  do  not  know  whether 
other  members  of  the  committee  have  also  received  it,  but  I  would  ask 
that  that  be  inserted  in  the  record  also.  I  will  turn  it  over  to  the 
committee. 


1  See  p.  574,  pt.  2. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  839^ 

The  Chairman.  As  regards  the  letter  to  which  Senator  Ferguson 

refers,  that  letter  and  the  reply  will  be  inserted  also. 

(The  letters  referred  to  are  as  follows :) 

Septembek  13,  1951. 

Hon.  Henry  A.  Wallace, 

South  Salem,  N.  Y. 
My  Dear  Henry  :  Upon  my  return  from  Turkey,  I  found  your  letter  of  August 
20  which  had  been  previously  acknowledged  by  my  secretary. 

If  you  would  permit  me  to  do  so,  I  shall  be  very  glad  to  place  your  letter  in  the 
official  record  of  the  committee. 

With  kindest  personal  regards,  I  am. 
Yours  sincerely. 


South  Salem,  N.  Y.,  August  25, 1951. 
Hon.  Homer  Ferguson, 

Senate  Office  Building, 

Washington,  D.  €. 

Dear  Senator  Ferguson  :  In  a  UP  report  of  August  22  you  are  quoted  as  say- 
ing that  much  of  the  Budenz  testimony  was  hearsay.  Therefore  I  am  moved  to 
call  your  attention  to  the  Budenz  testimony  on  August  23  before  the  Senate 
Internal  Security  Committee  to  the  effect  that  I  was  under  the  influence  of 
Communists  (Lattimore  and  Vincent,  according  to  Budenz)  on  my  trip  to  China 
in  1944. 

For  your  information  I  may  say  that  Lattimore  was  sent  along  on  the  trip 
not  as  a  member  of  my  personal  staff  but  as  a  representative  of  OWI  at  the 
instance  of  Elmer  Davis  and  Roosevelt.  He  was  an  expert  on  the  nomadic 
tribes  and  occasionally  was  helpful  as  an  interpreter  but  he  had  nothing  whatever 
to  do  with  my  report  to  President  Roosevelt  or  with  my  communication  to 
President  Roosevelt  on  June  28,  1944. 

The  person  who  had  by  far  the  greatest  influence  on  me  was  a  Republican, 
Ambassador  to  China,  Hon.  Clarence  E.  Gauss.  You  may  remember  that  in  the 
fall  of  1945  Senator  Hart,  of  Connecticut,  was  urging  him  for  the  Republican 
place  on  the  Export-Import  Bank.  It  was  at  instance  of  Gauss  that  I  re- 
ported to  Roosevelt  that  in  spite  of  Chiang's  weaknesses  as  a  leader  that  at  the 
moment  we  had  no  alternative  to  the  support  of  Chiang. 

It  was  at  Chiang's  instance  that  I  sent  a  message  from  Kunming  to  Roosevelt 
on  June  28,  1944.  suggesting  the  name  of  General  Wedemeyer  as  liaison  between 
Roosevelt  and  Chiang.  While  Vincent  did  not  inspire  this  suggestion  he  was 
cognizant  of  what  was  in  my  cable  and  did  not  in  any  way  object. 

On  December  15,  1945,  the  Honorable  Patrick  Hurley,  recently  resigned  as 
Ambassador  to  China,  told  me  in  the  presence  of  Herbert  Brownell  that  he  never 
had  any  quarrel  with  me  with  regard  to  the  Chinese  situation. 

I  thought  you  ought  to  have  these  facts  in  view  of  the  Budenz  testimony. 

With  cordial  regards,  I  am 
Sincerely  yours, 

Henry  A.  Wallace. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  a  letter  from  Mr.  Carter  ad- 
dressed to  me  which  I  think  should  go  in  the  record.  It  is  very  short. 
Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  read  that  very  briefly  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  It  is  a  letter  from  Edward  C.  Carter  dated  September 
6,  1951  [reading]  : 

Dear  Mr.  Morris  :  In  my  testimony  some  weeks  ago  I  believe  that  I  stated 
that  Miss  Elsie  Fairfax  Cholmeley  was  a  cousin  of  Christopher  Chancellor,  the 
present  head  of  Reuters.  My  wife  tells  me  that  this  is  inaccurate.  It  seems 
that  when  the  clhancellor  children  were  young  they  went  to  stay  for  long 
periods  in  Yorkshire  at  the  Cholomeley's  home.  It  was  because  of  this  intimate 
relationship  under  the  same  roof  that  I  made  the  mistake  of  thinking  they  were 
cousins. 

I  believe  that  the  mistake  is  quite  unimportant,  but  I  want  to  correct  it. 


840  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr._  Morris.  I  suggest,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  we  allow  that  letter 
to  go  into  the  record  as  a  correction  of  Mr.  Carter's  own  testimony. 
The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted. 
(The  letter  referred  to  is  as  follows :) 

New  York  Citt,  September  6,  1951. 
Mr.  Robert  Morris, 

Senate  Judiciary  Committee,  Washington,  D.  0. 
Dear  Me.  Morris  :  In  my  testimony  some  weeks  ago  I  believe  that  I  stated  that 
Miss  Elsie  Fairfax  Cholmeley  was  a  cousin  of  Christopher  Chancellor,  the 
present  head  of  Reuters.  My  wife  tells  me  that  this  is  inaccurate.  It  seems 
that  when  the  Chancellor  children  were  young  they  went  to  stay  for  long  periods 
in  Yorkshire  at  the  Cholmeley's  home.  It  was  because  of  this  intimate  rela- 
tionship under  the  same  roof  that  I  made  the  mistake  of  thinking  they  were 
cousins. 

I  believe  that  the  mistake  is  quite  unimportant  but  I  want  to  correct  it. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Edward  C.  Carter.* 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  it  is  printed  in  the  record,  if  it  is  possible, 
could  this  not  be  put  in  at  that  place  so  that  it  will  correct  the  record 
without  too  much  trouble  ?     Has  it  already  been  printed  ? 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Would  it  be  satisfactory  if  that  were  cross-indexed 
back  to  it  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes ;  so  that  at  least  it  would  be  clear  that  the 
correction  was  made. 

The  Chairman.  Is  there  anything  further,  Mr.  Morris? 

Mr.  Morris.  There  is  one  other  letter  that  the  War  Department  has 
asked  us  to  put  into  our  record.  It  concerns  the  testimony  of  General 
Willoughby.  It  is  not  very  important,  but  I  think  inasmuch  as  the 
Army  has  requested  that  it  should  go  in,  we  could  put  it  into  the 
record. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  letter  is  dated  August  15, 1951,  from  Miles  Reber, 
major  general,  GSC. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

(The  letter  referred  to  is  as  f ollow§_:) 

Department  of  the  Army, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Legislative  Liaison, 

Washington,  D.  C,  August  15,  1951. 
Hon.  Pat  MoCakran, 

Chairman,  Suhcommittee  on  Internal  Security, 

Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  United  States  Senate. 
Dear  Senator  McCarran  :  In  connection  with  the  recent  testimony  of  General 
Willoughby  before  your  committee  pertaining  to  his  official  report  on  the  Sorge 
case,  it  is  respectfully  requested  that  the  following  facts  in  connection  with  his 
report  be  included  in  the  record  of  the  hearings  of  your  committee. 

Copies  of  all  consecutive  reports  and  exhibits  pertaining  to  the  Sorge  case 
received  by  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  Department  of  the  Army,  from 
the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  FECOM,  were  distributed  to  the  FBI,  CIA, 
and  State  Department  between  the  dates  of  March  9,  1949,  and  November  22, 
1950.  No  reports  or  exhibits  to  the  Sorge  case  have  been  received  since  Novem- 
ber 22, 1950. 

On  behalf  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Army,  may  I  suggest  that  this  letter  be  made 
a  part  of  the  record  of  hearings  in  this  case.    Your  cooperation  in  such  action 
will  be  very  much  appreciated. 
Sincerely  yours, 

MrLES  Reber, 
Major  General,  OSC, 
Chief  of  Legislative  Liaison. 

>  See  p.  51,  pt.  1. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  841 

Mr.  Morris.  Tomorrow,  Senator  McCarran,  we  have  General 
Fortier  who  is  theater  intelligence  commander  in  the  Far  East  Com- 
mand. He  will  be  our  witness  tomorrow.  That  will  be  at  10  o'clock 
or  9  o'clock,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  think  it  can  be  10  o'clock.  It  is  very  difficult  to 
convene  at  9  o'clock.  I  think  we  will  be  able  to  meet  at  10  o'clock. 
I  have  discussed  it  with  the  leader  and  I  think  it  will  be  all  right  to 
proceed. 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Fortier  is  under  subpena  to  appear  here  at 
9  o'clock.    May  I  inform  him  that  he  may  come  in  at  10? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

The  committee  is  recessed  until  10  o'clock  tomorrow  morning. 

(Wliereupon,  at  12:10  p.  m.,  the  committee  recessed  to  be  recon- 
vened at  10  a.  m.  Thursday,  September  20,  1951.) 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


THURSDAY,   SEPTEMBER   20,   1951 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration 
OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 

Security  Laws  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  G. 

The  subcommittee  met  at  10  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  in  room  424, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Pat  McCarran  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  McCarran,  Eastland,  Ferguson,  Jenner,  and 
Watkins. 

Also  present:   Senator  McCarthy. 

J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel;  Robert  Morris,  subcommittee 
counsel ;  and  Benjamin  Mandel,  director  of  research. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Are  you  ready  to  proceed,  Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  "Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Please  stand  and  be  sworn,  General. 

You  do  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  give 
before  the  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  will  be 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you 
God? 

General  Fortier.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  BRIG.  GEN.  L.  JOSEPH  FORTIER,  UNITED  STATES 
ARMY  (RETIRED),  McLEAN,  VA. 

Mr.  Morris.  General  Fortier,  will  you  give  your  full  name  and 
address  to  the  reporter,  please? 

General  Fortier.  Louis  Joseph  Fortier,  brigadier  general,  United 
States  Army,  retired.  Spring  Hill  Eoacl,  McLean,  Va. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  your  present  military  status? 

General  Fortier.  United  States  Army,  retired. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  was  your  last  military  assignment,  General  ? 

General  Fortier.  Director  of  Theater  Intelligence  Division  of  the 
Far  East  Command. 

Mr.  Morris.  Wlien  did  you  relinquish  that  command  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  sailed  from  Japan  in  October,  the  middle  of 
October  1950.  I  was  the  Director  of  Theater  Intelligence  Division 
until  some  time  in  September  1950. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  describe  briefly  the  nature  of  your  assign- 
ment, General  Fortier,  at  that  time  ? 

General  Fortier.  From  around  the  1st  day  of  February  1949  until 
September  1950  I  was  in  charge  of  the  Theater  Intelligence  Division 
under  G-2,  Far  East  Command,  GHQ,  Tol^yo. 

22848— 52— pt.  3 10  843 


844  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr,  Morris.  Will  you  describe  for  us  generally  the  functions  that 
you  had  to  perform  in  that  post  ? 

General  Fortier.  As  Director  of  this  Division,  my  job  was  that  of 
observing,  studying  the  capabilities  of  any  external  threat  to  the  Far 
East  Command.  In  other  words,  I  was  concerned  with  any  potential 
outside  enemy  that  might  threaten  the  security  of  the  Far  East  Com- 
mand. 

Mr.  Morris.  As  such,  General,  did  you  take  recognition  of  the  de- 
velopment of  Red  China  ? 

•  General  Fortier.  Besides  observing  the  capabilities  of  the  Soviets 
in  that  area,  probably  my  greatest  interest  was  that  of  watching  the 
development  in  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  Had  you  been  interested  in  communism  in  China  as  a 
professional  matter,  General  Fortier? 

General  Fortier.  I  had  been  in  and  out  of  Intelligence  for  the  last 
14  years  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  ever  since  1921-23  when  I  took  a 
master  of  science  degree  in  political  science,  in  which  I  specalized 
on  the  problems  arising  from  the  Versailles  Treaty,  I  have  been  closely 
observing  the  development  of  Soviet  Russia  and  communism  in  general. 

Mr.  Morris.  So  it  is  your  testimony  that  while  you  held  this  posi- 
tion you  were  concerned  with  the  development  and  the  consolidation 
of  communism  on  the  mainland  of  China  ? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir ;  I  was. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  that  not  be  right  in  line  with  your  duties 
if  you  were  to  look  into  the  questions  that  might  be  a  threat  to  your 
command  ?  Communism  in  China  could  be  a  threat  to  the  command 
in  Tokyo,  could  it  not? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir. 

May  I  explain  this?  That  whereas  I  had  the  division  that  was 
charged  with  the  external  security,  in  other  words,  a  threat  from 
outside,  there  was  another  division  of  G-2  which  was  charged  with  the 
internal  security.  My  primary  interest  was  watching  the  development 
in  China  and  seeing  the  advance  of  communism  and  Mao  Tse-tung's 
forces  in  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  General,  did  you  ever  have  occasion  to  brief  important 
leaders  of  the  United  States  Government  as  an  adviser  to  Japan  ? 

General  Fortier.  It  was  what  we  call  in  the  service  a  standard 
operating  procedure  that  whenever  any  distinguished  representative 
of  the  United  States  Government  came  to  Tokyo,  he  was  given  a  brief- 
ing as  to  the  situation  as  we  saw  it  and  in  turn  we  endeavored  to  obtain 
from  him  his  views,  or  the  Washington  view  if  he  came  from  Wash- 
ington. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  was  standard  operating  procedure? 

General  Fortier.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Do  you  recall  a  visit  that  Ambassador  at  Large  Philip 
C.  Jessup  made  to  Japan  in  late  1949  or  early  1950? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  I  do. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  relate  the  circumstances  to  this  committee, 
please  ? 

General  Fortier.  As  I  recall  it,  Mr.  Jessup  came  to  Japan,  to  Tokyo, 
in  the  early  days  of  January  1950.  It  was  just  about  the  time  that 
we  had  gotten  word  that  Britain  had  recognized  Communist  China. 
We  gave  Mr.  Jessup  the  normal  briefing  that  was  given  to  visiting 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  845 

people  from  Washington.  And  it  so  happened,  the  instance  that 
Mr.  Morris  is  referring  to,  that  during  one  of  the  intermissions,  I 
found  myself  alone  with  Mr.  Jessup 

The  Chairman.  Found  yourself  where? 

General  Fortier.  Standing  next  to  him  in  the  conference  room,  and 
I  put  the  following  question  to  him.  I  said :  "Wlien  will  we  recognize 
Communist  China?" 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  knew  at  that  time  he  was  connected  with 
the  State  Department  of  the  United  States  Government? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir.  He  was  there  as  an  ambassador  with 
that  rank. 

Mr.  SouRWiNE.  Why  did  you  put  the  question  that  way,  in  the 
affirmative,  General? 

General  Fortier.  I  had  been  very  much  concerned  about  Britain 
recognizing  Communist  China. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Had  he  been  briefed  on  that  question?  Was 
that  mentioned  in  the  briefing  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  don't  recall  that  it  was.  We  had  a  set  briefing 
that  involved  our  views  on  Asia  as  a  whole ;  that  is,  on  the  periphery 
of  the  Far  East  Command.  That  briefing  was  usually  given  by 
General  Willoughby  who  was  G-2. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Y^ou  usually  had  around  the  table  more  than 
Oeneral  Willoughby  and  yourself,  did  you  not  ? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is,  as  I  recall,  your  briefing  form. 

General  Fortier.  All  the  key  staJff  officers  of  GHQ  Far  East  Com- 
mand were  present  at  this  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  do  not  know  whether  that  question  was 
raised  in  the  briefing  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  don't  think  it  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact. 

Senator  Eastland.  What  did  Mr.  Jessup  tell  you  ? 

General  Fortier.  Mr.  Jessup  said,  "Well,  in  about  2  or  3  weeks." 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  it  as  a  categorical  statement  ? 

General  Fortier.  It  is  a  little  bit  difficult  for  me  to  remember  his 
exact  words  as  to  whether  it  was  a  categorical  statement  or  not,  but 
I  do  remember  that  I  picked  up  the  statement  and  I  argued  with  Mr. 
Jessup  and  told  him  that  I  thought  it  would  be  a  grave  error  if  we 
recognized  Communist  China. 

Senator  Eastland.  Why  did  you  think  it  would  be  a  grave  error? 

General  Fortier.  I  thought  it  would  be  a  grave  error  for  the  fol- 
lowing reason :  that  as  far  as  I  knew  never  in  its  history  had  China 
been  consolidated  under  one  particular  regime  or  one  head.  China 
had  always  had  these  regional  groups  and  throughout  the  history  of 
China  there  had  been  an  attempt  made  to  consolidate  it,  but  never 
with  success. 

Having  followed  the  development  in  China,  in  Communist  China, 
and  seeing  Mao  Tse-tung's  army  overrun  the  key  areas,  and  feeling 
that  Mao  Tse-tung  was  being  aided  and  abetted  by  the  Russians,  I  felt 
that  Mao  Tse-tung  had  a  very  fine  chance  of  consolidating  that  coun- 
try for  once  under  a  regime  that  would  be  inimical  to  us  and  against 
the  best  interests  of  the  United  States. 

Senator  Eastland.  If  we  recognized  them  ? 


846  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

General  Fortier.  Yes ;  if  we  recognized  the  country  and  gave  them 
that  moral  and  political  support  that  would  be  received  bj^  them  should 
we  grant  recognition. 

Senator  Fergusox.  What  did  Jessup  say  about  that  ? 

General  Fortier.  Mr.  Jessup  said,  'AVel'l,  we  must  face  facts."  I  am 
not  putting  in  quotes  and  end  quotes  now.  I  am  giving  you  my  recol- 
lection on  this.  He  said,  "We  must  face  facts.  After  all,  Mao  Tse- 
tung's  armies  have  overrun  the  vast  portion,  in  fact  the  key  areas  of 
China.  They  are  in  the  process  of  reestablishing  law  and  order  and 
the  mere  fact  that  we  should  recognize  them  does  not  mean  we  approve 
either  of  the  character  of  their  government  or  of  the  nature  of  it.  In 
arriving  at  a  decision  as  to  recognition  or  nonrecognition,  the  criteria 
should  be  whether  the  government  that  has  come  in  has  established 
sovereignty,  has  control  of  the  majority  of  the  country,  and  is  in  the 
process  of  reestablishing  law  and  order." 

Senator  Eastland.  Had  they  consolidated  China  at  that  time  ? 

General  Fortip:r.  In  my  opinion,  no. 

Senator  Eastland.  Had  they  consolidated  their  position  in  China 
when  you  left  Japan  ? 

General  Fortier.  In  my  opinion,  no. 

Senator  Eastland.  Have  they  consolidated  China  today? 

General  Fortier.  In  my  opinion,  no. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  think  recognition  by  this  country  would 
do  much  to  consolidate  communism  in  China  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  certainly  do. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  told  Jessup  that  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  told  him  substantially  that. 

About  that  time,  someone  else  came  in.  Here  was  this  conference 
room  and  the  conversation  was  interrupted  and  never  came  to  a  final 
conclusion. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  he  tell  you  we  had  an  agreement  with 
Great  Britain  that  after  recognition  by  Britain  that  we  would  recog- 
nize China  ? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir.  ^ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  he  mention  anything  about  the  fact  of 
Britain's  recognition? 

General  Fortier.  Ho  did  not,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  Eight  there,  as  a  general  in  intelligence  and 
from  your  sources  of  information  and  your  feel  of  the  atmosphere 
and  general  knowledge,  did  you  not  think  that  there  had  been  an 
understanding  betA^■een  this  country  and  Great  Britain  that  Great 
Britain's  recognition  of  Communist  China  would  be  followed  by  our 
recognition  ? 

General  Fortier.  That  is  a  rather  difficult  question  to  answer.  I 
prefer  to  give  you  the  atmosphere. 

Senator  Eastland.  Was  that  not  your  judgment.  General,  and  is 
not  that  the  reason  you  asked  Mr.  Jessup  the  question  you  did  ? 

General  Fortier.  Well,  some  time  in  October  or  November  1949,  I 
had  become  so  much  concerned  with  the  fact  that  Britain  might 
recognize  Communist  China  that  I  had  made  a  study  for  my  own 
satisfaction  of  the  situation  as  faced  by  the  British  in  Hong  Kong 
in  1941,  in  December,  when  the  Japanese  invaded  Hong  Kong,  and  the 
situation  as  existed  in  1949,  late  1949. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  847 

I  studied  it  from  a  political,  economic,  military,  and  psycliological 
point  of  view,  I  drafted  mainly  for  my  own  information  and  that  of 
my  immediate  entourage,  a  study  in  which  I  concluded  that  while  it 
would  be  a  great  error  should  Britain  recognize  Connnunist  China,  I 
feared  very  much  they  would  and  that  possibly  the  economic  factor 
would  be  the  determining  one  because  there  was  no  question  but  that 
there  had  been  a  terrific  increase  in  trade  through  Hong  Kong  be- 
tween 1948  and  1949. 

To  answer  Senator  Eastland's  question,  I  have  no  information, 
direct  evidence,  on  which  to  base  any  deal  between  the  United  States 
and  Britain.  On  the  other  hand,  I  feared,  you  might  say,  that  the 
United  States  would  follow  a  recognition  by  Britain,  and  if  I  remem- 
ber correctly,  either  Britain  had  just  recognized  Communist  China, 
at  the  time  I  spoke  to  Mr.  Jessup,  or  I  had  obtained  some  information, 
that  they  would  do  so  shortly.  I  believe  that  is  what  prompted  my 
questioning  of  Mr.  Jessup,  the  fact  that  a  day  or  two  before  there  had 
been  some  sort  of  an  official  announcement  that  Britain  had  recog- 
nized Communist  China. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  were  worried  about  Formosa,  too? 

General  Fortier.  I  was  worried  we  might  follow  suit. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  get  his  pereonal  opinion,  or  was  he 
speaking,  that  the  Government  was  going  to  do  this  ? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir.  This  was  a  man  to  man  conversation 
between  Jessup  and  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  it  was  his  personal  idea  that  it  should  be 
recognized  ? 

General  Fortier.  Senator,  the  entire  conversation ■ 

Senator  Ferguson.  Because  you  were  giving  him  your  personal 
argument  and  he  was  giving  his. 

General  Fortier.  I  feel  he  was. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  way  it  impressed  you  at  the  time? 

General  Fortier.  Yes.  The  whole  conversation  did  not  last  more 
than  2  or  3  minutes,  as  you  can  well  understand.  We  were  having  this 
conference  and  about  every  50  minutes  there  would  be  a  10-minute 
intermission.    It  was  in  one  of  them  I  tackled  him  on  that  subject. 

Senator  Eastland.  Were  you  afraid  of  the  loss  of  Formosa,  too? 

General  Fortier.  I  was  very  much  concerned  with  that. 

Senator  Eastland.  Wliy  were  you  concerned  with  that? 

General  Fortier.  Because  I  shared  the  view  that  Formosa  is  a 
key  area — I  do  not  like  to  use  the  word  "vital"  because  the  word  has 
been  overworked,  but  that  Formosa  lies  between  the  Philippines  and 
Japan  and  if  it  fell  in  enemy  hands  it  would  be  a  very  serious  threat 
to  either  country. 

Senator  Eastland.  Would  it  not  put  Japan  in  a  nutcracker  be- 
tween the  islands  we  have  given  Russia  on  the  north  and  those  islands 
south  of  Japan  ? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  Were  there  many  airfields  on  Formosa  ? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir ;  there  are. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  the  Far  East  Command  have  trouble  with 
the  State  Department  in  getting  in  Formosa,  or  did  the  United  States' 
State  Department  attempt  to  keep  generals  in  the  Far  East  Com- 
mand away  from  Formosa? 


848  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

General  Fortier.  Well,  tlie  correct  answer  to  that  is  I  know  of  no 
important  official  of  GHQ  who  was  ever  barred  admittance  to 
Formosa. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  you  not  have  to  resort  to  subterfuges  to 
get  in? 

General  Fortier.  I  think  the  Senator  is  referring  to  the  fact  that 
there  was  at  times  a  tendency  to  scrutinize  the  group  from  GHQ  that 
had  requested  admission  to  Formosa,  and  I  will  say,  Senator,  that  it 
was  based  largely,  at  least  from  the  information  we  obtained,  on  the 
lack  of  hotel  reservations  and  facilities  there. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  you  not  think  that  was  a  subterfuge, 
General  ? 

General  Fortier.  In  my  particular  case,  when  I  went  to  Formosa, 
every  one  in  GHQ  knew,  of  course,  of  my  particular  job,  that  of  Di- 
rector of  Theater  Intelligence  Division,  and  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment had  its  set-up  in  Formosa,  including  military,  air,  and  naval 
attaches.  At  least,  theoretically,  any  information  that  we  desired 
concerning  Formosa  could  have  been  obtained  through  those  sources. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  you  not  have  to  resort  to  subterfuge  to  get 
in  Formosa  ?    I  want  you  to  answer  that  question. 

General  Fortier.  I  don't  know  whether  I  had  to  or  not,  but  I  did. 

Senator  Eastland.  What  was  that  subterfuge  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  do  you  hesitate  on  this  ? 

General  Fortier.  Because,  if  I  seem  to  hesitate  it  may  have  been 
in  this  particular  instance  being  referred  to  that  it  was  overplayed. 
I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  had  I  applied  formally  for  admission 
to  Formosa  that  that  would  not  have  been  granted  me.  I  think  it 
would,  but  on  a  particular  occasion,  I  had  heard  certain  reports  about 
the  defense  capabilities  of  Formosa  that  bothered  me.  I  wanted  to 
get  over  there  and  get  there  in  a  hurry,  because  it  was  a  time  when 
actually  it  was  a  critical  period.     It  was  late  May,  early  June,  of  1950. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wliy  did  you  have  to  ask  the  State  Department  ? 

Senator  Eastland.  Please  go  ahead  and  answer  the  question. 

General  Fortier.  So,  in  order  to  get  there  and  get  there  in  a  hurry, 
an  arrangement  was  made  whereby  I  was  invited  as  a  guest  of  a  very 
high-ranking  official  in  Formosa. 

Senator  Eastland.  Who  was  that  official  ? 

General  Fortier.  Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek. 

Senator  Eastland.  Is  it  true  that  you  sent  word  you  were  coming 
to  the  State  Department  representative  and  got  in  a  plane  and  left 
before  he  had  time  to  answer  ? 

General  Fortier.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  Was  it  not  general  knowledge  that  the  Far  East 
command  was  not  welcomed  down  at  Formosa  by  the  American  State 
Department  ? 

General  Fortier.  Well,  it  was  my  impression  that  we  were  none  too 
welcome,  at  least  those  of  us  in  the  intelligence  field. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  you  ever  hear  of  a  General  Merritt  who  was 
being  sent  subrosa  by  the  State  Department  to  organize  an  anti-Chiang 
faction  in  Formosa  ? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  made  a  statement  a  little  while  ago.  General, 
that  when  you  attempted  to  go  to  Formosa  you  seemed  to  be  "scruti- 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  84^ 

nized."    Why  do  you  use  the  word  "scrutinize"  ?    Your  going  to  For- 
mosa was  scrutinized.     By  whom  and  how  ? 

General  Fortier.  Did  I  use  that  word  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

General  Fortier.  I  believe  I  don't  recall  in  a  particular  thing,  but 
I  said  those  officers  who  were  involved  in  the  intelligence  field,  their 
request  for  admission  into  Formosa  would  have  been  more  closely 
scrutinized  by  the  American  representation  in  Formosa  than  would 
others.  After  all,  let's  be  fair  about  this  thing.  The  United  States 
Government  had.  a  consul  general,  had  United  States  Military,  Air 
and  Naval  attaches  in  Formosa.  Certainly,  theoretically,  we  had 
appropriate  United  States  representation  in  the  place.  If  I  was  not 
satisfied  with  their  views  and  reports  and  I  desired  my  own  estimate,. 
V7hy,  you  might  attribute  that  to  my  own  idiosyncrasy,  that  I  preferred 
my  own  evaluation  to  that  which  I  was  receiving. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But,  General,  you  don't  claim  that  the  military 
and  attaches  at  an  embassy  are  Intelligence  officers,  do  you,  in  the  sense 
of  the  word  you  were  ? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir;  they  are  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Therefore,  you  had  to  obtain  information  out 
of  Formosa.  Why  did  you  have  to  ask  the  State  Department  for 
permission  to  go  to  Formosa  ? 

General  Fortier.  Sir,  one  has  to  obtain  a  visa  from  the  State  De- 
partment or  through  the  State  Department  channels  to  visit  any 
foreign  country.  Formosa  was  not  under  the  aegis  of  the  Far  East 
Command. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  true  that  civilians  who  went  to  Japan,  for 
instance,  connected  with  the  United  States  Government  and  not  con- 
nected with  the  State  Department,  had  difficulty  going  to  Formosa? 

General  Fortier.  Sir,  that  I  would  not  know.     I  don't  know. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  ever  hear  that? 

General  Fortier.  That  is  the  first  I  ever  heard  of  that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  get  a  visa  from  the  State  Department? 

General  Fortier.  I  got  one  from  the  State  Department  representa- 
tive. General  MacArthur's  chief  political  adviser,  Mr.  Seabald,  was 
my  channel  of  getting  into  any  country.  Through  him,  we  could 
contact  these  various  missions  that  were  in  Tokyo.  For  example, 
when  I  went  to  Hong  Kong  or  Indochina,  or  to  Korea,  that  was  proc- 
essed through  the  State  Department  representative  in  Tokyo. 

Senator  Eastland.  That  State  Department  representative  in  Tokyo 
told  you  how  to  get  into  Formosa,  did  he  not  ? 

General  Fortier.  He  aided  and  abetted  me. 

Senator  Eastland.  That  was  through  subterfuge,  to  send  a  mes- 
sage to  Formosa  you  were  coming  and  get  in  your  plane  and  go  before 
they  had  time  to  answer.    Is  that  true  ? 

General  Fortier.  That  is  the  way  I  got  in  there;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  might  tell  you.  General,  that  I  had  a  similar 
experience  to  get. into  Formosa  aft^  I  was  in  the  air  in  the  plane. 
We  had  to  obtain  permission  to  go  in  instead  of  getting  clearance 
from  the  State  Department. 

Is  that  not  what  you  did  ?  You  got  in  the  plane  and  got  permission 
to  land? 


850  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

General  Fortier.  I  had  anticipated  that  I  would  have  trouble 
getting  in. 

The  Chairman.  Trouble  from  what  source  ?  From  our  authorities 
or  from  whom  ? 

General  Fortier.  Through  Mr.  Robert  Strong,  who  was  our  con- 
sul general  there. 

The  Chairman.  Proceed,  Mr.  Morris. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  point  out  the  relevancy 
of  this  testimony  to  our  Institute  of  Pacific  Kelations  inquiry. 

Our  records  are  replete  with  the  association  of  Mr.  Jessup  to  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.  So  Mr.  Mandel  has  compiled  a  list  of 
the  important  positions  that  Mr.  Jessup  held  in  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations.    I  would  like  those  introduced  in  the  record  at  this  time. 

The  Chairman.  He  has  compiled  them  from  what  source? 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  describe  your  compilation  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  According  to  Problems  of  the  Pacific,  1933,  Proceed- 
ings of  the  Fifth  Conference  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  held 
August  14  to  26,  1933,  one  of  the  conference  members  was  Philip  Jes- 
sup. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  a  publication  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

Then,  according  to  Problems  of  the  Pacific,  dated  1939,  Proceedings 
of  the  Study  Meeting  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  held  at 
Virginia  Beach,  November  18  to  December  2, 1939,  page  273,  one  of  the 
international  officers  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  was  Philip 
C.  Jessup,  who  was  also  chairman  of  the  Pacific  Council. 

Then,  according  to  the  Annual  Report  of  the  American  Council 
of  the  IPR,  1938,  page  58,  Philip  C.  Jessup  was  vice  chairman  and  a 
member  of  the  board  of  trustees. 

Then  in  the  volume  called  War  and  Peace  in  the  Pacific,  A  Prelimi- 
nary Report  of  the  Eighth  Conference  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Re- 
lations held  at  Mont  Tremblant,  December  4  to  December  14,  1942, 
page  159,  Philip  C.  Jessup  is  listed  as  a  conference  member  and  as 
chairman  of  the  Pacific  Council. 

Again  in  a  volume  called  Security  in  the  Pacific,  A  Preliminary 
Report  of  the  Ninth  Conference  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 
held  at  Hot  Springs,  Va.,  January  6  to  January  17,  1945,  page  157, 
Philip  C.  Jessup  is  listed  as  a  conference  member ;  and,  finally,  we  have 
a  telegram  addressed  to  Edward  C.  Carter  from  "Fred" 

Senator  Eastland.  Do  you  know  who  that  Fred  is  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  It  may  be  Field. 

Senator  Eastland.  What  is  the  date  of  that  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  November  23,  and  the  year  is  not  given. 

It  says :  "Approve  nominations  suggest  Jessup  for  research  chair- 
man." 

Mr.  Morris.  There  is  no  other  Fred  on  the  staff  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations  other  than  Fred  Field  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  None  that  I  know  of. 

Senator  Eastland.  Have  you  any  idea  what  year  that  is? 

Mr.  Mandel.  We  can  check  it  and  establish  the  year  from  other 
correspondence. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  851 

Mr.  Morris.  When  yon  do  verif}^  that,  which  we  are  not  prepared  to 
do  now,  verify  the  position  that  Mr.  Jessnp  did  hold  as  research 
chairman,  you  will  be  able  to  relate  it  to  that  telegram. 

Mr.  MANDEii.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  had  another  question  of  the 
witness.  I  wanted  to  ask  whether  or  not  it  was  a  fact,  to  your  knowl- 
edge, that  in  the  Far  East  in  the  various  embasssies  there  were  rumors 
about  the  insecurity  of  the  defense  and  the  fact  that  Formosa  was 
just  ready  for  an  overthrow  of  the  Nationalist  Government?  That 
was  back  around  the  time  you  were  talking  about. 

General  Fortier.  There  was  considerable  rumor  and  misgiving 
about  the  state  of  defense  of  Formosa  in  general. 

To  be  very  honest  with  you,  that  is  the  reason  I  was  anxious  to  go 
down  there. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  go  down  and  see  and  get  the  facts? 

General  Fortier.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  on  October  26,  I  think  that  is 
the  date,  the  United  States  Government  sent  a  message  to  the  Nation- 
alist Government  at  Formosa  that  we  would  not  give  them  any  more 
military  aid,  and  that  was  1949  ? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir;  I  do  not  know  that.  I  had  heard  they 
were  not  receiving  any  military  aid,  but  I  did  not  know  of  any  message 
such  as  you  spoke  of. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  not  know  that  such  a  message  was 
sent  ? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  To  the  Nationalist  Government  ? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  long  did  you  stay  in  Formosa  ? 

General  Fortier.  As  I  recall,  I  stayed  there  3  days. 

Senator  Ferguson..  I  assume  you  talked  to  General  Sun  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  did,  at  long  length. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  had  no  trouble  getting  hotel  space? 

General  Fortier.  I  did  not  live  in  a  hotel. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  lived  in  the  palace  ? 

General  Fortier.  No  ;  but  I  lived  in  a  cottage,  a  very  comfortable- 
cottage  in  the  mountains. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Near  Chiang  Kai-shek's  place? 

General  Fortier.  Yes ;  where  the  generalissimo  lived. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  not  know  they  had  plenty  of  space  for 
visitors  in  Taipei  ? 

General  Fortier.  The  facts  are  not  quite  that  way.  Senator.  In 
late  August  1950,  I  was  the  deputy  chief  of  the  Far  East  Command's 
survey  group  that  made  a  complete,  exhaustive  study  of  Formosa. 
This  was  after  the  Korean  war  had  broken  out.  This  was  in  August 
1950. 

We  sent  a  rather  sizable  group  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  to  For- 
mosa, to  Taipei,  to  conduct  the  survey.  We  had,  as  I  recall,  something 
between  40  and  50  officers.  We  had  considerable  difficulty  in  find- 
ing  

Senator  Ferguson.  But  I  am  talking  about  the  number  of  people 
you  had  in  mind  going  down  just  to  get  information. 


852  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

General  Fortier.  Hotel  accommodations 


Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  not  talking  about  the  hotels;  I  am  talk- 
ing about  the  place  that  the  former  resident  commissioner  of  Japan 
used  as  a  guest  house  for  visiting  people. 

General  Fortier.  Sir,  I  am  inclined  to  agree  that  hotel  accom- 
modations in  Formosa  were  extremely  limited,  that  one  or  two  in- 
dividuals might  not  have  been  taken  care  of  would  not  stand  too 
close  scrutiny.     But  if  there  were  a  group  of  10  or  12  people ■ 

Senator  Ferguson.  If  you  tried  to  send  a  large  mission  over 
there;  but  that  was  not  your  purpose,  was  it?  It  was  to  get  some 
man  in  there  to  get  accurate  information  for  you  ? 

General  Fortier.  The  problem  was  to  get  just  a  few  to  obtain 
information. 

Senator  Eastland.  The  problem  was  for  you  to  get  in? 

General  Fortier.  I  got  in,  sir. 

Senator  Eastland.  General,  it  is  just  to  get  your  full  background 
in  the  record,  but  were  you  ever  stationed  in  Yugoslavia? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir.  I  was  military  attache  to  Yugoslavia 
from  the  latter  part  of  May  1939  until  I  wrote  my  own  orders  to 
get  out  of  there  after  the  Germans  had  overrun  the  country. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  you  have  anything  to  do  with  setting  up 
the  coup  that  overthrew  the  regency  ? 

General  Fortier.  Not  that  I  had  anything  to  do  with  it,  but  I  was 
a  very  intimate  friend  of  Gen.  Bor  Mirkovic,  who  was  the  deputy 
chief  of  aviation.  He  was  the  one  who  planned  and  implemented 
and  executed  the  coup  d'etat  on  the  26th  of  March  1941.  One  of  his 
lieutenants  was  Mikhailovich.     I  knew  him  quite  intimately. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  you  know  Tito  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  did  not  know  Tito. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  now  it  would  be  a  grave  mistake 
to  recognize  Red  China  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  do. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  think  now  as  you  did  in  the  past  that 
it  would  consolidate  them  and  give'prestige  and  aid  to  them  in  their 
communism  and  their  efforts  as  Communists? 

General  Fortier.  I  do. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  feel  very  strongly  about  that? 

General  Fortier.  I  have  felt  right  along  there  were  two  things 
that  might  happen  that  would  consolidate  Communist  China.  One 
would  be  for  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  make  a  deal  with  Mao  Tsetung 
and  lend  his  support  to  Mao  Tse-tung. 

The  other  would  be  for  us  to  recognize  them.  In  so  doing,  then 
they  would  have  the  moral  and  the  economic  force  that  would  be 
needed  to  consolidate  the  country. 

Senator  Eastland.  Would  an  armistice  in  Korea  help  consolidate 
the  Communist  regime  in  China  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  doubt  that  seriously. 

Senator  Watkins.  May  I  inquire  when  it  was  that  you  had  this 
conversation  with  Ambassador  Jessup  ? 

General  Fortier.  Sir,  it  was  in  the  early  winter  of  1949-50.  If  I 
recall  correctly,  it  was  in  early  January  of  1950.  The  date  can  be 
fixed  hj^  studying  Mr.  Jessup's  itinerary  when  he  made  that  Far  East 
survey  in  the  winter  of  1949-50.  I  have  not  any  access  to  any  records 
to  determine  the  exact  date  on  which  I  spoke  to  him. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  853 

Senator  Watkins.  It  was  at  least  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean 
police  action  ? 

General  Fortier,  Yes,  sir.  It  was  several  months  before  the  out- 
break of  the  Korean  war. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  notice  you  refer  to  that  as  a  "war."  I  said  a 
police  action. 

General  Fortier.  Well,  a  police  action.  I  am  sure  it  is  a  war  to 
the  man  in  there  fighting. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  quite  agree  with  you. 

This  might  be  a  bit  far  afield,  but  somewhere  along  the  line,  Mr. 
Chairman,  it  seems  to  me  we  ought  to  make  some  inquiry  into  what 
caused  the  United  States  to  get  out  of  Korea  when  we  had  our  forces 
there,  to  get  out  when  they  moved  back  into  Japan. 

Do  you  know  the  situation  with  respect  to  what  prompted  us  to 
get  out  of  Korea  at  that  time  ?    I  mean  when  we  withdrew  our  forces. 

General  Fortier.  I  would  not  have  been  too  well  informed  on  that. 
I  may  have  seen  the  papers,  in  fact  I  probably  did  see  the  papers,  in 
connection  with  it ;  but  as  I  recall  it,  it  was  some  United  Nations  agree- 
ment that  by  a  certain  date  the  United  States  would  remove  its  forces 
from  Korea.  I  went  to  Korea  in  April  of  1949  and  at  that  time  we  had 
a  reinforced  regiment  there  plus  a  number  of  instructors.  By  the 
30th  of  June  1949,  we  had  removed  all  troops  from  the  area  and  had 
nothing  but  military  advisers  in  a  group. 

Senator  Watkins.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  it  was  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  Army  that  caused  us  to  get  out  of  Korea  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  wouldn't  know,  sir.  You  can  probably  obtain 
that  from  National  Defense. 

Senator  Watkins.  Would  you  inform  the  committee  now  without 
violating  any  classified  information  just  what  the  situation  was  in 
Korea  at  the  time  we  got  out  ? 

General  Fortier.  From  what  point  of  view,  sir  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  From  the  point  of  view  of  whether  it  was  a  wise 
or  unwise  move. 

General  Fortier.  In  my  opinion,  it  was  a  wise  move  for  us  to  move 
out  at  that  particular  stage  in  the  game.  After  all,  a  reinforced  regi- 
ment is  purely  a  token  force.  We  would  have  been  neither  fish  nor 
fowl  with  a  reinforced  regiment. 

Senator  Watkins.  Do  you  believe  that  the  North  Koreans  or  the 
Chinese  would  have  attacked  the  United  States  forces  even  if  they 
were  only  a  token  force  ? 

General  Fortier.  That,  I  do  not.  I  do  not  believe  they  would  have 
attacked  us. 

The  Chairman.  They  were  not  making  sporadic  drives  across  the 
line  before  we  moved  out,  or  were  they  ? 

General  Fortier.  Throughout  the  entire  period  there  were  border 
incidents. 

Senator  Watkins.  There  were  no  actual  attacks  on  American 
troops,  however?  All  of  the  attacks  occurred  later  on  after  the 
American  troops  had  been  withdrawn  ? 

General  Fortier.  There  had  been  border  incidents  with  the  South 
Koreans  even  when  we  were  there. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Almost  weekly  ? 

General  Fortier.  Not  against  our  forces. 


854  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Watkins.  That  was  part  of  your  investigation,  to  investi- 
gate any  possible  threat  to  the  United  States  from  North  Korea,  from 
China,  and  that  particular  section  ? 

General  Fortier.  When  I  went  over  there,  it  was  to  get  the  feel  of 
the  country,  to  study  the  capabilities,  get  information  direct  from  the 
people  on  the  ground  as  to  what  might  be  the  North  Korean  capabili- 
ties. I  did  the  same  thing  by  traveling,  for  example,  to  the  Kowloon- 
Hong  Kong  front.  I  went  to  Saigon  and  Hanoi  and  spent  a  week  in 
Tonkin.  I  was  a  house  guest  there  of  the  French  deputy  commanding 
general. 

I  studied  the  location  of  his  advance  posts  and  talked  with  his  staff 
about  the  situation  internally  and  externally  in  Indochina.  We  did 
not  feel  too  secure  about  the  whole  situation  there  in  the  spring  of 
1950. 

Senator  Watkins.  What  are  you  referring  to  now,  just  Korea? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir.  This  map  that  we  had  was  showing  more 
and  more  red.  We  were  getting  this  encroachment  on  our  command. 
Here  were  these  four  Japanese  islands  and  Okinawa.  The  Beds  were 
driving  south.  At  first  our  attention  had  been  drawn  to  the  north 
around  Hokkaido,  but  as  it  swept  down,  don't  you  see,  here  was  our 
southern  flank  becoming  more  and  more  exposed.  We  had  the  respon- 
sibility for  the  Philippines,  too. 

So,  naturally,  anyone  who  is  in  the  intelligence  profession,  and 
particularly  one  who  had  that  special  responsibility  that  I  had,  would 
concern  himself  with  what  was  going  on  and  where  were  the  build- 
ups, what  were  the  capabilities,  where  might  they  strike  if  they  did 
strike. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  you  expect  war  to  break  out  on  one  of  those 
four  fronts  in  1950? 

General  Fortier.  To  answer  your  question  directly,  sir,  I  was  very,, 
very  much  concerned.  I  was  afraid.  I  had  enough  of  an  intuition 
that  something  was  going  to  break  out  in  the  Far  East  that  the  record 
will  show  that  I  was  constantly  on  the  move  traveling,  trying  to  find 
out  where  it  might  break  out. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  Intelligence  know  where  the  Chinese 
divisions  were  concentrated? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir.  We  had  very  good  information  on  where 
all  these  threats  were,  exactly  how  they  were  distributed.  But  I 
would  like  to  say  right  here  that  to  know  what  a  potential  enemy  is 
capable  of  doing  and  to  determine  what  he  intended  to  do  on  the 
spur  of  the  moment  or  at  the  last  minute,  those  are  two  entirely 
different  things. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  our  potential  enemy  at  that  time  that 
you  were  apprehensive? 

General  Fortier.  I  was  mostly  apprehensive — well,  of  course,  the 
Soviets  never  left  my  mind,  and  Mao  Tse-tung  and  his  forces. 

The  Chairman.  It  was  in  this  atmosphere  that  you  have  described 
here  that  you  discussed  with  Mr.  Jessup  as  to  when  we  might  recog- 
nize Red  China? 

General  Foriter.  Yes;  it  was.  From  nround  September  1940  until 
June  1950,  to  use  the  vernacular,  I  was  "sweating  it  out"  in  the  Far 
East  Command. 

Senator  Jenner.  When  you  talked  to  Jessup.  he  made  his  tour  and 
inspection  of  Korea  at  that  time? 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  855 

General  Fortier.  I  think  he  was  on  his  way  out. 

Senator  Jenner.  What  did  lie  say  in  regard  to  Korea? 

General  Fortier.  I  did  not  discuss  Korea  with  him. 

Senator  Jenner.  Have  you  seen  any  statements  he  made  to  the 
American  public  upon  his  return  to  America  about  the  situation  in 
Korea  being  awfulb'  peaceful  over  there  and  everything  lovely? 

General  Fortier.  No,  sir;  I  did  not. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  further  questions,  Senators? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  would  like  to  know  if  he  can  give  us  that 
information  as  to  what  the  real  situation  in  Korea  was  as  far  as  the 
Army  knew  it  just  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  this  police  action  in  Korea. 

General  Fortier.  We  were  quite  well  informed  about  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  North  Korean  forces,  their  strength,  their  armament.  We 
knew  their  capabilities.  We  did  not  know  on  the  morning  of  the 
26th  day  of  June  1050  at  4 :  30  a,  m.,  or  whatever  time  it  was,  they 
were  going  to  jump  off. 

Senator  Watkins.  Did  you  know  in  a  general  way  an  attack  from 
that  section  was  impending? 

General  Fortier.  Not  any  more  so  than  any  of  these  others ;  not  any 
more  so  than  it  would  have  been  against  Formosa  or  Indochina. 

Senator  Watkins.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  indications  were  pretty 
.strong  there  was  likely  to  be  an  attack  on  Formosa,  were  they  not  ? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Watkins.  And  also  Indochina  ? 

General  Fortier.   Yes. 

Senator  Watkins.  If  it  were  put  in  the  same  category,  it  would  be 
in  the  realm  of  a  probable  attack  coming  from  that  point  ? 

General  Fortier.  Yes. 

Senator  Watkins.  That  was  your  business  to  find  out  ? 

General  Fortier.  It  was  my  business  to  find  out. 

Senator  Waticins.  Did  you  evaluate  the  North  Koreans  as  a  danger 
to  your  security? 

General  Fortier.  Yes,  we  did ;  not  as  much  so  as  the  Chinese  Com- 
imunists. 

Senator  Watkins.  What  I  would  like  to  know:  Were  you  really 
caught  flat-footed  hj  the  North  Korean  attack  on  South  Korea  ? 

General  Fortier.  We  were  not  surprised,  but  we  were  amazed. 
Xet's  put  it  that  way. 

To  answer  your  question,  I  think  the  greatest  surprise  was  what 
liappened  2  days  later  when  we  got  word  we  would  intervene  in  that 
action. 

Senator  Watkins,  You  were  surprised  at  that? 

General  Fortier.  Yes. 

Senator  Watkins.  Why  were  you  surprised  at  that? 

General  Fortier.  I  don't  know  why.    I  am  just  telling  you. 

Senator  Watkins  You  say  you  were  surprised.  There  must  have 
'been  some  reason  for  it. 

General  Fortier.  In  the  first  place,  we  had  no  responsibility  in  the 
Far  East  Command  for  Korea  at  all,  as  you  probably  well  know. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  ]iad  no  authority  whatever  to  send  troops  in  there 
:at  the  time? 

General  Fortier.  No. 

Senator  Jenner.  Was  it  not  a  determined  fact  among  the  high 
•command  that  Korea  was  militarily  untenable? 


856  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

General  Fortier.  I  didn't  share  that  view. 

Senator  Jenner.  Was  that  not  the  view  ? 

General  Fortier.  I  don't  know  of  any  official  expression  that  ever 
came  from  the  Far  East  Command  to  that  effect,  but  I  think  that  it 
has  been  shown  that  South  Korea  is  tenable  and  those  of  us  who  were ' 
there  in  the  days  of  the  latter  part  of  June,  July,  and  August  learned 
what  America  can  do  with  very  few  resources  with  every  one  playing 
as  one  team  and  as  one  coordinated  unit. 

Senator  Eastland.  How  many  American  divisions  would  you  think 
it  would  take  to  bring  the  Korean  war  to  a  speedy  conclusion  ? 

General  Fortier.  We  have  had  in  the  military  service  a  rule  of 
thumb  in  determining  the  number  of  divisions  to  hold  its  own  against 
a  potential  enemy,  and  that  has  been  usually  a  division  for  every  ten 
miles  of  front.  Korea  happens  to  be  a  peninsula.  If  I  recall  cor- 
rectly, it  is  about  150  miles  wide.  With  the  superiority  of  naval 
forces  we  have  guarding  either  flank,  with  the  Air  Force  that  we  have, 
if  we  had  a  total  of  12  to  15  divisions  in  there,  I  do  not  think  there 
would  be  any  question  about  the  liquidation  of  the  Korean  conflict 
successfully. 

Senator  Eastland.  We  could  go  to  the  Yalu  River  ? 

General  Fortier.  You  are  asking  me  to  pit  my  knowledge  of  mili- 
tary strategy — in  other  words,  you  are  shifting  my  role,  sir.  I  have 
been  playing  in  the  role  of  an  intelligence  officer.  Now  I  am  to  become 
the  commander  in  chief. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Morris,  you  may  proceed  with  your  questions. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  had  commenced  to  show  the  associa- 
tion between  Mr.  Jessup  about  whom  we  have  had  testimony  today, 
and  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.  We  had  set  forth,  to  a  partial 
extent,  Mr.  Jessup's  association  with  the  IPR. 

I  would  like  to  put  in  in  detail,  Mr.  Chairman,  some  of  the  roles 
that  he  did  have  in  some  of  the  more  important  conferences  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations.  For  instance,  the  IPR  holds  a  triennial 
conference  which  is  one  of  the  features  of  that  organization,  one  of 
the  principal  means  of  expression. 

I  would  like  to  show  he  had  an  important  role  certainly  during  the 
two  conferences  that  were  held  during  the  war,  the  one  at  Mont  Trem- 
blant  in  1942  and  then  again  in  the  Hot  Springs  convention  in  1945. 

Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  put  in  the  record  Mr.  Jessup's  association 
with  those  two  conferences? 

The  Chairman.  From  what  are  you  reading,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  was  formerly  entered  into  the  record  as  exhibit 
No.  110  on  August  14,  1951.  It  is  a  letter  dated  June  15,  1942,  from 
the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  headed :  "E.  C.  C.  from 
W.  W.  L :".     The  memorandum  reads  as  follows : 

In  response  to  your  request  I  have  hastily  jotted  down  a  number  of  suggestions 
for  the  American  group  at  the  conference.  It's  a  long  list,  of  course,  but  I  believe 
we  should  add  to  it  considerably,  and  then  get  competent  advice — say  that  of 
Currle,  Barnes,  and  Jessup — on  elimination.  This  list  runs  too  much  in  the 
regular  groove  as  regards  nongovernment  people.  So  far  as  Washington  is 
concerned,  we  need  more  intimate  knowledge  as  to  who  really  are  in  the  key 
positions. 

Then  a  list  of  names  follows. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  that  reintroduced  in  the 
record  and  one  of  the  points  is  to  show  that  the  leaders  of  the  Institute 
of  Pacific  Relations,  E.  C.  C.  and  W.  W.  L.,  were  consulting  at  this 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  857 

time  Currie,  Barnes,  and  Jessup  for  the  makeup  of  the  representation 
to  that  particular  conference.     As  such,  I  would  like  it  in  the  record. 
The  Chairman.  For  that  purpose  it  will  be  inserted  again, 
(The  document  referred  to  previously  marked  "Exhibit  No.  110;' 
was  reintroduced  and  is  as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  110 

June  15,  194?:. 

E.  C.  C.  from  W.  W.  L. 

In  response  to  your  request  I  have  hastily  jotted  clown  a  number  of  suggestions 
for  the  American  group  at  the  conference.  It's  a  long  list,  of  course,  but  I  belie-vo 
we  should  add  to  it  considerably,  and  then  get  competent  advice — say  that  of 
Currie,  Barnes,  and  Jessup — on  elimination.  This  list  runs  too  much  in  the 
regular  groove  as  regards  non-Government  people.  So  far  as  Washington  is 
concerned,  we  need  more  intimate  knowledge  as  to  who  really  are  in  the  key 
positions. 

GOVERNMENT 

Gruening,  Ernest  H.,  Governor,  Alaska. 

Bean,  Louis,  Board  of  Economic  Warfare. 

Perkins,  Milo,  Board  of  Economic  Warfare. 

Riefler,  Winfield,  Board  of  Economic  Warfare. 

Shoemaker,  James  H.,  Board  of  Economic  Warfare. 

Stone,  W.  T.,  Board  of  Economic  Warfare. 

AVallace,  H.  A.,  Vice  President,  Board  of  Economic  Warfare. 

Staley,  Eugene,  Bureau  of  the  Budget. 

Barnes,  Joseph,  Coordinator  of  Information. 

Bunche,  Ralph,  Coordinator  of  Information. 

Fahs,  C.  B.,  Coordinator  of  Information. 

Hayden,  J.  R.,  Coordinator  of  Information. 

Wheeler,  Leslie,  Department  of  Agriculture. 

Ropes,  E.  C,  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Trade. 

Berle,  A.  A.,  Department  of  State. 

Davies,  Joseph,  Department  of  State.  ■ 

Grady,  Henry,  Department  of  State. 

Hiss,  Alger,  Department  of  State. 

Hornbeck,  S.  K.,  Department  of  State. 

Sayre,  Francis  B.,  Department  of  State. 

Stinebower,  L.  D.,  Department  of  State. 

Vince,  Jacob,  Department  of  the  Treasury. 

White,  H.  D.,  Department  of  the  Treasury. 

Gulick,  Luther  H.,  National  Resources  Planning  Board. 

Emerson,  Rupert,  Office  of  Price  Administration. 

Nathan,  Robert,  War  Production  Board. 

Currie,  Lauchlin,  White  House 

Lubin,  I.,  White  House 

OTHEES 

Bassett,  Arthur,  American  Red  Cross 
Bates,  Searle,  International  Missionary  Council 
Beukema,  Col.  Herman,  West  Point 
Binder,  Carroll,  Chicago  Daily  News 
Clapper,  Raymond,  Washington  columnist 
Cowles,  Gardner,  Des  Moines  Register  &  Tribune 
Dennett,  Tyler,  historian 
Dollard,  Charles,  Carnegie  Corp. 
Emeny,  Brooks,  Foreign  Affairs  Council,  Cleveland 
Field,  Frederick  V.,  New  York 
Herod,  W.  R.,  International  General  Electric 
Jessup,  Prof.  Philip  C,  Columbia  University 

Kizer,  Benjamin  H.,  Pacific  Northwest  Regional  Planning  Commission 
Lochhead,  Archie,  Universal  Trading  Corp. 
Luce,  Heni-y,  Time,  Inc. 
Molyneaux,  Peter,  Texas  Weekly 
Moore,  Harriet  L.,  American  Russian  Institute 

Schwellenhach,  Judge  Lewis  B.,  United  States  District  Court,  Spokane,  Wash. 
(ex-Senator) 


858  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Sproiil,  Allan,  Federal  Reserve  Bank,  New  York 

Sweetlaml,  Monroe,  National  CIO  Committee  for  American  and  Allied  War  Relief 

Voorhis,  Jerry,  House  of  Representatives 

Wilkie,  Wendell,  attorney 

Willits,  Joseph  H.,  Rockefeller  Foundation 

Wilson,  C.  E.,  General  Electric 

Yarnell,  Admiral  H.  E.,  United  States  Navy,  retired 

The  Chairman,  Did  you  have  something  else  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Then  we  have  former  exhibit  No.  104  from  the  open 
hearings  of  August  14,  1951, 

It  is  a  letter  from  the  IPE  files  dated  November  30,  1942.  Memo- 
randum to  Mr,  Carter,  copy  for  Mr.  Jessup,  Mont  Tremblant,  It  reads 
as  follows : 

In  response  to  your  request  for  designations  of  American  Council  members  of 
Mont  Tremblant  committees,  I  am  putting  down  the  following  suggestions. 

These  should  be  reconsidered  at  Mont  Tremblant  after  checking  with  Jessup 
so  that  they  are  merely  tentative  for  the  present. 

The  Pacific  Council — Jessup,  the  regular  American  Council  member,  will  be  in 
the  chair  so  presumably  another  American  should  represent  the  Council.  I 
believe  Kizer  is  the  best  choice. 

Program  committee — Currie  would  be  an  excellent  member,  with  Field  as 
alternate.  Currie  may  not  wish  to  be  burdened  with  this,  however,  and  1 
understand  you  have  Field  in  mind  as  program  committee  secretary,  which  would 
be  excellent.    The  final  decision  here  I  would  like  to  leave  until  later.     *     *     *" 

That  is  a  partial  excerpt  from  the  exhibit, 

Mr.  Morris,  Mr,  Chairman,  I  notice  that  this  exhibit  and  the  pre- 
vious one  have  already  been  introduced  in  the  record  at  previous 
hearings. 

I  believe  Mr,  Mandel  gave  the  previous  hearing  dates. 

The  Chairjman,  Very  well, 

Mr.  Mandel,  This  is  former  exhibit  No,  132,  used  in  open  hearings 
on  August  16,  1951,  It  comes  from  the  files  of  the  IPE,  and  is  on  the 
letterhead  of  the  Columbia  University,  addressed  to  Mr,  Raymond 
Dennett,  secretary,  American  Council,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations, 
from  Philip  C.  Jessup,  and  I  read  portions  of  this  exhibit : 

In  regard  to  the  delegation  at  the  conference,  I  am  not  sure  what  you  have  in 
mind  about  a  secretariat  for  the  delegation.  I  do  not  recall  that  we  have  ever 
made  the  kind  of  distinction  which  you  seem  to  have  in  mind  for  the  American 
delegation.  The  Pacific  Council  provides  a  secretariat  for  the  conference  and 
some  of  our  people  have  been  taken  by  the  Pacific  Council  for  that  purpose. 
Maybe  I  miss  the  point  and  if  so  I  wish  you  would  let  me  know. 

Mr,  Morris.  This  is  Mr,  Jessup  writing  ? 
Mr.  Mandel.  Yes. 

The  following  are  people  whom  I  would  include :  Benjamin  Kizer,  Brayton 
Wilbur,  Eric  Johnston,  Will  Clayton,  George  A.  Morison,  Mansfield  Freeman  or 
J.  A.  MacKay,  Lauchlin  Currie,  Dean  Acheson,  John  Carter  Vincent,  Hari'y  White, 
Rupert  Emerson,  Owen  Lattimore,  W.  A.  M.  Burden,  Abbot  Low  Moffat,  Robert 
J.  Watt,  Len  DeCaux,  Col.  Carl  Faymonville,  Colonel  Shoemaker,  Virginius 
Dabney  or  R.  E.  Freeman,  Walter  Lippmann,  Sumner  Welles,  Josepli  Barnes, 
Frederick  V,  Field,  Harold  Sprout,  Grayson  Kirk,  Adam  Comstock  Notestein. 

Further : 

In  reply  to  yours  of  the  31st,  I  do  not  know  Coons,  but  have  no  objection  to 
him.     I  doubt  if  Wilson  would  add  much  but  Alger  Hiss  would  be  fine. 

There  is  a  pencil  note  at  the  bottom  which  says :  "Frank  Coe  of  FEA 
also  good." 

Mr.  Morris.  I  would  like  to  point  out  in  that  list  of  names  are  names 
.of  10  people  identified  before  the  committee  as  being  members  of  the 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  859 

Communist  organization.  I  think  it  would  be  proper  to  make  that 
comment  as  that  exhibit  number  132  was  introduced  in  the  open 
hearings  of  August  16,  1951. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  this  should  go  in  the  record  at  this  point, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  excerpts  are  already  in. 

Mr.  Morris.  May  it  be  incorporated  in  its  entirety  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

(Exhibit  No.  132  is  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  132 

Mr.  Raymond  Dennett, 

Secretary,  American  Council,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations, 
New  York  22,  N.  Y. 

Deae  Ray  :  In  regard  to  the  delegation  at  the  conference,  I  am  not  sure  what 
you  have  in  mind  about  a  secretariat  for  the  delegation.  I  do  not  recall  that  we 
have  ever  made  the  kind  of  distinction  which  you  seem  to  have  in  mind  for  the 
American  delegation.  The  Pacific  council  provides  a  secretariat  for  the  con- 
ference and  some  of  our  people  have  been  taken  by  the  Pacific  council  for  that 
purpose.    Maybe  I  miss  the  point  and  if  so  I  wish  you  would  let  me  know. 

The  following  are  people  whom  I  would  include:  Benjamin  Kizer,  Brayton 
Wilbur,  Eric  Johnston,  Will  Clayton,  George  A.  Mori  son,  Mansfield  Freeman  or 
J.  A.  MacKay,  Lauchlin  Currie,  Dean  Acheson,  John  Carter  Vincent,  Harry 
White,  Ruperl  Emerson,  Owen  Lattimore,  W.  A.  M.  Burden,  Abbot  Low  Mo'tfat, 
Robert  J.  Watt,  Len  DeCaux,  Col.  Carl  Faymonville,  Colonel  Shoemaker,  Vir- 
ginius  Dabney  or  R.  E.  Freeman,  Walter  Lippmanu,  Sunnier  Welles,  Joseph 
Barnes,  Frederick  V.  Field,  Harold  Sprout,  Grayson  Kirk,  Ada  Comstock 
Notestein. 

In  reply  to  your  of  the  31st,  I  do  not  know  Coons,  but  have  no  objection  to 
him.    I  doubt  if  Wilson  would  add  much  but  Alger  Hiss  would  be  fine. 

I  definl  tely  would  exclude  Hunter  on  the  ground  that  we  have  too  much  of  the 
Kizer  group ;  I  would  exclude  Captain  Pence  because  he  is  now  out  of  the  Occu- 
pied Areas  Section.  If  either  of  them  were  available  I  would  suggest  Commodore 
Vanderbilt  or  Commodore  Stassen. 

I  suppose  we  may  need  to  invite  General  McCoy  for  organizational  purposes. 
I  do  not  know  anything  about  General  Bissell.  Yarnell  should  certainly  come 
as  a  vice  chairman  and  not  as  a  member  of  the  American  delegation.  Apropos 
your  statement  below  "Military,"  on  page  II,  I  would  get  away  from  the  idea  of 
California  naming  a  delegate. 

Personally  I  would  exclude  Swing  and  would  add  to  your  press  people  Way- 
mack,  of  Des  Moines. 

I  would  be  careful  that  we  do  not  get  too  stodgy  a  delegation  but  keep  a  bal- 
ance. I  think  the  above  list  is  fairly  good.  Another  Government  man  who 
woidd  be  new  to  us  but  very  helpful  because  of  his  interest  in  native  peoples  and 
Pacific  island  government  is  John  Collier,  head  of  the  Indian  service  and  a  fine 
person.  Let  me  know  what  you  hear  from  the  others  and  we  will  see  how  things 
add  up. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Phiop  C.  Jessup. 

Frank  Coe,  of  FEA,  also  good.    [Penciled  note.] 

General  Fortier.  I  would  like  to  have  it  quite  clear  that  the  Far 
East  Command  was  not  caught  short  on  an  external  enemy.  In  other 
words,  our  function  in  General  MacArthur's  headquarters  was  to  take 
care  of  the  security,  both  external  and  internal,  of  the  Far  East 
Command.  No  attack  came  on  Japan,  no  attack  came  on  Okinawa 
that  we  had  not  foreseen  or  anticipated.  In  other  words,  we  had  no 
responsibility  in  the  Far  East  Command  or  for  the  intelligence  be- 
tAveen  South  and  North  Korea.  There  was  a  State  Department  repre- 
sentation there  in  South  Korea  and  likewise  there  was  a  mission  func- 
tioning under  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  South  Korea.  It  was  not 
the  MacArthur  mission  by  any  means. 

22848^52— pt.  3 11 


860  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Watkins.  The  reason  I  asked  the  question  about  that  was 
because  it  had  been  reported  that  the  Far  East  Command  had  been 
caught  napping. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  say,  and  I  think  Senator  Ferguson  will  con- 
firm what  I  am  about  to  say,  that  before  the  Appropriations  Com- 
mittee many  months  ago  there  was  presented  to  us  evidence  that  the 
Intelligence  Department  had  full  knowledge  of  what  was  going  on  and 
that  they  knew  that  munitions  were  being  delivered  from  Kussian 
boats  into  North  Korea  and  that  was  also  brought  to  the  attention  of 
the  State  Department  and  to  the  attention  of  the  White  House.  That  is 
testified  before  the  Appropriations  Committee  of  the  Senate. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  the  withdrawal  of  civilians  away  from 
the  line. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  merely  wanted  to  give  you  an^opportunity  to 
explain  that  situation  if  you  were  caught  napping  or  if  you  had  any 
responsibility  so  that  we  would  know  about  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  Let  the  record  show  that  Korea  was  not  General  For- 
tier's  command.    I  hope  that  is  understood. 

General  Fortier.  It  was  never  my  command.  Korea  was  not  under 
General  MacArthur's  command. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  did  need  some  intelligence  in  order  to  do 
your  own  work  out  of  both  Formosa  and  Korea  ? 

General  Fortier.  And  we  got  considerable  intelligence  from  these 
otlier  sources,  occasionally  to  confirm  on  the  ground  that  which  was 
confirmed  in  cables  and  dispatches,  which  I  think  is  a  very  reasonable 
reaction. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  reply  to  your  question  about  the  10  people  who  have 
been  identified  as  part  of  tlie  Communist  organization  on  that  last 
list  recommended  by  Mr.  Jessup,  I  will  point  out  that  we  have  had 
testimony  that  Benjamin  Kizer  was  a  member  of  the  Communist 
Party,  testimony  that  Lauchlin  Currie  was  associated  with  an  espi- 
onage ring  and  gave  vital  military  secrets  to  the  Russian  espionage 
system,  the  military  secret  being,  iifone  case,  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  had  broken  the  Soviet  code. 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  inquire  whether  Currie  is  in  the  United 
States'? 

Mr.  Morris.  My  information  is  he  is  in  Colombia. 

John  Carter  Vincent  has  been  identified  as  a  member;  Harry  Dexter 
White  as  a  member  of  an  espionage  ring ;  Owen  Lattimore  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Communist  organization;  Len  DeCaux  as  a  member  of  the 
Communist  Party ;  Alger  Hiss  as  a  member  of  the  Commuinst  Party ; 
Joseph  Barnes  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party;  Frederick  V. 
Field  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  and  Frank  Coe  as  a 
member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

We  have  had  other  evidence  on  some  of  the  other  people  there,  but 
none  of  it  that  would  warrant  any  such  conclusion  as  we  can  make 
about  those  10. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Morris,  have  you  any  evidence  that  any 
salary  or  money  is  being  paid  to  Mr.  Lauchlin  Currie  furnished  by  the 
taxpayers  of  the  United  States  Government? 

Mr.  Morris.  I  cannot  answer  that  question,  but  that  is  one  of  the 
things  we  are  inquiring  about. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  861 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  ask  now  that  we  get  that  information  as  to 
whether-  or  not  taxpayers'  money  is  being  paid  to  Mr.  Currie. 

The  Chairman.  Whether  he  is  on  any  payroll  of  the  United  States 
Government. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes;  or  getting  money  that  the  taxpayers  are 
furnishing. 

Senator  Watkins.  Directly  or  indirectly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  read  a  newspaper  clipping  last  night.  It  would  take 
me  just  3  minutes  to  find  it.  It  describee!  his  resignation  from  th& 
World  Bank  and  accepting  the  position  with  Colombia,  and  there  was 
a  related  story  about  that. 

Mr.  Chairman,  if  you  think  it  is  appropriate,  we  could  put  in  more 
associations  of  Mr.  Jessup  with  the  institute  in  the  record  at  this  time. 
]\Ir.  Mandel  is  prepared  to  do  so.  For  instance,  his  activity  in  the  IPR 
bearing  on  the  American  Peace  Mobilization.  I  wonder  if  you  want 
that  in  the  record  now  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Why  do  you  not  insert  that  ? 

The  Chairman.  Please  go  on  with  your  laying  a  foundation  for 
each  insertion. 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  read  exhibit  14  from  the  open  hearing  of  July  28, 
1951,  being  a  telegram  from  Frederick  V.  Field,  from  Chicago,  elated 
September  1, 1940,  to  Philip  C.  Jessup,  as  follows : 

I  have  been  attending  a  peace  congress  of  some  6,000  representatives  from 
all  parts  of  the  country,  labor,  farm,  and  middle-class  organization.  This  is  a 
genuine  peace  movement  through  the  interpretation  of  democracy.  These  people 
and  our  program  represent  what  I  have  for  long  profoundly  believed  in.  They 
are  asking  me  to  become  the  executive  of  {\,  continuing  organization,  and  I  feel 
a  deep  conviction  that  I  must  accept.  As  the  people  I  should  be  working  for  will 
meet  to  elect  officers  tomorrow.  I  must,  despite  obvious  personal  preference  to 
postpone  decision  pending  consultation  with  you  and  others,  and  as  the  executive 
must  be  presented  to  them,  make  an  immediate  affirmative  decision.  This  show 
has  been  and  will  be  smeared  by  the  newspapers.  I  anticipate  losing  the  respect 
of  many  present  friends.  These  developments  I  regard  as  inevitable  if  we  do 
the  job  in  tliis  country  that  was  not  done  in  France,  etc.  In  view  the  inevitable 
criticism  and  misunderstanding,  and  because  of  my  continued  deep  interest  in 
the  IPR  welfare,  I  feel  that  I  must,  by  this  telegram,  affirm  my  immediate  resig- 
nation from  all  the  IPR  responsibilities  that  its  officers  wish  to  accent.  Finally 
I  must  urgently  hope  for  both  personal  and  professional  associations  that  you 
will  reserve  your  own  judgment  until  I  can  talk  with  you. 

The  Chairman.  From  whom  was  that  and  to  whom,  again,  please? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  from  Frederick  V.  Field  to  Philip  C.  Jessup, 
dated  September  1,  1940.  He  is  referring  to  his  acceptance  of  a  posi- 
tion with  the  American  Peace  Mobilization  which  was  organized  at 
that  time. 

May  I  read  at  this  point  the  statement  of  Attorney  General  Francis 
Biddle  in  reference  to  the  gathering  that  Mr.  Field  was  to  be  made 
an  official  of?  He  declares  in  regard  to  the  American  Peace  Mobili- 
zation : 

It  was  formed  in  Decemlier  of  1940  under  the  auspices  of  the  Communist 
Party  and  the  Young  Communist  League  as  a  front  organization  designed  to 
mold  American  opinion  against  participation  in  the  war  against  Germany. 

The  second  communication  is  a  part  of  exhibit  14,  introduced  in 
open  hearings  on  July  26,  1951.  It  purports  to  be  minutes  of  a  meet- 
ing of  the  executive  committee  of  the  American  Council  of  the  Insti- 


862  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

tute  of  Pacific  Relations  and  it  was  taken  from  the  files  of  the  insti- 
tute. Present,  among  others,  was  Philip  C.  Jessup,  chairman,  and 
Edward  C.  Carter.    I  read  an  excerpt : 

The  chairman  read  a  long  telegram  which  he  had  received  from  Mr.  Frederick 
V.  Field  in  Chicago  on  September  1,  in  which  Mr.  Field  indicated  that  he  had 
been  called  to  the  secretaryship  of  a  new  society  which  was  being  created  to 
strengthen  the  forces  of  democracy  during  the  coming  critical  years.  He  had  a 
deep  conviction  that  he  was  obligated  to  accept  this  new  responsibility  because 
the  election  of  officers  was  taking  place  at  that  time.  He  felt  it  was  necessary 
to  accept  despite  his  obvious  personal  preference  to  postpone  decision  pending 
consultation  with  Dr.  Jessup  and  others.  As  he  anticipated  criticism  and  mis- 
understanding, his  continued  deep  interest  in  the  welfare  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations  demanded,  he  felt,  the  afiirmation  of  his  immediate  resignation 
from  all  IFR  responsibilities.  Dr.  Jessup  explained  that  he  had  subsequently 
talked  at  length  with  Mr.  Field  who  explained  in  detail  the  reasons  that  had 
led  him  to  accept  tlie  new  position.  Mr.  Parker  voiced  the  feelings  of  all  present 
when  he  inquired  whetlier  Dr.  Jessup  felt  that  Mr.  Field  could  not  be  persuaded 
to  resume  the  secretaryship  of  the  American  Council.  Dr.  Jessup  replied  that 
he  thought  Mr.  Field's  decision  was  final.  Under  the  circumstances  it  was  moved 
that  a  minute  be  drafted  indicating  the  committee's  acceptance  of  the  resignation 
with  great  regret.  The  minute  should  include  an  appropriate  appreciation  of 
the  distinguished  service  which  Mr.  Field  had  rendered  during  11  years  of 
service  with  the  American  Council.  The  hope  was  to  be  expressed  that  when  his 
new  task  was  completed,  it  would  be  possible  for  him  to  resume  active  leader- 
ship in  the  work  of  the  American  Council. 

That  is  an  excerpt  from  the  exhibit. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  has  already  been  introduced  in  evidence. 

Mr.  Mandel.  Next  is  a  letter  memorandum  from  the  files  of  the 
Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  dated  September  20,  1940,  headed 
"WLH  from  ECC."    I  read  this  memorandum  for  the  record: 

For  your  private  information  I  enclose  a  copy  of  a  telegram  which  Field  sent 
to  Jessup  on  August  31  or  September  1.  Field  telephoned  me  late  on  the  afternoon 
of  August  30  from  Chicago  saying  that  great  pressure  was  being  put  on  him  to 
become  secretary  of  the  American  Peace  Mobilization.  I  told  him  that  institu- 
tionally I  hoped  he  could  postpone  a  decision,  but  that  if  personally  he  decided 
it  was  his  national  duty  to  take  the  Chicago  job,  I  would  do  everything  I  could 
to  back  him  up.  From  Ellsworth  early  the  next  morning  I  sent  him  a  wire 
urging  him  to  postpone  a  decision  for  another  week.  I  thought  it  was  of  the 
utmost  importance  that  he  should  first  consult  Edith,  Jessup,  and  his  colleagues 
of  the  New  York  office. 

The  immediacy  of  the  program,  the  pressure  of  the  20,000  attending  the 
Chicago  convention,  and  the  very  short  time  that  was  left  before  the  Conscription 
Act  would  be  voted  in  Congress  made  him  feel,  however,  that  he  must  make  an 
immediate  and  affirmative  decision.  He  took  a  thousand  people  from  Chicago 
to  Washington  where  they  bombarded  Congressmen  for  several  days  and  I 
think  Fred  believes  that  the  conscription  bill  got  100  less  votes  in  Congress  than 
it  otherwise  would.  He  is  now  working  night  and  day  with  a  large  staff  and 
thousands  of  backers  throughout  the  country,  to  get  the  conscription  bill  repealed 
or  nullified. 

He  expects  at  any  moment  he  may  go  to  prison  but  desires  to  work  full  steam 
ahead  until  the  moment  of  arrest  in  a  gigantic  Nation-wide  effort  to  launch  a 
movement  which  will  preserve  our  democratic  institutions  so  that  if  we  do 
have  to  go  to  war  we  will  have  something  worth  fighting  for.  He  does  not  wish 
to  have  the  United  States  imitate  France. 

For  a  considerable  time  he  lived  on  benzedrine  instead  of  sleep  and  feels, 
I  think,  that  he  is  in  exactly  the  same  position  as  a  man  who  is  suddenly  drafted 
to  throw  everything  else  over  and  join  in  the  work  of  the  national  defense  council 
or  join  the  ranks.  He  was  here  for  2  days  this  week  and  has  agreed  next  week 
to  go  into  the  whole  question  of  the  handbook.  It  is  on  his  conscience,  though 
I  cannot  make  out  whether  it  is  on  his  conscience  as  much  as  it  is  on  yours  and 
mine. 

I  shall  use  your  letter  in  my  talk  with  him,  so  I  don't  know  that  there  is  any 
point  in  your  writing  him  yet.     I  have  asked  Miss  Greene  to  prepare  for  Fred, 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  863 

you,  and  me  a  very  careful  analysis  of  just  how  much  progress  has  been  made 
in  quantity  and  quality  and  a  detailed  slietch  of  what  still  remains  to  be  done. 
When  we  have  this  we  will  have  to  make  a  cost  accounting  of  what  would  be 
required  to  finish  the  job.  I  am  wondering  whether  I  would  be  justified  in 
telling  Fred  that  he  ought  to  consider  giving  whatever  money  is  necessary  to 
enable  us  to  employ  a  staff  to  finish  the  book.  Though  I  think  he  imagines  he 
can  give  a  little  time  to  it  each  week,  I  personally  do  not  think  there  is  a  ghost 
of  a  chance  of  his  being  able  to  give  enough  time  to  bring  the  book  to  a  speedy 
conclusion. 

Can  you  give  me  an  estimate  of  what  the  project  has  cost  us  thus  tax,  or 
should  I  get  this  from  Miss  Austern? 

I  heard  Fred  speak  to  an  audience  of  2,000  in  the  Manhattan  Center  a  couple 
of  nights  ago.  There  must  have  been  5  minutes  sustained  cheering  when  he 
stood  up  before  he  could  begin  his  speech.  He  has  long  wanted  to  be  a  part  of  a 
great  mass  movement.  Now  he  is  at  the  head  of  one.  I  think  the  Pacific  will 
be  a  marginal  interest  from  1  to  5  years.  Some  day  it  may  come  back  as  the 
focus  of  his  life,  but  there  is  no  point  in  putting  on  any  pressure  at  the  present 
time. 

If  you  have  anything  to  add  to  your  letter  of  September  18  on  this  matter, 
please  send  it  to  me  by  air  mail. 

The  Chairman.  By  whom  is  that? 

Mr.  Mandel.  That  is  headed  "WLH  from  ECC."  There  is  no 
signature. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  who  WLH  is  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  the  practice,  Mr.  Chairman,  of  the  institute  to 
refer  to  their  staff  members  by  initials  only.  "WLH"  is  generally 
W.  L.  Holland,  and  "ECC"  is  generally  E.  C.  Carter.  That  is  almost 
without  exception  true. 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  might  quote  from  Attorney  General  Francis  Biddle, 
who  describes  the  organization. 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  organization? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  American  Peace  Mobilization. 

The  most  conspicuous  activity  of  the  American  Peace  Mobilization  was  the 
picketing  of  the  White  House  which  began  in  April  1941  in  protest  against  lend- 
lease  and  the  entire  national  defense  program.  On  the  afternoon  of  June  21, 
1941,  Frederick  V.  Field,  national  secretary,  suddenly  called  off  the  picket  line 
around  the  White  House. 

Here  is  a  letter  taken  from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Public  Rela- 
tions headed  "Pacific  Council,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations"  and  com- 
ing from  the  Columbia  University,  signed  Phil.  The  signature  cor- 
responds to  the  signature  of  Philip  C.  Jessup  on  other  letterheads  in 
the  file. 

I  read  this  letter,  to  Mr.  Edward  C.  Carter : 

October  29,  1940. 

Dear  Ned  :  I  don't  really  think  we  can  use  Fred's  statement  as  is,  much  as 
I  would  be  glad  to  help  him  with  his  cause.  How  about  a  combination  of  the 
two,  something  like  this : 

"Frederick  V.  Field,  who  has  been  on  the  staff  of  the  American  Council  since 
1928,  has  resigned  in  order  to  become  executive  secretary  of  the  American  Peace 
Mobilization.  The  American  Peace  Mobilization  is  a  mass  organization  of  pro- 
gressive trade-unions,  farm,  church,  youth,  Negro  and  fraternal  groups  dedi- 
cated to  preserving  the  interests  of  the  United  States  through  the  strengthening 
of  American  democracy  and  through  nonparticipation  in  the  war  between  Eng- 
land and  the  fascist  powers.  Mr.  Field  had  a  deep  conviction  that  he  was 
obligated  to  accept  this  new  responsibility  and  felt  that  in  view  of  the  acceptance 
of  his  new  position,  it  was  not  possible  for  him  to  continue  his  official  connection 
with  the  IPR.  The  executive  committee,  being  forced  to  the  conclusion  that 
Mr.  Field's  decision  was  final,  felt  compelled  to  accept  Mr.  Field's  resignation 
with  great  regret.  It  expressed  its  appreciation  of  the  distinguished  service 
that  Mr.  Field  had  rendered  during  his  11  years  of  service  to  the  American  Coun- 


864  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

cil  and  expressed  the  hope  that  when  his  new  task  was  completed,  it  would  be 
possible  for  him  to  resume  active  leadership  in  the  work  of  the  IPR." 

Perhaps  we  could  add  to  that  the  expression  of  appreciation  which  came  from 
the  staff. 

How  does  that  strike  you? 

The  paragraphs  in  regard  to  Lasker  seem  to  me  excellent. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Phil. 

Mr.  Morris.  Wliile  we  are  reading  these  exhibits,  Mr.  Chairman, 
I  might  point  out  it  is  no  longer  necessary  for  General  Fortier  to  be 
here. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Thank  you,  General,  for  your  presence. 

Mr.  Morris.  Thank  you.  General. 

May  that  letter  of  October  29, 1940,  be  introduced? 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be. 

(The  document  referred  to  and  read  in  its  entirety  by  Mr.  Mandel 
was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  256,"  and  filed  for  the  record.) 

Mr.  Morris.  We  have  Mr.  Joseph  Kornfeder  available,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, and  he  is  prepared  to  testify  today.  The  general  nature  of  his 
testimony  is  to  show  that  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  has  been 
in  the  past  a  full-fledged  member  of  the  Communist  Internationale,  he 
having  been  in  Moscow  to  make  personal  observations  on  this  fact. 

The  Chairman.  I  would  like  to  hear  that  testimony,  but  I  would 
like  to  have  other  members  of  the  committee  present  also.  I  am  in- 
clined to  believe  we  will  have  to  defer  on  account  of  the  vote  being 
taken. 

Mr.  Morris.  Until  some  time  later  today  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  suggest  we  convene  at  2 :  30. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Kornfeder  is  from  Detroit  and  he  is  not  easily 
summonable. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Kornfeder,  please  be  here  at  2 :  30. 

(Whereupon,  at  11 :  30  a.  m.,  the  hearing  recessed  until  2 :  30  p.  m., 
this  same  day.) 

afternoon  session 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order.  Has  the  wit- 
ness been  sworn  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  do  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you 
are  about  to  give  before  the  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  of  the 
Judiciary  of  the  United  States  Senate  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  JOSEPH  ZACK  KORNFEDER,  DETROIT,  MICH. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  purpose  of  this  hearing,  one  of 
the  purposes  of  this  hearing,  is  that  we  would  like  the  record  to 
show  something  of  the  nature  of  the  Chinese  Communist  organization. 

It  has  been  said  on  many  occasions  that  Chinese  Communists  are 
not  real  Cominunists.  An  example  of  this  can  be  found  in  a  pamplilet 
which  represents  a  cooperative  project  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations  and  the  Webster  Publishing  Co.  It  is  called  China  Yes- 
terday and  Today,  by  Eleanor  Lattimore. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  865 

On  page  108  of  that  pamphlet,  we  read  the  expression : 

When  we  speak  of  the  Chinese  Communists,  we  should  remember  that  they 
stand  for  something  rather  different  from  what  is  ordinarily  meant  by  the  word 
^'Communist."  They  are  not  advocating  the  Russian  system  for  China,  and, 
unlike  the  Russians,  they  maintain  the  rights  of  private  property  and  enterprise 
in  the  areas  under  their  control. 

Because  their  chief  interest  at  the  moment  is  in  improving  the  economic  con- 
ditions of  the  Chinese  farmer  and  in  increasing  the  number  of  people  capable 
of  taking  part  in  political  Ufe,  they  are  often  described  as  a  peasant  party. 

Then  it  goes  on  on  that  page,  that  is  page  108  and  page  109.  Taking 
this,  Mr.  Chairman,  as  typical  of  such  an  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists, I  think  it  is  necessary  that  we  have  a  witness  here  who  can 
testify,  first-hand,  about  the  nature  of  the  Chinese  Communist  organi- 
zation. 

For  that  reason,  we  have  asked  Mr.  Kornf  eder  to  be  here. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  you  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Kornfeder,  would  you  give  your  name  and  address 
to  the  reporter,  please? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  My  name  is  Joseph  Zack  Kornfeder,  3210  Book 
Tower,  Detroit,  Mich. 

The  Chairman.  How  do  you  spell  your  name  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  K-o-r-n-f-e-d-e-r. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Kornfeder,  when  did  you  join  the  Communist 
Party  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  joined  the  Communist  Party  at  the  time  of  its 
formation  in  1919. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  how  long  did  you  remain  a  member  of  the  Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  remained  a  member  until  October  1934. 

Mr.  Morris.  Could  you  tell  us  what  the  highest  position  you  achieved 
in  the  Communist  Party  was,  Mr.  Kornfeder? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  was  a  member  of  the  district  committee  of  the 
Communist  Party,  New  York  district,  a  member  of  the  central  execu- 
tive connnittee  of  the  Communist  Party,  now  known  as  the  national 
committee,  for  several  terms. 

While  in  Moscow,  I  was  a  member  of  the  Anglo-American  secre- 
tariat of  the  Communist  International  at  the  Communist  International 
headquarters,  and  later  a  representative  of  the  Communist  Interna- 
tional in  South  America. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  you  a  Comintern  delegate  to  North  and  South 
America  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  was  a  Comintern  delegate  to  South  America. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Kornfeder,  did  you  have  any  training  in  Moscow? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes;  I  took  a  3-year  course  in  the  Lenin  School. 

The  Lenin  School  is  a  college  to  train  leaders  for  the  various  Com- 
munist Parties  in  the  various  methods  of  political  warfare. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  years  were  you  so  trained,  Mr.  Kornfeder  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  was  in  Moscow  from  the  latter  part  of  1927  until 
April  or  May  1930. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  what  was  your  next  assignment  after  your  train- 
ing period  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder,  After  that,  I  went  as  a  representative  of  the  Com- 
munist International  to  South  America. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  describe  your  relationship  under  those 
circumstances  to  the  Communist  Party  of  South  America  ? 


866  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Well,  as  representative  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
national in  the  Communist  Parties  of  Columbia  and  Venezuela,  I 
was  in  charge  of  these  parties,  that  is,  I  was  their  political  director 
about  the  same  way  Gerhardt  Eisler  was  of  the  Communist  Party  of 
the  United  States,  while  he  was  here. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is,  in  other  words,  Mr.  Kornf  eder,  you  were  not  a 
member  of  the  Communist  Party  of  South  America,  but  you  were 
their  superior  and  their  boss  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  That  is  right,  yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  really  what  your  position  was? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  when  you  say  that  you  were  then  the  counterpart 
of  Gerhardt  Eisler  in  the  United  States,  do  you  mean  that  Gerhardt 
Eisler  was  the  Comintern  man  that  was  sent  here  to  run  the  Commu- 
nist Party  of  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Well,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  while  you  were  in  Moscow  did 
you  have  any  opportunity  to  observe  the  workings  of  the  Chinese 
Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes,  definitely  so. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  tell  us  whatever  you  can  in  connection 
with  that  question,  Mr.  Kornfeder  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  in  1927,  there  developed  a  big  crisis  inside  of 
the  Chinese  Communist  Party 

The  reason  for  the  crisis  was  that  the  Chinese  Communist  Party 
who,  until  then,  had  been  a  part  of  the  Kuomintang,  had  been  ex- 
pelled from  the  Kuomintang  by  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  his  associates, 
and  that  created  a  crisis  inside  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party. 

The  subject  of  that  crisis  and  the  question  as  to  what  was  wrong 
in  the  policy.  Communist  policies,  in  China  then  became  an  item  of 
discussion  in  all  of  the  higher  committees  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
national. 

I  attended  the  discussions.  The  result  of  these  discussions  was 
that  the  leading  committees  of  tire  Chinese  Communist  Party  were 
purged,  reorganized,  and  those  that  Moscow  disapproved  of  were  ex- 
pelled from  the  Communist  Party  as  Trotskyites. 

I  also  had  an  opportunity  to  become  familiar  with  the  Chinese 
Communist  politics  by  attending  the  various  meetings  of  the  Commu- 
nist International  leading  committees. 

Mr.  Morris.  Now,  before  you  get  on  to  that,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  in  what 
capacity  did  you  attend  these  other  discussions  that  you  have  testified 
about? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  was  a  member  of  the  Anglo-American  secretariat 
of  the  Communist  International.  That  was  a  subcommittee  in  charge 
of  the  Communist  Party's  English-speaking  countries. 

The  Communist  Party  of  the  United  States  always  played  a  large 
role  in  the  affairs  of  the  Communist  Party  of  China.  So,  because  of 
that,  I  was  interested  to  stay  informed  on  affairs  in  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  say,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  that  the  American  Com- 
munist Party  was  very  active  in  the  affairs  of  the  Chinese  Communist 
Party  in  China  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  is  right. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  867 

Mr.  Morris.  Now,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  why  were  the  American  Com- 
munists employed  in  connection  with  the  Chinese  Communist  activi- 
ties?   What  is  the  reason  for  that? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  the  reason,  as  I  get  it  from  attending  these 
discussion,  is  that  America  wielded  a  large  influence  in  China  all  the 
time. 

Mr.  Morris.  Wielded  a  large  influence? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes.  And  the  Comintern  wanted  to  avail  itself 
of  that  influence  even  if  it  was  just  in  the  form  of  representation  from 
the  United  States,  whether  they  had  been  Communist  or  Communist- 
controlled  unions  that  claimed  to  represent  a  big  following  in  the 
United  States,  or  any  other  form. 

It  seemed  to  hav.e  an  effect  of  building  up  the  morale  of  the  Chinese 
Communists  to  have  Communist  representation  on  the  leading  com- 
mittees in  the  Chinese  labor  movement. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  Communist  representation,  or  do  you 
mean  American  representation? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  is  right,  American  Communist  representa- 
tion. 

Mr.  Morris.  Now,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  while  you  were  in  Moscow  at 
these  various  Comintern  meetings,  did  you  encounter  Chinese  Com- 
munists there? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes,  definitely  so. 

The  Chinese  Communist  Party  was  represented  on  all  the  leading 
committees  in  the  Communist  International.  They  were  on  the  execu- 
tive committee  of  the  Communist  International,  they  were  on  the 
agitation  and  propaganda  commission  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
national, on  the  organization  commission  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
national, and  there  was  a  special  secretariat  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
national which  preoccupied  itself  entirely  with  the  problems  of  China, 
Japan,  Malaya,  Indochina,  and  so  on,  the  so-called  far  eastern  sec- 
retariat of  the  Communist  International. 

Mr.  Morris.  Now  could  you  tell  us,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  the  evidence  as 
you  experienced  it  which  indicated  to  you  that  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists were  an  integral  part  of  the  Comintern  organization  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  in  the  first  place,  there  was  a  tremendous 
college,  the  largest  college  to  train  leaders  in  the  arts  of  political 
warfare,  the  so-called  Far  Eastern  University,  formerly  also  known 
as  the  Snn  Yat-sen  University. 

The  Chairman.  And  that  is  located  where? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Located  in  Moscow. 

That  university  had  a  capacity  to  train  2,000  organizers  and  agi- 
tators a  year. 

At  the  time  I  was  there,  the  number  of  Chinese  Communists  being 
trained  there  was  1,200. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  that  be  1,200  a  year,  Mr.  Kornfeder  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  1,200  a  year;  yes. 

This  training  system  started  in  1926  and,  as  far  as  I  know — Vt^ell,,  it 
certainly  was  there  while  I  was  in  Moscow,  and  as  far  as  I  Imow  from 
others  that  were  there  subsequently,  it  continued  throughout  the  years. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  were  you  there  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  was  there  until  1930, 


868  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  Chairman.  From  when  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  From  1927. 

The  Chairman.  Attending  that  university  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  I  attended  anotlier  one,  the  Lenin  School,  which  was 
a  college  to  train  leaders  for  the  more  advanced  countries,  like  the 
United  States,  Germany,  England,  France,  and  so  on. 

But  the  Eastern  University  trained  Communist  leaders  for  China, 
Japan,  Korea,  Indochina,  Burma,  Malaya,  India,  and  so  on,  the  so- 
called  colonial  countries. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  it  is  your  testimony,  then,  that  the  Chinese  Com- 
munist leaders  were  being  trained  in  Moscow  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Definitely  so. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  the  discipline  exerted  by  the  Comintern  organiza- 
tion on  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  as  strong  as  the  discipline  exer- 
cised in  other  Communist  parties  throughout  the  world  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  It  certainly  was,  even  stronger  because  they  had  a 
civil-war  situation. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  explain  that,  Mr.  Kornfeder? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Well,  in  a  strange  situation  like  existed  inside  of 
China,  the  Communist  Party  under  such  conditions  maintained  a 
discipline  that  is  even  more  severe  than  in  countries  where  conditions 
are  relatively  stable. 

This  manifested  itself  in  the  control  that  Moscow  headquarters  had 
on  the  personnel  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party.  There  was  not  a 
single  official  of  any  consequence  that  could  be  elected  by  the  Chinese 
Communist  Party  without  previous  consent  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
national, whether  it  be  a  secretary  of  the  party,  whether  he  be  a  head 
of,  let  us  say,  trade-union  activities  commission,  or  organization  com- 
mission, or  of  the  guerrilla  army  that  they  were  already  then  forming. 
All  of  these  leading  personnel  were  all  decided  first  in  Moscow  before 
they  could  be  put  into  position. 

The  same  procedure  was  true,  by  and  large,  with  all  of  the  other 
Communist  parties. 

The  Chinese  Communist  Party  was  an  integral  part  of  the  world 
Communist  Party,  which  is  monolithic,  and  there  is  no  difference 
between  the  control  of  Moscow  over  that  party  as  compared  with 
other  parties,  except  that  discipline  was  even  more  severe  because  of 
the  more  severe  internal  situation  in  China. 

The  Chairman.  How  did  these  students,  as  you  termed  them  as 
such,  maintain  themselves  in  this  University  of  Moscow  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Well,  the  university,  its  teaching  staff,  and  oper- 
ating personnel,  and  all  the  trainees,  all  the  expenses  of  that  were  paid 
by  the  Soviet  Government  and,  coming  there,  that  is  the  transjDorta- 
tion  costs,  were  also  furnished  from  the  same  source. 

If  they  had  relatives  back  home,  which  they  had  to  maintain,  then 
a  subsidy  was  allowed  for  that  purpose. 

There  were  all  together  about  four  colleges  like  that  in  Moscow. 
They  were  all  at  the  expense  of  the  Soviet  Government. 

The  Chairman.  The  students  then,  so-called,  were  maintained  with 
their  tuition,  their  living,  their  housing,  their  clothing,  everything 
was  furnished  to  them  by  the  Soviet  Government? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  JSIr.  Kornfeder,  have  you  ever  met  Stalin,  personally  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes,  sir. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  869 

Mr.  Morris.  Could  you  tell  us  whether  or  not  he  took  an  active 
interest  in  the  affairs  of  the  Chinese  Communist  organization? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Stalin  was  in  charge  of  the  affairs  of  the  Chinese 
Communist  Party  by  decision  of  the  political  bureau  of  the  Commu- 
nist Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  since  1926, 

All  matters  of  policy,  whether  relating  to  the  line  to  be  adopted  or  to 
organization  strategy,  were  decided  in  the  final  sense  by  Stalin  himself. 

I  am  not  the  only  one  that  says  that.  At  the  celebration  for  Stalin's 
seventieth  birthday  which  took  place,  I  believe,  2  years  ago,  Beria, 
the  head  of  the  political  police,  known  as  the  MVD,  in  a  laudatory 
speech  on  Stalin,  which  appeared  in  some  of  the  papers,  also  said 
that  the  successes  in  China  are  due  to  the  brilliant  leadership  of  our 
great  leader,  Joseph  Stalin,  who  has  been  guiding  the  affairs  of  the 
Communist  Party  of  China  ever  since  1926. 

Mr.  JNIoRRis.  And  you  know  that  to  be  a  fact,  that  statement  of 
Beria,  you  know  that  to  be  a  statement  of  fact  from  your  own  personal 
experience  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  That  is  right.  I  knew  it  long  before  he  made  the 
speech. 

Mr.  Morris.  Well,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  did  you  attend  the  Sixth  World 
Congress  of  the  Communist  International  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes ;  I  attended  the  Sixth  World  Congress  of  the 
Communist  International  in  Moscow. 

Mr.  Morris.  When  was  that  held  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  The  summer  of  1928. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  anything  take  place  at  that  congress  bearing  on 
the  importance  of  the  Chinese  Connnunist  Party  in  its  future  role 
in  world  affairs  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes.  The  situation  in  China,  from  a  Communist 
point  of  view,  was  one  of  the  very  principal  topics  of  discussion  and 
decision  at  the  congress.     I  have  here,  and  if  I  may  I  could  quote  it. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  it  that  you  have  there? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  have  here  the  Theses  on  the  Revolutionary  Move- 
ment in  the  Colonies  and  Semi-Colonies,  which  was  adopted  at  that 
congress,  and  all  the  principal  parts  of  which  w^ere  written  by  Joseph 
Stalin  himself. 

Mr.  Morris.  From  what  are  you  reading,  Mr.  Kornfeder?  From 
what  publication? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  would  like  to  read  from  a  copy  of  this,  decisions, 
that  appeared  in  the  International  Press  Correspondence,  which  was 
a  weekly  news  service  of  the  Communist  International,  a  thesis  on 
the  colonial  question. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  is  the  date  of  the  publication  you  are  reading 
from,  Mr.  Kornfeder? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  December  12,  1928. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  you  attended  this  congress  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  1  attended  the  congress,  and  I  know  this  is  the 
resolution,  the  thesis  that  was  adopted  there. 

Now,  the  decision  at  that  congress  revolved  largely  on  the  subject, 
that  is,  in  reference  to  China,  whether  to  orientate  the  activities 
of  the  Communists  in  China  on  the  peasantry. 

There  is  the  accepted  Marxian  theory  and  the  theory  of  Lenin,  the 
founder  of  the  Soviet  state,  that  the  Communists  should  orientate 


870  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

themselves  on  the  factory  workers  and  by  forming  labor  unions  there 
and  so  on  and  so  forth,  entrench  themselves. 

That  was  the  accepted  theory  up  until  about  the  time  of  this  con- 
gress, also  for  colonial  countries. 

Now,  at  the  sixth  congress,  by  the  initiative  of  Stalin,  the  base  of 
Communist  politics  in  this  type  of  country  was  fundamentally 
changed.  From  there  on,  the  Communists  were  to  base  themselves  on 
the  peasants. 

Now,  the  peasant,  to  make  an  illustration,  would  be  something  like 
a  very  poor  sharecropper  down  in  the  South,  not  a  farmer  as  we  under- 
stand it.  A  farmer  would  be  a  relatively  rich  man.  The  peasant  is 
something  like  the  poorest  type  of  sharecropper  down  in  the  South, 
except  that  in  China  their  conditions  are  even  worse. 

Now,  the  Communists  were  to  base  themselves  upon  this  strata,  and 
conquer  the  countryside  first,  and  then,  after  forming  guerrilla  armies 
in  the  countryside,  conquer  the  cities. 

Those  of  you  gentlemen  who  may  have  followed  the  course  of  events 
must  have  noticed  that  that  is  the  thing  that  took  place  in  China,  first 
the  countryside  was  conquered  and  then  the  cities,  instead  of  the  tra- 
ditional Marxian  method  of  first  conquering  the  cities  and  then  con- 
quering the  rest  of  the  country. 

Now,  the  change  in  that  direction,  which  required  the  Communists 
to  change  their  organization  methods,  their  agitation  methods,  to 
concentrate  on  what  we  call  agrarian  reform,  and  out  of  which  some 
intellectuals  here  in  this  country  got  the  impression  that  the  Com- 
munists in  China  are  agrarians — of  course,  that  was  entirely  false.  It 
was  just  the  change  of  operational  tactics  on  the  part  of  Moscow. 

Now,  to  show  you  here,  I  will  quote  this  change.  I  will  quote  a  part 
of  this  resolution  on  page  1665. 

Along  with  the  national-emancipatory  struggle,  the  agrarian  revolution  con- 
stitutes the  axes  of  the  bourgeois  democratic  revolution  in  the  chief  colonial 
countries. 

The  chief  colonial  country  was,  of  course,  in  Asia,  China.  It  is  the 
peasantry  that,  from  here,  becomes  the  center  of  operation. 

Another  part  which  was  already  then  introduced  in  the  strategy  of 
the  Communists  in  this  type  of  country  is  to  exploit  nationalism. 

You  see,  prior  to  this,  the  Communists  operated,  well,  under  their 
own  flag.  All  the  propaganda  was  outright  Communist  and  so  on  and 
so  forth. 

After  this  Congress,  more  and  more,  •  they  shifted  to  the  use  of 
nationalism,  to  operate  behind  nationalist  movements,  to  infiltrate 
nationalist  movements,  to  use  their  flag  and  operate  under  it,  and  so  on. 

There  is  a  part  here  which  introduces  that  change  of  tactics.  It  is 
on  the  same  page. 

It  is  very  important,  in  accordance  with  the  concrete  circumstances,  to  investi- 
gate very  carefully  the  special  influence  of  the  national  factor,  which  to  a  con- 
siderable degree  determines  the  special  character  of  the  colonial  revolution,  and 
to  take  it  into  account  in  the  tactics  of  the  Communist  Party  concerned. 

The  Chairman.  How  would  that  apply  in  the  United  States  ?  Have 
you  an  illustration  of  it  ?     Can  you  give  us  an  illustration  of  it  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Well,  in  the  United  States  they  apply  this  thesis 
only  to  the  Negroes.  They  consider  the  Negroes  as  colonials  who  are 
being  exploited  and  oppressed  by  American  imperialism,  and  who 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  871 

should  have  an  independent  Kepublic  based  on  the  Negro  Belt  in  the 
South. 

That  is  the  only  part  of  this  thesis  that  would  apply  to  the  United 
States,  because  the  United  States  is  an  industrially  advanced  country 
where  conditions  are  different. 

You  see,  their  strategy  adjusts  itself  in  its  method  of  operation  to 
the  type  of  country  in  which  the  Communists  operate. 

In  this  country  this  would  also  be  translated  to  the  Communists 
hiding  behind  the  skirts  of  the  liberals. 

The  Chairman.  Hiding  behind  what? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Operating  behind  the  skirts  of  the  liberals.  That 
is,  using  the  liberals  as  a  front  or  pretending  to  be  liberals. 

They  could  not  use  nationalism  in  the  sense  that  it  is  in  China  be- 
cause, well,  we  are  an  independent  Nation  and  the  leading  Nation. 

But  in  their  internal  operations,  they  would  make  an  assimilation 
of  this  tactic  by  not  operating  under  their  own  flag,  operating  as  lib- 
erals or  so-called  progressives,  and  so  on. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  concludes  your  comments  on  that  world  congress, 
Mr.  Kornfeder,  does  it? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes. 

I  would  suggest  that  it  may  be  of  use  to  introduce  this  part  into  the 
record,  which  is  entitled  "Comnmnist  Strategy  and  Tactics  in  China^ 
India,  and  Similar  Colonial  Countries." 

Of  course,  the  Communist  methods  since  that  was  adopted  have  gone 
through  considerable  changes,  have  become  smoother.  But  the  basic 
principles  are  still  in  here  and  are  being  used  even  today. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  suggest  that  we  have  that  introduced 
into  the  record  for  the  purposes  described  by  Mr.  Kornfeder. 

That  is  an  official  publication  of  the  Communist  International,  and 
therein  is  a  thesis  on  the  revolutionary  movement  in  the  colonies  and 
semicolonies.  We  have  had  testimony  from  Mr.  Kornfeder  on  that 
score. 

The  Chairman.  And  this  is  under  date  of  December  12,  1928,  vol- 
ume 8,  No.  88. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  an  official  publication  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
national ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  That  part  referred  to  by  the  witness  may  be  in- 
serted in  the  record,  commencing  on  page  1665,  under  the  caption 
"On  Communist  strategy  and  tactics  in  China,  India,  and  similar 
colonial  countries,"  extending  down  to  the  middle  of  page  1670,  just 
before  "The  immediate  tasks  of  the  Communists." 

It  will  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(Document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  257"  and  is  as 
follows:) 

[From  International  Press  Correspondence,  December  12,  1928] 

III.  On  Communist  Strategy  and  Tactics  in  China,  India,  and  Similar 

Colonial  Cotcjntries 

16.  As  in  all  colonies  and  semicolonies,  so  also  in  China  and  India  the  develop- 
ment of  productive  forces  and  the  socialization  of  labor  stands  at  a  comparatively- 
low  level.  This  circumstance,  together  with  the  fact  of  foreign  domination  and 
also  the  presence  of  powerful  relics  of  feudalism  and  precapitalist  relations, 
determines  the  character  of  the  immediate  stage  of  the  revolution  in  these  coun- 


872  INSTITUTE   OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 

tries.  In  the  revolutionary  movement  of  these  countries  we  have  to  deal  with 
the  bourgeois  democratic  revolution,  i.  e.  of  the  stage  signifying  the  preparation 
of  the  prerequisites  for  proletarian  dictatorship  and  socialist  revolution.  Corre- 
sponding to  this,  the  following  kinds  of  tasks  can  be  pointed  out,  which  may  be 
considered  as  general  basic  tasks  of  the  bourgeois  democratic  revolution  in  the 
colonies  and  semicolonies : 

(a)  A  shifting  in  the  relationship  of  forces  in  favor  of  the  proletariat; 
emancipation  of  the  country  from  the  yoke  of  imperialism  (nationalization  of 
foreign  concessions,  railways,  banks,  etc.)  and  the  establishment  of  the  national 
tmity  of  the  country  where  this  has  not  yet  been  attained ;  overthrow  of  the 
power  of  the  exploiting  classes  at  the  back  of  which  imperialism  stands ;  organ- 
ization of  Soviets  of  workers  and  peasants  and  organization  of  the  Red  Army; 
establishment  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  and  peasantry ;  consolidation 
of  the  hegemony  of  the  proletariat. 

(&)  The  carrying  through  of  the  agrarian  revolution;  emancipation  of  the 
peasants  from  all  precapitalist  and  colonial  conditions  of  exploitation  and  bond- 
age ;  nationalization  of  the  land ;  radical  measures  for  alleviating  the  position 
of  the  peasantry  with  the  object  of  establishing  the  closest  possible  economic 
and  political  union  between  the  town  and  village. 

(c)  In  correspondence  with  the  further  development  of  industry,  transport, 
etc.,  and  with  the  accompanying  growth  of  the  proletariat,  the  widespread  de- 
velopment of  trade  union  organizations  of  the  working  class,  strengthening  of 
the  Communist  Party  and  its  conquest  of  a  firm  leading  position  among  the  toil- 
ing masses ;  the  achievement  of  the  8-hour  working  day. 

(d)  Establishment  of  equal  rights  for  nationalities  and  of  sex  equality  (equal 
rights  for  women)  ;  separation  of  the  church  from  the  state  and  the  abolition  of 
caste  distinctions ;  political  edvication  and  raising  of  the  general  cultural  level 
of  the  masses  in  town  and  country,  etc. 

How  far  the  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  will  be  able  in  practice  to  realize 
all  its  basic  tasks,  and  how  far  it  will  be  the  case  that  part  of  these  tasks  will  be 
carried  into  effect  only  by  the  Socialist  revolution,  will  depend  on  the  course  of 
the  revolutionary  movement  of  the  workers  and  peasants  and  its  successes  or 
defeats  in  the  struggle  against  the  imperialists,  feudal  lords  and  the  bourgeoisie. 
In  particular,  the  emancipation  of  the  colony  from  the  imperialist  yoke  is  facil- 
itated by  the  development  of  the  Socialist  revolution  in  the  capitalist  world  and 
can  only  be  completely  guaranteed  by  the  victory  of  the  proletariat  in  the  leading 
capitalist  countries. 

The  transition  of  the  revolution  to  the  Socialist  phase  demands  the  presence 
of  certain  minimum  prerequisites,  as,  for  example,  a  certain  definite  level  of 
development  in  the  country  of  industry,  of  trade  union  organizations  of  the 
proletariat  and  a  strong  Communist  Party,  The  most  important  is  precisely  the 
development  of  a  strong  Communist  Party  with  a  big  mass  influence,  which  would 
be  in  the  highest  degree  a  slow  and  difficult  process  were  it  not  accelerated  by 
the  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  which  already  grows  and  develops  as  a  result 
of  the  objective  conditions  in  these  countries. 

17.  The  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  in  the  colonies  is  distinguished  from 
the  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  in  an  independent  country  chiefly  in  that 
it  is  organically  bound  up  with  the  national  emancipatory  struggle  against  im- 
perialist domination.  The  national  factor  exerts  considerable  influence  on  the 
revolutionary  process  in  all  colonies,  as  well  as  in  those  semicolonies  where 
imperialist  enslavement  already  appears  in  its  naked  form,  leading  to  tlie  revolt 
of  the  mass  of  the  people.  On  the  one  hand,  national  oppression  hastens  the 
ripening  of  the  revolutionary  crises,  intensifies  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  masses 
of  workers  and  peasants,  facilitates  their  mobilization  and  endows  the  revolu- 
tionary mass  revolts  with  the  elemental  force  and  character  of  a  genuine  popular 
]-evolution.  On  the  other  hand,  the  national  factor  is  able  to  infiuence  not 
only  the  movement  of  the  working  class  and  peasantry  but  also  the  attitude 
of  all  the  remaining  classes,  modifying  its  form  during  the  process  of  revolution. 
Above  all,  the  poor  urban  petty  bourgeoisie  together  with  the  petty  bourgeoise 
intelligentsia  is  during  the  first  period,  to  a  very  considerable  extent,  brought 
under  the  influence  of  the  active  revolutionary  forces ;  secondly,  the  position 
of  the  colonial  bourgeoisie  in  the  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  is  still  for  the 
most  part  an  ambiguous  one  and  its  vacillations  in  accordance  with  the  course 
of  the  revolution  are  even  more  considerable  than  in  the  bourgeoisie  of  an  inde- 
pendent country  (e.  g.,  the  Russian  bourgoisie  in  1905-17) . 

It  is  very  important,  in  accordance  with  the  concrete  circumstances,  to  investi- 
gate very  carefully  the  special  influence  of  the  national  factor,  which  to  a  con- 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  873 

siderable  degree  determines  the  special  character  of  the  colonial  revolution,  and 
to  take  it  into  account  in  the  tactics  of  the  Communist  Party  concerned. 

Along  with  the  national  emancipatory  struggle,  the  agrarian  revolution  con- 
stitutes the  axis  of  the  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  in  the  chief  colonial  coun- 
tries. Consequently,  Communists  must  follow  with  the  greatest  attention  the 
development  of  the  agrarian  crisis  and  the  intensification  of  class  contradictions 
in  the  village ;  they  must  from  the  very  beginning  give  a  consciously  revolutionary 
direction  to  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  workers  and  to  the  incipient  peasant  move- 
ment, directing  it  against  imperialist  exploitation  and  bondage  as  also  against 
the  yoke  of  the  various  precapitalist  (feudal  and  semifeudal)  relationships  as  a 
result  of  which  peasant  economy  is  suffering,  declining,  and  perishing.  The 
incredible  backwardness  of  agriculture,  the  prevalence  of  oppressive  rent  rela- 
tions, and  the  oppression  of  trading-usury  capital  represent  the  greatest  hind- 
rance to  the  development  of  productive  forces  in  village  economy  in  the  colonies 
and  stand  in  monstrous  contradiction  with  the  highly  organized  forms  of  ex- 
change between  the  village  agricultural  production  of  the  colonies  and  the  world 
market  created  by  monopoly  imperialism. 

IS.  The  national  bourgeoisie  in  these  colonial  countries  does  not  adopt 
a  uniform  attitude  in  relation  to  imperialism.  A  part  of  this  bourgeoisie, 
more  especially  the  trading  bourgeoisie,  directly  serves  the  interests  of  im- 
perialist capital  (the  so-called  compradore  bourgeoisie).  In  general,  it  more 
or  less  consistently  defends  the  antinational  imperialist  point  of  view  directed 
against  the  whole  nationalist  movement,  in  common  with  the  feudal  allies  of 
imperialism  and  the  more  highly  paid  native  officials.  The  remaining  portions 
of  the  native  bourgeoisie,  especially  the  portion  reflecting  the  interests  of  native 
industry,  support  the  national  movement  and  represent  a  special  vacillating 
compromising  tendency  which  may  be  designated  as  national  reformism  (or, 
in  the  terminology  of  the  theses  of  the  Second  Congress  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
national, a  bourgeois-democratic  tendency). 

This  intermediate  position  of  the  national  bourgeoisie  between  the  revolu- 
tionary and  imperialist  camps  is  no  longer  to  be  observed,  it  is  true,  in  China  after 
1925 ;  there  the  greater  part  of  the  national  bourgeoisie  from  the  beginning, 
owing  to  the  special  situation,  took  the  leadership  in  the  national-emancipatory 
war;  later  on  it  passed  over  finally  into  the  camp  of  counterrevolution.  In 
India  and  Egypt,  we  still  observe,  for  the  time  being,  the  typical  bourgeois- 
nationalist  movement — an  opportunistic  movement,  subject  to  great  vacilla- 
tions, balacing  between  imperialism  and  revolution. 

The  independence  of  the  country  in  relation  to  imperialism,  being  to  the 
advantage  of  the  whole  colonial  people,  corresponds  also  to  the  interests  of  the 
national  bourgeoisie,  but  is  in  irreconcilable  contradiction  to  the  whole  nature  of 
the  imperialist  system.  Various  native  capitalists,  it  is  true,  are  by  their  im- 
mediate interests  to  a  great  Extent  bound  by  numerous  threads  to  imperialist 
capital.  Imperialism  is  able  directly  to  bridge  a  considerable  portion  of  them 
(it  may  be  even  a  greater  portion  than  heretofore)  and  to  create  a  definite  Com- 
pradore position,  a  position  of  intermediary  trader,  subexploiter  or  overseer 
over  the  enslaved  population.  But  the  position  of  slave  owner,  of  monopolist 
supreme  exploiter,  imiierialism  reserves  for  itself  alone.  Independent  rule,  a 
future  of  "free"  independent  capitalist  development,  hegemony  over  an  "independ- 
ent" people — this  imperialism  will  never  voluntarily  yield  to  the  national  bour- 
geoisie. In  this  respect,  the  contradiction  of  interests  between  the  national 
bourgeoisie  of  the  colonial  country  and  imperialism  is  objectively  of  a  radical 
character.  In  this  respect,  imperialism  demands  capitulation  on  the  part  of 
the  national  bourgeoisie. 

The  native  bourgeoisie,  as  the  weaker  side,  again  and  again  capitulates  to  im- 
perialism. Its  capitulation,  however,  is  not  final  as  long  as  the  danger  of  class 
revolution  on  the  part  of  the  masses  has  not  become  immediate,  acute  and  men- 
acing. In  order,  on  the  other  hand,  to  avoid  this  danger,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  strength  its  position  in  relation  to  imperialism,  bourgeois  nationalism  in 
these  colonies  strives  to  obtain  the  support  of  the  petty  bourgeoisie,  of  the 
peasantry  and  in  part  also  of  the  working  class.  Since,  in  relation  to  the  work- 
ing class  it  has  little  prospect  of  success  (as  soon  as  tbe  working  class  in  these 
countries  has  at  all  begun  to  avv-ake  politically),  it  becomes  the  more  important 
for  it  to  obtain  support  from  the  peasantry. 

But  just  here  is  the  weakest  point  of  the  colonial  bourgeoisie.  The  unbear- 
able exploitation  of  the  colonial  peasantry  can  only  be  put  an  end  to  by  the  way 
of  the  agrarian  revolution.  The  bourgeoisie  of  China,  India,  and  Egypt  is  by  its 
immediate  interests  so  closely  bound  up  with  landlordism,  with  usury  capital 


874  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

and  with  the  exploitation  of  the  peasant  masses  in  general,  that  it  takes  its  stand 
not  only  against  the  agrarian  revolution  but  also  against  every  decisive  agrarian 
reform.  It  is  afraid,  and  not  without  foundation,  that  even  the  more  open 
formulation  of  the  agrarian  question  will  stimulate  and  accelerate  the  growth 
of  the  process  of  revolutionary  fermentation  in  the  peasant  masses.  Thus, 
the  reformist  bourgeoisie  hardly  dare  to  decide  to  approach  practically  this 
basic  urgent  question. 

Instead,  it  attempts  by  means  of  empty  nationalist  phrases  and  gestures  to 
keep  the  petty  bourgeois  masses  under  its  influence  and  to  compel  imperialism 
to  grant  certain  concessions.  But  the  imperialists  draw  the  reins  ever  tighter, 
for  the  national  bourgeoisie  is  incapable  of  offering  any  serious  resistance.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  national  bourgeoisie  in  every  conflict  with  imperialism  attempt, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  make  a  great  show  of  their  nationalist  "firmness"  of  prin- 
ciple, and  on  the  other  hand,  they  sow  illusions  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  peace- 
ful compromise  with  imperialism.  Through  both  the  one  and  the  other,  the 
masses  inevitably  become  disillusioned  and  in  this  way  they  gradually  outlive 
their  reformist  illusions. 

19.  An  incorrect  estimation  of  the  basic  national-reformist  tendency  of  the 
national  bourgeoisie  in  these  colonial  countries  gives  rise  to  the  possibility  of 
serious  errors  in  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  the  Communist  Parties  concerned.  In 
particular,  two  kinds  of  mistakes  are  possible  : 

(a)  A  nonunderstanding  of  the  difference  between  the  national  reformist  and 
national-revolutionary  tendency  can  lead  to  a  "khvostist"  policy  in  relation  to  the 
bourgeoisie,  to  an  insufiiciently  accurate  political  and  organizational  delimitation 
of  the  proletariat  from  the  bourgeoisie,  and  to  the  blurring  of  the  chief  revolu- 
tionary slogans  (especially  the  slogans  of  the  agrarian  revolution) ,  etc.  This  was 
the  fundamental  mistake  into  which  the  Communist  Party  of  China  fell  in 
1925-27.  • 

ib)  An  underestimation  of  the  special  significance  which  the  bourgeois  na- 
tional-reformist, as  distinct  from  the  feudal-imperialist  camp,  possess  owing  to 
its  mass  influence  on  the  ranks  of  the  petty  bourgeoisie,  peasantry  and  even  a 
portion  of  the  working  class,  may  lead,  at  least  in  the  first  stages  of  the  move- 
ment, to  a  sectarian  policy  and  to  the  isolation  of  the  Communists  from  the 
toiling  masses. 

In  both  these  cases,  insufficient  attention  is  given  to  the  realization  of  precisely 
those  tasks  which  the  Second  Congress  of  the  Communist  International  had  al- 
ready characterized  as  the  basic  tasks  of  the  Communist  Parties  in  the  colonial 
countries,  i.  e.  the  tasks  of  struggle  against  the  bourgeois-democratic  movement 
inside  the  nation  itself.  Without  this  struggle,  without  the  liberation  of  the 
toiling  masses  from  the  influence  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  of  national-reformism, 
the  basic  strategical  aim  of  the  Communist  movement  in  the  bourgeois-demo- 
cratic revolution — the  hegemony  of  the  proletariat — cannot  be  achieved.  With- 
out the  hegemony  of  the  proletariat,  an  organic  part  of  which  is  the  leading  role 
of  the  Communist  Party,  the  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  cannot  be  carried 
through  to  an  end,  not  to  speak  of  the  socialist  revolution. 

20.  The  petty  bourgeoisie  in  the  colonial  and  semieolonial  countries  plays  a 
very  important  role.  It  consists  of  various  strata,  which  in  different  periods  of 
the  national-revolutionary  movement  play  very  diverse  roles. 

The  artisan,  who  is  hit  by  the  competition  of  foreign  imported  goods,  is  hos- 
tilely  disposed  toward  imperialism.  At  the  same  time,  he  is  interested  in  the 
unlimited  exploitation  of  his  journeymen  and  apprentices,  and  accordingly,  he 
is  hostilely  disposed  toward  the  class-conscious  labor  movement.  At  the  same 
time,  also,  he  usually  suffers  himself  from  the  exploitation  of  trading  and  usury 
capital.  The  exceedingly  ambiguous  and  hopeless  position  of  this  stratum  of  the 
petty  bourgeoisie  determines  its  vacillations,  and  it  frequently  falls  under  the 
influence  of  Utopian  reactionaries. 

The  small  tradei" — both  in  town  and  village — is  connected  with  village  exploi- 
tation through  usury  and  trade,  and  he  clings  to  the  old  forms  of  exploitation  in 
preference  to  the  prospects  of  an  expansion  of  the  internal  market.  These 
strata,  however,  are  not  homogeneous.  These  sections  of  the  trading  bourgeoisie 
which  in  one  form  or  another  are  connected  with  the  Compradores  occupy  a 
different  position  from  tho.se  sections  the  activity  of  which  is  limited  mainly  to 
the  internal  market. 

The  petty  bourgeois  intelligentsia,  the  students,  and  such  like,  are  very  fre- 
quently the  most  determined  representatives,  not  only  of  the  specific  interests 
of  the  petty  bourgeoisie,  but  also  of  the  general  objective  interests  of  the  entire 
national  bourgeoisie,  and,  in  the  fii'st  period  of  the  national  movement,  they 
often  come  out  as  the  spokesmen  of  the  nationalist  struggle.     Their  role  at  the 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  875 

head  of  the  movement  is  comparatively  important.  In  general,  thpy  cannot  act 
as  representatives  of  peasant  interests,  for  the  very  social  strata  from  which 
they  come  are  connected  with  landlordism.  Tlie  upsurge  of  the  revolutionary 
wave  may  drive  them  into  the  labor  movement,  bringing  with  them  their  petty 
bourgeois  ideology  of  vacillation  and  indecision.  Only  a  few  of  them  in  the 
course  of  the  struggle  are  able  to  break  with  their  own  class  and  rise  to  an 
understanding  of  tlie  tasks  of  the  class  struggle  of  the  proletariat,  and  to  become 
active  defenders  of  the  interests  of  the  latter.  It  frequently  happens  that  the 
petty  bourgeois  intellectuals  give  to  their  ideology  a  socialist  or  even  Communist 
color.  In  the  struggle  against  imperialism  they  have  played,  and  in  such  coun- 
tries as  India  and  Egypt  they  even  now,  still  partially  play  a  revolutionary  role. 
The  mass  movement  may  draw  them  after  it,  i>ut  it  may  also  push  them  into  the 
camp  of  extreme  reaction  or  at  least,  cause  the  spread  of  Utopian  reactionary 
tendencies  in  their  ranks. 

Alongside  of  these  strata,  there  are  to  be  found  in  the  colonial  towns  con- 
siderable sections  of  urban  poor,  the  position  of  which  objectively  drives  them  to 
the  support  of  revolution — artisans  who  do  not  exploit  the  labor  of  others,  street 
traders,  unemployed  intellectuals,  ruined  peasants  seeking  work,  etc.  Further, 
the  colonial  town,  as  also  the  village,  has  a  populous  section  of  "coolies",  semi- 
proletarians  who  have  not  passed  through  the  school  of  factory  production  and 
who  live  by  casual  labor. 

The  peasantry,  along  with  the  proletariat  and  in  the  character  of  its  ally, 
represents  a  driving  force  of  the  revolution.  The  immense  many-millioned 
peasant  mass  constitutes  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  population  even  in 
the  most  developed  colonies  (in  some  colonies  it  is  90  percent  of  the  population). 
The  many  millions  of  starving  tenant-cultivators,  petty  peasants  oppressed  by 
want  and  groaning  under  all  kinds  of  precapitalist  and  capitalist  forms  of  ex- 
ploitation, a  considerable  portion  of  them  deprived  of  the  possibility  of  cultiva- 
tion even  on  the  lands  that  they  rent,  thrown  out  from  the  process  of  production 
and  slowly  dying  from  famine  and  disease,  village  agricultural  laborers,  all 
these  are  the  allies  of  the  proletariat  in  the  village.  The  peasantry  can  only 
achieve  its  emaucipation  under  the  leadership  of  the  proletariat,  but  the  prole- 
tariat can  only  lead  the  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  to  victory  in  union  with 
the  peasantry. 

The  process  of  class  differentiation  of  the  peasantry  in  the  colonies  and  semi- 
colonies  which  possess  important  relics  of  feudalism  and  of  precapitalist  rela- 
tionships, proceeds  at  a  comparatively  slow  rate.  Nevertheless,  market  relation- 
ships in  these  countries  have  developed  to  such  a  degree  that  tiie  peasantry 
already  no  longer  represent  a  homogeneous  mass,  as  far  as  their  class  relations 
are  concerned.  In  the  villages  of  China  and  India,  in  particular  in  certain  parts 
of  these  countries,  it  is  already  possible  to  find  exploiting  elements  derived  from 
the  peasantry,  who  exploit  the  peasants  and  village  laborers  through  usury, 
trade,  employment  of  hired  labor,  the  sale  or  letting  out  of  land  on  rent,  the 
loaning  of  cattle  or  agricultural  implements,  etc.,  etc. 

In  general,  it  is  possible  that,  in  the  first  period  of  the  struggle  of  the  peasantry 
against  the  landlords,  the  proletariat  may  be  able  to  carry  with  it  the  entire 
peasantry.  But  in  the  further  development  of  the  struggle  some  of  the  upper 
strata  of  the  peasantry  may  pass  into  the  camp  of  counter-revolution.  The 
proletariat  can  achieve  its  leading  role  in  relation  to  the  peasantry  only  under 
the  conditions  of  unflinching  struggle  for  its  partial  demands,  for  complete  carry- 
ing through  of  the  agrarian  revolution,  and  only  if  it  will  lead  the  struggle  of  the 
wide  masses  of  the  peasantry  for  a  revolutionary  solution  of  the  agrarian 
question. 

21.  The  working  class  in  the  colonies  and  semicolonies  has  characteristic 
featvires  which  play  an  important  role  in  the  building  up  of  an  independent 
working  class  movement  and  proletarian  class  ideology  in  these  countries.  The 
predominant  part  of  the  colonial  proletariat  is  derived  from  the  pauperized 
village,  with  which  the  worker  remains  in  connection  even  when  engaged  in 
production.  In  the  majority  of  colonies  (with  the  exception  of  some  large  factory 
towns  such  as  Shanghai,  Bombay,  Calcutta,  etc.),  we  find,  as  a  general  rule, 
only  a  first  generation  of  proletariat  engaged  in  large-scale  production.  Another 
portion  is  made  up  of  the  ruined  artisans  who  are  being  driven  out  of  the  decay- 
ing handicrafts,  which  are  widely  spread  even  in  the  most  advanced  colonies. 
The  ruined  artisan,  a  petty  owner,  carries,  with  him  into  the  working  class  a 
guild  tendency  and  ideology  which  serves  as  a  basis  for  the  penetration  of 
national-reformist  influence  into  the  labor  movement  of  the  colonies. 

22,S48 — .52 — pt.  .3 12 


876  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  great  fluctuation  in  the  composition  of  the  proletariat  (frequent  renewal 
of  the  labor  force  iu  the  factories  owing  to  workers  returning  to  the  villages  and 
the  inflow  of  new  masses  of  poverty-stricken  peasants  into  production)  ;  the 
considerable  percentage  of  women  and  children ;  the  numerous  different  lan- 
guages ;  illiteracy ;  the  wide  distribution  of  religious  and  caste  prejudices — all 
make  diflScult  the  work  of  systematic  agitation  and  propaganda  and  retard  the 
growth  of  class  consciousness  among  the  workers.  Nevertheless,  the  merciless 
exploitation,  practiced  in  the  most  oppressive  forms  by  native  and  foreign  capital, 
and  the  entire  absence  of  political  rights  for  the  workers,  create  the  objective 
pre-conditions  on  the  basis  of  which  the  labor  movement  in  the  colonies  is 
rapidly  overcoming  all  obstacles  and  every  year  draws  greater  and  greater  masses 
of  the  working  class  into  the  struggle  against  the  native  exploiters  and  the 
imperialists. 

The  first  period  of  the  growth  of  the  labor  movement  in  the  colonial  and  semi- 
colonial  countries  (approximately  1919-1923)  is  organically  bound  up  with  the 
general  growth  of  the  national-revolutionary  movement  which  followed  the  world 
war,  and' which  was  characterized  by  the  subordination  of  the  class  interests  of 
the  working  class  to  the  interests  of  the  anti-imperialist  struggle  headed  by  the 
native  bourgeoisie.  Insofar  as  the  labor  strikes  and  other  demonstrations  bore 
an  organizational  character,  they  were  usually  organized  by  petty  bourgeois  in- 
tellectuals who  restricted  the  demands  of  the  workers  to  questions  of  the 
national  struggle.  The  most  important  characteristic  of  the  second  period  of 
rapid  growth  of  the  labor  movement  in  the  colonies,  on  the  other  hand,  the  period 
which  began  after  the  Fifth  Congress  of  the  Communist  International,  was  the 
emergence  of  the  working  class  of  the  colonies  into  the  political  arena  as  an 
independent  class  force  directly  opposing  itself  to  the  national  bourgeoisie,  and 
entering  upon  a  struggle  with  the  latter  in  defense  of  its  own  immediate  class 
interests  and  for  hegemony  in  the  national  revolution  as  a  whole.  The  history  of 
the  last  few  years  has  clearly  confirmed  this  characteristic  of  the  new  stage  of 
the  colonial  revolution,  first  of  all  in  the  example  of  the  great  Chinese  revolution, 
and  subsequently  in  the  insurrection  in  Indonesia.  There  is  every  ground  to 
believe  that  in  India  the  working  class  is  liberating  itself  from  the  influence  of 
the  nationalist  and  social-reformist  leaders  and  is  being  converted  into  an  inde- 
pendent political  factor  in  the  struggle  against  the  British  imperialists  and  the 
,  native  bourgeoisie. 

22.  In  order  correctly  to  determine  the  immediate  tasks  of  the  revolutionary 
movement,  it  is  important  as  a  starting  point  to  take  into  consideration  the  degree 
of  maturity  attained  by  the  movement  in  the  separate  colonial  countries.  The 
revolutionary  movement  in  China  is  distinguished  from  the  present  movement  in 
India  by  a  series  of  essential  features,  characterizing  the  different  degrees  of 
maturity  of  the  movement  in  the  two  countries.  The  previous  experience  of  the 
Chinese  revolution  must,  undoubtedly,  be  utilized  in  the  revolutionary  movement 
in  India  and  other  analogous  colonial  countries.  But  it  would  be  a  completely 
mistaken  application  of  the  Chinese  experience  if,  at  the  present  time  in  India, 
Egypt,  etc.,  we  were  to  formulate  the  inunediate  tasks,  slogans  and  tactical  meth- 
ods in  exactly  the  same  form  as  took  place  in  China,  for  example  in  the  Wuhan 
period,  or  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  necessary  to  formulate  them  there  at  the 
present  time. 

The  tendency  to  skip  over  the  inevitable  difficulties  and  special  tasks  of  the 
present  stage  of  the  revolutionary  movement  in 'India,  Egypt,  etc.,  can  only  be 
harmful.  It  is  necessary  to  carry  through  much  work  in  the  building  up  and 
consolidation  of  the  Communist  Party  and  trade-union  organizations  of  the 
proletariat,  in  the  revolutionization  of  the  trade-unions,  in  the  development  of 
economic  and  political  mass  demonstrations  and  in  the  winning  over  of  the 
masses  and  their  liberation  from  the  influence  of  the  national-reformist  bour- 
geoisie, before  it  is  possible  to  advance  in  these  countries  with  definite  prospects 
of  success  to  the  realization  of  such  tasks  as  those  which  were  fully  carried  out  in 
China  during  the  Wuhan  period  as  the  immediate  tasks  of  the  struggle  of  the 
working  class  and  peasantry. 

The  interests  of  the  struggle  for  the  class  rule  of  the  national  bourgeoisie 
compel  the  most  important  bourgeois  parties  in  India  and  Egypt  (Swarajists, 
Wafdists)  still  to  demonstrate  their  opposition  to  the  ruling  imiTierialist-t'eudal 
bloc.  Although  this  opposition  has  not  a  revolutionary  but  a  reformist  and  class 
collaborationist  character,  this  by  no  means  signifies  that  it  has  not  a  special 
significance.  The  national  bourgeoisie  has  not  the  significance  of  a  force  in 
the  struggle  against  imperialism.  Nevertheless,  this  bourgeois-reformist  opposi- 
tion has  its  real  special  significance  for  the  development  of  the  revolutionary 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  877 

•movement— and  this  both  in  a  negative  as  well  as  in  a  positive  sense — insofar 
as  it  possesses  any  mass  influence  at  all. 

Its  chief  feature  is  that  it  exerts  a  braking  retarding  influence  on  the  develop- 
ment of  the  revolutionary  movement,  insofar  as  it  is  successful  in  drawing  the 
toiling  masses  in  its  wake  and  holding  them  back  from  the  revolutionary 
struggle.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  demonstrations  of  the  bourgeois 
opposition  against  the  ruling  imperialist-feudal  bloc,  even  if  they  do  not  have 
any  deei^  foundation,  can  exert  a  certain  accelerating  influence  on  the  process 
of  the  iwlitical  awakening  of  the  wide  masses  of  toilers;  the  concrete  open 
conflicts  of  the  national-reformist  bourgeoisie  with  imperialism,  although  of 
little  significance  in  themselves,  may,  under  certain  conditions ;  indirectly  serve 
as  the  cause  of  the  unleashing  of  even  greater  revolutionary  mass  actions. 

It  is  true' the  reformist  bourgeoisie  itself  endeavours  not  to  allow  of  any  such 
effect  of  its  oppositional  activities,  and  in  one  way  or  another  seeks  to  prevent 
it  in  advance.  But,  wherever  the  objective  conditions  exist  for  a  far-reaching 
political  crisis,  there  the  activities  of  the  national-reformist  opposition,  even 
their  insignificant  conflicts  with  imperialism  which  are  least  of  all  connected 
with  the  real  hearth  of  the  revolution,  can  become  of  serious  importance. 

The  Communists  must  learn  how  to  utilize  each  and  every  conflict,  to  develop 
such  conflicts  and  to  broaden  their  significance,  to  connect  them  with  the  agitation 
for  revolutionary  slogans,  to  spread  the  news  of  these  conflicts  among  the  wide 
masses,  to  arouse  these  masses  to  independent,  open  manifestations  in  sui^port 
of  their  own  demands,  etc. 

23.  The  correct  tactics  in  the  struggle  against  such  parties  as  the  Swarajists 
and  Wafdists  during  this  stage  consist  in  the  successful  exposure  of  their  real 
national-reformist  character.  These  parties  have  already  more  than  once  betrayed 
the  national-emancipatory  struggle,  but  they  have  not  yet  finally  passed  over 
to  the  counter-revolutionary  camp  in  the  manner  of  the  Kuomintang.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  they  will  do  this  later  on,  but  at  the  present  time  they  are  so 
particularly  dangerous  precisely  because  their  real  physiognomy  has  not  yet 
been  exposed  in  the  eyes  of  the  wide  masses  of  toilers.  For  this  exposure  there 
is  still  needed  a  very  large  amount  of  Communist  educational  work  and  a  very 
great  deal  of  new  political  experience  on  the  part  of  the  masses  themselves. 
If  the  Communists  do  not  already  succeed  in  this  stage  in  shaking  the  faith  of 
the  toiling  masses  in  the  bourgeois  national-reformist  leadership  of  the  national 
movement,  then  this  leadership  in  the  coming  upsurge  of  the  revolutionary 
wave  will  represent  an  enormous  danger  for  the  revolution. 

Consequently,  it  is  necessary,  by  means  of  correct  Communist  tactics,  adapted 
to  the  conditions  of  the  present  stage,  to  help  the  toiling  masses  in  India.  Egypt, 
Indonesia  and  such  colonies  to  emancipate  themselves  from  the  influence  of  the 
bourgeois  parties.  This  is  not  to  be  achieved  by  any  noisy  phrases,  however, 
radical  they  may  sound  superficially,  about  the  absence  of  any  distinction  be- 
tween the  oppositional  national-reformists  (Swarajists,  Wafdists,  etc.)  and  the 
British  imperialists  or  their  feudal  counter-revolutionary  allies.  The  national 
reformist  leaders  would  easily  be  able  to  make  use  of  such  an  exaggeration  in 
order  to  incite  the  masses  against  the  Communists.  The  masses  see  the  chief 
immediate  enemy  of  national  emancipation  in  the  form  of  the  imperialist  feudal 
bloc,  which  in  itself  is  correct  at  this  stage  of  the  movement  in  India,  Egypt,  and 
Indonesia  (as  far  as  one  side  of  the  matter  is  concerned) . 

In  the  struggle  against  this  ruling  counter-revolutionary  force,-  the  Indian, 
Egyptian,  and  Indonesian  Communists  must  proceed  in  advance  of  all,  they  must 
fight  more  determinedly,  more  consistently  and  more  resolutely  than  any  petty 
bourgeois  section  or  national-revoluntary  group.  Of  course,  this  fight  must  not 
be  waged  for  the  organizing  of  any  kind  of  putsch  or  premature  attempt  at  a 
rising  on  the  part  of  the  small  revolutionai-y  minority,  but  for. the  purpose  of 
organizing  the  widest  possible  strata  of  the  masses  of  toilers  in  demonstrations 
and  other  manifestations  so  that  in  this  way  the  active  participation  of  these 
masses  can  be  guaranteed  for  a  victorious  uprising  at  a  further  stage  of  the 
revolutionary  struggle. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  no  less  important  mercilessly  to  expose  before  the  toil- 
ing masses  the  national-reformist  character  of  the  Swarajist,  Wafdist  and  other 
nationalist  parties,  and  in  particular  of  their  leaders.  It  is  necessary  to  expose 
their  half-heartedness  and  vacillation  in  the  national  struggle,  their  bargainings 
and  attempts  to  reach  a  compromise  with  British  imperialism,  their  previous 
capitulations  and  counter-revolutionary  advances,  their  reactionary  resistance  to 
the  class  demands  of  the  proletariat  and  peasantry,  their  empty  nationalist- 
phraseology,  their  dissemination  of  harmful  illusions  about  the  peaceful  decolon- 


878  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

ization  of  the  country  and  their  sabotage  in  relation  to  the  application  of  revolu- 
tionary methods  in  the  national-emancipatory  struggle. 

It  is  necessary  to  reject  the  formation  of  any  l<ind  of  bloc  between  the  Com- 
munist Party  and  the  national-reformist  opposition ;  this  does  not  exclude  the 
formation  of  temporary  agreements  and  the  coordinating  of  separate  activities 
in  connection  with  definite  antiimperialist  demonstrations,  provided  that  the 
demonstrations  of  the  bourgeois  opposition  can  be  utilized  for  the  development 
of  the  mass  movement,  and  provided  that  these  agreements  do  not  in  any  way 
limit  the  freedom  of  the  Communist  Parties  in  the  matter  of  agitatimi  among 
the  masses  and  among  the  organizations  of  the  latter.  Of  course,  in  this  work 
the  Communists  must  linow  how  at  the  same  time  to  carry  on  the  most  relentless 
ideological  and  political  struggle  against  bourgeois  nationalism  and  against  the 
slightest  signs  of  its  influence  inside  the  labor  movement.  In  such  cases,  the 
Communist  Party  must  take  particular  care  not  only  to  maintain  its  complete 
political  independence  and  to  make  quite  clear  its  own  character,  but  also,  on 
the  basis  of  facts,  to  open  the  eyes  of  the  masses  of  toilers  who  are  under  the 
influence  of  the  bourgeois  opposition,  so  that  they  will  perceive  all  the  hope- 
lessness of  this  opposition  and  the  danger  of  the  bourgeois  democratic  illusions 
that  it  disseminates. 

24.  An  incorrect  estimation  of  the  chief  tendency  of  the  parties  of  the  big 
national  bourgeoisie  gives  rise  to  the  danger  of  an  incorrect  estimation  of  the 
character  and  role  of  the  petty  bourgeois  parties.  The  development  of  these 
parties,  as  a  general  rule,  follows  a  course  from  the  national-revoluntionary  to 
the  national-reformist  position.  Even  such  movements  as  Sun  Yat-senism  in 
China,  Gandhism  in  India,  Sarekat  Islam  in  Indonesia,  were  originally  radical 
petty  bourgeois  ideological  movements  which,  however,  as  a  result  of  their 
service  to  the  big  bourgeoisie  became  converted  into  a  bourgeois  nationalist- 
reformist  movement.  After  this,  in  India,  Egypt,  and  Indonesia,  there  was 
again  founded  a  radical  wing  from  among  the  different  petty  bourgeois  groups 
(e.  g.  the  Republican  Party,  Watanists,  Sarekat  Rayat),  which  stand  for  a  more 
or  less  consistent  national-revolutionary  point  of  view.  In  such  a  country  as 
India,  the  rise  is  possible  of  some  new  analogous  radical  petty  bourgeois  parties 
and  groups. 

But  tlie  fact  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  these  parties,  essentially  con- 
sidered, are  connected  with  the  national  bourgeoisie.  The  petty  bourgeois  in- 
telligentsia at  the  head  of  the  parties  puts  forward  national-revolutionary  de- 
mands but  at  the  same  time  appears  more  or  less  conscious  as  the  representative 
of  the  capitalist  development  of  their  country.  Some  of  these  elements  can 
become  the  followers  of  various  kinds  of  reactionary  Utopias,  but  when  con- 
fronted with  feudalism  and  imperialism,  they,  in  distinction  from  the  parties 
of  the  big  national  bourgeoisie,  appear  at  the  outset  not  as  reformists  but  as  more 
or  less  revoluntionary  representatives  ot  the  anti-imperialist  interests  of  the 
colonial  bourgeoisie.  This  is  the  case,  at  least,  so  long  as  the  development 
of  the  revolutionary  process  in  the  country  does  not  put  on  the  order  of  the  day 
in  a  definite  and  sharp  form  the  fundamental  internal  questions  of  the  bourgeois- 
democratic  revolution,  particularly  the  question  of  the  realization  of  the  agi-arian 
revolution  and  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  and  peasantry.  When  this 
happens,  then  it  usually  denotes  the  end  of  the  revolutionary  character  of  the 
petty  bourgeois  parties.  As  soon  as  the  revolution  has  placed  the  class  interests 
of  the  proletariat  and  the  peasantry  in  critical  contradiction  not  only  to  the 
rule  of  the  feudal-imperialist  bloc,  but  also  to  the  class  rule  of  the  bourgeoisie, 
the  petty  bourgeois  groups  usually  go  back  to  the  position  of  the  national-re- 
formist parties. 

It  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  Communist  Parties  in  these  countries  should 
from  the  very  beginning  demarcate  themselves  in  the  most  clear-cut  fashion,  both 
politically  and  organizationally,  from  all  the  petty  bourgeois  groups  and  parties. 
In  so  far  as  the  needs  of  the  revolutionary  struggle  demand  it,  a  temporary  co- 
operation is  permissible,  and  in  certain  circumstances  even  a  temporary  unTon 
between  the  Communist  Party  and  the  national  revolutionary  movement,  pro- 
vided that  the  latter  is  a  genuine  revolutionary  movement,  tliat  it  genuinely 
struggles  against  the  ruling  power  and  tliat  its  representatives  do  not  put  ob- 
stacles in  the  way  of  the  Communists  educating  and  organizing  in  a  revolutionary 
sense  the  peasants  and  broad  masses  of  the  exploited.  In  every  such  coopera- 
tion, however,  it  is  essential  to  take  the  most  careful  precautions  in  order  that 
this  cooperation  does  not  degenerate  into  a  fusion  of  the  Communist  movement 
with  the  bourgeois-revolutionary  movement. 

The  Communist  movement  in  all  circumstances,  most  unconditionally  pre- 
serve the  independence  of  the  proletarian  movement  and  its  own  independence  in 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  879 

agitation,  in  organization  and  in  demonstrations.  To  criticize  tlie  half-hearted 
ness  and  vacillation  of  the  petty  bourgeois  groups,  to  anticipate  their  vacilla- 
tions, to  be  prepared  for  them  and  at  the  same  time  to  utilize  to  the  full  all  the 
revolutionary  possibilities  of  these  strata,  to  carry  on  a  consistent  struggle 
against  petty  bourgeois  influence  over  the  proletariat,  employ  all  means  to 
liberate  the  wide  masses  of  the  peasantry  from  the  influence  of  the  petty  bour- 
geois parties  and  to  win  from  them  the  hegemony  over  the  peasantry — these  are 
the  tasks  of  the  Communist  Parties. 

25.  How  rapidly  the  revolutionary  movement  in  India,  Egypt,  etc.,  will  reach 
such  a  high  degree  of  maturity  as  it  has  already  reached  in  China,  depends  to  an 
essential  extent  on  how  quickly  there  arises  there  a  big  revolutionary  wave. 
In  the  event  of  its  postponement  for  a  considerable  time,  the  political  and  organ- 
izational ripening  of  the  driving  forces  of  the  revolution  can  only  proceed  by  way 
of  a  gradual  and  relatively  slow  process  of  development.  If,  however,  the  com- 
ing powerful  revolutionary  wave  rises  earlier,  then  the  movement  may  quickly 
be  able  to  attain  a  much  higher  stage  of  maturity. 

Under  exceptionally  favorable  circumstances,  it  is  not  even  excluded  that  the 
revolution  there  may  be  able  in  one  single  mightly  wave  to  achieve  the  conquest 
of  power  by  the  proletariat  and  peasantry.  It  is  also  possible  that  the  process 
of  the  development  of  the  revolution  from  one  stage  to  another  more  mature  stage 
will  be  interrupted  for  a  more  or  less  prolonged  period  of  time,  in  particular  if 
the  coming  wave  of  revolutionary' upheaval  reaches  a  relatively  small  height 
and  is  not  of  great  duration.  Consequently,  it  is  necessary  in  every  case  to  sub- 
ject the  concrete  situation  to  the  most  detailed  analysis. 

The  following  factors  are  of  decisive  significance  for  the  immediate  growing 
over  of  the  revolution  from  one  stage  to  another  higher  stage:  (1)  The  degree 
of  development  of  the  revolutionary  proletarian  leadership  of  the  movement,  i.  e. 
of  the  Conuuunist  Party  of  the  given  country  (the  numerical  strength  of  the 
Party,  its  independent  character,  consciousness  and  fighting  readiness,  as  well 
as  its  authority  and  connection  with  the  masses  and  its  influence  on  the  trade 
union  and  peasant  movement)  ;  (2)  the  degree  of  organization  and  the  revolu- 
tionary experience  of  the  working  class,  as  well  as,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  the 
l>easantry.  Tlie  revolutionary  experience  of  the  masses  signifies  experience  of 
struggle :  in  the  first  place,  liberation  from  the  influence  over  them  of  the  bour- 
geois and  petty  bourgeois  parties. 

Since  these  prerequisites  for  the  first  big  mass  outburst  of  the  revolution, 
even  in  the  best  circumstances,  are  present  only  to  an  insufficient  degree,  an  un- 
usually deep  revolutionary  crisis  and  an  unusually  high  and  persistent  revolu- 
tionary wave  are  required  for  it  to  be  possible  for  the  bourgeois-democratic 
revolution  with  the  aid  of  this  one  wave  of  upheaval  to  lead  to  the  complete  vic- 
tory of  the  proletariat  and  peasantry.  Such  a  possibility  is  most  easily  pre- 
sented, for  example,  when  the  ruling  imperialism  is  temporarily  distracted  by 
a  long-continued  war  outside  the  frontiers  of  the  colonial  country  concerned. 

26.  Living,  concrete,  historical  dialetics,  such  as  were  demonstrated  by  the 
now  completed  first  period  of  the  bourgeois-democratic  revolution  in  China,  will 
give  to  the  Communists,  especially  those  working  in  the  colonial  countries,  a 
valuable  experience  which  it  is  necessary  to  study  carefully  in  order  to  draw 
the  correct  conclusions,  especially  from  the  mistakes  committed  in  the  course 
of  Communist  work  in  the  colonies. 

The  rise  of  the  revolutionary  wave  in  China  was  unusually  prolonged  (over  2 
years),  since  it  was  connected  with  a  protracted  internal  war.  Inasmuch  as  the 
Northern  Expedition  was  not  conducted  directly  against  the  great  imperialist 
powers  and  inasmuch  as  the  latter,  owing  to  competition  between  them,  were 
partially  passive  during  the  first  period,  while  the  bourgeois  leadership  of  the 
national  movement  had  already  for  some  years  held  Canton  in  its  hands — a 
definite,  though  limited,  territory — as  well  as  a  centralized  power  backed  up  by 
the  army,  and  so  forth,  it  is  understandable  that  in  this  exceptional  case  a  great 
part  of  the  bourgeoisie  in  the  beginning  looked  upon  the  national  emancipatory 
war  as  its  own  particular  affair.  The  Kuomintang,  in  which  it  pi-acticnlly  played 
a  leading  role,  in  the  course  of  a  short  time  came  to  be  at  the  head  of  the  national 
revolutionary  movement,  a  circumstance  which  in  the  course  of  further  events 
represented  an  extremely  great  danger  for  the  revolution. 

On  the  other  hand,  among  the  peculiarities  of  the  situation  in  China  nuist  be 
numbered  the  fact  that  the  proletariat  there  was  stronger  in  relation  to  its  bour- 
geoisie than  the  proletariat  of  other  countries.  It  is  true  that  it  was  weakly 
organized,  but  during  the  upsurge  of  the  revolutionary  wave  the  growth  of  labor 
organization  proceeded  at  a  very  rapid  rate. 


880  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  Communist  Party  also  rose  in  a  short  time  from  a  small  group  to  a  party: 
with  60,000  members  (and  presently  even  more)  and  possessing  a  wide  influence 
among  the  workers.  Naturally,  in  these  conditions  many  petty  bourgeois  ele- 
ments also  entered  the  party.  The  party  was  lacking  in  revolutionary  expe- 
rience and,  even  more,  in  traditions  of  Bolshevism.  In  the  beginning,  the  upper 
hand  in  its  leadership  was  taken  by  wavering  elements,  which  were  still  only  to 
a  very  small  degree  liberated  from  petty  bourgeois  opportunist  tendencies  which 
inadequately  understood  the  independent  tasks  and  role  of  the  Communist  Party 
and  which  came  out  against  any  decisive  development  of  the  agrarian  revolution. 
The  entry  of  the  Communists  for  a  certain  period  into  the  leading  party  of  the 
national  revolution,  the  Kuomintang,  in  itself  corresponded  to  the  requirements 
of  the  struggle  and  of  the  situation,  and  was  also  in  the  interests  of  the  indis- 
pensable Communist  work  among  the  fairly  wide  masses  of  toilers  who  followed 
this  party.  In  addition,  at  the  beginning,  tlie  Communist  Party  of  China  received 
in  the  territory  under  the  rule  of  the  Kuomintang  Government  the  possibility  of 
independent  agitation  among  the  masses  of  workers  and  peasants  and  among  the 
soldiers  of  the  national  army  and  their  organizations.  At  that  time  the  party 
possessed  greater  possibilities  than  it  actually  made  use  of. 

At  that  time  the  party  did  not  sufficiently  clearly  explain  to  the  masses  its 
proletarian  class  position  in  distinction  from  Sun  Yat-senism  and  other  petty 
bourgeois  tendencies.  In  the  ranks  of  the  Kuomintang,  the  Communists  did  not 
conduct  any  independent  policy,  leaving  out'of  account  that  in  any  such  inevi- 
table bloc  the  Communists  must  adopt  an  unconditionally  critical  attitude  toward 
the  bourgeois  elements  and  always  come  out  as  independent  force.  The  Com- 
munists failed  to  expose  the  vacillations  of  the  national-bourgeoisie  and  of 
bourgeois-democratic  nationalism,  just  at  the  time  when  this  exposure  ought  to 
have  constituted  one  of  the  most  important  tasks  of  the  Communist  Party.  The 
inevitable  disruption  of  the  Kuomintang  drew  nearer  and  nearer  as  the  national 
army  advanced,  but  the  leadership  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  undertook 
nothing  or  almost  nothing  in  order  to  prepare  the  party  in  case  of  a  breach,  and 
in  order  to  guarantee  its  independent  position  and  to  unite  the  revolutionary 
workers  and  peasants  in  an  independent  lighting  bloc  which  would  oppose  itself 
to  the  leadersliip  of  the  Kuomintang. 

Thus,  the  bourgeois-counter-revolutionary  coup  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  found  the 
revolutionary  proletariat  completely  unprepared  and  threw  its  ranks  into  con- 
fusion. Further,  the  leadership  of  the  Communist  Party  even  at  that  time 
badly  understood  the  process  of  the  development  of  the  revolution  from  one 
stage  to  another  and  did  not  carry  through  the  correct  changes  in  the  line  of 
the  party  made  necessary  by  this  coup.  Inasmuch  as  the  left  wing  of  the  petty 
bourgeois  leaders  of  the  Kuomintang  during  the  course  of  a  certain  time  still 
went  together  with  the  Communist  Party,  there  took  place  a  territorial  separa- 
tion;  there  arose  the  separate  governments  of  Nanking  and  Wuhan.  But  the 
Communist  Party  did  not  occupy  a  leading  position  even  in  Wuhan. 

Very  quickly,  in  the  Wuhan  territory  there  commenced  a  second  period,  char- 
acterized, among  other  things,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  presence  of  elements  of  an 
incipient,  still  indefinite  dual  power  (the  seizure  by  peasant  unions  of  a  number 
of  ruling  functions  in  the  villages,  and  the  extension  of  the  functions  of  the  trade 
unions,  determined  by  the  endeavour  of  the  masses  to  reach  a  "plebeian"  inde- 
pendent solution  of  the  questions  of  power),  and,  on  the  other  hand,  by  the 
absence  of  sufficiently  mature  conditions  for  the  organization  of  Soviets  as  organs 
of  revolt  against  the  Wuhan  government,  insofar  as  the  latter  still  carried  on  a 
revolutionary  struggle  against  the  Nanking  government  which  represented  the 
treachery  of  the  bourgeosie  to  the  revolution. 

Tlie  Communist  Party  at  that  time  directly  hindered  the  independent  actions  of 
the  revolutionary  masses,  it  did  not  facilitate  their  task  of  gathering  and  or- 
ganizing forces,  it  did  not  assist  in  breaking  down  the  influence  of  the  leaders  of 
the  Left  Kuomintang  and  their  position  in  the  country  and  in  the  army,  instead 
of  utilizing  its  participation  in  the  Government  for  these  purposes,  it,  on  the 
contrary,  screened  the  whole  activity  of  this  Government  (individual  petty 
bourgeois  leading  members  of  the  party  went  so  far  that  they  even  participated 
in  the  disarming  of  the  workers'  pickets  in  Wuhan  and  in  sanctioning  the 
punitive  expedition  to  Changsha!). 

At  the  bottom  of  this  opportunist  policy  lay  the  hope  of  avoiding  a  rupture  with 
the  petty  bourgeois  leaders  of  the  Wuhan  governments.  But,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  this  rupture  could  only  be  put  off  for  a  short  space  of  time.  When  tlie  mass 
risings  acquired  a  threatening  character,  the  leaders  of  the  Wuhan  Kuomintang 
also  began  to  reach  out  toward  unity  with  their  allies  on  the  other  side  of  the 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  881 

barricades.    The  revolutionary  movement  of  the  workers  and  peasants  still  con- 
tinued to  exert  all  its  forces  in  order  to  achieve  victory. 

The  Communist  Party  of  China  now  also  corrected  its  line,  elected  a  new  lead 
ership  and  took  its  place  at  the  head  of  the  revolution.  But  the  revolutionary 
wave  had  already  ebbed.  The  heroic  mass  struggles  under  the  slogan  of  Soviets 
could  only  achieve  a  few  temporary  successes.  Only  in  individual  localities  did 
the  uprising  of  the  agrarian  revolution  begin  sufticiently  early,  in  the  remainder 
the  many  millions  of  the  ijeasants'  rearguard  were  delayed  in  their  advance. 
Instead  of  the  former  gross  errors  of  opportunist  leadership,  there  were  now 
revealed  on  the  contrary,  in  various  places  extremely  harmful  putschist  mistakes. 
The  preparations  for  risings  also  did  not  take  place  without  great  defects  on  the 
part  of  tlie  Communists.  The  heavy  defeats  once  more  threw  back  the  revolu- 
tion, which  in  the  south  had  already  entered  into  the  second  stage  of  develop- 
ment, to  the  starting  point  of  this  stage. 

27.  Thanks  to  the  fact  that  the  Chinese  national  bourgeoisie  obtained  power, 
the  composition  of  the  former  bloc  of  the  imperialists  and  militarists  was  partly 
altered  and  the  new  ruling  bloc  now  represents  the  immediate  chief  enemy  of  the 
revolution.  In  order  to  overthrow  it,  it  is  necessary  to  win  over  the  decisive 
masses  of  the  proletariat  and  peasantry  to  the  side  of  the  revolution.  This  con- 
stitutes the  most  important  task  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  for  the  im- 
mediate future.  The  Chinese  workers  have  already  acquired  an  enormous 
experience.  The  further  strengtliening  and  revolutionization  of  the  trade  union 
movement  and  the  further  strengthening  of  the  Communist  Party  is  essential. 
A  certain  portion  of  the  Chinese  peasantry  has  already  outlived  bourgeois  dem- 
ocratic illusions  and  shown  considerable  activity  in  the  revolutionary  struggle, 
but  this  is  only  an  insignificant  minority  of  the  huge  peasant  population  of  China. 

It  is  very  probable  that  some  petty  bourgeois  groups  will  take  up  the  position 
of  national  reformism  (inside  or  outside  the  Kuomintang),  in  order  by  a  certain 
display  of  bourgeois-democratic  opposition  to  conquer  influence  over  the  toiling 
masses  (to  these  petty  bourgeois  reformists  belong  also  Tang  Ting-san  and  the 
Social  Democratic  trade-union,  leaders).  Under  no  circumstances  must  the 
significance  of  these  attempts  be  underestimated.  The  isolation  of  these  groups 
and  their  exposure  before  the  masses  by  means  of  correct  Communist  tactics 
constitutes  an  absolutely  essential  precondition  for  the  Communist  Party  to  be 
able  to  take  a  really  leading  position  in  the  moment  of  the  coming  new  rise  of  the 
revolutionary  wave  in  China. 

Already  at  the  present  time,  the  party  must  everywhere  propagate  among 
the  masses  the  idea  of  Soviets,  the  idea  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat 
and  peasantry,  and  the  inevitability  of  the  coming  revolutionary  mass  armed 
uprising.  It  must  already  now  emphasize  in  its  agitation  the  necessity  of  over- 
throw of  the  ruling  bloc  and  the  mobilization  of  the  masses  for  revolutionary 
demonstrations.  Carefully  studying  the  objective  conditions  of  the  revolution 
as  they  continue  to  mature,  utilizing  every  possibility  for  the  mobilization  of 
the  masses,  it  must  consistently  and  undeviatingly  follow  the  line  of  seizure  of 
state  power,  organization  of  Soviets  as  organs  of  the  insurrection,  expropriation 
of  the  landlords  and  big  property-owners,  expulsion  of  the  foreign  imperialists 
and  the  confiscation  of  their  property. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Kornfeder,  after  you  finished  your  assignment 
in  South  America,  that  is,  you  were  Comintern  delegate  to  South 
America,  what  was  your  next  assignment? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  my  next  assignment  was  I  was  put  in  charge 
of  the  Communist  Party's  labor  union  activities  in  the  New  York 
area. 

Mr.  Morris.  In  other  words,  you  were  assigned  from  South  America 
back  to  New  York  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Wliat  year  was  that? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  was  about  the  end  of  1931. 

Mr.  Morris.  Would  you  tell  us  what  you  did  when  you  reported 
for  your  duties,  you  new  duties  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  think  before  you  get  into  that,  I  have  a  question 
I  would  like  to  ask  you.  When  you  left  South  America,  did  you  re- 
turn to  Russia  ? 


882  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  No,  I  returned  to  the  United  States, 

The  Chairman.  Tell  me,  what  was  the  date  of  your  departure  from 
Moscow  to  go  to  South  America  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  departed  from  Moscow,  I  believe,  in  April  1930. 
It  may  have  been  the  early  part  of  May. 

Mr.  Morris.  So  you  were  in  South  America  a  little  more  than  a 
year? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  was  in  South  America  about  17  months. 

The  Chairman.  Where  were  you  in  South  America  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  I  was  first  in  Colombia,  stationed  in  the  capital  of 
Colombia,  Bogota,  and  then  I  was  in  Venezuela,  in  the  capital,  Caracas. 

The  Chairman.  Specifically,  what  was  your  mission  down  there? 
Was  it  to  organize? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  the  strategic  objective  was  to  get  at  the  oil 
fields  of  Venezuela  and  Colombia.  But  since  there  were  no  com- 
petent Communist  Parties  in  existence,  the  job  was,  first,  to  organize 
Communist  Parties  with  which  to  do  it,  and  after  organizing  native 
Communist  Parties,  and  organizing  a  labor  federation,  then  to  con- 
centrate on  the  organization  of  the  oil  fields. 

The  Chairman.  Through  the  labor  population,  is  that  right  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  How  far  along  did  you  get  with  it  while  you  were 
there  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  I  succeeded  to  reorganize  a  very  loose,  in- 
efficient, socialistic  political  party  in  Colombia,  and  make  out  of  it  a 
Communist  Party,  and  organized  also  a  committee  for  the  formation 
of  a  labor  federation,  which  had  the  affiliation  of  the  existing  local 
unions  that  then  were  operating  in  Colombia. 

I  also  succeeded  to  organize  organizing  committees  amongst  the 
Colombian  peasants  and  plantation  hands — that  is,  the  plantation 
workers,  the  coffee  plantations,  and  some  groups,  two  small  organizing 
groups,  in  the  oil  areas  and  in  the  banana  region. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  the  purpose  olthis  work  of  the  Communist  or- 
ganization to  cut  off  raw  materials  from  the  United  States  in  the  event 
of  an  emergency  with  that  country  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  the  whole  strategic  purpose  of  activities  in 
this  type  of  country  is  to  isolate  the  hinterland  from  the  advanced 
countries,  and  does  deprive  the  advanced  countries  from  raw  mate- 
rials and  markets  for  their  goods.     That  is  the  broad  strategic  purpose. 

In  the  specific  case  of  Venezuela  and  Colombia,  the  general  purpose 
was  similar,  but  the  specific  purpose  was  that,  in  the  event  of  a  war, 
a  war  between  the  United  States  and  Russia,  which  was,  of  course, 
anticipated  in  Moscow  all  the  time — because  the  United  States  was 
considered  the  ultimate  fortress  of  capitalism — they  wanted  to  be  in  a 
position  during  a  strategic  moment  to  tie  up  the  oil  fields.  That  was 
the  immediate  strategic  objective  of  organizing  Venezuela  and 
Colombia. 

Mr.  Morris.  A  few  years  ago,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  there  was  a  Com- 
munist demonstration  in  Bogota.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  any 
of  the  people  engaged  in  that  uprising  were  people  you  organized  when 
you  were  in  South  America? 

Mr.  Kornfeder,  Yes.  All  the  leaders  whose  names  appeared  in 
the  news  dispatches  from  there  were,  at  the  time  I  was  there,  members 
of  the  central  committee  of  the  Communist  Party  that  I  had  organized. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  883 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Kornfeder,  we  are  just  getting  a  little  bit  from  our 
principal  subject  here. 

Will  you  describe  the  activities,  or  rather  describe  your  visit  back 
to  the  United  States  in  1941  ?  What  was  the  first  thing  you  did  when 
you  got  to  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  the  first  thing  I  had  to  do  was  to  find  a  place 
where  to  live,  and  since  I  didn't  have  one,  I  camped  in  Earl  Browder's 
apartment  for  6  weeks. 

Mr.  Morris.  Who  else  was  there  during  that  period  of  6  weeks? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  almost  all  the  then  leaders  of  the  party  off 
and  on  used  to  come  to  that  apartment  for  discussions,  tactical  and 
organizational  and  strategic  problems. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  in  the  city  of  New  York? 

Mr.  Kornfeder,  That  was  in  the  city  of  New  York. 

And  among  them  was  one  that  I  imagine  you  would  be  interested 
in,  Harrison  George. 

Harrison  George  was  then  taking  the  place  of  Earl  Browder  in  the 
Pan-Pacific  Union  secretariat. 

The  subsidiary  body  of  the  Red  international  labor  unions,  which 
w^as  seeking  to  infiltrate  the  labor  movement  in  China  and  Japan,  and 
other  countries  in  the  Far  East,  had  received  a  new  project.  The 
project  was  that  this  secretariat  that  he  was  then  heading  was  to  move 
from  China  to  San  Francisco  because,  in  China  at  that  time,  the  sit- 
uation had  become  difficult  for  the  Communists,  and  they  were  moving 
the  headquarters  of  the  Communist  International  that  was  operating 
secretly  in  Shanghai  or  Hankow,  moving  them  to  the  United  States. 

There  is  one  special  episode  I  think  I  should  mention  before  this 
committee. 

From  then  on,  the  Communist  Party  of  the  United  States  began 
to  concentrate  on  the  district  in  California,  which  had  been  neglected 
until  then.  A  great  many  of  the  agitators,  writers,  organizers,  were 
from  there  on  assigned  to  develop  the  party  organization  in  Cali- 
fornia, especially  in  'Frisco,  Los  Angeles,  and  so  on. 

The  Chairman.  Now  you  say  from  there  on.  From  about  what 
date  would  that  be? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  From  1932  on. 

Now,  among  the  problems  that  Harrison  George  raised  was  the 
problem  under  what  auspices  to  do  a  great  deal  of  this  work,  not  only 
in  the  United  States  but  in  the  countries  at  which  these  activities  were 
especially  aimed,  that  is,  China,  Indochina,  Indonesia,  India,  and  so 
on. 

It  is  in  this  connection  that  I  first  took  notice  of  the  organization 
known  as  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

The  subject  came  up  because  there  was  needed  an  organization  that 
could  function  as  a  front  for  the  operations  in  that  area,  a  respectable 
enough  front  that  is  not  suspect. 

Earl  Browder,  as  I  recall  it,  said  that  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Re- 
lations could  be  made  an  instrument  for  that  purpose,  that  the  party 
had  already  important  contacts  in  there  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  was  that  in  your  line  of  activity  in  the  Communist 
movement,  to  work  on  such  a  project,  Mr.  Kornfeder? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  No,  that  was  not  in  my  line  of  actviity. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  you  learned  that  just  because  of  the  fact  that  you 
happened  to  be  staying  at  Earl  Browder's  house  at  that  time  ? 


884  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  then  you  continued  on  and  worked  in  the  Com- 
munist Party  until  how  long  ? 

Mr.  KoRXFEDER.  I  Continued  in  charge  of  their  labor  union  and 
unemployment  activities  in  the  New  York  area  and  later  on  in  Ohio, 
until  1934. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  then  did  you  break  with  the  Communist  Party 
in  1934? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Kornf eder,  as  a  matter  of  interest,  how  long  did  it 
take  you  to  completely  dissassociate  yourself  from  the  Communist 
Party? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Well,  to  disassociate  myself  completely,  not  only 
from  their  organization  but  from  their  theories  and  ideology,  I  would 
say  it  took  me  until  1937,  about  3  years. 

I  first  rejected,  of  course,  Stalin's  methods  and  then  I  questioned 
Lenin's  theories,  but  still  held  on  to  the  principal  concepts  of  Marxism, 
and  then  I  sweated  through  that  subject  as  to  whether  Marx  was  right 
or  not. 

Politically,  I  thought  he  was  wrong  2  years  after,  but  as  to  whether, 
on  his  economics,  he  was  wrong,  it  took  me  another  year. 

So  it  took  me  about  3  years  to  completely  disassociate  myself  from 
the  philosophy,  theory,  et  cetera,  of  that  movement. 

The  Chairman.  How  did  you  initiate  the  break? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Well,  the  break  occurred  on  a  difference  on  current 
policy,  which,  at  that  time,  involved  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
Communist  Party  should  work  through  the  craft  unions  of  the  Ameri- 
can Federation  of  Labor  and  dissolve  the  independent  nonaffiliated 
unions  that  it  controlled,  or  whether  it  should  form  a  new  organization 
of  the  type,  as  later  on,  as  the  CIO  became. 

I  was  in  favor  of  the  type  of  organization  like  the  CIO  which,  at 
that  time,  was  contrary  to  the  line  dictated  from  Moscow. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  a  Marxist  before  you  were  a  Com- 
munist ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  why  it  took  some  time  to  break  your 
ties  with  Marxism? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  see  now  really  any  difference  between 
Marxism  and  communism  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Not  in  the  objectives,  but  there  is  a  big  difference 
in  methods. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  the  methods  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  do  you  not  think  that  in  the  end  they  have 
to  be  one  and  the  same  if  they  are  going  to  be  successful  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDx-iiR.  In  the  end,  if  they  get  control,  in  order  to  stay  in 
control  they  will  have  to  use  more  and  more  Communist  methods 
themselves. 

Senator  Ferguson.  They  will  have  to  use  force  to  keep  their  con- 
Iro],  will  they  not? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  is  right. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  885 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  is  that  not  really  their  policy,  was  that  not 
the  Marxist  policy  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  That  was  Marxist  policy ;  yes. 

You  see,  the  disputation  between  the  Socialists  and  the  Communists 
is,  to  a  considerable  extent,  on  the  interpretation  of  what  Marx  meant. 
But  they  both  consider  Marx  as  their  ideological  prophet. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Kornfeder,  after  you  broke  with  the  Communist 
organization,  and  you  say  that  break  took  you  about  3  years,  still  you 
were  not  orientated  to  the  point  of  view  that  you  would  have  testified 
before  a  Senate  committee  at  that  time,  would  you,  Mr.  Kornfeder? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Definitely  not.  I  would  not  have  appeared  before 
any  official  body  of  the  Government,  whether  judicial,  legislative,  or 
any  other.  It  requires  the  complete  break  and  the  realization  that 
this  thing  is  a  menace. 

Mr.  SouRwiNE.  Do  you  not  mean  that  it  requires  more  than  a  com- 
plete break,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  that  in  addition  to  the  complete  break 
there  must  also  come  this  realization  you  speak  of,  the  menace  of  com- 
munism ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes,  definitely  so.    Yes. 

I  came  to  look  upon  communism  as  a  modern  form  of  reaction  in 
the  sense  that  it  seeks  to  reimpose  the  domination  of  the  state  in  an 
absolutist  form,  a  thing  that  humanity  has  struggled  against  for 
centuries. 

So  once  that  picture  dawns  upon  your  mind,  well,  then  you  are 
finished  with  the  whole  thing. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  it  is  sold  to  you  in  the  package  that  it  is 
something  new  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes;  that  it  is  something  new,  that  through  its 
methods  you  are  going  to  achieve  great  innovations  that  are  good  for 
the  humanity  as  a  whole,  and  especially  for  the  underdog;  and 
especially,  if  you  are  one  of  the  underdogs,  it  is  very  appealing. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  does  not  show  you  the  side  that  you  become  the 
slave  of  the  state  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Definitely  not. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  it  criticizes  the  economic  royal- 
ists and  it  advocates  the  political  royalists,  does  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  It  criticizes  the  monopolies  of  capitalism  and  im- 
poses a  supermonopoly  of  the  state. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Of  statism  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  it  would  be  well  for  us  to  see  how  we  can  get 
rid  of  the  monopolies  of  the  economic  royalists  and  not  impose  upon 
ourselves  a  political  monoply  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder,  Something  even  worse. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Something  even  worse? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  get  back  to  this  pamphlet  again  ? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  would  like  to  have  the  following  passage,  two  or 
three  passages,  read  into  the  record,  and  then  I  will  ask  Mr.  Kornfeder 
a  few  questions  on  it. 


886  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

This  is  from  page  107,  from  a  pamphlet  called  China  Yesterday  and 
Today,  by  Eleanor  Lattimore,  edited  by  Marguerite  Ann  Stewart,  a 
cooperative  project  between  the  American  Council,  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations,  and  Webster  Publishing  Co. 

Until  early  1946,  however,  the  Kuomintang  refused  to  recognize  other  parties 
as  legal  political  bodies.  Friction  has  been  especially  bitter  between  the  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Communists.  Soon  after  the  war  with  Japan  ended,  armed  con- 
flicts occurred  between  them  which,  if  allowed  to  become  an  all-out  civil  war, 
could  -easily  have  destroyed  all  that  China  had  gained  during  her  war  against 
Japan. 

For  the  Communists  are  by  no  means  the  small  minority  party  they  were  when 
they  were  driven  from  the  south  by  Chiang's  troops.  They  are  now  second 
to  the  Kuomintang  in  size  and  influence,  and  control  an  area  inhabited  by  about 
100,000,000  people. 

When  we  speak  of  the  Chinese  Communists,  we  should  remember  that  they 
stand  for  something  rather  different  from  what  is  ordinarily  meant  by  the 
word  Communist. 

And  the  word  "Communist"  is  italicized. 

They  are  not  advocating  the  Russian  system  for  China,  and,  unlike  the  Rus- 
sians, they  maintain  the  rights  of  private  property  and  enterprise  in  the  areas 
under  their  control. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  read  that  again  ? 
Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  sir. 

They  are  not  advocating  the  Russian  system  for  China,  and,  unlike  the  Rus- 
sians, they  maintain  the  rights  of  private  property  and  enterprise  in  the  areas 
under  their  control. 

Because  their  chief  interest  at  the  moment  is  in  improving  the  economic  con- 
ditions of  the  Chinese  farmer  and  in  increasing  the  number  of  people  capable 
of  taking  part  in  political  life,  they  are  often  described  as  a  peasant  party. 

They  have  established  a  system  of  popular  elections  in  the  regions  under  their 
control ;  they  favor  extending  the  vote  to  the  people  of  the  rest  of  the  country ; 
and  they  have  long  declared  that  they  would  support  a  democratic  republic  in 
which  not  only  they  themselves  but  all  other  Chinese  political  parties  would 
be  represented. 

At  the  time  this  is  being  written — 

and  the  date  is  1946 — 

negotiations  are  being  carried  on  between  the  Chinese  Government  and  the 
Communists  which,  it  is  hoped,  will  result  in  a  more  democratic  government. 
For  not  until  China  achieves  a  government  in  which  the  Chinese  people  are  ade- 
quately represented  and  which  brings  about  agricultural  reforms  designed  to 
give  her  farmers  enough  to  live  on  will  the  underlying  causes  of  communism  be 
removed. 

Mr.  Kornfeder,  I  ask  you  if  you  will  comment  upon  those  passages 
that  I  have  just  read.     I  offer  this  book  for  your  scrutiny. 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  Well,  I  think  I  already  covered  one  angle  of  this, 
namely,  that  the  Chinese  Communists  are  just  a  peasant  party. 

The  change  of  strategy  from  basing  upon  the  factory  workers  to 
the  Chinese  peasants  was  important,  decisive,  tactical  change. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  it  decided,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  at  that  Sixth  World 
Congi-ess  that  you  attended,  that  the  Chinese  Communists  would  be 
represented  as  a  peasant  party  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  No;  it  wasn't  decided.  They  don't  accept  the 
peasant  party,  they  only  accept  affiliations  of  Communist  parties. 
The  change  was  to  orientate  the  strategy  on  the  peasants.  The  peas- 
ant can  be  made  ideologically  a  Communist  just  like  a  factory  worker. 

A  Communist  is  not  necessarily  made  in  the  economic  category,  he 
is  made  through  ideology.  So  the  calculation  of  Stalin  worked  out, 
that  you  can  work,  which  was  one  of  his  major  contributions  to  Com- 


i 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  887 

muiiist  strategy,  by  the  way,  tlie  change  of  orientation  in  the  colonial 
€oantries  from  the  workers  which,  in  the  colonial  countries,  are  only  a 
few.  There  is  not  much  industry.  But  the  peasants  which  are  the 
big,  downtrodden  mass,  and  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  became  a 
Communist  Party,  recruited  mainly  from  peasants  who  had  become 
Communists.     But  it  was  a  Communist  Party  in  every  sense. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  you  say  Communist  Party,  you  mean 
international,  under  the  domination  of  the  Kremlin? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Under  the  complete  domination  of  the  Kremlin; 

yes. 

Now,  as  to  private  propertj^  Well,  you  see,  this  is  a  very  skillful 
piece  of  sugar-coating  the  Communist  position,  very  cleverly  writ- 
ten.   You  could  imply  this,  and  you  could  imply  another  thing. 

But  it  is  a  part  of  Communist  strategy  when  they  seize  a  country 
not  to  expropriate  the  peasants  and  the  small  shopkeepers  right 
away.     They  cannot  do  it.     But  they  nationalize  the  land. 

Here  it  says  that  nationalization  is  taking  place.  Well,  national- 
ization means  that  the  Government  takes  title  to  all  the  land,  whether 
it  enforces  that  title  right  away  or  not  in  a  matter  of  tactics,  of  opera- 
tion. 

In  Russia,  the  land  was  nationalized  immediately  after  seizure  of 
the  power  by  the  Bolsheviks,  but  the  nationalization  wasn't  really 
enforced  until  years  later  when  they  had  consolidated  themselves 
and  collectivized  the  farms,  had  supercollectivized  them,  and  so  on 
and  so  forth. 

So  you  can  say,  half-truths,  that  they  are  going  to  maintain  private 
property.    But  for  how  long? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Is  it  not  true  that  the  facts  today,  that  China 
today,  and  I  am  talking  about  the  mainland,  has  disproved  that 
statement  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Well,  they  nationalized  the  land.  They  have 
not  yet  taken  the  land  off  the  peasants.  They  have  taken  the  land 
from  the  larger  landowners  and  distributed  it  among  the  peasants 
in  order  to  get  the  support  of  the  peasants  and  their  cooperation 
until  they  entrench  themselves. 

Then,  after  they  have  entrenched  themselves,  they  will  do  in 
China,  carry  out,  the  same  Bolshevik  program  as  in  Russia.  They 
will  make  state  farms,  and  they  will  make  supercollectives  which  are 
dominated,  controlled,  and  managed  by  the  state. 

But  in  the  first  stage,  in  a  colonial  country,  that  would  be  a  suicidal 
method,  if  the  Communists  would  attempt  to  force  collectivization 
immediately.  They  first  have  to  have  complete  control  of  the  Gov- 
ernment apparatus,  a  well-organized  political  police,  a  well  func- 
tioning Communist  Party,  and  all  the  committees,  before  they  can 
attempt  to  create  a  war  with  the  peasants  because  when  they  begin 
to  take  the  land  away  from  the  peasants,  and  the  so-called  collectives, 
the  peasants  will  resist. 

They  resisted  in  Russia  and  they  certainly  will  resist  in  China. 
So  this  is  a  very  misleading,  skillful  piece  of  selling  the  Com- 
munist program  with  the  pretense  that  it  isn't  Communist.  But 
it  is. 

The  Chairman.  Now  you  are  referring  to  the  article  in  the  book 
handed  to  3'ou  by  Mr.  Morris  ? 

Mr.  KoRNFEDER.  Yes. 


888  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  Chairman.  And  that  is  "China  Today','  is  that  it  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  No  ;  this  is  a  publication  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Re- 
lations and  the  Webster  Publishing  Co.,  by  Eleanor  Lattimore,  pub- 
lished in  1946,  and  it  is  entitled  "China  Yesterday  and  Today." 

In  other  words,  Mr.  Kornfeder,  you  do  not  agree  with  Mrs.  Latti- 
more when  she  says  here : 

When  we  speak  of  the  Chinese  Communists,  we  should  remember  that  they 
stand  for  something  rather  different  from  what  is  ordinarily  meant  by  the 
word  "Communist." 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  That  is  right.    I  disagree  with  it  in  every  sense. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  you  know  that  the  Chinese  Communists,  from 
your  own  experience,  is  a  member  of  the  Comintern  organization  ? 

Mr.  Kornfeder.  They  are  not  only  Communists,  they  are  among 
the  most  intransigent,  they  are  among  tlie  best  Communists. 

They  really  believe  and  they  are  thoroughly  indoctrinated,  like 
semi-illiterate  persons.  When  they  absorb  a  doctrine,  they  really  are 
all-out  for  it.    The  Chinese  Communists  are  that  type. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  before  putting  this  into  the  record,  I 
would  like  to  make  the  observation  that  the  photograph  appearing  on 
page  108,  from  which  we  have  made  these  extracts,  has  been  supplied 
by  courtesy  of  the  China  Aid  Council,  and  I  would  like  the  record  to 
show  that  two  witnesses  have  identified  the  China  Aid  Council  as  a 
Communist-controlled  organization. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Could  you  say  what  the  photograph  is? 

Mr.  MoRRrs.  It  is  the  photograph  tliat  appears  on  page  108.  It  says 
"Courtesy  China  Aid  Council,"  and  the  caption  is  "Communist  stu- 
dents of  China's  northwest  studying  in  front  of  the  loess  cave  which 
is  their  classroom." 

May  that  go  into  the  record.  Senator?  The  text  does  not  have  to 
go  in  because  I  have  read  it. 

The  Chairman.  I  cannot  put  the  picture  into  the  record.  The  rest 
will  go  into  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  mg^rked  "Exhibit  No.  258"  and  filed, 
for  the  record.) 

Mr.  Morris.  I  think  that  is  all  we  have  of  Mr.  Kornfeder. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  questions.  Senator? 

Senator  Ferguson.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  some  more  exhibits.  I  think 
we  will  take  a  few  minutes  to  put  them  into  the  record,  if  you  have 
the  time. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Chairman,  this  last  exhibit  that  went  in, 
this  pamphlet,  is  there  any  description  in  the  record  as  to  who  Eleanor 
Lattimore  is? 

Mr.  Morris.  Eleanor  Lattimore  is  the  wife  of  Owen  Lattimore,  and 
is  the  Eleanor  Lattimore  who  has  held  c^ce  in,  and  who  has  worked 
for,  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

There  would  seem  to  be  absolutely  no  doubt  that  she  is  the  wife  of 
Owen  Lattimore. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  880 

The  Chairman.    I'liat  is  in  the  record  from  before  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  She  has  testified  in  executive  session  before  this  com- 
mittee. 

Mr.  Mandei,.  I  have  here  a  letter  from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations,  dated  March  31,  1938,  addressed  to  Philip  C.  Jessup 
from  Edward  C.  Carter.    It  reads  as  folloAvs : 

Dear  Jessup  :  Would  you  be  interested  in  dining  with  me  and  a  few  others  at 
the  Century  Club  at  7 :  15  on  the  evening  of  Wednesday,  April  20,  to  listen  to  a 
hundred-percent  Bolshevik  view  of  the  Moscow  trials?  I  have  invited  Constan- 
tine  Oumansky,  the  able,  two-listed  counselor  of  the  Soviet  Embassy  in  Wash- 
ington, to  come  to  New  York  that  evening  to  speak  to  a  little  dinner  of  a  dozen 
of  my  friends  and  then  submit  himself  to  the  frankest  questions  that  any  of 
my  guests  care  to  put. 

If  it  is  possible  to  accept,  I  can  promise  you  a  provocative  and  interesting 
evening. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Edwakd  C.  Carter. 

The  Chairman.  To  whom  is  that  addressed  ? 

Mv.  ]\Iandel.  To  Prof.  Philip  C.  Jessup  from  Edward  C.  Carter. 

We  have  a  letter,  also  from  the  files,  from  Birchfield,  Norfolk,  Conn., 
dated  April  2,  1938,  addressed  to  Mr.  Carter,  from  Philip  C.  Jessup, 
reading  as  follows : 

Dear  Mr.  Carter:  I  accept  eagerly  and  gratefully  for  Wednesday  the  20th. 
Many  thanks. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Philip  C.  Jessttp. 

Senator  Ferguson.  May  I  have  the  letter  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  offer  that,  and  ask  that  that  be  intro- 
duced into  the  record  and  marked  as  the  next  consecutive  exhibit. 

Mr,  Mandei,  will  you  kindly  identify  that  as  having  been  taken 
from  the  institute's  files? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes;  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  Taken  from  where? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Kelations. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted  in  the  record,  and  properly 
identified. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  259"  and 
are  as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  259 

129  East  Fifty-second  Street, 
New  York  City,  March  31,  1938. 
Prof.  Philip  C.  Jessltp, 

Norfolk,  Conn. 

Deab  Jessup  :  Would  you  be  interested  in  dining  with  me  and  a  few  others  at 
the  Century  Club  at  7 :  15  on  the  evening  of  Wednesday,  April  20,  to  listen  to  a 
100-percent  Bolshevik  view  of  the  Moscow  trials?  I  have  invited  Constantino 
Oumansky,  the  able,  two-fisted  counselor  of  the  Soviet  Embassy  in  Washington, 
to  come  to  New  York  that  evening  to  speak  to  a  little  dinner  of  a  dozen  of  my 
friends  and  then  submit  himself  to  the  frankest  questions  that  any  of  my  guests 
care  to  put? 

If  it  is  possible  to  accept,  I  can  promise  you  a  provocative  and  interesting 
evening. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Edward  C.  Carter. 


890  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

BmCHFIELD, 

Norfolk,  Conn.,  April  2,  1938. 
Deak  Mr.  Caeteb:    I  accept  eagerly  and  gratefully  for  Wednesday,  the  20th. 
Many  thanks. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Philip  0.  Jbssup. 

Senator  Ferguson-.  Could  you  identify  the  Moscow  trials  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  Moscow  trials  were  in  1937,  and  were  popularly 
known  as  the  purge  trials,  and  created  a  tremendous  furor  throughout 
the  world  because  noted  Soviet  leaders  were  brought  to  trial,  and  they 
confessed  to  having  tried  to  overthrow  the  Soviet  Government.  Many 
of  them  were  liquidated  or  disappeared.  They  aroused  indignation 
throughout  the  world  and  especially  in  the  United  States. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  you  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  refer  now  to  a  document  which  is  from  the  files  of 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  dated  April  12,  1943,  addressed 
to  Hon.  John  H.  Kerr,  chairman.  Special  Subcommittee  on  Committee 
on  Appropriations,  and  it  is  signecl  by  Edward  C.  Carter. 

Now,  the  reference  in  this  letter  that  I  want  to  read  is  this : 

I  have  known  Mr.  Bisson  personally  for  more  than  10  years.  He  was  a  member 
of  the  American  delegation  to  the  IPR  conference  at  Yosemite  National  Park  in 
1936.    Tlie  late  Hon.  Newton  D.  Baker  was  chairman  of  that  delegation. 

As  a  member  of  the  research  stafC  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association,  I  have  fol- 
lowed Mr.  Bisson's  scholarly  writing  on  the  Far  East  very  closely.  He  has  con- 
sistently maintained  a  high  standard  of  objectivity.  Indeed,  his  work  is  of  such 
a  high  order  that  in  1938  the  institute  asked  him  to  write  a  book  on  American 
policy  in  the  Far  East.  Dr.  Philip  C.  Jessup  of  Columbia  University  was 
chairman  of  the  institute  at  that  time  and  this  assignment  was  given  to  Mr. 
Bisson  with  Dr.  Jessup's  full  approval. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr,  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  Mr.  Bisson 
has  been  identified  before  this  committee  as  a  member  of  the  Commun- 
ist organization. 

May  I  offer  this  into  evidence,  Mr.  Chairman,  for  whatever  pro- 
bative value  there  may  be  in  that  one  reference  ? 

The  Chairman.  As  I  understandjt,  this  is  a  document  taken  from 
the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Morris.  And,  Mr,  Chairman,  the  Hon.  John  H.  Kerr  was  the 
chairman  of  a  special  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Appropria- 
tions, of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  apparently  the  question 
of  Mr.  Bisson's  loyalty  had  come  up  and  letters  of  recommendation 
were  sent  in  from  various  people,  according  to  our  scrutiny  of  the 
files, 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  260"  and  is 
as  follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  260 

129  East  Fifty-second  Street, 

Neiv  York  City,  April  12, 1943. 
Regarding  T.  A.  Bisson. 

Hon.  John  H.  Kerr, 

Chairman,  Special  Subcommittee  on  Committee  on  Appropriations, 
House  of  Representatives ,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Dear  Sir  :  I  have  known  Mr.  Bisson  personally  for  more  than  10  years.  He 
was  a  member  of  the  American  delegation  to  the  IPR  conference  at  Yosemite 
National  Park  in  1936.  The  late  Hon.  Newton  D.  Baker  was  chairman  of  that 
delegation. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  891 

As  a  member  of  the  research  staff  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association,  I  have 
followed  Mr.  Bisson's  scholarly  writing  on  the  Far  East  very  closely.  He  has 
consistently  maintained  a  high  standard  of  objectivity.  Indeed,  his  work  is  of 
such  a  high  order  that  in  1938  the  institute  asked  him  to  write  a  book  on 
American  policy  in  the  Far  East.  Dr.  Philip  C.  Jessup,  of  Columbia  University, 
was  chairman  of  the  institute  at  that  time  and  this  assignment  was  given  to 
Mr.  Bissou  with  Dr.  Jessup's  full  approval.  Under  separate  cover  I  am  sending 
you  a  copy  of  that  book  in  order  that  you  may  familiarize  yourself  with  the 
quality  of  his  writing.  This  book  has  received  high  praise  from  a  great  many 
outstanding  American  experts  on  the  Far  East.  It  has  consequently  had  a  wide 
sale  and  is  a  standard  reference  book  in  a  great  many  public  and  university 
libraries. 

Mr.  Bisson  is  100 'percent  American.  He  was  alert  to  the  Japanese  menace 
long  before  the  general  public  became  aware  of  the  implications  to  the  peace 
of  America  of  Japanese  aggression  and  in  many  of  his  writings  he  faithfully 
stated  the  issues  that  the  United  States  must  face  vis-^-vis  Japanese  military 
expansion. 

If  you  wish  further  information,  please  let  me  know. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Edward  C.  Carter. 

Mr.  IMandel.  I  have  here  a  letter  from  the  tiles  of  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations,  dated  February  16,  1940,  addressed  to  Mr.  Motylev, 
Pacific  Institute,  20  liazin  Street,  Moscow,  U.  S.  S.  R. 

Dear  Motylev  :  You  will,  I  think,  be  interested  in  the  enclosed  clipping  from 
the  New  York  Herald  Tribune  of  February  1.5,  1940,  giving  the  views  of  Dr. 
Philip  C.  Jessup  with  reference  to  the  City  of  Flint  at  Murmansk. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Edward  C.  Carter. 

And  I  have  here  the  clipping,  a  copy  of  the  clipping,  from  the  New 
York  Herald  Tribune  of  February  15,  1910,  and  I  read  the  last  para- 
graph of  the  article  referred  to  as  follows : 

Dr.  Jessup  paid  tribute  to  naval  officers,  who  were,  he  said,  the  firmest  STip- 
porters  of  international  law  at  present.  He  declared  that  the  Soviet  Union  had 
committed  no  violation  of  international  law  in  holding  the  freighter  City  of 
Flint  at  Murmansk.  The  action  of  the  British  naval  patrol,  however,  in  forcing 
the  Mormacsnn  to  enter  a  belligerent  port  he  described  as  contrary  to  the 
neutrality  laws  of  the  United  States  and  to  accepted  principles  of  international 
law. 

May  I  point  out  that  this  occurred  during  the  period  of  the  Stalin- 
Hitler  pact  ? 

Mr.  MoREis.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  that  go  into  the  record  and  be 
marked  as  the  next  consecutive  exhibit?  That  is  the  letter  from  the 
institute's  files,  Mr.  Carter  to  Mr.  Motylev,  as  well  as  the  clipping 
from  the  New  York  Herald  Tribune  that  Mr.  Mandel  read. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  inserted  in  the  record. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  261"  and  are 
as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  261 

129  East  52d  Street, 

New  York  City, 
Fehniary  16,  19J,0. 
Dr.  V.  E.  Motylev, 

PacifiG  Institute,  20  Rasin  Street, 

Moscoio,  U.  S.  S.  R. 
Dear  Motylev  :  You  will,  I  think,  be  interested  in  the  enclosed  clipping  from 
the  New  York  Herald  Tril)une  of  February  Ift.  1940,  giving  the  views  of  Dr.  Philip 
C.  Jessup  with  reference  to  the  City  of  Flint  at  Murmansk. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Edward  C.  Cartkk. 
(22848— 52— pt.  3 13 


892  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

[From  tlie  New  York  Herald  Tribune,  February  15,  1940] 

United    States   Neutrality   Dogma   Called   Mild-Mannered — Jessup,   of 
Columbia,  Finds  Change  in  International  Law 

The  assertion  of  neutrality  rights  by  the  United  States  was  called  mild-man- 
nered yesterday  by  Prof.  Philip  C.  Jessup,  of  the  Columbia  University  Law 
School,  at  a  luncheon  of  the  school's  alunmi  association  at  the  Lawyer's  Club, 
115  Broadway.  He  said  the  British  blockade  was  not  a  blockade  in  any  technical 
sense  but  a  measure  of  reprisal  against  Germany  for  its  submarine  warfare. 

Under  earlier  concepts  of  international  law,  Dr.  Jessup  explained,  the  burden 
of  proof  was  on  the  captor  of  a  merchant  vessel  in  wartime.  Under  the  present 
procedure  of  British  prize  courts,  he  said,  this  burden  of  proof  had  been  shifted 
to  the  complainant,  making  it  almost  impossible  for  the  neutral  owner  of  a 
vessel  to  prove  what  would  be  the  eventual  destination  of  his  cargo. 

Dr.  Jessup  paid  tribute  to  naval  officers,  who  were,  he  said,  the  firmest  sup- 
porters of  international  law  at  present.  He  declared  that  the  Soviet  Union  had 
committed  no  violation  of  international  law  in  holding  the  freighter  City  of 
Flint  at  Murmansk.  The  action  of  the  British  naval  patrol,  however,  in  forcing 
the  Mormacsun  to  enter  a  belligerent  port,  he  described  as  contrary  to  the  neu- 
trality laws  of  the  United  States  and  to  accepted  principles  of  international  law. 

Mr.  Mandel.  In  connection  with  the  last  item,  may  I  refer  to  the 
New  York  Times  of  October  29,  1939,  which  carries  a  statement  as 
follows,  under  the  headline  "United  States  accuses  Soviet  in  Flint 
confusion.  Formal  charge  is  made  that  Russia  treats  American  en- 
voy with  contempt." 

The  first  paragraph : 

With  the  freighter  City  of  Flint  evidently  having  left  Murmansk  carrying 
her  American  crew  on  board  under  a  German  prize  detail,  and  with  Laurence 
A.  Steinhardt,  the  United  States  Ambassador  to  Russia,  having  been  unable  to 
communicate  with  Capt.  Joseph  A.  Gainard  of  the  ship,  the  State  Department 
tonight  charged  the  Soviet  Government  with  "withholding  adequate  coopera- 
tion." 

The  article  goes  into  greater  detail. 

Senator  P'erguson.  May  I  inquire,  then,  is  it  a  fact  that  Mr.  Jessup 
was  taking  a  stand  contrary  to  the  stand  taken  by  the  United  States 
of  America  through  its  State  Department  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Correct. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is,  in  that  article? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  then  this  stand,  which  was  opposing  the 
stand  of  the  United  States  of  America,  was  being  sent  by  Mr.  Carter 
to  a  Russian  Communist  in  Russia? 

Mr.  Mandel.  To  a  Russian  official. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  a  Communist  in  Russia  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Whether  he  is  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  we 
cannot  say,  Senator.  But  Dr.  Motylev,  who  is  the  representative  of 
the  Soviet  Council  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  whether  he 
is  a  member  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party,  we  cannot  say. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  this  letter  says  "I  think  it  will  be  inter- 
esting." You  will  be  interested  in  this  stand,  in  other  words,  of  Dr. 
Jessup  against  the  stand  of  the  United  States  Government;  is  that 
correct  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  Correct,  sir. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  had  a  little  difficulty  at  first  getting  the  sig- 
nificance when  you  put  it  in  at  first.  Until  you  read  the  last,  I  won- 
dered whether  I  was  right  in  my  conclusions. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  893 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  suggest  that  Mr.  Mandel  make  a 
photostat  of  this  article  from  which  he  read,  and  have  that  intro- 
duced into  the  record. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  it  should  be,  to  make  tliis  perfectly 
clear  as  to  what  this  is. 

The  Chairman.  That  may  be  done.  See  that  it  gets  into  the  record 
at  the  proper  sequence. 

(The  information  referred  to  is  as  follows :) 

[From  the  New  York  Times,  October  29,  1939] 

United  States  Accuses  So^aET  in  "Flint"  Confusion — Formal  Charge  Is  Made 
That  Russia  Treats  American  Envoy  With  Contempt 

(By  Bertram  D.  Hulen) 

Washington,  October  128. — With  the  freighter  City  of  Flint  evidently  having 
left  Murmansk  carrying  her  American  crew  on  board  under  a  German  prize 
detail  and  with  Laurence  A.  Steinhardt,  the  United  States  Ambassador  to  Rus- 
sia, having  been  unable  to  communicate  with  Capt.  Joseph  A.  Gainard  of  the 
ship,  the  State  Department  tonight  charged  the  Soviet  Government  with  "with- 
holding adequate  cooperation." 

The  charge,  made  in  a  formal  statement,  reflected  the  intense  irritation  felt 
in  Washington  over  the  cavalier  fashion  in  which  the  diplomatic  representative 
of  this  Government  in  Moscow  has  been  treated  by  the  Soviet  authorities.  OflS- 
cials  expressed  unconcealed  anger  over  the  failure  to  ascertain  any  definite  facts 
officially  regarding  the  vessel. 

State  Department  officials  discussed  the  situation  from  every  angle  during 
the  day.  It  was  learned  that  staff  conferences,  headed  by  Secretary  Cordell 
Hull,  were  held  behind  closed  doors  twice  during  the  day.  Officials,  however, 
preserved  an  unusual  reticence  and  nothing  more  than  the  formal  statement 
was  made  public. 

HIGH   officials   CONFER 

Conferring  with  Mr.  Hull  were  top-flight  officials  of  his  Department,  including 
R.  Walton  Moore,  counselor ;  Adolf  A.  Berle,  Jr.,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State ; 
and  Green  H.  Hackworth,  lesal  adviser  of  the  Department. 

It  is  generally  believed  that  the  City  of  Flint  sailed,  possibly  2  or  3  days 
ago,  to  run  the  British  blockade  and  reach  a  German  port  in  the  Baltic  before 
institution  of  prize  court  proceedings  by  the  Nazi  authorities. 

According  to  press  reports,  the  United  States  Embassy  in  Moscow  was  con- 
vinced tonight  that  she  had  sailed.  This  word  had  not  been  communicated  to 
the  State  Department  by  the  Embassy,  but  it  was  regarded  as  a  reasonable 
assumption. 

Previous  reports  from  Moscow  and  from  Berlin,  first  that  the  City  of  Flint 
had  sailed,  then  that  she  had  not,  were  considered  an  obvious  effort  to  confuse 
the  situation  in  order  to  minimize,  if  possible,  the  risks  the  ship  must  take  in 
eluding  British  blockaders. 

But  it  was  apparent  from  the  State  Department's  statement  tonight  that 
if  she  does  run  the  blockade  German  claims  to  her  permanent  possession  will  be 
resisted  in  the  expected  legal  proceedings. 

The  statement,  factual  in  its  contents  and  reciting  the  circumstances  that 
have  surrounded  the  City  of  Flint  since  her  seizure,  clearly  implied  that  the 
Russian  Government  had  disregarded  the  requirements  of  international  law. 

It  implied  also  that  neither  Russia  in  her  dealings  with  Ambassador  Stein- 
hardt nor  Germany  in  her  conversations  with  Alexander  C.  Kirk,  the  United 
States  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Berlin,  had  been  frank,  if  indeed  honest. 

It  emphasized  that  Mr.  Steinhardt  throu^Jiout  had  been  denied  access  to  the 
primary  source  of  information,  the  vessel  herself. 

So  far,  Mr.  Stcinhnrdt  has  lieen  unsuccessful  in  persuading  the  Soviet  regime 
to  conform  to  the  customary  diplomatic  procedure,  even  although  this  be  of 
the  most  formal  character.  In  short,  official  Washington  considers  that  he  has 
been  treated  with  nothing  less  than  contempt. 


894  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

The  State  Department  statement  was  considered  as  forming  a  basis  for  resist- 
ance to  any  claim  for  permanent  possession  of  tlie  vessel  tliat  Germany  might 
advance  in  prize  court  proceedings. 

VIEVPS  NOT  VOICED  IN  NOTE 

The  statement  could  be  considered  a  protest,  although  outside  formal  diplo- 
matic channels.  While  some  thought  may  have  been  given  to  voicing  these 
views  in  a  note,  that  course  has  not  yet  been  adopted,  at  least  so  far  as  was 
revealed  tonight. 

An  emphatic  form  of  protest  could  be  registered  by  ordering  Mr.  Steinhardt 
home  for  consultation,  but  no  consideration  is  said  to  have  been  given  to  that 
course  as  yet. 

Today's  statement  pointed  out  that,  judging  from  press  reports  from  German 
sources,  the  German  authorities  were  not  without  information,  although  Mr. 
Steinhardt  was  having  extraordinary  difHculty  in  obtaining  the  facts  and  was 
given  no  facility  for  personally  verifying  them. 

A  short  time  b?fore  the  statement  was  issued,  the  Ambassador  reported  to 
the  State  Department  that  again  he  had  been  unable  to  make  telephone  contact 
with  Captain  Gainard. 

Officials  here  were  satisfied  that  the  vessel  had  left  Murmansk  and  was  seek- 
ing to  reach  a  German  harbor.  Obviously,  it  was  pointed  out,  Russia  would  not 
give  this  information  if  she  were  deliberately  siding  with  Germany.  If  really 
neutral,  she  might  feel  that  to  announce  departure  of  the  ship  would  be  to  in- 
form Great  Britain  and  for  that  reason  be  an  unneutral  act. 

That  Germany  would  bend  every  effort  to  conceal  the  departure  of  the  vessel 
"was  considered  only  natural,  so  reports  on  this  score  from  Berlin  today  were 
discounted. 

IMr.  Kirk  reported  from  Berlin  to  the  State  Department  that  in  reply  to  an 
inquiry  at  the  Ministry  of  Marine  this  afternoon  he  was  told  that  the  American 
crew  was  on  board  the  City  of  Flint  at  Murmansk.  After  a  further  inquiry  late 
this  afternoon  at  the  Foreign  Office,  Sir.  Kirk  was  informed  that,  according  to 
the  latest  reports,  the  vessel  and  crew  were  still  in  the  Arctic  port.  It  was  also 
said  that  if,  after  the  completion  of  repairs,  the  ship  were  taken  to  another  port, 
the  American  crew  would  presumably  be  kept  on  board  to  operate  the  vessel. 

Mr.  Kirk  also  reported  that,  according  to  information  he  had  received  from 
the  American  consul  general  in  Hamburg,  the  prize  commissioner  has  received 
no  news  of  the  vessel. 

The  rebuffs  received  at  the  hands  of  Russia  were  resented  here  no  less  because 
the  Foreign  Office  was  following  its  customai'y  course  of  putting  off  and  humiliat- 
ing an  Ambassador  and  his  Government^  It  is  a  well-understood  technique  of 
the  Soviet  regime. 

An  Ambassador  will  seek  official  information,  only  to  be  refused  an  appoint- 
ment at  the  Foreign  Office  or  be  told  that  there  is  no  information  available. 
Later  the  substance  of  what  he  has  sought  will  appear  in  press  reports,  and 
when  he  again  calls  at  the  Foreign  Office  this  will  be  given  him.  In  this  and 
other  ways  the  Moscow  Government  follows  a  calculated  policy  of  insolence 
toward  the  envoy. 

Diplomats  of  long  experience  in  revolutionary  Russia  know  the  pattern  well 
and  are  not  surprised,  thoiigh  their  resentment  reaches  the  boiling  point.  To 
them  it  reflects  Bolshevist  philosophy  of  treating  governments  with  contempt 
in  making  announcements  first  through  Soviet  press  channels  on  the  theory 
that  in  this  way  they  are  dealing  directly  with  the  people  of  a  country,  not  with 
their  representatives. 

But  the  White  House  and  the  State  Department  are  not  concerned  with  the 
philosophy  that  might  explain  the  treatment  accorded  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment in  this  case.    They  are  deeply  resentful  over  the  whole  episode. 


United  States  Statement  on  "Flint" 

Washington,  Oftober  2S. — Following'  is  the  text  of  the  statement  issued  by  the 
State  Department  tonight  on  the  case  of  the  steamer  Citij  of  Flint : 

"The  Citii  of  Flint  was  captured  by  a  German  cruiser  at  an  estimated  distance 
of  some  1,250  miles  from  New  York,  with  a  mixed  cargo  destined  for  British 
ports.     The  date  of  capture  is  understood  to  have  been  October  9. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  895 

"The  Citii  of  Flint  was  taken  into  the  harbor  of  Tromsoe  on  Or-tober  21,  with 
a  German  crew  and  flying  the  German  flag.  After  remaining  2  hours  to  talce 
water,  it  was  ordered  by  the  Norwegian  Government  to  depart,  which  it  did. 

The  Citi/  of  Flint  was  taken  into  the  harbor  of  Murmansk  on  tlie  evening  of 
October  23. 

"On  October  25  the  American  chargt^  d'affaires  cabled  from  Berlin  that  the 
Foreign  Oflice,  at  its  press  conference,  said  that  the  City  of  Flint  was  captured 
by  a  German  vessel  and  contraband  was  found  on  board,  destined  for  England. 
The  Foreign  Oflice  then  added  that  it  was  found,  however,  that  the  sliip  was 
unsea worthy  in  that  it  did  not  have  navigation  charts  adequate  for  bringing 
the  ship  into  a  German  port. 

"When  the  vessel  entered  the  harbor  of  Murmansk,  according  to  an  announce- 
ment presmuably  from  the  Soviet  Government  through  the  Tass  news  agency, 
'the  naval  forces  at  the  port  of  Murmansk  have  temporarily  held  the  vessel 
and  interned  the  German  crew.' 

"On  October  2.5  the  American  charge  d'affaires  at  Berlin  cabled  that  the  Ger- 
man Foreign  OflSce,  referring  to  the  seizure  of  the  City  of  Flint,  said  that  'the 
German  authorities  were  communicating  with  the  Soviet  authorities  in  the 
matter.' 

"On  the  same  day  [October  25]  the  Tass  Agency  reported  that  'the  German 
crew  of  tlie  cargo  steamer  City  of  Flint  has  been  released  from  internment  by 
the  maritime  authorities  of  Murmansk  in  view  of  the  fact,  as  has  been  estab- 
lished, that  the  vessel  was  brought  into  port  for  repair  of  her  machinery.  The 
vessel  is  meanwhile  remainiig  in  Murmansk  for  verification  of  the  exact  compo- 
sition of  her  cargo.' 

•'On  October  26  the  American  charge  d'affaires  cabled  from  Berlin  quoting  a 
memorandum  received  that  morning  from  the  Foreign  Office  relative  to  the  City 
of  Flint  and  its  crew,  which,  among  other  things,  stated  that  a  'prize  crew  placed 
on  board  [the  City  of  Flintl  has  brought  the  steamer  to  the  harbor  of  Mur- 
mansk because  of  sea  damage.' 

"When  transmitting  the  memorandum  an  official  of  the  Foreign  Office  stated 
informally  to  the  charge  d'affaires  that  the  Foreign  Office  had  no  details  as  to 
the  damage  which  necessitated  taking  the  ship  to  Murmansk,  but  he  maintained, 
in  response  to  an  inquiry,  that  the  term  'damage'  would  cover  the  case  of  a 
ship  lacking  charts  with  which  to  navigate  the  waters  through  which  she  had  to 
proceed. 

"For  some  reason  as  yet  unexplained  the  German  crew  was  interned  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  according  to  German  authorities  they  were  without  charts  and 
liad  put  into  Murmansk  because  they  could  not  proceed  to  a  German  poi't  without 
charts.  Later,  they  were  released,  seemingly  under  a  plea  that  their  entry  into 
Murmansk  was  required  for  necessary  repairs  to  defective  machinery. 

"A  prize  crew  may  take  a  captured  ship  into  a  neutral  port  without  internment 
only  in  case  of  stress  of  weather,  want  of  fuel  and  provisions,  or  necessity  of 
repairs.  In  all  other  cases,  the  neutral  is  obligated  to  intern  the  prize  crew  and 
restore  the  vessel  to  her  former  crew. 

"The  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  facts  and  circumstances  indicates  that 
when  the  City  of  Flint  entered  the  harbor  at  Murmansk,  any  plea  relating  to  the 
chart  requirements  if  advanced  must  have  been  ignored  since  the  German  crew 
was  interned.  A  second  and  entirely  different  reason  for  entering  Murmansk, 
namely,  defective  machinery  which  called  for  immediate  repairs,  was  not  ad- 
vanced until  later. 

"A  subsequent  cable  from  the  American  charge  d'affaires  at  Berlin,  also  dated 
October  26,  quoted  a  statement  of  the  Foreign  Office  at  its  noon  press  conference 
to  the  effect  that  the  fact  that  the  Russians  have  freed  the  German  crew  indicates 
that  the  Soviet  authorities  have  confirmed  the  view  of  the  prize  crew  that  the 
City  of  Flint  was  unseaworthy  and  it  was  therefore  permissible  to  take  the  ship 
into  a  neutral  harbor. 

"Testimony  of  the  American  crew  as  to  the  full  facts  pertaining  to  the  taking 
of  the  City  of  Flint  into  Murmansk  is  not  yet  available. 

"It  seems  manifest  that  even  if  it  is  assumed  that  the  German  crew  was  pro- 
ceeding legally  prior  to  the  entry  of  the  City  of  Flint  into  the  harbor  of  Murmansk, 
the  known  facts  and  circumstances  support  the  contention  of  the  American  Gov- 
ernment that  the  crew  did  not  at  the  time  of  entry  offer  any  reasonable  or  justi- 
fiable grounds  such  as  are  prescribed  by  international  law  for  taking  the  vessel 
into  this  port,  and  that,  therefore,  it  was  the  clear  duty  of  the  Soviet  Government 


896  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

to  turn  the  City  of  Flint  over  to  the  American  crew.     This  has  been  the  major 
contention  of  the  American  Government. 

"In  view  of  tlie  foregoing  facts  and  circumstances,  each  person  can  judge  for 
himself  the  question  as  to  how  much  light  is  shed  on  this  entire  transaction  by 
the  action  of  the  Soviet  Government  in  withholding  adequate  cooperation  with 
the  American  Government  with  respect  to  assembling  and  disclosing  to  the  Amer- 
ican Embassy  in  Moscow  the  essential  facts  pertaining  to  the  landing,  the  where- 
abouts, and  welfare  of  the  American  crew ;  by  the  facts  that  it  was  first  alleged 
by  the  German  authorities  that  the  need  for  charts  was  the  ground  for  bringing 
the  vessel  into  port ;  and  by  the  fact  that  later  this  ground  seems  to  have  been 
abandoned  and  a  new  ground  or  theory  relating  to  defective  machinery  was 
set  up." 

Ml'.  Morris.  Mr.  Cliairman,  we  are  preparing  more  exhibits  along 
the  lines  that  we  are  presenting  today,  and  I  ask  that  they  be  presented 
at  some  other  time. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.    Is  there  anything  further  today  ? 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  hope,  Mr.  Chairman,  if  they  are  along  this 
same  line,  that  they  may  all  be  put  into  the  record  as  soon  as  possible 
because  I  understand  there  will  be  another  hearing  of  another  com- 
mittee where  Mr.  Jessup's  name  will  be  up  for  confirmation  by  the 
Senate. 

I  think  it  is  only  fair  to  Mr.  Jessup  and  to  the  Senators  that  any- 
thing that  this  committee  has  in  relation  to  these  exhibits  should  go 
into  the  record. 

The  Chair]max.  I  may  say.  Senator  Ferguson,  that  today  I  have,  as 
chairman  of  this  committee,  addressed  a  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the 
subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate 
advising  him  that  I  am  having  a  transcript  of  the  proceedings  of  this 
committee  bearing  on  Mr.  Jessup  prepared  for  that  committee's  pe- 
rusal and  use. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  that  is  proper  because  we  should  not 
have  a  hearing  where  one  matter  is  brought  up  and  then  not  refer  that 
to  another  committee  that  is  going  to  pass  upon  Mr.  Jessup. 

The  Chairman.  The  entire  files  of  this  committee  will  be  made 
available  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 

Mr.  Morris.  Senator  Ferguson,  may  I  point  out  some  of  the  diffi- 
culties ? 

There  is  one  point  that  arose  this  morning  on  whether  or  not  Fred 
Field  is  the  one  who  recommended  Mr.  Jessup  for  a  particular  office. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Mr.  Carter  is  here.  Why  do  we  not  clear  this  up 
and  ask  Mr.  Carter  if  the  Fred  who  signed  that  telegram  is  Fred 
Field? 

Mr.  Carter,  can  you  give  us  information  on  this? 

The  Chairman.  Come  forward,  Mr.  Carter,  if  you  care  to. 

TESTIMONY  OF  EDWARD  C.  CARTER,  INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC 

RELATIONS 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  have  the  telegram  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  were  here  this  morning  when  that  wire  was 
read  ? 

Mr.  Carter.  Yes ;  I  was  in  the  back  row. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Would  you  look  at  this  wire? 

Mr.  Carter.  I  would  be  delighted. 

Mr.  Morris.  One  of  the  difficulties  here.  Senator,  is  that  we  have  an 
estimated  300,000  letters  here,  and  then  we  have  all  the  files  of  the 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  897 

institute.  It  takes  a  long  time  to  track  anything  down,  as  Mr.  Carter 
can  appreciate. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  appreciate  that,  and  that  is  wliy  I  knew  Mr. 
■Carter  was  here,  and  he  might  clear  this  up. 

Mr.  Carter.  Well,  the  internal  evidence,  which  is  very  slender, 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  this  was  Frederick  V.  Field. 

In  what  year  was  this,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  The  year  is  not  given. 

Mr.  Carter.  That  is  rather  important. 

Mr.  IMoRRis.  Can  you  remember  such  a  recommendation  that  Field 
made? 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  is  a  recommendation  at  a  certain  convention 
■or  committee  meeting  that  might  bring  it  back  to  your  mind.  I  think 
the  place  of  the  meeting  is  shown  on  the  next  page. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  record  will  show  that  Mr.  Carter 
has  been  sworn. 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Carter,  when  did  Jessup  serve  as  research  chair- 
man?    Do  you  recall  that? 

Mr.  Carter.  I  think  it  is  here  in  the  document  you  just  gave  to  me. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  meeting  is  given,  Mr.  Carter,  on  the  sheet 
.attached  to  the  telegram. 

Mr.  Carter.  I  wouldn't  want  to  be  too  sure,  but,  frankly,  I  am 
mixed  up  as  to  whether  Mr.  Field  was  speaking  of  Mr.  Jessup,  I  am 
■confused  on  two  points:  One,  whether  it  refers  to  the  Mount  Trem- 
blant  conference  in  1942,  or  the  Hot  Springs  conference  in  1945. 

It  says,  "approve  him  as  research  chairman."  For  the  life  of  me, 
on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  I  can't  remember  whether  it  was  Mount 
Tremblant,  1942,  or  Hot  Springs,  1945,  where  Jessup  was  proposed  as 
research  chairman  and  so  served. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes.  But  was  he  proposed  by  Fred  Field  at 
•either  one  of  those?  Did  you  have  another  Fred  in  either  1942  or 
1945? 

The  Chairman.  That  is,  on  your  staff. 

Mr.  Carter.  I  think  we  only  had  one  Fred. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  Fred  Field? 

Mr.  Carter.  From  the  text  of  this  short  telegram,  Fred  doesn't 
3iominate  him ;  someone  else  has  nominated  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  he  approves  him? 

Mr.  Carter.  But  he  aj^proves  him. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  that  would  be  Fred  Field  ? 

Mr.  Carter.  That  would  be  Fred  Field. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  not  quite  right,  is  it,  Mr.  Carter  ?  It  says  here, 
approve  the  nominations  and  suggest  Jessup  for  research  chairman." 

In  other  words,  the  suggestion  is  coming  from  Field,  if  it  is  Field, 
ihat  Jessup  be  research  chairman  ? 

Mr.  Carter.  Yes.  But  just  on  the  one  telegram,  without  refreshing 
myself  on  all  of  the  operations — this  was  a  complicated  international 
■organization,  Avith  a  dozen  countries  and  committees  within  each 
country,  trying  to  get  agreement  between  the  British  and  the  French 
and  the  Australians,  and  so  on. 

Mr.  Morris.  This  Winsted,  Conn.,  November  23  would  not  give  you 
a  clue,  would  it?  The  Hot  Springs  convention  was  in  the  summer, 
was  it  not? 


■(( 


898  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Carter.  No  ;  it  was  along,  I  think,  in  January. 

Mr.  Morris.  Hot  Springs? 

Mr,  Carter?  Winsted  is  far  away  from  Hot  Springs. 

Mr.  Morris.  But  someone  may  have  lived  there  in  1942  and  not 
in  1945.    That  does  not  mean  anything  to  you? 

Mr.  Carter.  No. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  think  he  identified  it  earlier.  Fred  Field  is 
the  only  one  they  have.    Therefore  it  is  apparent  that  it  is  Fred  Field. 

Mr.  Carter.  I  could  call  up  Mr.  Holland,  who  has  the  remains  of 
the  files  there,  and  his  memory  might  be  better  than  mine. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  all  for  today? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  all,  Mr.  Chairinan. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  be  called  any  time  you  want 
it  called. 

Mr.  Morris.  We  have  a  witness  for  next  Tuesday. 

The  Chairman.  In  the  meantime,  if  you  have  any  additional  files 
or  records  bearing  upon  matters  that  should  go  before  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  lielations,  would  you  so  advise  the  committee? 

We  will  stand  in  recess  until  the  call  of  the  Chair. 

(Whereupon,  at  4:10  p.  m.,  Thursday,  September  20,  1951,  the 
hearing  was  recessed  subject  to  the  call  of  the  Chair.) 


INSTITUTE  OF  PACIFIC  RELATIONS 


TUESDAY,  SEPTEMBER   25,    1951 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Adminstration 
OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 

Security  Laws  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.  G . 

The  subcommittee  met  at  10  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  recess,  Senator  Pat 
■  McCarran  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present :    Senators  ISlcCarran,  Eastland,   Ferguson,  and  Jenner. 

Also  present :  J.  G.  Sourwine,  committee  counsel ;  liobert 
Morris,  subcommittee  counsel;  and  Benjamin  Mandel,  director  of 
research. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order,  please. 

Mr,  Morris,  have  you  anything  to  proceed  with  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes,  sir.  Mr.  Chairman,  there  are  a  number  of  re- 
quests made  by  this  committee  of  the  various  branches  of  the  Executive 
Departmeiit  that  are  in  a  state  of  either  we  have  been  turned  down  on 
our  requests,  or  else  we  have  gotten  a  generally  unsatisfactory  answer. 
I  would  like  that  the  record  show  some  of  the  difficulties  we  have 
encountered  in  this  respect. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  Today,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  are  going  to  take  testimony 
on  a  3-day  conference  that  Avas  held  by  the  State  Department  in  Oc- 
tober 1949.  At  that  time  Secretary  of  State  Acheson  had  appointed 
Philip  C.  Jessup  to  be  the  head  of  a  panel  of  three  people  to  advise 
him  on  the  formulation  and  the  review  of  far  eastern  policy.  Think- 
ing this  to  be  completely  in  line  with  the  line  of  our  investigation  be- 
cause most  of  the  people  invited  were  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 
people,  we  requested  on  August  24,  1951,  of  Hon.  Dean  Acheson,  Sec- 
retary of  State,  Washington,  D.  C,  over  your  signature,  a  request 
which  reads  as  follows : 

My  Dear  Mr.  Secretaky  :  The  Senate  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  has 
had  testimony  in  executive  session  concerning  tlie  :>-day  round-table  discussion 
arranged  by  the  Office  of  Public  Affairs  of  the  State  Department  for  the  pur- 
pose of  exchanging  views  with  informed  private  citizens  on  United  States  for- 
eign policy  toward  China,  and  which  took  place  on  October  0,  7,  and  8,  1949. 

It  is  requested  that  the  minutes,  which  our  testimony  indicates  were  taken 
at  the  time,  be  made  available  to  this  committee. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  that  request  on  your  part  to  Secretary 
of  State  Acheson  on  August  24,  1951,  introduced  in  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  introduced  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  and  read  into  the  record  by  Mr.  Mandel 
was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  262"  and  filed  for  the  record.) ' 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  answer  ? 

899 


900  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  The  answer  is  dated  September  12,  1951,  and  reads: 

Deab  Senator  McCarran  :  I  have  received  your  letter  of  August  24,  1951 
(received  August  27),  requesting  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  held  in  the  Depart- 
ment on  October  0,  7,  and  8,  1949,  concerning  American  policy  toward  China. 
I  regret  that  this  reply  has  been  delayed  during  the  absence  of  many  depart- 
mental officers  in  San  Francisco. 

As  I  think  you  knovF,  the  record  kept  of  this  decision  was  classified  con- 
fidential. This  was  done  to  insure  frankness  on  the  part  of  the  non-Government 
people  invited  to  the  conference  and  they  were  specifically  advised  that  their 
remarks  would  not  be  made  available  outside  the  Department  of  State.  To 
honor  the  commitment  made  to  these  participants,  therefore,  the  Department 
believes  that  the  record  of  this  meeting  should  not  be  released,  even  on  a 
confidential  basis.  I  am,  however,  enclosing  a  list  of  the  people  invited  to  this 
meeting. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Jack  K.  McFaix, 
Assistant  Secretary 
(For  the  Secretary  of  State). 

I  would  like  that  introduced. 

The  Chairman.  That  will  be  inserted  in  the  record. 
(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  263"  and 
is  as  follows:) 

Exhibit  No.  263 

September  12,  1951. 
Hon.  Pat  McCarran, 

CJiairman,  Internal  Security  Suico^nmittec, 

United  States  Senate. 
Dear  Senator  McCarean  :  I  have  received  your  letter  of  August  24,  1951 
(received  August  27),  requesting  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  held  in  the  Depart- 
ment on  October  6,  7,  and  8,  1949,  concerning  American  policy  toward  China. 
I  regret  that  this  reply  has  been  delayed  during  the  absence  of  many  depart- 
mental officers  in  San  Francisco. 

As  I  think  you  know,  the  record  kept  of  this  discussion  was  classified  con- 
fidential. This  was  done  to  insure  frankness  on  the  part  of  the  non-Govern- 
ment people  invited  to  the  conference  and  they  were  specifically  advised  that 
their  remarks  would  not  be  made  available  outside  the  Department  of  State. 
To  honor  the  commitment  made  to  these  participants,  therefore,  the  Department 
believes  that  the  record  of  this  meeting  should  not  be  released,  even  on  a  con- 
fidential basis.  I  am,  however,  enclosing  a  list  of  the  people  invited  to  this 
meeting. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Jack  K.  McFat.l, 
Assistant  Secretary 
(For  the  Secretary  of  State). 

List  of  Consultants,  Conference  on  Problems  of  United  States  Polict  in 

China 

Joseph  W.  Ballantine,  the  Brookings  Institute,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Bernard  Brodie,  department  of  international  relations,  Yale  University,  New 

Haven,  Conn. 
Claude  A.  Buss,  director  of  studies.  Army  War  College,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Kenneth  Colegrove,  department  of  political  science.  Northwestern  University, 

Evanston,  111. 
Arthur  G.  Coons,  president.  Occidental  College,  Los  Angeles,  Calif. 
John  W.  Decker,  International  Missionary  Council,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
John  K.  Fairbanks,  committee  on  international  and  regional  studies.  Harvard 

University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
William  R.  Herod,  president.  International  General  Electric  Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Arthur  N.  Holcombe,  department  of  government,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge, 

Mass. 
Benjamin  H.  Kizer,  Graves,  Kizer  &  Graves,  Spokane,  Wash. 
Owen  Lattimore,  director,  Walter  Hines  Page  School  of  International  Relations. 

Johns  Hopkins  University,  Baltimore,  Md. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  901 

Ernest  B.  MacNaughton,  chairman  of  the  board,  First  National  Bank,  Portland, 

Oreg. 
George  C.  Marshall,  president,  American  Red  Cross,  Washington,  D.  C. 
J.  Morden  Murphy,  assistant  vice  president.  Bankers  Trust  Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Nathaniel  Pelfer,  department  of  public  law  and  government,  Columbia  University, 

New  York,  N.  Y. 
Harold  S.  Quigley,  department  of  political  science,  University  of  Minnesota, 
Minneapolis,  Minn. 
Edwin  O.  Reischauer,  department  of  far-eastern  languages,  Harvard  University, 

Cambridge,  Mass. 
William  S.  Roberston,  president,  American  &  Foreign  Power  Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
John  D.  Rockefeller  III,  president.  Rockefeller  Brothers'  Fund,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Lawrence  K.  Rosinger,  American  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Eugene  Staley,  executive  director,  World  Affairs  Council  of  Northern  California, 

San  Francisco,  Calif. 
Harold  Stassen,  president,  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Phillips  Talbot,  tFniversity  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 
George  E.  Taylor,  University  of  Washington,  Seattle,  Wash. 
Harold  M.  Vinacke,  department  of  political  science,  University  of  Cincinnati, 

Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  during  the  testimony  of  General  Wil- 
loughby  testimony  turned  up  which  indicated  that  there  are  records 
in  the  War  Department  which  could  be  available  to  this  committee  and 
which  would  aid  us  in  our  investigation.  Accordingly,  on  August 
20,  1951,  a  letter  was  sent  to  the  President  at  the  White  House  in 
Washington,  D.  C.    It  reads : 

Dear  Mr.  President  :  During  the  open  public  hearing  of  the  Internal  Security 
Subcommittee  held  on  August  9,  1951,  Maj.  Gen.  C.  A.  Willoughby  was  questioned 
concerning  the  loyalty  of  three  individuals  who  were  attached  to  SCAP  head- 
quarters in  the  postwar  period.  General  Willoughby  replied  that  he  was  for- 
bidden by  oflScial  directive  to  testify  on  the  contents  of  the  files  of  the  tliree  em- 
ployees involved.  Each  of  these  three  persons,  namely,  Miriam  S'.  Farley,  An- 
drew Gi  ajdanzev,  and  T.  A.  Bisson,  was  an  active  leader  of  the  Institute  of  Pa- 
cific Relations  prior  to,  during,  and  subsequent  to  their  assignments  to  Tokyo. 

It  is  respectfully  rquested  that  the  contents  of  tliese  files  be  made  available 
to  the  members  of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  in  order  that  they  may 
translate  the  information  in  such  files  into  evidence  for  the  subcommittee,  if 
the  facts  wai'rant  such  action.  Naturally,  if  any  confidential  sources  of  in- 
formation must  be  protected,  the  subcommittee  will  scrupulously  protect  iden- 
tities. 

Very  sincerely  yours, 

Pat  McCarran. 

I  would  like  that  introduced. 

The  Chairsian.  It  will  be  inserted. 

(The  document  referred  to  and  read  in  full  by  Mr.  Morris  was 
marked  "Exhibit  No.  264"  and  filed  for  the  record.) 

Mr.  MoRuis.  On  September  19,  1951,  over  the  signature  of  Harry 
Truman,  President,  we  received  a  letter  reading : 

Dear  Senator  McCarran  :  I  have  your  letter  asking  that  the  files  of  Miriam  S. 
Farley,  Andrew  Grajdanzev,  and  T.  A.  Bisson  be  made  available  to  the  Senate  In- 
ternal Security  Subcommittee. 

I  am  informed  that  none  of  these  persons  is  now  employed  by  the  Federal 
Government.  However,  all  three  were  formerly  employed  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  Supreme  Commander,  Allied  Powers,  Tokyo,  Japan.  According  to  the 
records  of  tlie  Department  of  tiie  Army,  Miriam  S.  Farley  was  employed  there 
from  January  to  May  1946;  Andrew  Grajdanzev  was  employed  from  January 
1946  to  August  1947 ;  and  T.  A.  Bisson  was  employed  from  October  1945  to  May 
1947. 

I  have  asked  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  to  make  available  to  the  subcommit- 
tee the  employment  records  of  these  three  persons.  However,  for  reasons  which 
I  have  set  forth  at  length  on  a  number  of  occasions,  I  do  not  feel  that  the  in- 


902  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

formation  so  made  available  to  the  subcommittee  shoulcl  include  investigative 
data  of  a  confidential  nature. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Harry  Truman. 

T  would  like  to  have  that  introduced,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  inserted. 

(The  document  referred  to  and  read  in  full  by  Mr.  Morris  was 
marked  "Exhibit  No.  265"  and  filed  for  the  record.) 

Mr.  Morris.  On  August  27,  1951,  over  the  signature  of  Pat  Mc- 
Carran,  chairman,  a  letter  was  sent  to  the  Hon.  Dean  Acheson. 

Senator  Ferguson.  JNIight  I  go  back  to  this  and  ask  what  the  em- 
ployment records  of  the  three  persons  mean  to  us  ?  It  only  means  the 
dates,  does  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  We  have  received  nothing.  Senator. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  it  is  all  confidential  data  and  the  personnel 
file  is  kept  from  us  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  reason  for  discharge  if  they  were  dis- 
charged, recommended  for  their  employment,  and  so  forth? 

Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

Will  you  read  this,  Mr.  Mandel  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  letter  dated  August  27,  1951,  addressed  to 
Hon.  Dean  Acheson  from  Pat  McCarran : 

Mt  Dear  Mr.  Secretary  :  The  Senate  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  intro- 
duced into  the  record  on.Auwst  23,  1951,  two  items  from  the  Daily  Worker, 
copies  of  wliich  are  enclosed  herewith.  One  is  dated  October  4,  1942,  pages  1 
and  5,  and  is  an  article  by  Mr.  Earl  Browder,  general  secretary  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  U.  S.  A.,  on  the  State  Department ;  and  the  second  is  an  article 
entitled  "Welles  States  United  States  Policy  on  China,"  published  October  16, 
1942,  pages  1  and  2. 

The  second  article  is  preceded  by  a  statement  that  the  memorandum  was  the 
result  of  an  interview  between  Mr.  Earl  Browder  and  ]Mr.  Robert  Minor,  both 
representing  the  Communist  Party,  U.  S.  A.,  Under  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
Sumner  Welles,  and  Mr.  Lauehlin  Currie,  Administrative  Assistant  to  the  Pres- 
ident, held  on  October  12,  1942. 

It  was  pointed  out  in  the  course  of  the  hearing  that  in  fairness  to  the  State 
Department  it  miglit  be  well  to  request  a  brief  statement  on  this  matter  fi'om 
the  Department.  In  this  connection,  we  would  appreciate  the  following  infor- 
mation : 

1.  Was  there  an  interview  held  at  the  State  Department  in  which  Mr.  Earl 
Browder,  Mr.  Robert  Minor,  INIr.  Sumner  Welles,  and  Mr.  Lauehlin  Currie  par- 
ticipated on  October  12,  1942? 

2.  Who  arranged  this  interview  and  how  was  it  arranged? 

3.  Is  the  enclosed  memorandum,  as  taken  from  the  Daily  W^orker  of  October 
16,  1942,  a  true  copy  of  the  memorandum  submitted  by  Mr.  Sumner  Welles  and 
Mr.  Lauehlin  Currie  on  that  date? 

Your  kind  cooperation  in  this  matter  will  be  appreciated. 

The  reply  dated  September  1,  1951,  is  signed  by  Jack  K.  McFall, 
Assistant  Secretary,  and  reads  as  follows : 

My  Dear  Senator  McCarran  :  The  receipt  is  acknowledged  of  your  letter  of 
August  27,  1951,  addressed  to  Secretary  Acheson  requesting  information  con- 
cerning an  alleged  meeting  held  at  the  State  Department  October  12.  1942,  in 
which  Earl  Browder,  Robert  Minor,  Sumner  Welles,  and  Lauehlin  Currie  par- 
ticipated. 

The  Department  received  a  similar  request  from  a  INIember  of  Congress  some 
time  ago  and  at  that  time  made  a  thorough  but  unsuccessful  search  of  de- 
partmental files  for  evidence  of  such  a  meeting.  These  efforts  to  obtain  in- 
formation respecting  the  meeting  were  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  De- 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  903 

partiuent   officers  who   reportedly  participated  were   no   longer   with    the   De- 
partment. ,  .        ^       ,  J.   ■   . 

The  Department  will  again  examine  its  files  with  a  view  to  obtaining  in- 
formation bearing  on  the  specific  questions  in  your  letter  of  August  27  and 
will  write  you  further  upon  completion  of  this  reexamination. 

Tlie  CiiAiKMAN.  What  is  the   date   of  that   letter  again? 

j\rr.  Mandel.  The  date  is  September  1,  1951. 

Then  on  September  21,  1951,  a  telephone  message  came  to  the 
office  from  Mr.  Holland,  Chinese  Affairs  Division  of  the  State  De- 
partment, -who  said  that  they  are  vv'orking  on  the  answer  to  the  letter 
of  August  27  in  regard  to  Browder.  This  requires  considerable  re- 
search^ but  they  waiit  us  to  know  that  they  are  working  on  it.  That 
is  not  a  verbatim  transcript  of  the  message. 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  I  would  like  those  two  letters  to  go  in  the  record, 
along  with  the  telephon.e  conversation  as  read  by  Mr.  Mandel,  and 
given  the  next  exhibit  numbers. 

The  Chairman.  They  will  be  inserted. 

(The  documents  referred  to  and  read  in  full  by  Mr.  Mandel  were 
marked  as  "Exhibit  Nos.  266,  267,  and  288"  and  hied  for  the  record.) 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  letter  from  Senator  Pat  McCarran  dated 
July  10, 1951,  to  the  Honorable  Dean  Acheson : 

My  Dear  Mr.  Secretary  :  Perhaps  it  might  save  some  time  for  all  of  us  if,  in 
addition  to  my  previous  requests  for  information  on  loyalty  cases,  you  sent 
us  a  complete  list  of  individuals  dropped  or  permitted  to  resign  from  the  State 
Department  since  the  end  of  19-14  because  of  loyalty  considerations. 

Thank  you  for  your  courtesy  in  this  matter. 

The  reply  is  dated  August  2,  1951,  from  the  Department  of  State, 
signed  Carlisle  H.  Humelsine,  Deputy  Under  Secretary: 

My  Dear  Senator  McCarran  :  I  refer  to  your  letter  of  July  10,  1951,  in 
which  you  request  to  be  supplied  with  a  complete  list  of  the  individuals  who 
were  dropped  or  permitted  to  resign  from  the  State  Department  since  the  end 
of  1944  because  of  loyalty  considerations. 

I  regret  that  I  am  precluded  from  furnishing  you  with  the  information  which 
you  requested,  by  reason  of  the  President's  directive  of  March  13,  1948  (Fed- 
eral Register,  March  16,  194S),  with  regard  to  the  confidential  status  of  em- 
ployee loyalty  records. 

Mr.  Morris.  JNIr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  those  tvro  letters  intro- 
duced and  marked  with  the  next  consecutive  exhibit  numbers. 

Tlie  Ciiairiman.  They  may  be  inserted. 

(The  documents  referred  to  and  read  by  Mr.  Mandel  were  marked 
as  "Exhibits  Nos.  269  and  270"  and  filed  for  the  record.) 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  letter  dated  August  31,  1951,  addressed  to 
Hon.  Dean  Acheson  and  signed  by  Eva  B.  xVdams,  administrative 
assistant  to  Senator  McCarran : 

In  connection  with  some  matters  now  under  consideration  by  the  Senate  In- 
ternal Security  Subcommittee,  we  will  have  occasion  to  refer  to  certain  memo 
randa  from  Foreign  Service  officers  quoted  in  part  on  pages  5(>4  to  5157  of  the 
State  Department's  publication  "Tlie  United  States  Relations  with  China." 
In  all  fairness  to  the  Department  and  the  individuals  involved,  we  would  like  the 
full  documents  for  our  use  rather  than  the  excerpts  quoted.  We  would  appre- 
ciate your  sending  us  the  full  memoranda  from  which  the  quotations  were  taken. 

Thank  you  for  your  cooperation, 
Sincerely  yours, 

Eva  B.  Adams. 

Tliat  refers  to  the  reports  of  Davies.  Ludden,  and  Service,  along 
with  Emmerson,  in  the  white  paper.     The  reply  is  dated  September 


904  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

12,  1951,  Department  of  State,  signed  by  W.  K.  Scott,  Acting  Deputy 
Under  Secretary : 

My  Dear  Senator  McCarran  :  The  receipt  is  acknowledged  of  Miss  Adams' 
letter  of  August  31,  1951,  requesting  the  full  text  of  certain  memoranda  quoted 
in  part  in  pages  564  to  576  of  the  Department  publication  "United  States  Rela- 
tions With  China." 

The  Department  will  examine  its  files  for  the  documents  in  question  and  will 
communirntp  with  you  further  respecting  this  matter. 
Sincerely  yours, 


(For  the  Secretary  of  State). 

The  Chatrman.  Wliat  is  the  date  of  that  letter  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  September  12,  1951. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  recommend  that  these  two  letters  be  introduced  into 
the  record  and  be  marked  with  the  next  consecutive  exhibit  numbers. 

The  Chairman.  They  will  be  inserted. 

(The  documents  referred  to  and  read  in  full  by  Mr.  Mandell  were 
marked  as  "Exhibits  Nos.  271  and  272"  and  filed  for  the  record.) 

Mr.  Morris.  I  have  just  one  more  exchange,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Has  any  further  reply  come  from  the  State  De- 
partment on  that  last  letter  ? 

Mr.  Mandel.  I  am  searching  to  find  if  there  is  any  further  reply. 

This  is  a  letter  dated  September  12, 1951,  to  the  Hon.  Dean  Acheson 
from  Senator  Pat  McCarran : 

My  Dear  Mr.  Secretary  :  For  puriwses  of  use  by  the  Senate  Internal  Security 
Subcommittee,  we  would  like  to  have  a  copy  of  a  report  sent  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment by  John  Kenneth  Emmerson,  dated  February  25,  1946,  entitled  "Political 
Factors  in  the  Present  Japanese  Situation,"  and  another  dated  January  5,  1945, 
entitled  "The  Japanese  Communist  Party." 

We  would  like  to  use  this  material  in  connection  with  a  hearing  on  Friday, 
September  14.  We  shall  be  glad  to  send  a  messenger  to  the  Department  if  you 
will  telephone  us  that  this  material  is  available. 

Thank  you  for  your  cooperation. 
Sincerely, 

Pat  McCarran,  Chadrman. 

On  Thursday,  September  13,  we  received  a  telephone  message  from  a 
Mr.  Anderson  of  the  State  Department,  extension  2206,  in  reference  to 
the  documents  mentioned  in  our  letter  of  September  12,  1951,  telling 
us  we  would  hear  further. 

On  September  14  Mr.  Walter  K.  Scott  of  the  State  Department 
called  and  stated  that  a  letter  "is  being  written  us  that  they  will  not 
be  able  to  release  the  documents  requested." 

We  did  not  receive  the  letter  for  unexplained  reasons,  but  we  got 
this  letter  over  the  telephone  from  the  State  Department  that  they 
had  sent  us  dated  September  19, 1951 : 

My  Dear  Senator  McCarran  :  This  is  in  reply  to  your  request  for  copies  of 
two  reports  sent  to  the  State  Department  by  Mr.  John*Keiineth  Emmerson,  one 
dated  February  25,  1946,  entitled  "Political  Factors  in  the  Present  Japanese 
Situation,"  and  another  dated  January  5,  1945,  entitled  "The  Japanese  Commu- 
nist Party." 

It  is  the  view  of  the  Department  that  preserving  the  integrity  of  the  reporting 
by  departmental  officers  is  a  matter  of  principle  of  the  highest  importance.  In 
the  present  context,  the  release  of  these  reports  by  individual  officers  would 
undoubtedly  have  the  effect  of  inhibiting  the  free  and  frank  expression  of  views 
by  officers  in  the  field  in  their  reports  to  the  Department.  For  that  reason, 
the  re(iuest  must  be  respectfully  declined. 

As  this  matter  is  of  great  importance  to  the  Department,  I  should  very  much 
appreciate  an  opportunity  to  discuss  it  with  you  at  your  convenience. 
Sincerely, 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  905 


Signed  by  Mr.  Webb,  Acting  Secretary, 

Mr.  Morris.  I  would  like  those  letters  to  go  in  the  record,  together 
with  the  memoranda  and  marked  with  the  next  consecutive  exhibit 
numbers. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  so  ordered. 

(The  documents  referred  to  and  read  by  Mr.  Mandel  were  marked 
as  "Exhibits  Nos.  273,  374,  and  275,"  and  filed  for  the  record.) 

Mr.  Morris.  I  would  like  the  record  to  show  that  Professor  Cole- 
grove  is  here  today  under  subpena,  and  we  are  going  to  aslc  him  to 
testify  about  a  meeting  that  took  place  2  years  ago.  Mr.  Chairman, 
there  is  a  transcript  of  this  meeting,  and  we  have  requested  it  and  it 
has  been  denied  us. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  do  not  want  to  take  time  now,  but  I  do  want 
to  comment  on  some  of  this  information  that  is  now  put  in  the  record 
about  the  cooperation  of  the  executive  branch,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Certainly. 

Will  you  be  sworn?  You  do  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony 
you  are  about  to  give  before  the  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on 
the  Judiciary  of  the  United  States  Senate  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGRovE.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  KENNETH  COLEGHOVE,  NOKTHWESTEEN 
UNIVERSITY,  EVANSTON,  ILL. 

Senator  Ferguson.  We  asked  the  professor  to  come  here  and  he  has 
been  waiting  quite  a  while.  I  did  want  the  record  to  show  that  I  did 
not  want  the  record  to  stand  as  it  was. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  give  your  name  and  address  to  the  reporter, 
Professor  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  My  name  is  Kenneth  Colegrove.  My  address  is 
Harris  Hall  305,  Northwestern  University,  Evanston,  111. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  are  your  present  duties  ? 

JMr.  Colegrove.  I  am  professor  of  political  science,  Northwestern 
University. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  long  have  you  held  that  position  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  have  held  that  position  since  1919.  I  have  been 
absent  from  Northwestern  University  on  sabbaticals,  traveling  in 
Europe  and  Asia,  but  the  position  has  been  held  since  1919. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  has  been  your  major  assignment  in  Northwestern  ? 

Mr.  Colegro\te.  Teaching  political  science,  particularly  the  field  of 
international  law  and  international  relations  and  also  Asiatic  politics 
in  government. 

Mr.  Morris.  What 'degrees  do  you  hold,  Professor? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  have  an  A.  B.  degree  from  the  State  University 
of  Iowa,  a  Ph.  D.  from  Plarvard  University.  Columbia  University 
gave  me  an  honorary  Doctor  of  Letters  some  years  ago. 

Mr.  Morris.  When  was  that? 

Mr.  Colegro\t2.  That  was  in  1945. 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor,  what  books  have  you  written? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  have  written  one  book  on  Militarism  in  Japan,  in 
1936 ;  a  book  on  International  Control  of  Aviation.  That  was  back 
in  1930.  I  have  written  a  book  on  United  States  Senate  and  W^orld 
Peace,  in  1944. 


906  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor,  what  has  been  your  specialty  in  interna- 
tional affairs? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  My  specialty  has  been  international  control  of  avia- 
tion and  treaty-making  in  the  United  States,  and  then  government 
and  ])olitics  and  diplomacy  of  Japan.  I  might  say  that  my  studies  on 
Japan  amoimt  to  about  20  articles  which  are  published  in  the  Amer- 
ican Political  Science  Review,  the  American  Journal  of  International 
Law  and  other  learned  journals. 

Mr.  INIoRRis,  Professor,  when  did  you  first  join  the  Institute  of 
Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  I  joined  at  an  early  date.  I  am  sorry  to  say  I  didn't 
refresh  my  memory  on  that,  but  somewhere  in  the  middle  of  the  thir- 
ties, I  think. 

Mr.  Morris.  How  long  have  you  remained  a  member  of  the  institute  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  have  been  off  and  on,  a  member  of  the  institute. 
You  joined  the  institute  simply  by  paying  your  dues.  That  is  all  it 
amounts  to. 

May  I  say  I  joined  the  institute  back  in  the  early  thirties  because  at 
that  time  the  institute  had  the  reputation  of  unbiased  scientific  system 
of  investigation  and  many  of  the  books  that  it  published  and  the 
survey  which  it  published  were  very  excellent  helps  in  teaching  and 
in  research. 

It  also  purported  at  that  time  to  be  wholly  unbiased,  wholly  sci- 
entific, and  a  very  large  number  of  professors  and  libraries  subscribed 
to  it.  I  think  most  of  the  members  like  myself  became  members  in 
order  to  get  the  publications  rather  than  to  participate  in  the  studies. 

Senator  Ferguson.  The  studies  were  done  by  a  group  that  could 
spend  the  time  and  the  effort? 

Mr.  Colegro"st3.  Yes, 

Senator  Ferguson,  The  books  that  were  sent  out  to  the  student  of 
international  affairs  and  teachers,  you  did  want  to  be  in  a  position  to 
get  these  as  they  came  out? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.  We  referred"  our  students  to  these  studies. 
They  were  excellent  studies  on  the  Avhole.  Sometimes  you  coidd  detect 
a  bias  but  you  attached  that  to  the  writer  rather  than  to  the  institute 
itself. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  know  people  were  writing  under  ficti- 
tious names  or  aliases? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  didn't  realize  that  ^yith  reference  to  the  Institute 
of  Pacific  Relations. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  Avas  not  what  the  teacher  really  wanted. 
He  wanted  to  know  who  the  writer  was,  his  experience,  et  cetera? 

Mr.  CoLEGRO\T..  Exactly. 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor,  were  you  associated  with  the  publication 
Amerasia? 

Iklr.  Colegrove.  Yes;  I  was,  from  the  first  issue  down  to  the  time 
when  I  resigned. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  the  first  issue  in  1937? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  1987.  I  resigned  from  the  advisory  board.  I  was 
a  member  of  what  was  called  the  advisory  board  of  editors  from  1937 
until  1942  when  T  resignod  fii'st  and  was  persuaded  to  come  back. 
Then  I  resigned  for  good  in  1943. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  907 

Mr.  jNIorris.  Will  you  tell  us  the  circumstances  surrounding  your 
first  beconnuf^  associated  with  the  publication  and  the  two  resignations 
you  have  just  mentioned? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  I  was  invited  to  join  the  editorial  board  by  Fred- 
erick Field  Avho  was  and  still   is  a  very   personable  young  man. 

Senator  Eastland.  What  year  was  that  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  That  was'  in  1936,  the  year  before  the  first  pub- 
lication. 

At  that  time  the  American  people  were  not  widely  awake  to  Asia 
and  Asiatic  problems.  I  was  among  those  who  felt  we  ought  to  know 
more  about  Asia,  that  we  ought  to  study  Asia  more  in  the  schools 
and  we  ought  to  have  mor.i  information  with  reference  to  Asia  and 
we  ought  to  awaken  a  large  public  opinion  with  reference  to  Asia. 

America  knew  a  great  deal  about  Europe  but  Asia  had  been  very 
greatly  neglected.  What  Frederick  Fiekl  and  what  Mr.  Jaff'e  and 
others  connected  with  Amerasia,  prof>osed  to  do  was  to  publish  a 
monthly  journal  called  Amerasia,  America-Asia,  running  the  two 
together,  which  would  translate  into  popular  language  the  learning 
regarding  current  affairs  in  Asia.  To  me  that  was  a  very  attractive 
proposition.  I  think  most  of  the  editors,  most  of  the  scholars  who 
agreed  to  become  editors,  felt  that  they  were  really  doing  a  service 
to  the  American  people  and  doing  a  service  to  the  schools,  doing  a 
service  to  public  opinion,  by  serving  on  this  Amerasia. 

The  first  numbei-s  of  Amerasia  were  excellent.  Some  of  the  very 
best  things  we  have  on  Asia  were  published  in  Amerasia. 

The  Chairman.  Would  jou  raise  your  voice  just  a  bit,  Professor? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  Yes. 

Some  very  good  articles  were  published  in  Amerasia.  I  did  not  de- 
tect any  special  line  in  1937,  1938,  and  1939.  I  knew  that  some  of  the 
editorial  board  were  attached  preeminently  to  the  American  inter- 
ests, looked  at  the  national  interest  of  the  American  people  as  first 
and  foremost.  I  knew  that  others  were  not  so  careful  of  the  Ameri- 
can interests  and  sympathized  with  revolutionar}-  processes,  some  of 
which  are  rather  dangerous. 

I  thought  at  the  time  it  was  a  well-balanced  board.  All  views  were 
expressed  there. 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor,  looking  back  do  you  think  there  was  a  line 
there  or  do  you  think  you  just  did  not  detect  a  line? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  In  the  first  few  years  as  I  look  over  the  old  num- 
bers I  would  say  there  was  no  line  to  bo  easily  detected.  Eater  on 
the  line  appeared,  especially  in  articles  by  a  Chinese  scholar  by  the 
name  of  Chi. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  was  the  line,  Professor? 

Mr.  CoLEGRO\'E.  It  is  very  hard  to  say  exactly  what  the  line  was. 
When  I  use  "the  line,"  I  mean  a  person  is  following  the  policy  of 
Soviet  Russia. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  if  you  had  followed  the  line  you 
would  have  gone  to  the  Kremlin? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes ;  the  line  would  go  back  to  the  Kremlin. 

]\Ir.  Morris.  You  say  that  is  right  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.     That  is  what  I  meant  by  party  line. 

22848— 52— pt.  3 14 


908  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor.  I  "would  like  to  offer  you  an  exchange  of 
correspondence  involving  you,  which  Mr.  Mandel  will  certify  came 
from  the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  want  the  witness  to  see  them  first? 

ISIr.  Morris.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  This  is  a  letter  from  Mr.  Lockwood. 

Mr.  Morris.  There  were  three  letters,  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  Mr. 
Lockwood  to  you  and  the  second  letter  is  one  which  purports  to  be  an 
original  of  yours. 

Mr.  CoLEGEOVE.  I  recall  the  correspondence. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Mandel,  will  you  authenticate  that? 

Mr.  Mandel.  These  letters  dated  November  30,  1942,  November 
20,  1942,  November  18,  1942,  and  November  17,  1942,  were  taken  from 
the  files  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor,  will  you  tell  us  your  recollection  of  this 
exchange  of  correspondence  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  As  I  just  said,  I  served  on  this  advisory  editorial 
board  from  1937  on.  I  was  one  of  the  few  members  from  the  West, 
and  I  must  say  I  never  attended  a  meeting  of  the  editorial  board, 
although  I  understand  meetings  were  held  about  every  month  in  New 
York  City.  I  never  happened  to  be  in  New  York  City  when  such 
a  meeting  was  held. 

In  the  bsginning  it  was  my  understanding  with  the  board  that  I 
would  be  given  the  right  to  approve  all  the  articles  on  Japan  that  were 
published  in  Amerasia.  These  articles  were  sent  out  to  me  in  bunches. 
I  read  them  and  sent  back  my  comments.  Later  on  I  noticed  that 
Amerasia  did  publish  some  articles  on  Japan  which  I  had  not  O.  K.'d. 
I  was  very  busy  at  the  time  and  didn't  protest  at  this  seeming  neglect: 

Then  around  1940  a  number  of  articles  began  to  be  published  in 
Amerasia  by  Kate  Mitchell  and  by  Mr.  Mattuch  and  Mr.  Gohol  very 
antagonistic  to  the  British  rule  in  India  and  also  to  the  Dutch  rule  in 
Indonesia. 

During  the  war  Great  Britain  became  our  ally,  or  we  became  an 
ally  of  Great  Britain  and  I  thought  this  was  very  bad  policy  to  publish 
these  articles  without  having  articles  on  the  other  side.  I  protested 
at  this  lack  of  impartiality  and  scholarship.  Mr.  Jaffe  promised  me 
that  I  would  have  the  riglit  before  any  article  attacking  British  rule 
in  India  or  Dutch  rule  in  Indonesia 

INIr.  Morris.  Will  you  please  speak  up  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  American  articles  were  published  in  Amerasia  at- 
tacking the  British  rule  in  India  and  the  Dutch  rule  in  Indonesia. 
That  of  course  was  following  the  Communist  line.  I  didn't  know  that 
at  the  time.  I  thought  it  was  very  unscholarly  to  publish  articles 
attacking  British  rule  in  India  and  Dutch  rule  in  Indonesia  without 
publishing  articles  on  the  other  side.  Mr.  Jaffe  agreed  with  me  on 
this  matter  because  I  suppose  he  wanted  to  keep  the  old  members 
of  the  board  together,  and  said  that  before  any  article  attacking  the 
British  in  India  or  the  Dutch  in  Indonesia  was  published,  he  would 
allow  me  to  secure  some  other  writer  to  publish  an  article  on  the 
other  side. 

Mr.  Jaffe,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  in  my  view  broke  that  agreement,  and 
in  the  fall  of  1942  I  i-esigned  from  the  editorial  board,  saying  this  was 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  909 

not  following^  tlie  scholarly  procedure.  This  correspondence  relates 
to  my  resignation. 

Mr.  JafFe  later  on  persuaded  me  to  come  back,  with  the  very  firm 
promise  that  it  would  never  happen  again.  I  regret  to  say  that  it 
did  happen  again  and  I  resigned  for  good  in  April  1943. 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor,  docs  ]\Ir.  Lockwood  concede  there  was  a  line 
to  Amerasia  in  his  letter  to  you  there? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  I  am  afraid  he  does.  ]Mr.  Lockwood  seems  to  be 
on  both  sides. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  read  the  second  paragraph  ? 

This  is  his  letter  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  What  is  the  date  ? 

Mr.  Colegro\t3.  November  30,  1942. 

It  seems  to  me  that  as  matters  now  stand  the  editors  are  put  in  an  emliar- 
rassing  position  by  the  fact  that  the  material  in  the  monthly  issue  is  unsigned 
and  therefore  all  the  editorial  board  seems  to  take  responsibility  for  everything 
that  is  said  whether  they  agree  with  it  or  not  and  even  when  they  haven't  seen 
it  in  advance.  Jaffe  recognized  the  validity  of  this  olijection  and  promised  to 
think  it  over.     We  haven't  had  a  chance  to  discuss  it  again. 

In  later  correspondence  Jaffe  promised  that  would  not  be  done  in 
the  future. 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  I  ask  that  these  four  letters  identified  by  Professor 
Colegrove  and  by  Mr.  jMandel  as  letters  from  the  files  of  the  Institute 
of  Pacific  Relations  be  introduced  into  the  record  and  be  marked  with 
the  next  consecutive  exhibit  numbers. 

The  Chairman.  There  seems  to  be  something  more  than  letters 
here. 

Mr.  Morris.  This  is  just  our  summary  of  the  exchange.  The  four 
letters  should  go  in  the  I'ecord. 

The  Chairman.  The  letters  will  be  inserted  into  the  record. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  as  exhibits  Nos.  276,  277, 
278,  and  279,  and  are  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  279 

Northwestern  University, 

November  17,  19Jf2. 
Mr.  PniiJp  J.  Jaffe, 

Amerasia,  125  East  Fifty-second  Street,  New  York  City. 

Dear  Mr.  Jaffe  :  I  am  writing  you  regarding  the  lack  of  objectivity  and 
scholarsliip  displayed  in  recent  articles  in  Amerasia  dealing  with  India. 

In  the  October  2.5  issue  of  Amerasia  occurs  an  article  by  Mr.  Kurt  II.  Mattusch 
under  the  title  "The  American  Public  and  India,"  which  is  not  only  bitterly 
anti-British  but  also  unscholarly. 

For  instance,  on  page  403  he  says  that  the  debate  on  the  Cripps  Mission  in  the 
House  of  Lords  envisaged  safe  reservations  for  British  interests  within  India. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  tlie  debate  of  July  30  was  on  Europeans  in  India  and  was 
not  on  the  Cripps  mission.  The  Marquess  of  Crewe,  whose  speech  is  quoted,  was 
not  an  official  spokesman.  Mr.  Mattusch  completely  ignores  the  statement  of  the 
Duke  of  Devonshire,  who,  speaking  for  the  Government,  said :  "It  is  really 
impossible  to  make  an  offer  both  of  complete  self-government  and  to  exact 
guaranties  for  specified  British  interests." 

Again,  his  statement  aboiit  taxes  and  the  upkeep  of  Gibraltar,  Malta,  and  Eden 
is  simply  fantastic.    Numerous  other  errors  in  this  art'cle  could  be  pointed  out. 

I  wish  also  to  refer  to  the  number  of  Amerasia  published  in  May  and  devoted 
to  India  and  the  war.    This  number  contained  numerous  misrepresentations  tliat 


910  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

DO  scholar  would  tolerate.  For  instance,  on  pages  4  to  8,  the  onus  of  defeat  of 
the  Cripps  mission  seems  to  be  laid  on  Mr.  Jinnah,  who  is  pictured  as  a  scheming 
politician.  Now,  everyone  with  even  a  slight  acquaintance  with  Indian  affairs 
knows  that  the  working  committee  of  the  Indian  National  Congi'ess  contains 
politicians  just  as  scheming  and  sellisli  as  Mr.  .Jinnah.  Nevertheless  the  com- 
mentator ignores  this  fact. 

The  commentary  also  fails  to  give  a  proper  consideration  to  Pakistan,  to 
explain  tlie  Moslem  case,  to  give  proper  consideration  to  the  plight  of  the  untouch- 
ables under  the  Hindu  domination.  It  fails  to  call  proper  attention  to  the  very 
small  percentage  of  Indian  people,  barely  10.000,000  out  of  3S9,000,(X)0,  who  are 
political-minded.  A  scholarly  treatment  of  the  question  should  point  out  all 
these  facts. 

There  is  another  consideration  other  than  lack  of  scholarship  in  the  publication 
of  these  one-sided  articles  and  comment.  We  are  engaged  cooperatively  in  a  war 
for  the  self-preservation  of  our  institutions.  Great  Britain  is  our  ally  in  this 
war.  The  publication  of  articles  which  misrepresent  the  facts  while  attacking 
Great  Britain  can  do  little  else  than  impair  our  war  effort.  Loyalty  to  our  own 
country  requires  intellectual  honesty  and  moderation  in  any  criticism  of  our  ally. 

I  find  myself  under  necessity  of  resigning  from  the  editorial  board  unless 
Amerasia  is  willing  to  publish  in  the  very  near  future  two  articles  to  offset  the 
above-mentioned  anti-British  articles.  I  would  like  to  see  this  principle  also 
applied  to  the  editorials. 

it  is  a  matter  of  deep  regret  to  me  to  be  compelled  to  write  to  you  in  this 
fashion.  There  is  nothing  personal  in  my  feelins;  in  this  matter.  But  as  a 
teacher  I  cannot  permit  my  name  to  be  used  on  an  editorial  board  of  a  magazine 
which  prin.ts  such  unscholarly  and  unfair  articles  without  also  publishing  articles 
on  the  other  side. 

It  is  probable  that  in  any  case  I  ought  not  be  on  the  editorial  board,  inasmuch 
as  I  live  so  far  from  New  York  City  and  cannot  attend  the  periodical  meetings 
of  the  editorial  board. 

Please  do  not  consider  this  letter  as  any  ultimatum  in  this  matter.  T  have 
nothing  but  the  most  friendly  feeling  toward  you  personally  and  all  my  colleagues 
on  the  board. 

Faithfully  yours, 

Kenneth  Colegbove, 
Professor  of  Political  Science. 

Exhibit  No.  278 

Northwestern  UNivERSiri% 
^        College  of  Liberal  Arts, 
Evanston,  111,  November  18,  1942. 

Mr.  William  Lt^iCKWoon, 

Secrefari/,  American  Committee  for  International  Studies, 
Princeton,  N.  J. 

Dear  Mr.  Lockwood  :  I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  letter  which  I  have  just 
sent  to  Mr.  Philip  Jaffe,  editor  of  Amerasia.  I  regret  very  much  the  necessity 
of  sending  this  letter,  but  I  feel  that  I  cannot  remain  a  meml)er  of  the  editorial 
board  of  a  magazine  which  publishes  articles  severely  criticizing  our  ally  Great 
Britain  unless  those  articles  are  scholarly  in  character  and  also  unless  the 
British  side,  or  again  the  Moslem  side,  is  also  expressed  on  the  pages  of  the 
ma'  azine. 

I  suiijjo^e.  anyway,  it  is  time  for  me  to  withdraw  from  the  editorial  board, 
inasmuch  as,  living  in  Chicago.  I  cannot  attend  the  Ixiard  meeetings.  I  hope, 
of  course,  if  the  editorial  board  cannot  arrange  to  publish  some  articles  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Indian  question,  and  if  I  find  it  necessary  to  withdraw  from 
the  board,  Amerasia  will  publish  my  letter  of  resignation,  indicating  exactly  my 
reason  for  retiring. 
Hastily  yours, 

Kenneth  Colegrove, 
Profe.^sor  of  Political  Science. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  911 

Exhibit  No.  277 

The  Institute  for  Advanced    Study, 

Princeton,  N.  J.,  November  20,  1942. 
Mr.  WiU-iAM  W.  LocKwooD, 

Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  129  East  Fifty-second  Street, 
New  York  City. 
Dear  Bill  :  I  am  sorry  we  opened  the  enclosed  letter  from  Kenneth  Colegrove, 
which  is  not  on  American  committee  business  even  though  it  is  addressed  to  you 
as  secretary  of  the  committee. 
Sincerely  yours, 

(Signed)  Ed. 

(Typed  )   Edward  Meade  Earle. 

P.  S. — Incidentally,  I  was  pretty  peeved  about  the  review  of  Mackinder,  which 
I  thought  flippant. 


Exhibit  No.  276 

November  30,  1942. 
Prof.  Kenneth  Colegrove, 

105  Harris  Hall,  Northwestern  University, 

Evanston,  III. 

Dear  Professor  Colegrove  :  I  have  read  with  interest  and  some  sympathy 
your  letter  to  Phil  Jaffe  on  Amerasia.  I  felt  the  same  way  about  the  treatment  of 
India  and  have  said  so  to  him  and  to  Kate  Mitchell. 

It  seems  to  be  that  as  matters  now  stand  the  editors  are  put  in  an  embarras- 
sing position  by  the  fact  that  the  material  in  the  monthly  issue  is  unsigned ;  and, 
therefore,  all  the  editorial  board  seems  to  take  responsibility  for  everything 
that  is  said,  whether  they  agree  with  it  or  not  and  even  when  they  haven't  seen 
it  in  advance.  .Jafl'e  recognized  the  validity  of  tliis  objection  and  promised  to 
think  it  over.     We  haven't  had  a  chance  to  discuss  it  again. 

For  some  time  I've  been  frankly  rather  puzzled  as  to  whether  to  remain  on  the 
boai'd,  Ijeing  torn  between  reluctance  to  sponsor  the  "line"'  being  taken  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  feeling  that  Amerasia  had  a  lot  of  useful  stuff  in  it.  Also,  I 
dislike  making  any  sort  of  break  with  Jaffe  and  Miss  Mitchell,  both  of  whom 
are  close  personal  friends  of  mine. 

It  may  be  that  the  whole  board  of  outsiders  ought  to  disappear  and  the  maga- 
zine be  made  frankly  the  personal  vehicle  of  the  two  people  doing  all  the  work. 
They  are  reluctant  to  have  that  happen.  The  real  reason  I  haven't  withdrawn, 
conlidentially,  is  the  hope  that  sooner  or  later  some  kind  of  combination  could 
be  made  between  Amerasia  and  the  two  IPR  periodicals  which  would  strengthen 
their  total  usefulness  to  the  public  and  eliminate  the  present  duplication  and 
competition.  From  the  IPR  standpoint,  this  of  course  would  preclude  a  con- 
sistent and  personalized  editorial  line,  though  it  wouldn't  by  any  means  preclude 
a  forum  of  opinion  presenting  a  variety  of  views.  Personnel  is  getting  so  scarce 
that  there  ought  to  be  some  combination  in  this  general  field  of  Far  East  peri- 
odicals. The  new  form  of  Amerasia  serves  really  to  increase  the  duplication 
and  competition  with  Pacific  Affairs  and  tlie  Far  Eastern  Survey,  particularly  the 
former. 

My  own  ideas  aren't  very  clear  on  this,  and  I'm  writing  you  my  puzzlement 
ii\  the  hope  that  you  may  have  some  suggestions.     As  a  nonstalf  person  who  has 
been  interested  both  in  Amerasia  and  in  the  IPR,  I  would  very  much  appreciate 
having  your  views  as  to  what  we  ought  to  do. 
Sincerely  yours, 

Wm.  W.  Lockwood. 

Note. — I  understand  this  is  what  happened :  IPR  people  would  not  go  along 
with  Jaffe's  personal  views  as  reflected  in  Amerasia,  which  had  started  as  an 
objective  and  substantiated  paper. — Clayton  Lane,  January,  1950. 

(Above  is  handwritten.) 


912  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  you  invited  to  participate  in  Government  serv- 
ice during  the  war  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  I  was  invited  to  be  a  consultant  by  tlie  Office 
of  Strategic  Services. 

Mr.  Morris.  By  whom  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGRO^^.  I  was  invited  by  Charles  Burton  Foss.  I  might 
say  as  a  matter  of  amusement  here,  that  during  the  war  a  great  many 
of  us  old  professors  were  invited  to  serve  in  Government  agencies  by 
our  bright  young  students  who  had  gone  into  the  Government  serv- 
ice and  gotten  into  positions  of  some  importance.  Charles  Burton 
Foss  was  a  former  student  of  mine.  He  was  inviting  his  old  professor 
to  come  down  and  help  him  during  the  war,  which  I  did. 

]\Ir.  Morris.  What  other  invitation  did  you  have  to  join  the  Gov- 
ernment service.  Professor? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  During  the  war  my  consultation  with  the  Office  of 
Strategic  Services  was  my  only  service.  Immediately  after  the  war, 
I  was  invited  to  become  a  consultant  for  General  MacArthur,  the 
Supreme  Commander  for  the  Allied  Powers  in  Tokyo.  That  was  in 
1946. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  as  a  matter  of  fact  work  for  OSS,  Professor  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGRO^^.  Yes.  I  served  as  a  consultant  on  four  or  five  differ- 
ent occasions  in  Washington  for  the  OSS.  I  might  say  that  Charles 
Burton  Foss  was  first  the  Chief  of  the  Japan  Section  of  the  OSS  under 
the  Far  Eastern  Division.  Then  he  succeeded  Carl  Eemer  and  was 
Chief  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division  of  OSS. 

Mr.  Morris.  Were  you  ever  asked  to  join  the  Office  of  War  Infor- 
mation ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  I  w^as  offered  the  post  of  head  of  the  Japan- 
ese desk  in  the  OWI  in  Japan.  I  was  asked  to  take  that  position  by 
Prof.  Owen  Lattimore,  who  was  serving  the  Office  of  War  Informa- 
tion from  the  San  Francisco  position. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  accept  that  offer.  Professor  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  No ;  I  declined  that  position. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  have  a  conversation  with  Mr.  Lattimore  at 
the  time  of  your  declination.  Professor  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  Professor  Lattimore  wrote  me  several  letters 
and  then  asked  me  to  meet  him  as  he  came  through  from  Washington 
to  San  Francisco ;  asked  me  to  meet  him  in  Chicago.    I  met  him. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  relate  to  us  what  happened  during  the  course 
of  that  conversation,  Professor  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  That  was  in  December  1943,  and  Lattimore  again 
offered  me  the  post  of  the  Japan  desk  in  San  Francisco.  He  seemed 
a  little  annoyed  that  I  didn't  accept  it.  We  had  dinner  together.  I 
was  courteously  awaiting  until  his  plane  took  off  for  San  Francisco; 
so  we  continued  the  conversation.  We  discussed  first  the  position 
that  Amerasia  had  taken  with  reference  to  the  British  in  India,  and  I 
objected  to  Amerasia's  attitude  and  articles  and  said  that  was  one  of 
the  points  why  I  resigned.  Lattimore  seemed  to  take  great  offense  at 
that. 

Senator  Ferguson.  At  your  position  ? 

Mr.  Coi^.ROVE.  Yes,  at  my  position ;  very  great  offense  at  my  argu- 
ments, and  I  was  entirely  wrong  regarding  it.  For  some  reason  or 
other,  we  got  on  the  subject  of  the  Dutch  in  Indonesia.  Lattimore 
was  still  more  furious  at  my  contradicting  him  with  reference  to  the 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  913 

benefits  of  Dutch  rule  in  Indonesia.  I  was  opposed  to  liquidating 
Dutch  imperialism  in  Indonesia  immediately  after  the  war.  Then 
I  mentioned  something  about  the  Chinese  Communists,  and  this  sur- 
prised me  a  great  deal  to  have  Lattimore,  whom  I  thought  by  this 
time  had  lost  some  of  his  control,  claim  that  he  had  more  information 
on  China  than  I  had,  which  was,  of  course,  true.  He  went  so  far 
as  to  say  that  Chinese  Communists  under  Mao  Tse-tung  were  real 
democrats  and  that  they  were  really  agrarian  reformers  and  had  no 
connection  with  Soviet  Russia. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  say  Professor  Lattimore  said  the  Chinese 
Communists  were  democrats,  agrarian  reformers,  and  had  no  con- 
nection with  Soviet  Russia? 
Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Had  you  taken  the  opposite  view  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Oh,  yes.  I  think  most  scholars  felt  the  same  way 
at  the  time. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  you  were  right  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  felt  I  was  right. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  most  scholars  feel 

Mr.  Colegrove.  At  that  time  I  think  most  impartial  scholars  were 
very  hesitant  to  believe  that  the  Chinese  Communists  did  not  have 
some  connection  with.  Soviet  Russia,  that  Mao  Tse-tung  was  a  Marx- 
ian doctrinnaire  and  not  a  mere  agrarian  reformer,  and  certainly 
not  a  democrat  in  any  respect. 

I  told  Lattimore  on  this  occasion  that  I  felt  that  he  was  saying 
something  he  didn't  believe  himself,  and  I  was  surprised  to  see  Latti- 
more back  down. 

Mr.  INIoRRis.  You  say  he  was  conversing  with  you  in  a  state  of 
temper  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  think  he  got  very  annoyed  with  me  and  didn't 
exercise  caution  which  he  generally  does  exercise. 

JMr.  Morris.  Did  he  mention  whether  or  not  he  felt  that  the  Chinese 
Communists  were  receiving  aid  from  Soviet  Russia  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  He  claimed  they  were  not.  In  fact,  he  went  so 
far  as  to  say  there  was  no  means  of  communication. 

The  Chairman.  Was  it  not  quite  well  known  at  that  time  that  young 
Chinese  had  been  taken  to  Moscow  and  indoctrinated  and  trained? 
That  was  a  matter  of  pretty  common  knowledge ;  was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Certainly,  among  persons  who  followed  the  situa- 
tion in  Asia,  that  was  very  well  known. 

The  Chairman.  Mao  Tse-tung  was  one  of  them  ? 

Mr.  Colegroms.  Well,  Mao  Tse-tung  had  not  gone  to  Moscow.  He 
was  one  of  the  few  who  did  not.  Every  one  of  his  lieutenants  were 
Moscow-trained.     That  applied  especially  to  Chou  En  Lai. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Were  you  not  somewhat  surprised  at  Latti- 
more's  stand  being  in  the  OWI,  Lattimore  taking  the  stand  he  did  in 
relation  to  these  Communists  in  China? 

Mr,  Colegrove.  I  was  amazed,  frankly.  I  got  the  impression  that 
perhaps  Professor  Lattimore  was  not  folloAving  instructions  from  the 
State  Department  that  he  should  be  following  with  reference  to  his 
duties  in  San  Francisco. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  is  what  I  meant. 

Mv.  Colegrove.  About  this  time  the  official  view  of  the  United 
States  was  that  nothing  disparaging  should  be  said  of  the  Japanese 


914  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Emperor,  the  Tano  system;  nothing  should  be  done  to  arouse  hatred 
or  antagonism  of  the  imperial  household,  because  my  understanding  is 
that  Mr.  Grew,  who  was  the  Under  Secretary  of  State,  had  the  opinion 
that  the  Emperor  would  be  of  very  great  assistance  in  bringing  about 
the  surrender  of  Japan  when  finally  Japan  should  wisely  surrender. 
The  militarists  would  never  give  in.  So,  if  you  could  only  get  the 
Emperor,  you  would  save  a  situation. 

Owen  Lattimore's  view  from  conversations  was,  as  I  recall,  that  the 
Emperor's  system  was  the  greatest  deterrent  to  democracy  in  Jai)an 
and  that  the  Emperor  and  his  whole  family  should  be  exterminated. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  mean  killed  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Killed,  destroyed.  Publicly  he  did  not  go  that  far. 
He  went  that  far  privately. 

Senator  Ferguson.  With  you? 

Mr.  CoLEGKOVE.  Yes.  Publicly  his  proposal  was  that  the  Japanese 
Emperor  and  his  whole  family  should  be  sent  over  to  China  to  be 
dealt  with  by  the  Chinese.  Everybody  vvdio  knew  Asia  at  that  time 
would  realize  the  Chinese  would  annihilate  the  Emperor  and  his 
family  or  put  them  beyond  all  power  of  living. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Professor,  this  line  that  Lattimore  was  taking, 
both  on  the  Emperor  and  the  situation  of  the  Chinese,  was  that,  in  your 
opinion,  the  Soviet  line  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.  That  has  always  been  the  Soviet  line.  The 
Coimnunist  Party  in  Japan  ever  since  1921  has  opposed  the  Emperor. 
That  has  been  the  line  of  the  Communist  Party  in  Japan  while  they 
were  underground.  They  were  underground  from  1923  on.  Of 
course,  the  Communist  Party,  line  in  Japan  was  dictated  by  the 
Kremlin. 

Senator  Ferguson.  But  here  was  a  man,  Owen  Lattimore,  that  was 
well  informed  as  to  America's  stand,  or  should  have  been,  and  as  to 
the  world  situation.  When  he  was  advocating  to  you  privately  these 
matters,  in  your  opinion,  as  you  said  to  him  once,  I  believe,  that  he 
was  advocating  something  that  he  ci)uld  hardly  believe  himself  but 
he  was  still  advocating  it,  that  was  the  Communist  line? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.    1  do  not  charge  him 


Senator  Ferguson.  With  being  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  No.  I  did  not  charge  him  with  following  the 
Communist  line.  I  simply  told  him  I  was  sure  he  knew  better,  that 
Mao  Tse-tung  was  not  a  democrat  and  a  mere  agrarian  reformer.  I 
probably  did  not  make  my  statement  clear  here  when  I  said  1  talked 
these  tilings  over  with  Lattimore  on  the  occasion  of  our  visit  in 
December  1943. 

Also  I  discussed  with  Lattimore  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
toward  the  Emperor  that  was  being  followed  by  the  State  Depart- 
ment, the  War  Department  and  the  OWI  at  that  time. 

Senator  Eastland.  Why  did  you  decline  a  job  in  San  Francisco? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Largely  personal.  I  did  not  trust  Owen  Lattimore. 
1  did  not  care  to  be  associated  with  him. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  thought  they  were  following  the  Com- 
munist line  out  there? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  can't  say  that  I  was  that  alert.  Senator.  Some 
of  us  professors  are  not  as  alert  as  we  should  be.  I  could  not  say  that 
Owen  Lattimore  was  following  the  Communist  line.  I  didn't  like  his 
attitude  on  Asiatic  problems. 


INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  915 

Senator  Eastland.  You  say  it  was  a  Communist  line? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.    I  say  it  was  the  Connnunist  line. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  say  you  did  not  trust  him.  Therefore,  you 
did  not  take  the  job.    Is  that  right? 

Mr.  Colegkove.  Yes. 

Senator  Eastland.  Why  did  you  not  trust  him? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  For  those  reasons. 

Senator  Eastland.  Because  he  was  following  the  Communist  line? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  I  would  say  in  the  back  of  my  mind  that 
would  stand  out,  but  at  that  time  I  would  not  have  said  that  Owen 
Lattimore  is  following  the  Communist  line. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  no  doubt  about  it  now  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  That  was  the  Communist  line.  As  you  look  back 
over  the  situation  and  compare  it  with  the  editorials  in  the  Daily 
Worker,  you  can  see  definitely  that  was  the  Communist  line. 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor,  on  the  10th  of  July  of  this  year  while  you 
were  examined  in  executive  session  you  were  shown  a  letter  dated 
July  10,  1938,  by  Owen  Lattimore  to  Mr.  Carter.  I  would  like  to 
show  this  to  you  once  again  and  ask  you  if  you  will  make  any  general 
connnent  on  the  last  full  paragraph  on  the  first  page  and  the  first 
paragraph  on  the  second  page. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  this? 

Mr.  Morris.  This,  Senator,  is  a  letter  which  has  been  introduced 
in  evidence  previously,  a  letter  from  Owen  Lattimore  to  Edward  C. 
Carter,  dated  July  10.  1938,  and  officially  made  a  part  of  our  record. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  drawing  his  attention  to  certain  para- 
graphs? 

Mr.  Morris.  Two  paragraphs. 

The  CiiAiR3iAN.  What  is  your  question? 

Mr.  Morris.  I  have  just  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  he  was 
shown  that  letter  in  executive  session  and  asked  to  comment  on  it,  I 
am  going  to  ask  him  if  he  will  make  any  comments  now. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  it  would  be  well  for  you  to  read  the  para- 
graphs. 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  One  paragraph  that  you  refer  to  here  Professor 
Lattimore  says : 

I  think  that  yon  are  pretty  cagey  in  turning  over  so  much  of  the  China  section 
of  tlie  inquiry  to  Asiaticus,  Han-seng,  and  Chi.  They  will  bring  out  the  ab  o- 
Uitely  essential  radical  aspects,  but  can  be  depended  ou  to  do  it  with  the  right 
touch. 

Chi  was  a  member  of  the  editorial  board  of  Amerasia  and  I  did  not 
know  at  that  time  he  was  a  Communist,  but  it  was  very  evident  that 
he  was  following  the  Communist  line. 

Mr.  Morris.  It  was  evident  to  you.  Professor,  that  Chi,  while  you 
were  on  the  board  of  Amerasia  with  him,  was  follovving  the  Com- 
munist Party  line? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  That  came  gradually  into  our  minds,  that  he  was 
following  the  Communist  line.  At  first  we  thought  he  was  a  bright 
young  Chinese  scholar  who  had  a  mass  of  information,  which  he  did. 
He  had  a  mass  of  information.  We  finally  realized  it  was  along  the 
Communist  line  entirely. 

The  Chairman.  When  you  use  the  term  "we"  aj-e  you  using  the 
editorial  "we"  applying  to  yourself? 


916  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Mr.  CoLEGRovE.  I  would  say  it  included  members  of  the  committee 
like  Cyrus  Peake  and  myself.  I  assume  otlier  members  who  were  very 
sympathetic  toward  the  Kremlin  knew  it  all  the  time. 

The  last  paragraph  reads : 

For  the  general  purposes  of  this  inquiry  it  seems  to  me  tlnit  the  good  scoring 
position  for  the  IPR  differs  with  d'fferent  countries.  For  Cli'na,  my  liunch  is 
that  it  will  pay  to  keep  behind  the  official  Chinese  Communist  position — far 
enough  not  to  be  covered  by  the  same  label — but  enough  ahead  of  the  active 
Chinese  liberals  to  be  noticeable. 

That  sentence,  together  with  his  whole  letter,  seems  to  me  to  be  one 
of  the  most  intellectually  dishonest  academic  documents  that  I  have 
ever  seen.  This  is  a  complete  negation  of  what  the  IPR  said  to  pro- 
fessors and  teachers  all  over  the  country  that  it  was.  In  its  solicita- 
tion for  membership  it  had  always  emphasized  the  scholarly,  scientific 
viewpoint  that  it  was  presenting,  amplified  by  the  fact  that  it  was 
not  trying  to  advocate  the  interest  of  any  particular  country  but  only 
giving  us  the  benefit  of  their  researches  and  their  scholarship. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  you  thought  it  was  an  honest 
organization  and  this  sentence  indicates  to  you  that  it  was  really  a 
fraud  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGRO\TE.  Ycs.  This  is  fraudulent.  This  is  one  of  the  most 
contemjDtible  things  I  know  from  the  whole  academic  world.  Thou- 
sands of  university  professors  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  students 
all  over  the  country  who  were  beginning  to  study  Asia  looked  upon 
this  institute  as  an  unbiased,  wholly  scientific  institution  engaged  in 
research,  engaged  in  discovery  of  the  truth  and  in  not  following  any 
line. 

I  and  other  scholars  would  have  been  shocked  if  we  knew  that  one 
official  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  was  writing  to  the  secre- 
tary-general telling  him  to  follow  a  certain  line  with  reference  to 
China,  Japan,  with  reference  to  Indonesia. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Professor,  to  do  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  deceive 
the  people,  not  to  come  out  and  announce  it  was  a  Communist  propa- 
ganda agency  but  to  deceive  the  people,  isn't  that  true  with  that 
sentence  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  It  was  shocking.  It  is  almost  revolting  to 
think  that  you  yourself  were  misled  by  such  an  organization.  This 
will  have  done  a  very  great  injury  to  organized  scholarship  in  the 
United  States.  It  is  no  wonder  people  are  suspicious  of  the  Rocke- 
feller Foundation  or  of  the  Carnegie  Corp.  which  gives  so  much 
money  to  organizations  of  this  sort. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Then  to  realize  those  that  had  charge  of  it 
would  use  it  as  a  means  of  deceiving  the  people  and  use  it  really  as  a 
propaganda  agency  or  front  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  This  shows  behind  the  front  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations  was  nothing  else  than  a  propaganda  organization  support- 
ing a  line. 

Senator  Eastland.  A  Communist  line? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  In  this  case  a  Communist  line. 

Mr.  Morris.  Thank  you.  Professor. 

This,  Mr.  Chairman,  has  already  been  introduced  into  the  record  as 
exhibit  No.  4  on  the  first  day  of  the  open  hearing. 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  record  show  exhibit  No.  4  is  the  exhibit 
in  the  hands  of  the  witness  at  this  time  from  which  he  testified. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  917 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor  Colegrove,  did  you  attend  a  conference  held 
under  the  auspices  of  the  State  Department  on  October  C,  7,  and  8, 
1949? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.  I  was  invited  to  attend  that  conference.  The 
invitation  came  in  a  telegram  signed  by  Dean  Acheson,  Secretary  of 
State. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  was  your  understanding  of  this  conference, 
Professor  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove,  My  understanding  had  been  that  Professor  Jessup 
had  been  charged  by  the  State  Department  with  the  formulation  of 
a  new  policy  for  China  and  that  a  committee  had  been  set  up  with 
Professor  Jessup  as  chairman,  President  Case  and  Dr.  Fosdick  as 
the  two  other  members,  and  that  Ambassador  Jessup  and  the  State 
Department  wished  to  receive  advice  from  experts  regarding  what 
the  policy  of  the  United  States  in  China  should  be. 

I  might  say  the  collapse  of  the  Kuomintang  or  Nationalist  Govern- 
ment had  occurred  that  summer. 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor,  were  Messrs.  Jessup,  Fosdick,  and  Case  all 
three  IPR  men  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  believe  they  were,  but  Mr.  Jessup  of  course  was 
the  member  of  the  board  of  trustees.  I  believe  Dr.  Fosdick  was  also. 
1  have  always  assumed  that  President  Case  was  a  member. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  testified,  Professor,  that  this  conference,  to  your 
understanding,  was  called  by  Mr.  Jessup  in  order  to  assist  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  in  formulating  far-eastern. policy  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  wouldn't  like  to  be  positive  about  that.  I  would 
say  that  impression  was  that  the  list  was  prepared  by  Ambassador 
Jessup.  The  invitation  was  over  the  signature  of  the  Secretary  of 
State. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  the  record  to  show  that  the 
conference  we  are  now  having  testimony  about  is  the  conference,  the 
transcript  of  which  was  asked  for  by  you  of  the  State  Department 
and  which  was  denied. 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  record  so  show. 

Mr.  Morris.  At  the  time  of  receiving  a  letter  from  the  State  Depart- 
ment a  list  of  consultants  who  did  attend  this  conference  was  made 
available.  I  would  like  now  to  show  this  list  to  Professor  Colegrove 
to  refresh  his  recollection  on  the  make-up  of  that  particular  con- 
ference. 

The  Chairman.  This  is  the  list  attached  to  the  letter  addressed  to 
me  under  date  of  September  12,  1951,  over  the  signature  of  Jack  K. 
McFall,  Assistant  Secretary ;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Colegrove.  May  I  use  this  ? 
.  Mr.  Morris.  Yes. 

Would  you  just  state  that  most  of  the  participants  of  that  confer- 
ence were  associated  with  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  It  seems  to  me,  Mr.  Morris,  that  most  of  these  are 
members  of  the  IPR,_  and  many  of  them  are  high-ranking  officers. 

The  Chairman.  High-ranking  officers  of  what  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Of  the  IPR,  that  is,  members  of  the  board  of 
trustees.  I  must  say  I  was  never  a  high-ranking  officer  in  the  Insti- 
tute of  Pacific  Relations.    I  was  merely  a  member.     Thousands  of 


918  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

people  in  the  United  States  were  members  simply  to  subscribe  to  the 
Survey  and  other  publications. 

The  Chairman.  Were  you  a  member  of  the  editorial  staff  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  No;  but  I  was  a  member  of  the  advisory  editorial 
board  of  Amerasia  but  not  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  propose  that  the  best  way  of  identifj^- 
ing  or  establishing  whether  or  not  these  people  were  connected  with 
the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  is  during  the  course  of  the  testimony 
of  the  next  wifness  on  this  conference  to  ask  Mr.  Holland,  presently 
secretary-general,  to  confirm  those  who  were  associated  with  the  Insti- 
tute of  Pacific  Relations.  Mr.  Mandel  has  made  a  compilation  from 
our  records,  but  I  suggest  it  is  inadequate  and  that  the  best  way  of 
establishing  it  would  be  to  have  Mr.  Holland  assert  for  our  record  who 
the  members  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  are. 

The  Chairman.  He  is  coming  on  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  No;  but  during  the  testimony  of  our  next  witness  in 
regard  to  this  conference  have  Mr.  Holland  establish  that  fact. 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.  As  I  understand  the  witness'  testimony 
now,  he  is  saying  that  a  considerable  number  of  the  names  on  that  list 
were  high-ranking  officers  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations ;  is  that 
right? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes ;  many  were,  not  a  majority,  but  many  were. 

Mr.  Morris.  Will  you  describe  for  us  the  developments  of  the  con- 
ference as  they  unfolded,  Professor? 

The  Chairman.  You  did  attend  the  conference,  first  of  all  ? 

Mr.  Coi.EGROVE.  Yes,  I  was  present  during  the  3  days  that  the  con- 
ference was  held. 

The  Chairman.  Where  did  it  assemble? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  In  the  State  Department,  in  the  large  conference 
room  I'ight  off  of  the  offices  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 

The  Chairman.  Who  if  anyone  was  the  presiding  officer  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  The  presiding  officer  was  Ambassador  Jessup,  but 
Dr.  Jessup  was  detained  in  Lake  Success  with  the  United  Nations 
affairs  and  was  not  present  in  the  opening  session. 

Mr.  Morris.  He  was  present  during  the  second  and  third  sessions  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.  Dr.  Fosdick  presided  over  the  first  day's 
session. 

Mr.  Morris.  What  were  some  of  the  subjects  discussed  at  that  con- 
ference ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Mr.  Morris,  may  I  say  with  reference  to  giving 
testimony  on  the  subject  of  this  conference  in  the  State  Department 
that  the  State  Department  did  say  that  the  proceedings  would  be  con- 
fidential and  would  not  be  given  to  the  press.  The  implication  was 
that  members  of  the  conference  should  not  discuss  this  matter  with 
the  press. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  take  it  that  it  is  proper  for  any  member  of  the 
conference  who  is  testifying  before  a  Senate  committee  to  speak  very 
frankly  with  reference  to  what  was  said  and  done  in  the  conference. 

Mr.  SouRAViNE.  It  is  not  only  proper,  sir;  you  are  under  oath, 

Mr.  CoLEGROM-:.  And  must  answer  the  questions. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  called  in  by  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.  The  telegram  was  signed  Dean  Acheson. 
Secretary  of  State. 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  919 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  acting  as  a  Government  official? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes. 

Senator  Fercuson.  "Were  you  paid  or  not? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE,  Travel  expenses  were  given  and  a  per  diem. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  were  to  advise  with  the  various  members 
there  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Advise  with  Ambassador  Jessup's  committee. 

Senator  Ferguson.  It  was  public  business;  that  is,  the  Govern- 
ment was  paying  for  it,  setting  it  up  and  taxpayers"  money  was  being 
used 'for  it? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  The  obvious  purpose  was  to  formulate  far  eastern 
policy  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  So  we  understood. 

Senator  Jenner.  Were  there  any  press  releases  issued  from  this 
conference? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  Some  time  later,  as  I  recollect,  and  I  am 
sorry  I  cannot  give  you  the  exact  date,  the  State  Department  pub- 
lished a  list  of  consultants. 

Senator  Jenner.  Did  they  publish  any  news  or  anything  said  in 
the  conference? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  No.    My  understanding  is  they  did  not. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  the  question  of  Communist  China  discussed  ? 

JNIr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  The  recognition  of  Communist  China  was 
one  of  the  very  important  questions  discussed.  When  Ambassador 
Jessup  arrived  he  frankly  said  that  the  Department  wanted  the  ad- 
vice of  these  consultants  on  the  question  of  recognition  of  Communist 
China,  on  the  question  of  the  Japan  Peace  Treaty,  on  the  question  of 
a  Pacific  pact,  and  on  the  question  of  giving  economic  aid  to  Commu- 
nist and  non-Communist  countries  in  Asia.  Those  four  subjects  were 
broadly  discussed  and  a  great  many  other  subjects,  too. 

Mr.  Morris.  Was  there  a  tendency  of  the  various  people  during  the 
course  of  these  3  days  to  break  clown  into  groups  and  take  positions 
on  the  subjects  as  they  arose? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes,  there  was  that  tendency.  As  you  will  notice,  it 
always  occurs  in  a  group  of  individuals.  You  can  classify  them  more 
or  less  closely  into  groups.  If  you  are  going  to  limit  the  groups  to 
thre'e.  I  would  say  that  one  group  was  very  obviously  pro-American  in 
its  thinking,  put  America  first,  that  is,  foreign  policy  must  serve  the 
national  interest  of  the  American  people. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  that  group  generally  take  a  strong  anti-Commu- 
nist position? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  That  group  took  a  very  strong  anti-Communist  posi- 
tion. Now  on  the  other  side  of  this  group  they  were  not  thinking  so 
much  of  America  as  they  were  thinking  of  other  things  and  that  group 
tended  to  be  sympathetic  to  Communistic  China  and  very,  very  con- 
siderate of  the  Kremlin. 

Senator  Eastland.  Who  was  that  group  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGRo^^5.  I  would  say  the  leader  of  that  group,  if  you  consider 
he  was  a  leader,  was  Professor  Lattimore. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Owen  Lattimore? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Owen  Lattimore.  I  would  put  in  that  group  Mr. 
Rosinger. 

Mr.  Morris.  Is  that  Lawrence  K.  Rosinger? 


920  INSTITUTE    OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes,  of  IPR. 

Mr.  Morris.  I  would  like  the  record  to  show  at  this  time  that  Law- 
rence K.  Rosinger  has  been  identified  by  two  witnesses  as  having  been 
a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

The  Chairman.  By  two  witnesses  before  this  committee? 

Mr.  Morris.  Before  this  committee. 

Mr.  CoLEGRovE.  More  or  less,  Professor  Fairbank. 

Mr.  Morris.  Prof.  John  K.  Fairbank? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes. 

To  some  extent  E.eischauer  of  Harvard  and  Professor  Peffer  of 
Columbia  University. 

Senator  Eastland.  As  I  understand.  Ambassador  Jessup  invited 
Owen  Lattimore  to  a  conference  in  Washington  to  advise  and  assist 
in  formulating  United  States  Government's  China  policy  and  advise 
with  him  on  the  Japanese  Peace  Treaty;  is  that  right? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  Well,  if  Owen  Lattimore  received  the  very  same 
telegram  that  I  received,  it  was  signed  by  Dean  Acheson,  Secretary  of 
State. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  say  the  list  was  made  up  by  Professor 
Jessup  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  assume  that.    I  don't  know ;  that  was  the  talk. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  do  know  that  Professor  Jessup  was  in  charge  of 
this  particular  conference  you  attended  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.  I  think  the  Secretary  of  State  would  not 
act  very  wisely  if  he  didn't  allow  Ambassador  Jessup  to  select  his 
own  expert. 

Senator  Eastland.  Was  that  in  1949  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  October  6,  7,  and  8,  1949. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  mentioned  the  interest  for  America  in  the 
first  group  and  then  you  said  there  were  others  you  thought  were 
thinking  of  something  else  than  the  primary  interest  of  America  and 
her  relations  to  the  world.    What  was  that  other  thing? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  With  reference  to^this  extreme  group? 

Senator  Ferguson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  felt  that  they  were  very  sympathetic  toward  Chi- 
nese Communists  and  also  were  extremely  careful  with  reference  to 
the  Kremlin. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  other  words,  they  were  favoring,  in 'your 
opinion,  the  Communist  line  rather  than  the  good  interests  of  the 
United  States  of  America  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  That  was  my  impression. 

Senator  Ferguson.  From  what  was  said  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  they  advocate  economic  aid  to  Communist 
China? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes,  very,  very  strongly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  And  recognition  of  Communist  China? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Immediate  recognition  of  Communist  China,  and 
were  very  much  opposed  to  a  Pacific  pact. 

The  Chairman.  You  have  named  certain  people  who  were  present 
at  that  meeting  as  belonging  to  that  particular  group  that  favored 
Communist  China  and  the  Kremlin.  Have  you  named  all  of  them 
that  you  can  recall  who  belonged  to  that  group? 


INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS  921 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  I  see  one  other  name  I  should  have  thought  of ,  Mr. 
Benjamin  H.  Kizer,  who  is  very  decidedly  of  that  group;  sometimes 
Eugene  Staley,  Professor  Staley. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  the  chairman  take  any  side  as  to  what 
group  he  was  with  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Ambassador  Jessup  gave  no  sign  he  was  in  favor 
of  one  or  the  other.  He  w^as  a  good  presiding  officer.  He  was  a  good 
parliamentarian.  Ambassador  Jessup  is  suave,  courteous,  almost 
deferential.  He  knows  how  to  cut  off  debate  without  offending  any- 
one's sensibilities.    He  is  an  excellent  presiding  officer. 

At  the  same  time  Professor  Jessup  is  a  great  scholar.  I  have  very 
great  respect  for  his  scholarship,  his  learning,  and  his  books  on  inter- 
national law  particularly  are  very  notable  contributions. 

In  this  conference  Mr.  Jessup  did  not  indicate  his  own  personal 
attitude  on  any  question  whatsoever. 

Mr.  Morris.  Professor  Colegrove,  as  a  matter  of  fact  which  group 
dominated  the  conference  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  felt  that  the  group  that  was  sympathetic  to  Red 
China  dominated  the  conference.  Governor  Stassen  was  among  those 
who  were  very  much  opposed  to  Soviet  Russia.  Ballantine,  Joseph 
W.  Ballantine,  was  opposed.  Professor  Brodie  was  very  much  op- 
posed. I  was  decidedly  opposed  myself.  I  think  we  could  add  the 
name  of  Professor  Buss  as  among  those  who  took  a  strong  anti-Com- 
munist attitude.  I  felt  that  we  were  in  the  minority,  I  am  sorry  to 
say. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  the  people  avIio  did  favor  Communist  China  were 
in  the  majority  and  they  dominated  the  conference? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes. 

Then  the  third  group  I  mentioned  was  a  group  between,  that  was  on 
one  side  once  and  on  the  other  side  again,  persons  who  were  a  little 
unstable — well,  a  little  undecided  as  to  the  position  they  wished  to 
follow. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  the  record  show  at  this  time  that 
a  subpena  has  been  sent  to  Governor  Stassen  to  appear  before  this 
committee  next  Monday  afternoon  in  connection  with  the  testimony 
given  today  by  Professor  Colegrove? 

The  Chairman.  Very  well.    The  subpena  has  been  issued  ? 

Mr.  Morris.  It  is  going  out  today.  Senator. 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  am  sorry,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  not  had  an  op- 
portunity to  read  the  transcript  that  the  State  Department  kept. 

The  Chairman.  Was  there  a  transcript  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  A  transcript  was  made  of  everything  by  the  State 
Department.  Governor  Stassen  was  very  shrewd;  I  believe  he  had 
his  own  secretary  there  making  a  transcript.  But  I  have  had  no 
opportunity  to  review  this,  the  proceedings,  and  I  am  speaking  wholly 
from  my  memory  2  years  ago. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  have  spoken  generally  of  opinion,  so  you 
have  not  attempted  to  give  specific  statements. 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes;  except  I  would  be  specific  on  the  question  of 
recognizing  Red  China.  Mr.  Lattimore  was  wholly  for  it.  Mr. 
Kizer  was  for  it.  Mr.  Rosinger  was  for  it  and  Mr.  Staley  Avas  for  it, 
also  Mr.  Fairbank.  I  was  opposed  to  it,  Governor  Stassen  opposed  to 
it,  Ballantine  opposed  to  it,  and  Brodie  opposed  to  it. 


922  INSTITUTE    OF    PACIFIC    RELATIONS 

Senator  Jenner.  Was  there  anything  discussed  in  this  conference 
with  regard  to  our  attitude  toward  Korea  and  Formosa? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  Owen  Lattiniore,  who  had  furnished  the  State 
Department  with  a  memoranda,  proposed  in  that  memoranda  that 
tlie  United  States  immediately  liquidate  its  responsibilities  for  Korea, 
and  in  the  conference  he  expressed  the  same  view.  I  remember  that 
very  distinctly. 

Senator  Eastland.  As  a  loyal  American,  were  you  satisfied  with 
the  men  who  were  invited  to  that  conference  at  the  State  Department 
to  advise  Mr.  Jessup  on  the  formulation  of  China  policy? 

Mr.  CoLEQROVE.  Frankly,  Senator,  I  was  very  much  surprised. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  were  disappointed,  were  you  not? 

Mr.  CoLEGRovE.  I  was  very  much  disappointed. 

Senator  Eastland.  In  fact,  the  group  that  had  been  invited  was 
the  group  largely  that  had  betrayed  the  Chinese  Government  to  the 
Communists? 

Mr.  CoLEGRovE.  That  is  exactly  the  situation. 

Senator  Eastland.  In  fact,  there  were  no  new  experts  but  it  was  the 
same  crowd  that  had  betrayed  this  country  and  sold  China  down  the 
river  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  And  the  State  Department  knew  their  views. 

Senator  Eastland.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  I  might  add  this,  and  I  have  nothing  to  back  it  up 
except  my  impression — I  thought  the  State  Department  in  its  brief- 
ing was  doing  a  little  propaganda  work  on  a  professor  such  as  myself. 

Mr.  Morris.  Who  did  the  briefing  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  There  were  several  officers  who  briefed  us.  Nelson 
Johnson  of  the  Far  Eastern  Commission  did  a  very  good  job  of  brief- 
ing. I  was  very  much  disappointed  in  the  briefing  done  by  Cora 
Du  Bois,  who  briefed  the  conference  upon  southeast  Asia.  I  suspect, 
but  I  haven't  much  to  go  on,  that  the  State  Department  thought  it 
was  good  for  some  of  the  experts,  so-called  experts,  to  indoctrinate  us 
and  when  it  was  over  to  approve  the  new  policy  which  would  be 
recognition  of  New  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  You  thought  that  had  been  the  policy  and  they  just 
wanted  to  get  somebody  to  back  them  up? 

Mr.  CoLEGROATc.  I  got  that  impression,  I  am  sorry  to  say. 

Senator  Eastland.  Now  did  you  read  the  American  white  paper 
on  China? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes,  all  students  of  Asia  studied  that  with  a  great 
deal  of  care. 

Senator  Eastland.  Was  that  an  honest  or  dishonest  and  false 
document? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  In  my  opinion  it  was  one  of  the  most  false  docu- 
ments ever  published  by  any  country. 

Senator  Eastland.  It  was  a  dishonest  document? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Thoi'oughly  dishonest. 

Senator  Eastland.  Who  supervised  the  preparation  of  that  white 
paper? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  The  New  York  Times  said  that  Ambassador  Jessup 
had  been  appointed  by  the  State  Department  to  edit  that  but  I  can 
hardly  believe  that  Phil  Jessup  really  supervised  that  document.  He 
is  a  scholar,  he  is  a  learned  man,  and  as  a  scholar  the  man  must  have 
realized  that  that  document  is  not  the  real  story. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  923 

Senator  Jenner.  Owen  Lattimore  is  a  scholar  and  learned  man? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes,  a  fine  scholar,  he  has  a  fine  command  of  certain 
Asiatic  lano;iiages,  that  is  true. 

Senator  Eastland.  What  about  the  letter  of  transmittal? 

Mr.  CoLEGRO^^.  That  letter  of  transmittal  was  thoroughly  dis- 
honest, especially  the  paragraph  of  the  letter  which  says  that  there 
is  nothing  that  the  United  States  could  have  done  to  save  Chiang 
Kai-shek  and  again,  except  to  reemphasize  it,  the  United  States  had 
left  nothing  undone  that  might  have  saved  him  and  kept  the  Com- 
munists from  winning  the  victory. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  thought  that  was  a  lie? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  That  obviously  was  a  lie,  and  I  must  say  that  those 
sort  of  statements  are  one  thing  we  try  to  teach  freshmen  at  North- 
western University  never  to  make,  such  general  sweeping  statements 
like  that,  and  I  think  by  the  time  they  have  become  seniors  we  have 
taught  them  those  are  not  the  kind  of  statements  to  make. 

Senator  Eastland.  Who  signed  that  letter  of  transmittal  ? 

Mr.  Colegrg^t:.  That  letter  was  under  the  signature,  I  understand, 
of  the  Secretary  of  State,  but  obviously  someone  in  the  Department 
drafted  it  for  him. 

Senator  Eastland.  In  reality  was  it  drafted  by  Professor  Jessup  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE,  I  don't  know.  I  hope  it  was  not.  I  sincerely  hope 
that  Phil  Jessup  did  not  draft  that  letter. 

Senator  Eastland.  But  the  newspaper  said  he  prepared  that  white 
paper,  did  it  not? 

Mr.  CoLEGRovE.  My  understanding  was  that  he  supervised  the  edit- 
ing of  the  paper. 

Senator  Eastland.  Yes,  supervised  the  editing. 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes. 

Senator  Eastland.  Do  you  remember  when  Mr.  Alfred  Kohlberg 
made  charges  that  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  was  Com- 
munist-controlled ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes.  I  was  one  of  the  members  at  that  time  that 
voted  in  favor  of  Mr.  Kohlberg  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  change 
the  direction 

Senator  Eastl^vnd.  All  he  wanted  was  an  investigation? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Merely  an  investigation,  an  outside  investigation. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  he  get  that  investigation  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  No ;  he  did  not. 

Senator  Eastland.  It  was  whitewashed,  was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGRovE.  Very  distinctly. 

Senator  Ferguson.  He  did  not  even  get  an  inside  investigation, 
did  he?  "  ^ 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Presumably  he  got  an  inside  investigation  because 
a  letter  was  sent  saying  that  his  charges  had  been  found  utterly  false. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  know  it  was  a  whitewash,  do  you  not? 

Mr.  Colegroat:.  I  felt  that  very  strongly  even  at  the  time. 

Senator  Eastland.  Did  Professor  Jessup  have  a  hand  in  that  white- 
wash ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  regret  to  say  that  Jessup's  name  is  among  the 
eight  who  signed  the  letter  to  the  members  informing  them  that  the 
charges  were  false. 

22848— 52— pt.  3 15  •'■'   '^'-^  *-■' 


924  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

Senator  Eastland,  And  he  had  a  hand  in  whitewashing  and  con- 
cealing Communist  control  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  an 
organization  which  was  offering  alleged  experts  in  foreign  policy  to 
the  American  Government? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  To  my  great  regret,  his  name  was  in  the  list  of 
eight  informing  the  members. 

Senator  Eastland.  Now  what  about  Indonesia?  Were  you  satis- 
fied with  Professor  Jessup's  stand  in  the  United  Nations  on  the  Dutch 
Government  in  Indonesia  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROA^.  I  might  sa}'-,  in  answer  to  that,  that  my  whole  at- 
titude in  this  matter  goes  back  some  years  and  I  was  utterly  surprised 
that  Phil  Jessup  would  accept  the  chairmanship  of  the  board  of 
trustees  of  the  IPR.  He  is  a  great  international  jurist;  that  is  his 
field.  He  had  not  made  a  reputation,  had  not  at  that  time,  in  the  Far 
East.  He  had  written  no  articles  I  know  of  and  no  books.  He  had 
made  no  special  study.  So  the  appointment  of  Professor  Jessup  as 
chairman  of  the  IPR.  seemed  to  me  at  the  time  to  be  very  peculiar, 
something  extraordinary. 

Senator  Eastland.  Yes ;  but  then  it  was  extraordinary  and  in  his 
attacks  on  the  Dutch  Government  and  Dutch  imperialism  in  Indonesia 
he  followed  the  Communist  line  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  Yes ;  the  Communist  line  for  many  years  has  been 
the  destruction  of  the  Dutch  rule  in  Indonesia. 

Senator  Eastland.  Is  it  your  judgment  that  he  went  beyond  his 
instructions  from  the  State  Department  to  follow  the  Communist  line 
in  this  instance? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Well,  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  speeches  that  Am- 
bassador Jessup  made  to  the  Security  Council  in  December  1948  and 
again  in  January  1949  against  the  Dutch  Government  were  very  unfair 
and  were  not  the  speeches  that  a  scholar  should  make.  There  was  a 
rumor  around  the  State  Department  that  Ambassador  Jessup  had 
exceeded  his  instructions  in  pressing  the  Security  Council  to  take 
drastic  action  against  the  Dutch. 

I  recall  a  dinner  I  had  with  Ambassador  Jessup  in  February  of 
1949  at  which  I  said  to  him  that  rumors  had  been  to  the  effect  that  he 
had  exceeded  his  instructions  in  the  Indonesia  affair.  Phil  Jessup, 
however,  denied  that  had  been  the  case  and  told  me  that  he  had  not 
exceeded  his  instructions.    Nevertheless  the  rumors  persisted. 

Senator  Eastland.  He  was  following  the  Communist  line  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Well,  that  is  the  Communist  line. 

Senator  Eastland.  Now,  do  you  know  Edward  C.  Carter? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes ;  he  is  a  fine,  old  gentleman.  I  have  always  been 
annoyed  by  Mr.  Carter.  He  is  really,  let  me  say,  not  the  type  of  man 
who  should  have  headed  a  research  institute. 

Senator  Eastland.  I  certainly  agree  with  you.  He  ought  to  have 
been  on  Union  Square. 

Now  in  April  of  1945  there  were  charges  that  Carter  was  attempting 
to  influence  the  State  Department  to  force  the  Generalissimo  to  take 
the  Chinese  Communists  into  his  government ;  that  is  true,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes;  those  rumors  were  present  and  began  even 
before  that  time. 

Senator  Eastland.  Do  you  think  the  board  of  trustees  of  the  in- 
stitute should  have  called  Carter  to  rein  then  ? 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  925 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  I  was  very  much  disturbed  by  those  rumors.  I 
wrote  to  Raymond  Dennett,  who  was  acting  as  secretary  at  that  time, 
and  also  I  chose  him  because  I  knew  him  very  well.  I  wrote  to  him 
informing  him  that  the  rumors  were  that  Edward  Carter  and  other 
IPR  officers  had  been  lobbying  for  the  State  Department  to  force 
Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  take  the  Communists  into  his  gov- 
ernment and  even  to  share  the  Chinese  govermnent  on  a  50-50  basis. 
I  said  I  objected  very  strongly  to  any  officer  of  the  IPE.  lobbying  this 
way  with  the  State  Department  and  particularly  on  work  that  was 
said  to  have  been  done  by  Edward  Carter. 

Senator  Eastland.  Do  you  not  think  that  Professor  Jessup  and  the 
trustees  of  the  institute  should  have  stopped  Carter  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Certainly.  I  got  a  letter  back  saying  that  Carter 
wasn't  doing  anything  like  that  but  I  can  hardly  believe  that  letter 
because  I  think  the  letter  informing  me  was 

The  Chairman.  From  whom  was  the  letter  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Raymond  Dennett,  son  of  Tyler  Dennett.  Dennett 
at  that  time  was  acting  as  secretary  of  the  IPR. 

Senator  Eastland.  In  that  instance  were  you  not  disappointed  in 
Professor  Jessup,  that  he  did  not  attempt  to  prevent  Carter  from 
lobbying  with  the  State  Department  to  force  Communists  in  the 
generalissimo's  government  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  I  was  disappointed  with  the  whole  board  of 
trustees. 

Senator  Eastland.  Jessup  was  one  of  them  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  Jessup  was  one  of  the  board  of  trustees  at  that 
time.  I  was  disappointed  with  all  of  them  for  not  taking  these 
rumors  and  examining  them  and  for  not  taking  action  against  Carter, 
who  I  believe  unquestionably  was  lobbying  with  the  State  Department. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  believe  unquestionr»bly  he  was  lobbying 
with  the  State  Department? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes. 

Senator  Eastland.  To  force  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  put  Communists 
in  the  government? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes. 

Senator  Eastland.  You  said  on  a  50-50  basis  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes,  that  was  the  rumor. 

Senator  Eastland.  That  would  have  meant  a  bloodless  revolution 
in  China? 

Mr.  CoLESGROVE.  Yes.  Whenever  the  Communists  move  in,  even 
on  less  than  a  50-50  basis,  they  take  over  the  government  in  a  very 
short  time.    We  have  seen  that  too  frequently  in  Europe. 

Senator  Ferguson.  We  have  had  great  trouble  discovering  who  in 
the  State  Department  prepared  the  memorandum  for  General  Mar- 
shall when  he  went  out  to  accomplish  that  mission. 

Senator  Eastland.  In  fact.  Professor  Jessup  had  been  close  to  this 
left-wing  group  all  along,  had  he  not,  Lattimore,  Field  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Unfortunately  that  seems  to  be  the  case. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  want  to  go  back  to  this  question  of  the  ex- 
perts being  briefed  at  the  meeting  in  the  State  Department.  Was  that 
briefing  before  you  were  asked  to  give  your  opinion  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  It  began  with  a  briefing  by  George  Kennan  on  the 
very  first  day  and  the  rest  of  it  was  interspersed.     I  was  very  much 


926  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

disappointed  in  the  briefing  by  George  Kennan.  This  was  a  confer- 
ence upon  the  Far  East  and  George  Kennan  didn't  tell  us  anything 
that  we  hadn't  known  or  thought  about  for  years  and  years  and  years. 
I  thought  George  Kennan  just  wasted  the  time  of  the  conference. 

Senator  Ferguson.  You  got  a  kind  of  feeling  that  the  briefing  was 
to  give  you  some  propaganda  to  take  back  to  the  people  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  I  felt  distinctly  that  the  briefing  by  Cora  Du  Bois 
was  of  that  kind.  The  briefing  done  on  the  military  situation  by 
Colonel  McCann  didn't  give  us  anything  we  had  not  already  read  in 
the  New  York  Times. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Did  you  get  an  impression  from  this  conference 
on  the  Far  East,  which  you  said  was  in  your  estimation  propaganda, 
that  it  was  the  desire  of  the  State  Department  to  have  a  policy  of 
great  leniency  at  least  toward  the  Connnunists  in  China  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  The  State  Department  didn't  tip  its  hand  in  this 
respect.     I  indicated  that  Ambassador  Jessup 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  am  not  talking  about  his  action  but  the  lady 
who  briefed  you. 

The  Chairman.  Senator,  I  would  like  to  have  him  conclude  his 
sentence  there.  It  would  be  interesting.  You  said  didn't  tip  its 
hand? 

Mr.  Coij:grove.  Didn't  tip  its  hand,  and  Ambassador  Jessup  is  a 
very  clever  and  able  presiding  officer.  He  didn't  disclose  his  own 
views,  but  the  briefing  by  Cora  Du  Bois  was  a  briefing  very  sympa- 
thetic toward  the  Communists. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Those  were  the  kind  of  questions  that  were  being 
brought  up  in  the  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Do  you  know  when  her  briefing  took  place? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  think  her  briefing  took  place  in  the  second  session. 

Senator  Ferguson.  When  was  the  question  discussed  on  the  recog- 
nition of  China  by  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Curiously  enough  t^at  was  discussed  in  every  ses- 
sion but  particularly  emphasized  in  what  would  be  the  second  session. 

Senator  Ferguson.  How  did  this  lady  who  briefed  you  stand  on 
that  question  ?     Did  she  express  herself  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  She  was  talking  only  about  southeast  Asia  and  did 
not  cover  other  subjects. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  introduce  in  the  record 
at  this  time  the  only  document  that  we  have  on  the  reports  made  at 
this  particular  conference.  That  is  a  text  of  Lattimore's  memoran- 
dum which  he  himself  released  during  the  time  of  the  Foreign  Policy 
Committee's  investigation  of  the  same  subject  a  year  ago.  I  think  it 
is  appropriate  if  we  put  that  in  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  think  we  mi^ht  ask  Mr.  Colegrove  whether  or  not  the  views  set 
forth  there  coincide  generally  with  the  views  that  Mr.  Lattimore  ex- 
pressed at  the  conference,  according  to  his  testimony. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  read  this  memorandum  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  have  read  this  memorandum. 

The  Chairman.  This  that  has  been  handed  to  the  chairman  pur- 
ports to  be  the  New  York  Times  of  Tuesday,  April  4,  1950.  It  is  a 
photostatic  copy  of  certain  parts  of  the  New  York  Times.  What  is 
it  that  you  want  ?     How  do  you  identify  it  ? 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  927 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  Mr.  Mandel  will  authenticate  that 
photostat. 

Mr.  Mandel.  This  is  a  photostat  of  the  New  York  Times  of  April 
4,  1950,  pages  1  and  21,  being  a  news  release  accompanying  the  text 
of  Lattimore's  memorandum  on  the  United  States  far-eastern  policy. 
It  says : 

Following  is  the  text  of  Owen  Latimore's  memorandum  on  United  States  in 
the  Far  East,  drafted  for  a  State  Department  advisory  committee  last  August 
and  made  public  today  by  Mr.  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  That  is  the  photostat  of  the  New  York  Times  of  the 
morning  of 

Mr.  Mandel.  April  4,  1950. 

Mr.  Morris.  As  such  may  it  be  introduced  in  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  introduced. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibit  No.  280- A" 
and  "Exhibit  No.  280-B"  and  are  filed  as  follows :) 

Exhibit  No.  280-A 

[From  the  New  York  Times,  April  4,  1950] 

Lattimore  Bares  His  Memorandum  On  Far  East  Policy — Professor  Acts 
After  Senator  Challenges  State  Department  to  Release  the  Document — 
He  Opposed  Aid  to  Chiang  But  Urged  Efforts  to  Convince  Orientals  They 
Should  Turn  to  United  States  and  Not  Russia 

Washington,  April  3. — Prof.  Owen  Lattimore  made  public  today  a  secret 
memorandum  on  proposed  far-eastern  policy  that  he  had  submitted  to  the  State 
Department  last  August. 

He  did  so  after  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  Republican,  of  Wisconsin,  who 
has  accused  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  professor  of  being  a  "top  Soviet  es- 
pionage agent,"  demanded  that  the  State  Department  release  the  document,  or 
"it  will  be  my  duty  as  a  United  States  Senator  to  do  so." 

The  State  Department  said,  however,  that  Mr.  Lattimore's  views,  together 
with  those  of  about  30  other  persons,  were  solicited  on  a  confidential  basis,  and 
that  it  had  no  right  to  make  them  public. 

Then  a  few  hours  later,  Mr.  Lattimore,  who  has  called  the  spy  charge  "an 
unmitigated  lie,"  released  the  contents  of  his  memorandum,  saying : 

"Senator  McCarthy  in  typical  fashion  is  seeking  by  insinuation  and  conceal- 
ment to  spread  some  of  the  poison  of  which  he  has  an  inexhaustible  supply." 

aid  for  CHIANG  OPPOSED 

In  the  memorandum.  Professor  Lattimore  warned  against  United  States  sup- 
port for  the  Chinese  Nationalist  leader,  Chiang  Kai-shek,  but  recommended  efforts 
to  convince  the  far-eastern  peoples  that  it  was  this  counti'y  and  not  the  Soviet 
Union  to  which  they  should  turn. 

Mr.  Lattimore  bade  the  State  Department  "avoid  premature  or  excessive" 
commitment  of  American  resources  in  the  Far  East,  and  said  that  if  there  was 
to  be  war,  "it  can  be  won  only  by  defeating  Russia — not  Northern  Korea,  or 
Viet  Nam,  or  even  China." 

He  said  that  Russia  had  won  gains  in  the  Far  East  without  lessening  the 
strength  she  could  "deploy  toward  Europe"  and  cautioned  against  any  United 
States  assumption  that  Russia  would  become  so  involved  in  China  that  she 
would  no  longer  be  able  to  "maneuver  in  Europe." 

WOULD  BAR  USE  OF  JAPAN 

'"It  is  not  possible  to  make  Japan  a  satisfactory  instrument  of  American 
policy,"  he  said,  and  "South  Korea  is  more  of  a  liability  than  an  asset  to  the 
interests  of  the  United  States." 

"The  kind  of  policy  that  failed  in  support  of  so  great  a  figure  as  Chiang  Kai- 
shek  cannot  possibly  succeed  if  it  is  applied  to  a  scattering  of  "little  Chiang 
Kai-sheks'  in  China  or  elsewhere  in  Asia,"  he  wrote. 


928  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

In  his  statement,  Senator  McCarthy  said  that  the  State  Department  con- 
sidered tlie  Lattimore  report  "so  important  and  of  such  a  confidential  nature 
that  the  American  people  were  not  entitled  to  know  its  contents."  He  has  been 
arguing  that  Mr.  Lattimore  laid  down  a  policy  line  as  a  State  Department  con- 
sultant that  aided  the  Cliinese  Communists  and  "betrayed"  the  Chinese  Na- 
tionalists. 

The  Senator  had  called  a  press  conference  for  this  morning  at  the  Naval 
Medical  Center  in  nearby  Bethesda,  Md.,  where  he  is  undergoing  treatment  for 
a  sinus  condition.  But  after  about  20  reporters  arrived,  they  were  told  by 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  institution,  Capt.  R.  M.  Gillett,  U.  S.  N.,  that  Mr, 
McCarthy  was  "under  minor  surgical  procedure"  and  could  not  appear  before 
them  for  interviews  and  questions. 

Some  reporters  had  intended  to  ask  the  Senator  whether  he  wished  to  repeat 
off  the  Senate  floor,  and  thus  outside  his  congressional  immunity  from  suit  for 
libel,  the  charges  he  had  made  against  Professor  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Lattimore,  head  of  the  Walter  Hines  Page  School  of  International  Eela- 
tions  at  Johns  Ilopkins,  has  threatened,  through  his  lawyers,  to  sue  Senator 
McCarthy  if  given  an  opportunity  outside  the  area  of  immunity. 

The  Senator's  statement  asserted  in  substance  that  Secretary  of  State  Dean 
Acheson  had  not  been  truthful  in  saying  last  week  that  he  believed  he  had  never 
even  met  Professor  Lattimore. 

Mr.  McCarthy  declared  that  Drew  Pearson,  a  newspaper  columnist  and  one 
of  the  Secretary's  "very  loyal  friends,"  had  written  in  August  1945  that  Mr. 
Acheson  had  arranged  for  a  meeting  between  the  professor  and  President 
Truman. 

This  meeting,  Mr.  McCai'thy  said,  was  "for  the  purpose  of  weaning  Truman 
away  from  the  Byrnes-Grew  far-eastern  policy."  (He  was  referring  to  former 
Secretary  of  State  James  F.  Byrnes  and  former  Under  Secretary  Joseph  C. 
Gi*ew ) . 

"While  Lattimore  was  not  unsuccessful  in  convincing  Truman  at  that  par- 
ticular time,"  the  Senator  went  on,  "it  is  significant  that  very  shortly  after- 
ward both  Grew  and  Byrnes  left  the  State  Department  and  the  Acheson-Latti- 
more  crowd  took  complete  control." 

The  Senator  coupled  with  this  charge  that  Secretary  Acheson  had  not  con- 
ceded having  received  the  Lattimore  memorandum  "until  after  learning  that  I 
knew  the  contents." 

JESSUP  REPLIES  TO  CHABGE 

Tonight,  Ambassador  at  Large  Philip  C.  Jessup,  who  had  been  accused  by  Sen- 
ator McCarthy  of  "accepting"  contributions  for  the  American  Council  of  Institute 
of  Pacific  Relations  from  Frederick  Vanderbilt  Field,  denounced  this  as  a  false 
"insinuation"  that  the  council  was  "being  paid  to  peddle  the  Communist  Party 
line." 

Mr.  Jessup  declared  in  the  first  place  that  he  was  not,  as  alleged  by  Mr.  Mc- 
Carthy, largely  in  control  of  the  organization.  At  the  time  in  question,  1942  and 
1943,  the  Ambassador  added,  its  head  was  Dr.  Robert  Gordon  Sproul,  president 
of  the  University  of  California,  and  sponsors  for  a  drive  for  funds  included 
Henry  Luce,  the  magazine  publisher,  and  Juan  Trippe  of  Pan-American  Airways. 

Mr.  Field's  contributions  of  $3,500,  Mr.  Jessup  said,  were  part  of  $200,000 
taken  up,  much  of  it  from  the  Rockefeller  Foundation,  the  Carnegie  Corp.,  and 
large  industrial  concerns. 

Of  Messrs.  Luce  and  Trippe,  Ambassador  Jessup  observed : 

"Surely  these  gentlemen  would  never  have  accepted  payments  from  Mr.  Field 
or  anyone  else  for  'selling  the  Communist  Party  line.'  Neither  would  I  if  I  had 
been  in  control." 

Senator  McCarthy  had  called  Mr.  Field  a  known  Communist. 


Exhibit  No.  280-B 
[From  the  New  York  Times,  April  4,  1950] 

Text  of  Lattimore's  Memorandum  on  United  States  Far  Eastern  Policy 

Washington,  April  3  (AP). — Following  is  the  text  of  Owen  Lattimore's  mem- 
orandum on  United  States  policy  in  the  Far  East,  drafted  for  a  State  Department 
advisory  committee  last  August  and  made  public  today  by  Mr.  Lattimore : 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  929 

"In  clearing  the  way  for  a  fresh  approach  to  the  problems  of  United  States 
policy  in  the  Far  East,  several  negative  statements  can  usefully  be  made. 

"1.  The  type  of  policy  represented  by  support  for  Chiang  Kai-shek  does  more 
harm  than  good  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  and  no  modification  of  this 
policy  seems  promising.  Chiang  Kai-shek  was  a  unique  figure  in  Asia.  He  is 
now  fading  into  a  kind  of  eclipse  that  is  regrettably  damaging  to  the  prestige  of 
the  United  States,  because  the  United  States  supported  him.  His  eclipse  does 
not  even  leave  behind  the  moral  prestige  of  a  good  but  losing  fight  in  defense  of 
a  weak  cause. 

"On  the  contrary,  he  put  up  the  worst  possible  fight  in  defense  of  a  cause  that 
was  originally  strong  and  should  have  won.  The  kind  of  policy  that  failed  in 
support  of  so  great  a  figure  as  Chiang  Kai-shek  cannot  possibly  succeed  if  it  is 
applied  to  a  scattering  of  'little  Chiang  Kai-sheks'  in  China  or  elsewhere  in 
Asia. 

"2.  China  cannot  be  economically  coerced  by  such  measures  as  cutting  off  trade. 
Nothing  could  be  more  dangerous  for  the  American  interest  than  to  underestimate 
the  ability  of  the  Chinese  Communists  to  achieve  the  minimum  level  of  economic 
stability  that  will  make  their  regime  politically  secure.  Sound  policy  should 
allow  for  a  cautious  overestimate  of  the  ability  of  the  Chinese  Communists  in  this 
respect,  and  avoid  a  rash  underestimate. 

'•3.  It  is  not  possible  to  make  Japan  a  satisfactory  instrument  of  American 
policy.  There  are  two  alternatives  in  Japan.  The  first  alternative  is  to  keep 
Japan  alive  by  means  of  American  "blood  transfusions'  of  raw  materials  and 
credits.  Under  this  alternative  Japan  can  be  made  to  put  on  the  surface  appear- 
ance of  a  strong  ally ;  but  the  reality  will  be  an  overcommitment  of  American 
resources  to  a  distant  and  vulnerable  region. 

"Under  the  second  alternative  Japan  can  keep  herself  alive  by  coming  to  terms, 
economically  and  politically,  with  its  neighbors  in  Asia,  principally  China.  Under 
this  alternative  Japan  cannot  serve  as  a  trusted  American  ally.  Its  own  interests 
will  compel  it  to  balance  and  bargain  between  what  it  can  get  out  of  Asia  and 
what  it  can  get  out  of  America. 

"4.  South  Korea  is  more  of  a  liability  than  an  asset  to  the  interests  and  policy 
of  the  United  States.  It  is  doubtful  how  long  the  present  regime  in  South  Korea 
can  be  kept  alive,  and  mere  effort  to  keep  it  alive  is  a  bad  advertisement,  which 
continually  draws  attention  to  a  band  of  little  and  inferior  Chiang  Kai-shecks 
who  are  the  scorn  of  the  Communists  and  have  lost  the  respect  of  democratic 
and  would-be  democratic  groups  and  movements  throughout  Asia. 

"5.  The  colonial  and  quasi-colonial  countries  of  southeast  Asia  cannot  be  forced 
to  grant  priorities  to  the  economic  and  military  recovery  of  Europe  at  the 
expense  of  their  own  economic  and  political  interests.  In  this  region  as  a 
whole  there  is  a  rapid  development  of  combined  political  and  military  resistance 
to  coercion  which  can  be  indefinitely  sustained  by  local  resources.  On  the 
other  hand,  attempts  at  reconquest  by  European  countries  are  so  expensive  that 
they  defeat  their  own  ultimate  purpose,  which  is  the  strengthening  of  the  country 
attempting  the  reconquest. 

"The  situation  can  now  be  handled  only  by  convincing  the  Nationalist  leaders 
in  those  countries  that  any  sacrifices  they  are  asked  to  make  are  matched  by 
sacrifices  made  by  their  former  or  titular  rulers,  and  are  not  designed  to  give 
priority  to  the  interests  of  these  rulers,  but  to  bring  joint  benefits  both  to  the 
ruling  countries  and  to  the  colonial  country,  on  terms  that  satisfy  the  colonial 
aspiration  to  equality. 

"6.  The  United  States  cannot  assume  that  Russia  will  move  in  to  take  over 
direct  control  in  China,  and  will  thus  be  subjected  to  heavy  strategic  and 
economic  strains.  It  is  dangerous  to  assume  that  there  will  be  a  diversion  and 
commitment  of  Russian  resources  in  Asia  which  will  limit  Russian  ability  to 
maneuver  in  Europe.  Recent  developments  in  the  Far  East  have  been  favorable 
to  Russia,  but  not  in  a  way  that  lessens  the  resources  that  Russia  can  deploy 
toward  Europe. 

"Policy  toward  Russia  and  policy  toward  the  Far  East  meet  at  the  point  where 
such  a  move  as  the  imposition  of  an  economic  cordon  sanitaire  around  China 
is  considered.  Such  a  move  would  increase  Chinese  dependence  on  Russia ;  but 
it  would  probably  not  make  it  necessary  for  Russia  to  undertake  a  large-scale 
program  in  China.  The  Russians  would  get  credit  in  Asia,  multiplied  by 
propaganda,  for  any  grants  they  might  make  to  China,  but  would  probably 
not  have  to  make  grants  large  enough  to  distort  or  strain  their  own  resources, 
"It  would  be  possible,  therefore,  if  the  mistake  is  made  of  waiting  for  the 
Chinese  Communists  to  come  hat  in  hand  to  ask  for  American  terms,  for  United 


930  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

States  policy  to  encounter  another  set-back  in  Asia,  without  even  the  compensating 
advantage  of  hampering  Russia's  ability  to  apply  pressure  in  Europe. 

"The  foregoing  statement  defines  negative  aspects  of  the  situation  in  Asia, 
limiting  the  freedom  of  maneuver  of  United  States  policy.  Within  these  limita- 
tions, it  seems  advisable  that  a  number  of  positive  objectives  should  be  defined. 

"1.  Policy  in  the  Far  East  and  policy  toward  Russia  have  a  bearing  on  each 
other.  It  certainly  cannot  yet  be  said,  however,  that  armed  warfare  against 
communism  in  the  Far  East,  on  a  scale  involving  a  major  commitment  of  Amer- 
ican resources,  has  become  either  unavoidable  or  positively  desirable.  Nor  can 
it  be  said  with  any  assurance  that,  in  the  event  of  an  "armed  conflict  imdertaken 
for  the  purpose  of  forcing  Russia  back  from  Europe,  the  Far  East  would  be  an 
optimum  field  of  operation. 

"There  are  still  two  alternatives  before  us — a  relatively  long  peace,  or  a  rapid 
approach  toward  war.  If  there  is  to  be  war,  it  can  only  be  won  by  defeating 
Russia — not  Northern  Korea,  or  Viet  Nam,  or  even  China.  Sound  policy  should 
therefore  avoid  premature  or  excessive  strategic  deployment  in  the  Far  East. 

"If  there  is  to  be  a  long  peace,  the  primary  factor  in  making  peace  possible  will 
be  a  stabilization  of  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Russia,  Sound 
policy  should  therefore  maintain  a  maximum  flexibility.  If  and  when  negotiated 
and  mutually  acceptable  agreements  with  Russia  become  possible,  American 
policy  in  the  Far  East  should  be  in  a  position  to  contribute  to  Russo-American 
negotiations.  It  should  not  be  so  mired  down  in  local  situations  that  direct 
American-Russian  negotiations  are  actually  hampered. 

"2.  Any  new  departures  in  United  States  policy  in  the  Far  East  must  be  able 
to  fend  off  any  accusation  of  'appeasement'  of  local  or  Russian  communism. 
In  view  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  Russian  issue  as  a  weapon  in  in-fighting  in 
American  party  politics,  it  would  seem  that  the  advice  of  experts  on  domestic 
politics  should  be  coordinated  with  the  opinions  of  those  who  are  consulted  on 
foreign  policy. 

"The  dilemma  is  simple,  but  not  easy  to  solve;  but  unless  it  can  be  solved, 
no  successful  United  States  policy  in  the  Far  East  is  possible.  Any  United 
States  policy  that  is  interpreted  in  various  countries  in  the  Far  East  as  pressure 
applied  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  league  against  Russia  will  merely  increase 
the  ability  of  those  countries  to  bargain  with  both  the  United  States  and  Russia. 

"It  will  also  increase  the  identification,  in  those  countries,  between  local 
nationalism  and  local  communism.  On  the  other  hand,  any  proposed  United 
States  policy  in  the  Far  East  that  is  attacked  in  America  itself  as  a  bid  for 
better  relations  with  Russia  runs  the  danger  of  being  defeated. 

"3.  The  success  of  United  States  policy  in  the  Far  East  will  be  measured 
largely  by  the  contribution  that  it  makes  to  the  recovery  of  economic  relations 
between  the  Far  East  and  Europe.  This^recovery  will  be  possible  only  if  the 
assent  and  good  will  of  the  far  eastern  countries  are  won. 

"Assent  and  real  cooperation,  in  turn,  can  only  be  won  if  the  representatives  of 
the  far-eastern  countries,  including  those  that  are  still  technically  the  subjects 
of  European  countries,  are  convinced  that  they  have  as  direct  access  to  the 
highest  American  authorities  as  do  the  European  representatives,  and  if  they  are 
convinced  that  their  economic  needs  and  political  standards  are  not  being  given 
a  second  priority,  lower  than  that  of  the  European  countries  involved  in  the 
same  negotiations. 

"The  two  test  cases  in  southeast  Asia  on  which  the  leaders  of  various  nation- 
alist movements  will  rate  the  difi'erence  between  what  can  be  attained  tlirough 
friendly  association  with  representatives  of  the  United  States  and  what  can  be 
attained  through  outright  defiance  of  a  European  country  which  has  strong 
economic  support  from  the  United  States  are  Indonesia  and  the  Viet  Nam  regime 
under  Ho  Chi  Minh. 

"If  the  negotiations  between  Dutch  and  Indonesians,  brought  about  largely 
through  benevolent  United  States  pressure,  eventuate  in  a  settlement  which 
seems,  in  Indonesia,  to  contain  too  much  of  hope  deferred,  while  the  resistance 
in  Indochina  under  Ho  Chi  Minh  achieves  more  and  more  of  hope  fulfilled, 
the  results  throughout  southeast  Asia  will  be  adverse  to  the  United  States  in- 
terest. 

"Heavy  and  primary  United  States  commitments  in  Western  Europe  makes 
it  diflicult  to  bear  constantly  in  mind  that  when  the  Dutch-Indonesian  negotia- 
tions are  consummated,  the  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction  of  popular  opinion  in 
Indonesia,  will  have  wider  repercussions  tlian  the  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction 
of  Dutch  public  opinion. 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  931 

"It  is  a  fact,  nevertheless,  that  Indonesian  opinion  is  more  difficult  to  satisfy 
than  Dutch  opinion,  and  it  is  also  a  fact  that  the  rei^ercussions  will  be  more 
serious  if  Indonesian  opinion  is  not  satislied  than  if  Dutch  opinion  is  not  satis- 
fied. These  facts  mark  an  important  difference  between  prewar  and  postwar 
colonial  Asia.  They  are  facts  that  Americans  fully  accepted;  but  they  are 
also  facts  that  are  critical  for  the  formulation  of  an  over-all  United  States 
policy  in  Asia. 

"4.  The  foregoing  considerations  indicate  that  the  major  aim  of  United  States 
policy  in  the  Far  East  should  be  to  convince  the  countries  of  the  Far  East  that 
they  can  get  along  well  with  the  United  States  and  with  the  countries  of 
Western  Europe.  They  must  be  persuaded  that  they  can  get  along  well  because 
of  the  mutual  benetits  to  themselves,  to  the  United  States,  and  to  "Western  Eu- 
rope. 

"They  must  not  be  made  to  suspect  that  the  real  aim  of  the  United  States 
is  an  ulterior  aim  of  using  them  against  Russia. 

To  put  it  in  another  way,  the  aim  of  the  United  States  policy  should  be  to 
enable  the  countries  of  the  Far  East  to  do  without  Russia  to  the  maximum  ex- 
tent. 

This  is  a  much  more  modest  aim  than  an  insistence  on  and  organization  of 
hostility  to  Russia ;  but  it  is  an  attainable  aim,  and  the  other  is  not. 

"A  few  suggestions  for  implementation  are  appended. 

"1.  Conferences  with  tlie  independent  governments  of  the  Far  East,  on 
the  basis  of  helping  them  to  build  their  own  economies,  to  revive  their  trade 
with  Europe,  and  to  expand  their  trade  with  us.  Emphasis  on  positive  steps 
that  can  be  taken.  No  negative  conditions,  such  as  prohibitions  of  trade  with 
Russia  or  Communist  China ;  no  conditions  that  could  be  interpreted  as  Amer- 
ican regulation  of  their  political  parties. 

"2.  Working  relations,  and  a  refusal  to  be  bound  by  a  protocol,  with  legitimate 
nationalist  leaders  in  countries  whose  full  political  aspirations  have  not  been 
met  by  their  European  rulers. 

"3.  The  United  States  should  not  allow  any  European  country,  in  its  relations 
with  any  country  in  the  Far  Elast,  to  state  openly  or  to  imply  by  propaganda 
that  its  iwlicy  is  'backed  by  the  United  States.'  European  representatives,  in 
negotiating  with  the  representatives  of  countries  in  Asia,  should  be  discouraged 
from  stating  or  implying  that  they  are  authoritative  interpreters  of  United 
States  policy,  or  intermediaries  without  whom  the  United  States  cannot  be 
approached. 

"4.  It  should  be  made  clear  that  if  there  is  delay  or  difficulty  In  establishing 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Communist-controlled  countries,  such  as 
China,  the  trouble  comes  from  the  Communist  side  and  not  from  the  United 
States  side. 

"5.  It  should  be  made  clear  that  friendly  and  beneficial  relations  with  the 
United  States  depend  essentially  on  the  inherent  friendliness  or  unfriendliness 
of  the  nation  concerned,  and  not  on  the  formalities  of  diplomatic  recognition. 
In  order  to  facilitate  the  contrast  between  countries  which  are  on  friendly  terms 
with  the  United  States  and  countries  which  are  not,  the  number  of  countries 
formally  recognized  by  the  United  States  should  be  increased. 

"As  a  first  step,  tlie  United  States  should  accept  the  list  of  countries  recom- 
mended for  admission  to  the  United  Nations  by  Mr.  Tryg\'e  Lie,  Secretary- 
General  of  the  United  Nations.  In  the  first  place,  it  would  at  this  time  be  a 
good  move  for  the  United  States  to  accept  with  good  will  an  initiative  from 
the  Secretariat  of  the  United  Nations.  In  the  second  place,  the  list  is  on  balance 
more  favorable  to  the  United  States  than  to  the  Soviet  Union.  In  the  third  place, 
and  with  particular  reference  to  the  Far  East,  the  move  would  bring  within  the 
scope  of  United  States  diplomatic  activity  the  Mongolian  People's  Republic 
(Outer  Mongolia),  an  increasingly  important  potential  listening-post  country 
in  the  heart  of  Asia. 

"6.  The  United  States  should  disembarrass  itself  as  quickly  as  possible  of  its 
entanglements  in  South  Korea." 

Mr.  Morris.  Are  you  acquainted  with  the  views  expressed  by  Latti- 
more  in  the  record  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROvE.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  you  have  read  this  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes,  I  have  read  that  memoranda.  That  memo- 
randa covers  many  of  the  points  that  Mr.  Lattimore  made  in  the  con- 


932  INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS 

ference.  The  memoranda  among  other  things  calls  for  liquidation 
of  American  responsibilities  in  Korea.  That  was  a  point  which  Mr. 
Lattimore  made  during  the  conference.  This  was  in  October  1949. 
Professor  Lattimore  took  the  position  of  prompt  recognition  of  Red 
China.  He  was  very  careful  to  say  we  should  bargain  with  them 
when  we  were  doing  it,  but  nevertheless  we  should  recognize  them. 

Professor  Lattimore  was  opposed  to  dividing  economic  aid  in  Asia. 
He  wanted  to  give  economic  aid  to  Communist  countries  equally  with 
non-Communist  countries. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  you  hear  expressed  at  the  conference,  Professor, 
a  sentiment  as  to  the  disposition  of  Formosa  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Governor  Stassen  made  a  very  strong  appeal  to  de- 
fend Formosa  to  the  letter.  I  said  something  on  that  subject  myself. 
I  particularly  commended  the  acceptance  of  General  MacArthur's 
concept  of  what  is  now  called  the  MacArthur  line,  namely  from  Ko- 
rea, Formosa,  Okinawa,  the  Philippines,  and  around  to  Hawaii. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Doctor,  do  you  know  that  on  October  26,  if  that 
is  the  exact  date,  1949,  the  State  Department  sent  a  message  to  the 
Nationalist  government  in  China  notifying  them  they  would  not  give 
them  any  more  military  aid? 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  Wlien  did  you  learn  that  ? 

Mr.  CoLEGRO\"E.  I  didn't  learn  that  until  I  saw  that  in  the  news- 
papers. 

Senator  Ferguson.  That  was  after  this  meeting? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  That  was  shortly  after  this  meeting. 

Senator  Ferguson.  So  the  policy  was  really  laid  down  before  you 
went  to  this  meeting  as  far  as  Formosa  was  concerned  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes. 

Senator  Ferguson.  In  your  opinion,  with  respect  to  Formosa  and 
breaking  the  so-called  MacArthur  line  they  were  therefore  aiding 
the  Communists  of  China  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes.  Specifically^  Governor  Stassen  has  spent  a 
good  deal  of  time  on  maintaining  Formosa  and  I  believe — I  am  speak- 
ing without  any  record  here — I  believe  that  Joseph  Ballantine  said 
something  on  that  subject  that  is  favorable  to  holding  Formosa. 

Mr,  Morris.  Professor,  did  General  Marshall  attend  that  confer- 
ence ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes,  General  Marshall  was  present  at  every  session. 
He  was  one  of  the  first  ones  there. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  take  part  in  this  discussion  at  all  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  No.  General  Marshall  sat  in  the  same  seat  at  the 
end  of  the  room,  not  at  the  conference  table,  about  5  feet  from  the 
end  of  the  conference  table,  opposite  Ambassador  Jessup. 

Mr.  Morris.  And  was  he  sitting  near  Owen  Lattimore? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  He  was  about  5  feet  away  from  Owen  Lattimore. 

Mr.  Morris.  Did  he  hear  Owen  Lattimore  express  his  views  on 
those  occasions? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  assume  he  heard  Owen  Lattimore  talk  the  13  or 
14  times. 

Mr.  Morris.  Thirteen  or  fourteen  times  Lattimore  spoke? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  Yes. 

Mr.  Morris.  Now  could  you  testify  whether  or  not  Rosinger  had 
an  active  part  in  this  conference  ? 


INSTITUTE   OF   PACIFIC   RELATIONS  933 

Mr.  CoLEGROVE.  Not  as  active  a  part  as  Owen  Lattimore.  He  spoke 
probably  six  times,  and  all  of  his  speeches,  his  comments,  were  very 
favorable  to  Red  China. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  the  record  should  show  that  we 
have  had  testimony  in  the  past  that  Benjamin  Kizer  and  John  K.  Fair- 
bank,  whom  Professor  Colegrove  has  included  with  this  group  domi- 
nated by  Lattimore,  to  the  effect  that  both  of  those  were  members  of 
the  Communist  Party  also. 

How  many  times  did  you  speak  at  that  conference,  Professor  Cole- 
grove  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  believe  I  spoke  about  8,  9,  or  10  times. 

Mr.  Morris.  Mr.  Chairman,  in  view  of  the  line  of  questioning 
developed  by  Senator  Eastland  on  the  importance  of  the  actual  prepa- 
ration of  the  letter  of  transmittal  on  the  white  paper,  I  was  wonder- 
ing if  you  thought  it  necessary  that  we  should  ask  the  State  Depart- 
ment for  the  facts  behind  that  letter  of  transmittal. 

The  Chairman.  I  shall  be  very  glad  to  write  a  letter.  I  may  not 
be  able  to  get  any  more  information  than  I  have,  however. 

Senator  Ferguson.  I  move,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  you  do  write  a 
letter,  that  we  keep  on  trying,  because  I  thinly  this  is  so  vital  to  the 
Congress  and  to  the  people  that  we  should  not  be  discouraged. 

Professor  Colegrove,  have  you  anything  further  to  say  about  the 
letter  of  transmittal  ? 

Mr.  Colegrove.  I  objected  to  that  letter  of  transmittal  because  of 
the  bland  statement  that  the  white  paper  had  given  all  of  the  evidence 
and  presented  a  very  unbiased  view  of  it.  It  was  very  obvious  that 
it  had  not  given  all  the  evidence.  Even  the  Wedemeyer  report  was 
slightly  expurgated  as  published  by  the  State  Department.  All  rec- 
ords as  to  Korea  were  pulled  out  of  that  report  and  it  did  not  have 
the  Wallace  report  in  it.  I  felt  that  the  State  Department  had  glossed 
over  the  trouble  between  the  State  Department  and  General  Hurley. 
They  had  not  given  both  sides  of  that  story. 

What  I  objected  most  strongly  to  in  the  letter  of  transmittal  was  the 
argument  that  the  letter  made  in  favor  of  our  policy,  favored  by  with- 
drawing help  to  Chiang  Kai-shek,  and  glossing  over  what  help  we  had 
given  the  Chinese  Reds,  and  in  particular  that  paragraph  at  the  end 
where  the  State  Department  sums  up,  in  which  it  says  that  the  United 
States  Government  had  done  everything  that  was  possible  to  save  the 
Nationalist  government  and  that  the  United  States  had  left  undone 
everything  that  would  have  been  helpful  to  Red  China. 

Senator  Eastland.  Do  you  not  really  think  the